Development Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

United Nations Nonproliferation Sanctions

Much has been written about the role of UN sanctions to counter terrorism in the aftermath of the n September 2001 terrorist attacks, specifically sanctions against al Qaeda and the Taliban under resolution 1267, and broader UN counte rterrorism initiatives under resolution 1373. : Less attention has been focused on multilateral sanctions for nonproliferation objectives, despite the extensive efforts of the security council since the end of the Cold War to thwart proliferation as well as terrorism. Indeed, before the December 2009 arms embargo was imposed on Eritrea, no new UN sanctions had been adopted since 2006 that were not proliferation or terrorism-related.This article will discuss current UN sanctions to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), consider the lessons of counterterrorism sanctions for these nonproliferation measures, and assess the challenges for future nonproliferation sanctions.2 In addition, it will examine the relationship between sanctions and the broader UN initiative to promote nonproliferation under resolution 1540. While not a sanctions resolution, 1540 constitutes an important advance that strengthens the potential effectiveness of sanctions.SPECIFIC COUNTRY PROLIFERATION SANCTIONSThe use of multilateral sanctions to counter the development of nuclear weapons is not new; the UN imposed successive sets of sanctions on Iraq. Indeed, one ofthe ironies ofthe unfortunate history ofthe comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq is the apparent success of the measures in dismantling its WMD capabilities, even as they were considered a failure because of problematic implementation and humanitarian impact.3 More recently, sanctions to prevent the proliferation of WMD as a threat to international peace and security have focused on two countries: Iran and North Korea.IranFor 30 years, the US has maintained unilateral sanctions against Iran both for its support of terrorist organizations - Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad - and its nuclear activities. Congressional action (the IranLibya sanctions act of 1996 and its amended versions) to pressure Iran through secondary sanctions against foreign companies investing in Iran's energy sector or assisting Iran's WMD programs remain a key component of American policy towards Iran.4 More recently, the US has attempted to isolate Iran financially through sanctions against targeted individuals and entities and by persuading international financial institutions to cut ties to the country.5 One ofthe most difficult foreign policy challenges confronting the Obama administration is how to exercise greater pressure on Iran through additional crippling sanctions.6 Congress is expected to adopt broad new measures early in 2010 aimed at isolating the Iranian economy; these may include prohibiting foreign companies that provide Iran with refined petroleum products from doing business in the US.7Security council sanctions followed years of diplomatic negotiations to urge Iranian cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreements assuring that its nuclear activities were for peaceful purposes only. The security council has passed three resolutions aimed at halting Iran's proliferation activities.8 Adopted unanimously under chapter VII of the charter ofthe United Nations concerning threats to international peace, resolution 1737 demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA. The mandatory measures require member states to prohibit the transfer of all items, equipment, goods, and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems; freeze the assets of 12 Iranian individuals and 10 entities for providing support for Iran's nuclear activities; and exercise restraint with respect to the travel and training of designated individuals, arms, or WMD-useful exports to Iran, and the activities of Iranian banks. …

The United States and China in Southeast Asia: Conflict or Convergence?

The year 2009 witnessed important initiatives by the United States and China in Southeast Asia. Evidence of some sharpening of Sino-American competition to protect interests and project influence in Southeast Asia grew amid a broader pattern of mixed divergence and convergence in Sino-American relations over such important international concerns as the global economic crisis and recession begun in 2008, climate change, the armed conflicts, instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iran's and North Korea's nuclear weapons development. On balance, the leaders of both countries remained committed to a path of constructive engagement that has marked Sino-American interchange since early in the decade. Differences over various issues, including respective efforts to improve influence and protect interests in Southeast Asia, have tended to be dealt with through various private channels or formal dialogues, out of the public limelight. Neither side has taken steps in their respective foreign policy initiatives that would seriously jeopardize the positive stasis that has developed in relations between the American and Chinese governments. Many significant differences and strongly competing interests remain in U.S.-China relations, including in Southeast Asia. They feed deeply rooted mutual suspicions and impede progress in developing closer U.S.-China relations based on mutual trust. But the positive benefits of Sino-American engagement, ever closer mutual interdependence in U.S.-Chinese interests, especially in economic development, and massive preoccupations of both leaderships with other problems at

Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism

The emergence of nuclear terrorism, a threat that President Obama called "the gravest danger we face," has signaled a paradigm shift in international security. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, sensitive nuclear technologies and materials have become increasingly available. Globalization and the inadequate enforcement of treaties and export controls have allowed the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. Today, international terrorist organizations seek to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means to influence national policies around the world. AlQaida spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith declared that in order to balance the injustices that have been inflicted on the Muslim population worldwide, al-Qaida's new objective is "to kill 4 million Americans–2 million of them children." As political scientist Graham Allison notes, this could be achieved with either 1,334 attacks similar in magnitude to those of 9/11, or one nuclear bomb.Building a nuclear program is an arduous task that requires tacit knowledge, the recruitment of nuclear scientists, engineers, and machinists, and the resources and time to obtain nuclear materials and components. While it is unlikely that terrorist organizations have the capacity to develop full-fledged programs in the near term, terrorist development and acquisition of nuclear weapons remains a long-term threat that requires international action.

