Dictator Game Research Articles

Distributive Behavior Differences Between Ingroup and Outgroup and the Influence of Inhibitory Control and Intelligence on Preschoolers’ Distributive Behavior

Objectives: The purpose of this study was to investigate the patterns and characteristics of distributive behavior in preschoolers, influence of inhibitory control and intelligence on the distributive behavior, and associations between them.Methods: The data was collected through a one-on-one interview experiment with 328 children aged 3–5 years old attending daycare centers and kindergartens. The distributive behavior was measured by modifying the procedure of the dictator game. Children’s cognitive and emotional inhibitory control (IC) were assessed using the day-night task and the reverse compensation task respectively. The intelligence was assessed using the K-WPPSI short form test. Pearson's correlation, paired samples t-test, one-way ANOVA, McNemar test, multiple regression, and the verification of mediation were performed to analyze the dataResults: First, there were differences among boys in resource allocation according to the type of group (in-group vs. outgroup). That is, boys aged four and five gave more resources to classmates rather than anonymous children. Second, cognitive IC and performance intelligence were associated with distributive behavior towards anonymous children. However, only performance intelligence was related to the children’s distributive behavior towards their classmates. Lastly, performance intelligence was completely mediated in the association between cognitive IC and distributive behavior towards anonymous children.Conclusion: We provide empirical evidence that cognitive IC and thinking skills necessary for performance intelligence were related to distributive behavior towards outgroup. In particular, boys aged four and five tended to consider more social relations in distributive behavior. This may be useful information for teaching altruism and sharing in early childhood.

Do Empathic Individuals Behave More Prosocially? Neural Correlates for Altruistic Behavior in the Dictator Game and the Dark Side of Empathy.

Do empathic individuals behave more prosocially? When we think of highly empathic individuals, we tend to assume that it is likely that those people will also help others. Most theories on empathy reflect this common understanding and claim that the personality trait empathy includes the willingness to help others, but it remains a matter of debate whether empathic individuals really help more. In economics, a prominent demonstration that our behavior is not always based on pure self-interest is the Dictator Game, which measures prosocial decisions in an allocation task. This economic game shows that we are willing to give money to strangers we do not know anything about. The present study aimed to test the relationship between dispositional empathy and prosocial acting by examining the neural underpinnings of prosocial behavior in the Dictator Game. Forty-one participants played different rounds of the Dictator Game while being scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Brain activation in the right temporoparietal junction area was associated with prosocial acting (number of prosocial decisions) and associated with empathic concern. Behavioral results demonstrated that empathic concern and personal distress predicted the number of prosocial decisions, but in a negative way. Correlations with the amount of money spent did not show any significant relationships. We discuss the results in terms of group-specific effects of affective empathy. Our results shed further light on the complex behavioral and neural mechanisms driving altruistic choices.

An investigation of children's empathic dispositions and behaviours across seven countries

AbstractThis study examined individual influences on child empathy, the relationship between child and parent empathy, and the relationship between empathy and prosociality across seven countries. A large sample of children (N = 792, 49% female) from the ages of 6–10 years completed a situational empathy task, as well as a dictator game to assess prosociality. The questionnaire of cognitive and affective empathy was used to assess parents' and children's empathic dispositions. Children participated from Canada, China, Colombia, Jordan, South Africa, Turkey, and the United States. Situational empathy, empathic disposition, and prosociality were all positively associated with age. Boys displayed less situational empathy and lower empathic disposition than girls. Parental empathic disposition predicted the same dispositions in children but were not related to children's situational empathy or prosociality. No association was found between child prosociality and child empathic disposition. Overall, the results suggest similar ontologies of empathic disposition and situational empathy across countries.

Between Joy and Sympathy: Smiling and Sad Recipient Faces Increase Prosocial Behavior in the Dictator Game.

In human interactions, the facial expression of a bargaining partner may contain relevant information that affects prosocial decisions. We were interested in whether facial expressions of the recipient in the dictator game influence dictators’ behavior. To test this, we conducted an online study (n = 106) based on a modified version of a dictator game. The dictators allocated money between themselves and another person (recipient), who had no possibility to respond to the dictator. Importantly, before the allocation decision, the dictator was presented with the facial expression of the recipient (angry, disgusted, sad, smiling, or neutral). The results showed that dictators sent more money to recipients with sad or smiling facial expressions and less to recipients with angry or disgusted facial expressions compared with a neutral facial expression. Moreover, based on the sequential analysis of the decision and the interaction partner in the preceding trial, we found that decision-making depends upon previous interactions.

