Communicating State Repression to the International Community: A Case Study of How China Frames Its Policies in Xinjiang Online

Although previous research on the correlates of political repression has found a negative linear relationship between democracy and repression, we maintain that the relationship is more complex. We focus instead on the role of threats as a key precipitant to political repression and contend that scholars should attend to both non-linearities in analyses of political repression as well as Fein's (1995) argument that states with intermediate levels of democracy (ie semi-democracies) are more likely to be repressive. Such an orientation leads us to hypothesise that there is an inverted U relationship between regime type and political repression. In this article we examine this relationship for 91 less developed countries over the period 1979-92. The findings support the thesis and indicate that: (1) the level of threat is positively and significantly associated with political repression;(2) the level of threat has a greater impact than regime type on the likelihood of political repression; and (3) controlling for the level of threat, less developed states with intermediate levels of democracies--semi-democracies--have the highest levels of political repression.

Turning Points in the Historiography of Jewish Immigration from Arab Countries to Israel Esther Meir-Glitzenstein (bio) INTRODUCTION The twentieth century was characterized by mass immigration waves and the establishment of numerous nation-states. Israeli history is considered particularly unique for containing a simultaneous convergence of these phenomena. Israel's population doubled following its establishment, as the State absorbed Jews from European and Arab countries by the hundreds of thousands. These immigrants became the human infrastructure upon which the new nation was built, and marked the "genesis" of Israeli society. Given the complexity and significance of this phenomenon, it is no wonder the subject has become a source of both nostalgia and widespread contention. The article concerns Jewish immigration to Israel from Arab countries through the prism of historical research, with specific focus on major turning points within this historiography. It does not aim for an exhaustive representation of research literature on the subject, nor mention studies on the integration of immigrants into Israeli society and the progression of the ethnic conflict in Israel, as each of these topics merits its own discussion. JEWISH IMMIGRATION FROM ARAB COUNTRIES From the declaration of statehood in May of 1948 until the end of 1951, 700,000 new immigrants, half of whom hailed from Europe and half from Arab countries, joined the 650,000 Jews that had been residing in pre-state [End Page 114] Israel. The first to arrive were Holocaust survivors from displaced persons camps in Germany and Cyprus, and Eastern European Jews from Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. The mass immigration from Arab countries began in mid-1949 and included three communities that relocated to Israel almost in their entirety: 31,000 Jews from Libya, 50,000 from Yemen, and 125,000 from Iraq. Additional immigrants arrived from Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Iran, India, and elsewhere. Within three years, the Jewish population of Israel doubled. The ethnic composition of the population shifted as well, as immigrants from Muslim counties and their offspring now comprised one third of the Jewish population—an unprecedented phenomenon in global immigration history. From 1952–60, Israel regulated and restricted immigration from Muslim countries with a selective immigration policy based on economic criteria, and sent these immigrants, most of whom were North African, to peripheral Israeli settlements. The selective immigration policy ended in 1961 when, following an agreement between Israel and Morocco, about 100,000 Jews immigrated to the State. From 1952–68 about 600,000 Jews arrived in Israel, three quarters of whom were from Arab countries and the remaining immigrants were largely from Eastern Europe. Today fewer than 30,000 remain in Muslim countries, mostly concentrated in Iran and Turkey. This immigration process thoroughly altered the map of the Jewish-Mizrahi diaspora: its vast majority is now based in Israel, with a small minority in France, Britain, the US, Canada, and others. THE ZIONIST NARRATIVE REGARDING IMMIGRATION FROM ARAB COUNTRIES Discourse on the immigration from Arab countries developed in real time. The Israeli State explained it in apocalyptic terms as the realization of the "End of Days" prophecy regarding Jewish redemption in Zion, the result of 2,000-year-old religious-messianic longing. This explanation was widely accepted within and beyond Israel, being rooted in an ancient redemption myth familiar not only to Jews but to all monotheistic religions. The association of the immigration with a biblical prophecy, and the fact that these Jewish communities dated back to the First Temple period, corroborated Zionist claims regarding Jewish historical continuity and the right of Jews to return to Eretz Israel and establish a sovereign state. However, parallel to this discourse, and to great degree in contrast to it, immigration from Arab countries was also discussed as a reaction to antisemitism and [End Page 115] political persecution, and a solution to socio-economic crises. Jewish life in Arab countries was described as life atop an active volcano, and the massive immigration to Israel was therefore the spontaneous and predictable reaction of Jews who had simply suffered enough. This discourse became a formative part of the Israeli ethos, one that found its way to the center of public school curricula and to every sphere...