Is Peaceful Solution to Iran’s Nuclear Program Possible?

The Iranian government does not enjoy a friendly relationship with its counterparts in the USA and some western countries since the fall of the Shah when President Carter allowed the deposed monarch to enter the USA in October 22, 1979 to undergo surgical treatment in a New York hospital. In recent years, the relationship hit a new low with accusations that Iran’s nuclear program is not peaceful and is aimed at development of nuclear weapon, which can be an existential threat to Israel. The Iranian government has consistently rejected such claims and, on its part, accused Washington and her allies of meddling with its civilian nuclear program under false pretext and of practicing double-standards and demanding illegal concessions. In this paper, after a brief review of the causes behind unfriendly relationship between Iran and the West, especially the USA, practical measures towards a peaceful resolution of the current nuclear debate are suggested.

Запрет на ядерные испытания: каковы перспективы?

Referring to recent history, the author examines specific stages in nuclear weapons development, which, for their part, determined the fundamentals of the control system construction. The importance of the international Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May 2010 is noted, where serious attention was paid to the primary component of nuclear disarmament – the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which largely predetermines what the future world will be – nuclear or nuclear free.

The Evolution of Restraint: The Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. By T. V. Paul, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 336 pp., $29.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-6132-1). In the 64 years since the development of nuclear weapons, large and vibrant debates over the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and war-fighting (for example, Brodie 1978; Gray 1979; Howard 1981; McNamara 1983) and the impact of nuclear proliferation (for example, Waltz 1990; Sagan 1994; Sagan and Waltz 2003) have dominated the academic discourse on nuclear weapons. Largely obscured by these debates is an empirical question: why has no one used nuclear weapons since the Nagasaki bombing? This is the puzzle T. V. Paul addresses with The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons . Using a series of case studies, Paul provides a convincing solution to this puzzle, and in the process provides interesting insights for the analysis of nuclear deterrence and proliferation. T. V. Paul focuses on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), since the non-use of nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon states (NWS) can be adequately explained through deterrence (2009:1). Prior research on this issue has argued that the non-use of nuclear weapons is the result of a “nuclear taboo” (Tannenwald 1999, 2005, 2007), but as Paul notes the norm against nuclear use does not …

Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons Scientists, and Nonproliferation

In the early 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to con cerns about proliferation, including fears about the spread of nuclear weapons expertise. The splintering of the Soviet nuclear complex, poor security proto cols in the newly independent states, and pending layoffs of nuclear weapons workers combined with dismal economic conditions to reinforce fears that former Soviet nuclear weapons experts would sell their skills for money. In the United States, the response was the creation of several programs to fight proliferation by providing income to former Soviet nuclear weapons workers. Two such efforts were located in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Both focused on a two-pronged response: improve experts' living standards in the short term and re-direct them to non-weapons jobs in the future. One program, the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), initially succeeded by providing much-needed business training, infrastructure, and community improvements in Russia's core nuclear weapons institutes. The other program, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), engaged thousands of nuclear experts in short-term research contracts, at times providing their only income. Both programs, however, failed to find new jobs for weapons experts. I argue that this combination of success and failure can best be explained by organizational interest. More specifically, both NCI and IPP rely heavily on project managers from the U.S. national laboratories, including Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia, which focus on U.S. nuclear weapons research and development. I argue that organizational interest drove these labs to pursue cooperative ventures in the former Soviet nuclear complex, even in the face of serious political, security, and other impediments. But organizational in terest also proved their undoing. The U.S. labs enjoy considerable autonomy within DOE. This decentralized power structure eventually resulted in pro grams that could not document their results or coordinate their activities and

VERIFIABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate in October 1999 could have been avoided, and the consequences of that vote still loom in the minds of supporters of the treaty. President Barack Obama has embraced the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and a key element of the Obama administration's arms control agenda is delivering on U.S. CTBT ratification. In order to secure the two-thirds majority in the Senate necessary to ratify the treaty, senators that remain skeptical of nuclear disarmament must also be convinced that the entry into force of the CTBT is in the national security interest of the United States. This article provides an analysis of the issues surrounding U.S. CTBT ratification divided into three segments—verifiability of the treaty, reliability of the U.S. stockpile, and the treaty's impact on U.S. national security—and concludes that CTBT ratification serves the security objectives of the United States. The CTBT constitutes an integral component of the multilateral nonproliferation architecture designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it constrains the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, thereby hindering efforts by states of concern to develop advanced nuclear weapons.