Third-party punishment promotes fairness in children.

Third-party punishment can promote fair behavior. However, the mechanisms by which this happens are unclear. Third-party punishment may increase fair behavior by providing direct feedback, helping shape the behavior of those punished, or through an influence on reputation, by encouraging the transgressor to behave appropriately before a third-party audience. Investigating whether and how third-party punishment leads to fairness in children during middle childhood-a key developmental period in the emergence of fairness-presents an ideal context in which to explore these 2 mechanisms. Six to nine-year-old children (N = 121) allocated resources between themselves and a partner in a forced-choice dictator game. In the Direct Feedback condition, a third party punished if the child chose the less fair option. In the Reputation condition, a third party merely observed the child. In the Baseline condition, no third party was present. We find that the Direct Feedback condition increased fairness relative to the other conditions, especially among younger children. These results highlight an important link between third-party punishment and fairness in children and, more broadly, help clarify the mechanisms through which third-party punishment can influence fair behavior and thereby human cooperation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Dynamics of environmental decision making: A preliminary study

Little research attention has been paid to the cognitive processes underlying environmental decision making. We examined environmental decisions in public and private spheres made under different decision time periods, using a minimal version of the dictator game. Participants made binary decisions according to whether they would cede their cash proceeds to support environmental conservation. The results show that time pressure amplified participants' behavioral preferences: More proenvironmental choices were made under time pressure than when there was a time delay allowed or when there was no time limit on the decision. This bias was found to occur intuitively, without significant differences resulting from the environmental decisions being in public versus private spheres. These findings provide preliminary evidence that environmental decisions are the outcome of intuitive and deliberative processes.

Third-Party Punishment or Compensation? It Depends on the Reputational Benefits.

Third-party fairness maintenance could win some reputational benefits, and it includes two methods: punishment and compensation. We predicted that the third parties' preference between punishment and compensation are affected by whether they are free to choose between the two methods, and the affection could be interpreted through reputational benefits. The present study includes two sections. In Study 1, the participants acted as fourth parties who were asked to rate the reputations of the third parties who had chosen different response methods to an unfair result of the dictator game. The results showed that (1) there was no reputational difference between the two methods when third parties were not free to choose, (2) but the reputation of compensation was better when third parties were free to choose. In Study 2, the participants acted as third parties. The participants were asked to choose a method to respond to an unfair result of the dictator game. There were two reputational contexts: secret and open. The results showed that (1) when third parties were not free to choose, they had no preference between the two methods under the two reputational contexts, (2) but when third parties were free to choose freely, they prefer punishment under the secret context but prefer compensation under the open context. This study systematically reveals a reputational interaction between fourth and third parties, and verifies the affection of reputational benefits on the third parties' preference between punishment and compensation.

Meta-Analysis of Seven Standard Experimental Paradigms Comparing Student to Non-student

This study embarked on the very challenging proposition of systematically organizing and classifying an assortment of experimental economics essays pertinent to seven experiments performed with both non-student and student populations. The experiments were the Dictator game, Stag Hunt – Coordination game, Risk Aversion Measurement (as measured by the players type of lottery choice), Trust game, Guessing game, Prudence Measurement, and the Guessing game. This meta-analysis reviewed 126 published and unpublished papers collected from several journals and papers provided by several authors via the Google Groups "Economic Science Association - Experimental Methods Discussion" group. Ultimately, only 39 studies were utilized due to methodological alignment. While some studies showed statistically significant differences between non-students and students as indicated by their respective 95% confidence intervals, the overall random-effects model of each of the seven games showed not to be statistically significant. This study contributes to the literature in three important ways. First, the study generates a comprehensive inventory and review of experiments comparing student to non-student populations for the last four decades; second, the study points out a possible limitation when combining several studies of the same game, despite following similar protocols, suggesting that compounded contextual complexities might diminish aggregate effects of the individuals’ behavioral responses to the financial incentives, and third, the study indicates that generalizations from one experimental economic study, may not render a solid base for extending statistical extrapolations applicable to the total population since the aggregate effects do not indicate substantial differences.