Political Repression and Violent Rebellion in the Muslim World

This article explores the relationship between key economic development indicators and the occurrence of violent civil conflicts. It examines public policy failures and mistakes which link with onset of conflicts. Two sets of 160 countries are included to empirically analyse the determinants of conflicts. This analysis extends to two distinctive subsets of Muslim countries. The paper establishes that the classification procedure of violent conflicts matters—varying classifications offer dissimilar values to similar predictors. Here, our conclusions are contrary to the much emphasized ‘greed motivation’ to rebel, which dismisses strong linkages of ‘grievances’ like low income, economic development failures and political repression with intrastate violent conflicts. The paper also infers limitations in country level data—which cross-country studies employ—income and unemployment data are non-reflective of conflict regions and of horizontal inequalities. We stress region and country specific research.

Over the past two decades, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has profoundly reshaped Turkey’s political and social landscape, influencing the country more than any leader since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern republic. Becoming prime minister in 2003 and president in 2014, Erdoğan was initially praised for his economic reforms and negotiations with the European Union, positioning Turkey as a model of democracy in the Islamic world. However, his path has been marked by an authoritarian drift, characterized by control over the press, undermining the independence of the judiciary, and suppressing the opposition. The 2016 coup attempt accelerated the consolidation of power, transforming the presidency into a dominant executive role. A recent example is the 2025 arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, on terrorism and corruption charges, which triggered massive protests and criticism from the European Union and Western allies. This paper analyzes how Turkey under Erdoğan evolved from a promising democracy to an authoritarian regime, examining the role of the instrumentalization of Islam and political repression. By exploring the historical context, the stages of the regime’s evolution, and the impact on democracy, the paper investigates the tension between the democratic aspirations of Turkish society and the authoritarian temptation that defines the country’s present.

Historically, all cultural, geographical and political names, descriptions, definitions etc. clearly reflect intense categorization, political prejudice, cultural bias, and in general ‘otherization’ to a certain extent. Orientalism, as an influential political-cultural tradition, unambiguously reveals discriminating and arrogant Western stance regarding the rest of the world, particularly the ‘East’ and the Islamic world. This general trend, as a mainstream tradition, can easily be observed within the context of historical Western approach towards the using of the term ‘Middle East’. This paper aims at reviewing the term of ‘Middle East’ as an outcome of the Orientalist perspective both in cultural and political terms, and emphasizes the importance of using alternative ‘regionalist’ terms and concepts to describe the region’s contemporary realities.

This paper empirically evaluates four types of costs that may result from an international sovereign default: reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities. It finds that the economic costs are generally significant but short-lived, and sometimes do not operate through conventional channels. The political consequences of a debt crisis, by contrast, seem to be particularly dire for incumbent governments and finance ministers, broadly in line with what happens in currency crises.

Since introducing a series of domestic regulations and laws related to sanctions in 2019, China has increasingly employed formal sanctions against foreign actors over the past six years while still relying on its old-style informal sanctions approach. This study investigates the conditions under which China opts for formal versus informal sanctions and explores the synergistic effects of multiple factors shaping its choice. To address these questions, it develops an integrated analytical framework that incorporates both internal and external factors and formulates four research hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested using multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis based on a unique dataset comprising 67 cases of China’s sanctions from January 2019 to December 2024. The findings reveal that high-stakes issues and China’s relationship with the target are the primary stimuli for formal sanctions. In particular, when the United States and its allies challenge China’s core interests—especially those concerning China’s Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan—Beijing tends to impose formal sanctions. However, these sanctions are targeted in nature, limited in scope, and largely expressive or symbolic. Conversely, when other actors challenge China over either low- or high-stakes issues, China is more likely to resort to informal methods and impose greater economic costs on the target. By further incorporating the dimension of intensity into the analysis of China’s two-tiered sanctions policy, this study demonstrates how Beijing pursues a cautious balancing strategy to signal resolve while minimizing economic, geopolitical, and reputational costs.

Direct, difficult questions (e.g., Do you have other offers? How much did you make in your prior job?) pose a challenge. Respondents may incur economic costs for honestly revealing information, reputational costs for engaging in deception, and interpersonal costs, including harm to perceptions of trust and likability, for directly declining to answer the question (e.g., I would rather not answer that question). Across four experiments, we explore the relative economic and interpersonal consequences of a fourth approach: Deflection, answering a direct question with another question. We contrast deflection with other types of responses and show that deflection can mitigate the economic costs of honest answers, the reputational costs of engaging in deception, and the interpersonal costs of directly declining to answer a question. Paradoxically, deflection works by invoking the same Gricean norm, the norm of answering a direction question that deflection violates.

This paper evaluates empirically four types of cost that may result from an international sovereign default: reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities. It finds that the economic costs are generally significant but short-lived, and sometimes do not operate through conventional channels. The political consequences of a debt crisis, by contrast, seem to be particularly dire for incumbent governments and finance ministers, broadly in line with what happens in currency crises.

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy.Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.This paper evaluates empirically four types of cost that may result from an international sovereign default: reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities.It finds that the economic costs are generally significant but short-lived, and sometimes do not operate through conventional channels.The political consequences of a debt crisis, by contrast, seem to be particularly dire for incumbent governments and finance ministers, broadly in line with what happens in currency crises.