Group identity in fairness decisions: Discrimination or inequality aversion?

This paper reports preliminary evidence from a pilot study (n=91, with 455 decisions) on issues of decision time and race in distributive fairness decisions in South Africa. We conduct a dictator game to gather data on transfer amounts and time taken for decisions, where dictators are paired with a series of partners with whom they either share or do not share race. Our results are not in line with the empirical evidence that suggests that impulsive decisions are fair: transfers in our sample increase with decision time, with fairer decisions taking longer than selfish decisions. We note significantly higher transfers to black receivers from black decision-makers. White dictators give more to white receivers in very short (<15 s) decisions, but when they take more time to decide, more is given to black versus white receivers. This race-based discrimination in transfers appears to be primarily motivated by inequality aversion: black receivers are (correctly) assumed to have lower income than their white peers. Although our sample is small, the evidence of willingness to reduce perceived race-based inequality has encouraging implications for redistributive policies in the country, and therefore warrants further investigation.

Dictator game variants with probabilistic (and cost-saving) payoffs: A systematic test

• I test the validity of dictator game variants with probabilistic payoffs. • I include probabilistic decision or player payment, and role uncertainty. • I relate transfers to complementary individual difference measures of prosociality. • Data show that dictator behavior is sensitive to the applied methods. • Results confirm that role uncertainty in particular distorts validity. Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, I systematically test the validity of common dictator game variants with probabilistic payoffs. Using a unified experimental framework, I include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators, paying only some players, paying only some decisions, and role uncertainty. I also relate transfers in the dictator game variants to established complementary individual difference measures of prosociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation to charity, and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. My data shows that the standard dictator game presents the expected correlations with the complementary measures of prosociality. Involving fewer receivers yields comparably valid results. By contrast, when only some players or decisions are paid or, particularly, when subjects face role uncertainty, the expected associations with complementary prosociality measures are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also significantly biased upward. I conclude that the validity of dictator game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods. Not all dictator game variants can be recommended for the valid measurement of social preferences.

The impact of parental migration on social identity - A framed field experiment with left-behind children in China

Recent studies suggest that an estimated 61 million rural migrants in China were living outside their hometowns with their children left behind. We examine the impact of parental migration on the social identity among children by conducting a field experiment with 311 children from a major labor-exporting area in China. By exploiting a natural setting on varying parental migration status, we want to study whether children interact with left-behind children and children under parental care differently. Children in our experiment make decisions to divide tokens between left-behind children and children under parental care. They also play a dictator game and an ultimatum game between themselves and another child, whose identity characteristics vary. We find that children, regardless of their own identity, show stronger generosity towards the left-behind children, propose sharing higher amounts with left-behind children, and are willing to accept lower proposed amounts from left-behind children.

Spousal Secret Affairs with Money: Intra-household Allocative Efficiency in Spaces of Gender Politics in Development

Persisting gender inequities across political, economic and social life have spurred the global agenda to re-examine the triggers and consequences of gender disaggregation in household resource allocations. Defining and measuring intrahousehold allocations has been at the centre of the current debates among international development scholars and practitioners. The lack of clear consensus on intrahousehold public good allocation has consistently limited widespread efforts to design and evaluate programmes and policies aimed at improving women’s welfare. Based on intrahousehold allocation models, this paper proposes a conceptual framework which can accommodate the welfare of the household as an economic entreprise. Building on Sen (1989) and Kabeer (1999), this paper selectively reviews the abundant literature that offers insights into intra-household decision- making process and gender relations. The review illustrates the importance of intrahousehold allocations and describes a set of individual strategies that household agents use to by-pass intrahousehold negotiations and to secure private consumption. In many of the instances where inefficiencies have been identified in the data, a possible immediate cause is individual behaviour aimed at securing personal resources and consumption. Even, if they come, at the expense of total resources available to the household. Although, it need not be the case that such strategic behaviour are necessarily the source of inefficiencies, they may well be feeding the flames of suboptimality in household production entreprises.. That said, the paper clearly iterates circumstances under which non-cooperative behaviour of spousal income hiding could be vital to circumventing social norms which undermine Pareto productive efficiency. The paper further highlights the role played by collective resistance of social forces to economic changes that threaten social norms and gender roles. The study pinpoints evidence of collaborative efforts to stop women from embracing new economic opportunities that overturn traditional roles. Investigating the role played by household structure in reaching Pareto optimality for inefficient rural households, the paper concludes that neither monogamous nor polygynous conjugal units attain higher margins of efficiency. Instead, household agents played dictator games in public good allocation and responded opportunistically to private choices and strategies which optimized secret consumption.

On founders and dictators: Does it pay to pay for signals in crowdfunding?

Crowdfunding has become a serious means of financing new ventures. Funders come across numerous, often similar, projects seeking funds, making it difficult for them to decide which project to support. Founders can invest in signals (e.g., filing a patent) to highlight their projects, as signals are a typical communication channel on crowdfunding platforms. We examine how the cost of signaling affects funders' contributions. We modeled a crowdfunding situation using a modified dictator game in the laboratory. Our results illustrate that the higher the founders’ cost of signaling, the more the funders contribute, though not without restrictions; the characteristics of funders matter as reciprocity moderates this effect. Thus, our findings offer new insights for user innovators, entrepreneurs, and institutions, and explain why seemingly identical signals work differently.

It does (not) get better: Reference income violation and altruism

• We experimentally test the effects of gains and losses relative to a reference point on subsequent altruism. • Tightly controlling for wealth effects, we finnd that losses reduce transfers in a subsequent dictator game. Results for gains are more nuanced. • Thanks to physiological (skin conductance) and declarative measures of emotions, we discuss the role of emotions in our treatment effects. We experimentally test whether the gap between reference and actual income impacts subsequent altruism. Participants first perform a real-effort task for a fixed wage and then play a dictator game. Between conditions, we vary the level and the timing of the revelation of the wage. In some conditions, participants know the wage before the real effort task and are not informed of the other potential levels. In some other conditions, they are informed of the distribution of wages before the real effort task, but the actual wage is only revealed afterward. Participants in the latter conditions can form references that may be higher or lower than their actual wage. Our hypothesis is that the gap between the reference and the actual wage impacts transfers in the subsequent dictator game, either because participants want to compensate their recent losses, or because of the emotional reaction to gains and losses. The results support this hypothesis: participants who get the low wage transfer less and are less likely to transfer when they are informed of the other potential levels than when they are not. Conversely, participants who get the high wage are more likely to transfer positive amounts when they are informed of the other potential levels. We use physiological (skin conductance response) and declarative data to discuss the role of emotions in our treatment effects.

Expect the Worst! Expectations and Social Interactive Decision Making.

Psychological studies have demonstrated that expectations can have substantial effects on choice behavior, although the role of expectations on social decision making in particular has been relatively unexplored. To broaden our knowledge, we examined the role of expectations on decision making when interacting with new game partners and then also in a subsequent interaction with the same partners. To perform this, 38 participants played an Ultimatum Game (UG) in the role of responders and were primed to expect to play with two different groups of proposers, either those that were relatively fair (a tendency to propose an equal split—the high expectation condition) or unfair (with a history of offering unequal splits—the low expectation condition). After playing these 40 UG rounds, they then played 40 Dictator Games (DG) as allocator with the same set of partners. The results showed that expectations affect UG decisions, with a greater proportion of unfair offers rejected from the high as compared to the low expectation group, suggesting that players utilize specific expectations of social interaction as a behavioral reference point. Importantly, this was evident within subjects. Interestingly, we also demonstrated that these expectation effects carried over to the subsequent DG. Participants allocated more money to the recipients of the high expectation group as well to those who made equal offers and, in particular, when the latter were expected to behave unfairly, suggesting that people tend to forgive negative violations and appreciate and reward positive violations. Therefore, both the expectations of others’ behavior and their violations play an important role in subsequent allocation decisions. Together, these two studies extend our knowledge of the role of expectations in social decision making.