There is a tendency for research on state repression to focus on nondemocratic and non-Western states. The authors assume that all states are repressive and focus on state repression in Northern Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom. They also distinguish between the repressive activities of state authorities and the repressive activities of individual state agents. In general, they uncover important differences in state repression as perpetrated by state authorities versus state repression as perpetrated by individual state agents. The authors also find that the ethnic minority population in this Western democracy was more likely to suffer from state repression than was the ethnic majority population, and they find that state repression was strongly influenced by economic conditions.

Mental Health Issues and Substance Abuse in the Ethiopian Community Diaspora: Economic Costs, Public Health Perspective and Policy Prahlad Kasturi, Reethi N. Iyengar, Alemayehu Haile Abstract In this review paper, we estimate the percent of the US population represented by Ethiopian immigrants to be very small at about .015 percent of the total. Many Ethiopians fled their home country due to famine, violence and political repression. Many have experienced culture shock and an adjustment of their status in migrating to a new land. Thus, the likelihood of developing psychological problems has been and continues to be very high. In the literature, we found the most common mental problems encountered by Ethiopian immigrants to be somatic illnesses, depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorders, and suicides. A significant number of Ethiopian immigrants also have issues of substance abuse related to alcoholism and drugs. Thus, the community faces a significant mental health burden. We relied on previous survey studies done in the United States and Canada to get an understanding of the types of mental health problems experienced by the community. There is under-utilization of mental health services by the Ethiopian community under the current provisioning of healthcare. We estimate the appropriate level of mental health expenditures for the Ethiopian immigrants to be $20 million pro-rated based on US national per capita mental health expenditures while accounting for the extent of under-utilization of such services. The role of stigma, traditional beliefs, prejudices and superstitions regarding mental illness, access and affordability account for the under-utilization of mental health services. We offer public health perspectives, policy options and suggestions for future research direction based on our review of the literature. Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jeds.v2n4a2

This study attempts to measure the intensity of terrorism in the provinces level of the Islamic economies. The main idea of this study is to quantify the terrorism score at the state level of Islamic countries to gauge the terrorism intensity of that particular state in a particular period of time for that economy. The intuition is based on the logic that the economic cost and intensity terrorism is not uniform within a country. Some areas may have more intensity of terrorism than others in the same territory of a country. The application of the TEIE index (Khan and Yusof in Qual Quant, 2016b. doi: 10.1007/s11135-016-0336-z ) to Islamic countries (Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria) of the provinces/states confirms that terrorism intensity to measure economic cost is not uniform in the provinces of Islamic countries and it also confirms that geographical dimensions of terrorism are heterogeneous with in one country. Terrorism intensity fluctuates across the provinces of the Islamic countries. The idea of this research study gives a more realistic approach to the policy makers for the curb of terrorism. Anti-terrorism one-fit policy within one country is not appropriate and should be decentralized according to the magnitude of terrorism score at the state level. Furthermore, this study is not only useful for the information of terrorism score of a particular state, but at the same time, it is very important from economic perspective to utilize the scare resource for terrorism measures according to the intensity of terrorism of a state of an economy.

Looking at the Muslim world today, it is hard to recall that the Arab heartland was not on ly a major contributor to world culture during its early golden age, but that it also experi enced a later liberal age, roughly 1800-1948, in which modernists helped to bring about societal transformations. (The classic works in this area are by the late Mar shall Hodgson and the late Albert Hourani.) One can forget, too, that in the early modem era, the empires of the Ottoman Turks, the Safavid Persians, and the Mughal Indians were regional powers, albeit more vulnerable actors in the emerging capitalist world-sys tem. The dar ul (literally, the house of Islam) has changed dramatically since then, experiencing decline not only in political power but also-especially in relation to Eu rope, its one-time rival-in social, economic, and cultural development. One homegrown response to the crisis of identity and power has been the Islamic fundamentalist move ment and its political offshoot, with its slo gan, Islam is the solution. But this has only contributed to further upheaval in Muslim majority countries. A group of Arab intellec tuals brought together by the United Nations Development Programme to produce a series of reports has determined that stagnation or crisis in the Arab region lies in three deficits: the democracy deficit, the knowledge deficit, and the women's empowerment deficit. (This analysis certainly can be broadened to en compass countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh.) Over several decades, factors such as political unrest, repression, and lack of economic opportunity have engendered emigration from the Maghreb (North Africa), Mashreq (Arab countries of the Middle East), Iran, Turkey, and South Asia. And in recent years, those immigrants have become the subject of intense public debates about inte gration, exclusion, and cultural rights-espe cially in Europe, where the largest popula tions are concentrated. The three books under review address these developments, crises, and debates from different disciplinary vantage points. Man soor Moaddel provides the historical dimen sion and broad sociological analysis of what When and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States, by Jocelyne Cesari. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2006. 280pp. $24.95 paper. ISBN: 1403971463.