The effect of anime character\u2019s facial expressions and eye blinking on donation behavior

Studies of the use of artificial agents and robots to solicit donations from people have suggested that the design of the agents must consider facial expressions. However, there has not been sufficient evidence to generalize the finding that the emotions conveyed by agents’ facial expressions can induce donations. In the present study, we conducted an experiment with an animated character that has intermediate realism and a different appearance from those in previous studies to replicate the finding that facial expressions represented by changes in the shapes of the eyes and mouth cause people to become more prosocial and to test whether we can extend this finding to the emotional expressions presented by changes in the dynamic properties of eyes. In the experiment, participants (n=100) played a hypothetical dictator game with an avatar that expressed its emotions by changing the shapes of its eyes, eyebrows and mouth and by changing the frequency of eye blinking. The results showed that the emotions expressed by changes in the shape of the facial parts contributed to eliciting a higher donation amount, consistent with previous studies. However, we could not find an additive effect of the emotional expression shown by eye blinking. The results suggest that, regardless of appearance, emotional expression is useful in the design of a virtual agent’s face, but it might not be necessary to consider the dynamic properties of the eyes.

Charitable giving for cultural goods: Asymmetric gender responses to votes on tax increases

We examine the relationship between taxpayer support of cultural goods and charitable donations. Using a Dictator Game, subjects are paired with a real library as the recipient. Using outcomes from recent votes to increase property taxes to support local public libraries, we find a striking gender discrepancy. While slight reductions arise for both when the vote passes, female subjects increase their giving substantially in response to the ballot measure’s failure. This effect is driven by women donating all of their endowment more frequently.

Generous Attitudes and Online Participation

Some of the most popular websites depend on user-generated content produced and aggregated by unpaid volunteers. Contributing in such ways constitutes a type of generous behavior, as it costs time and energy while benefiting others. This study examines the relationship between contributions to a variety of online information resources and an experimental measure of generosity, the dictator game. Results suggest that contributors to any type of online content tend to donate more in the dictator game than those who do not contribute at all. When disaggregating by type of contribution, we find that those who write reviews, upload public videos, write or answer questions, and contribute to encyclopedic collections online are more generous in the dictator game than their non-contributing counterparts. These findings suggest that generous attitudes help to explain variation in contributions to review, question-and-answer, video, and encyclopedic websites.

‘Sharing in need’: How allocator and recipient's hunger shape food distributions in a dictator game

Do people in need share less with others? And what if the recipient is in need too? In two experiments, we addressed these questions by testing whether fasting-induced and self-rated hunger influence allocations in a dictator game in which allocators distribute food (cookies) between themselves and a recipient. In line with rational choice theory, which posits that a deprived good should increase in value (Smith, 1759; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), findings from the current studies consistently showed that participants shared fewer cookies when they were, and/or perceived themselves to be, in a food-deprived state. Across studies, participants moreover seemed to project their own hunger onto the recipient's state, as emotional perspective taking accounts propose, but this did not vary between fasting and control conditions, and did not translate into actual sharing differences, suggesting that these formed no basis for other-regarding decisions. Whether or not participants accounted for the recipient's hunger when redistributing foods, depended on whether they possessed actual knowledge of the recipient's deprivation state, such that participants engaged in greater sharing when they knew the recipient had been fasting (Study 2), but not in the absence of such knowledge (Study 1). Taken together, the results involving the need state of the recipient seem to provide most support for the need principle, that suggests that people share out of distributive justice considerations, where they take into account the recipient's need (Deutsch, 1975).

The Influence of Social Class on University Students’ Prosocial Behavior Based on the Game Perspective

In the present research, based on the game research paradigm, the research tools are the dictator game and the trust game, and the research objects are Chinese university students. We adopt 2(self-social class: high, low) × 2(target social class: high, low) between-subjects design experiment to investigate the influence of social class on university students’ prosocial behavior. Across the experimental study, we find that (1) in the two situations of dictator game and trust game, self-social class has no significant influence on university students’ prosocial behavior; (2) in the situation of dictator game, target social class has a significant influence on university students’ prosocial behavior, and it is regulated by self-social class. Under the condition of low self-social class, the higher the target social class, the more prosocial behavior of university students, which confirms the perspective of status and negates “if you are poor, you will be good for yourself.” Under the condition of high self-social class, the lower the target social class, the more prosocial the behavior of university students, which confirms the perspective of fairness and echoes “if you are good, you will be good at the world”; (3) in the context of the trust game, target social class has a significant influence on university students’ prosocial behavior, and there is no interaction effect with self-social class.