Rethinking Ratification: Legalization and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties

Why do countries ratify international treaties‘ To what extent is ratification contingent on the creation of agreements‘ To address these questions, this article examines the creation and ratification of regional nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) treaties, which prohibit the development, testing, deployment, and transit of nuclear weapons. We argue that states establish NWFZs when they have little interest in the future development of nuclear weapons, since nonproliferation commitments are relatively cheap under such circumstances. We also hypothesize that the actual terms of the treaty have little to do with ratification. Countries ratify NWFZ treaties when their neighbors do so as a result of norm diffusion. Statistical tests employing a Heckman probit selection model lend strong support to the hypotheses. The findings help resolve a debate in the literature on treaty ratification and have important implications for research on selection effects and legalization. They also suggest that NWFZ treaties can be viable nonproliferation tools, but only in regions where there is a relative absence of militarized conflict.

Sunset over Atomic Apartheid: United States–South African nuclear relations, 1981–93

This article, based on multi-archival research in the United States of America and South Africa, analyzes the nuclear relationship between South Africa and the US during the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations, by tracing South Africa's journey to non-proliferation during the last decade of the Cold War. During the Reagan years, anti-communism and the Cold War formed a major component of US foreign policy and dictated a closer nuclear relationship between the US and South Africa, coupled with US non-proliferation efforts vis-à-vis South Africa. At the end of the 1980s, the US efforts coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet support and indeed a nuclear war potential from Southern Africa. In late 1989, South Africa at last gave up its nuclear weapons development and destroyed all its nuclear weapons, followed by signature of the NPT in July 1991.

Managing a Secret Project

We consider the problem of scheduling a project when there is an adversary from whom you want to conceal the project’s progress. Interfering with the progress by the adversary is called interdiction. Interdiction may involve hiring away key employees, campaigning for a change in zoning laws, etc. In this paper we take the perspective of a project manager with an adversary. The project manager seeks to limit the adversary’s opportunity to interdict, and, therefore, tries to keep the adversary “in the dark” as long as possible while completing the project on time. In the context of a leader-follower game, we formulate and analyze a new form of project management problem for secret projects where the project manager uses a combination of deception, task scheduling, and crashing to minimize the time between the adversary’s awareness and reaction and the project’s completion. We formulate a novel mixed-integer linear program and determine characteristics of optimal schedules. Using a detailed example of nuclear weapons development we illustrate the interconnectedness of deception, task scheduling, and crashing and the resulting influence on adversary behavior.

Evolution of Cardiopulmonary Bypass

At the end of the Second World War, the devastation of many cities in Europe, combined with the problems of reconstruction and loss of financial support, had brought European medical research to a halt. On the other hand, in the United States the war brought about an enormous amount of scientific research through the development of nuclear weapons, the mass production of penicillin, early computers, and a variety of other technological advances, some of which were eventually put to use by medical investigators. In the immediate postwar years, Congress began 3 decades of generous funding for medical research and education through the National Institutes of Health and the Public Health Service. In the 1920s and 1930s, medical research money had been scarce, but after the war there was a flood of money. The National Institutes of Health budget for medical research in 1945 was $180 000. By 1947, it was increased to $4 000 000, in 1950 to $46 000 000, and in 1974 to $1 billion.1 By 2008, the total budget just for the Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute was almost $3 billion. Since colonial times, it had been customary for young American physicians to spend postgraduate time in Vienna, Berlin, London, or Paris. Now the opposite was true. It became important for a young European physician to have worked for a year or so in a US medical center. The world center for medical education and research had shifted from Europe to the United States. Postwar medical progress was also stimulated by several other programs. The Hill-Burton act of 1946 provided funds for community hospital upgrades and construction. Initially this bill provided $75 million per year for 5 years. It was a matching plan in which local hospitals were required to raise two thirds of the new …

Analysis of Soviet Technology Transfer in the Development of China's Nuclear Weapons

Because China built its atomic and hydrogen bombs at a time of resource scarcity and rudimentary industrial development, it is generally believed that it got a great deal of help from Soviet nuclear technology transfer during the late 1950s. In particular, Soviet leaders and scientists asserted that they supplied China with extensive and critical assistance; some even claimed that this transfer of nuclear technology shortened the time needed to develop China's nuclear weapons by at least 15 years. Many non-Soviet researchers have concurred. Yet while Chinese officials, scientists, and historians have always given the Soviets due credit for this help, many have also continued to assert that because the Chinese solved key nuclear technology issues on their own, the effect of Soviet technology transfer was in fact more limited than these other experts claimed. Following a brief review of the history of Soviet nuclear-weapons technology transfer to China, this article addresses the issue by describing the kinds of Soviet nuclear-weapons technology transferred to China, assessing the role this Soviet technology played in China's nuclear-weapons program, and finally comparing and contrasting Soviet and Chinese views on the importance of Soviet technology transfer to the development of China's nuclear-weapons program.

Deterrence in the Israeli-Iranian Strategic Standoff

One of the central concerns of current US foreign policy is that Iran will develop a nuclear weapons capability which it could use to threaten the security of other regional states. This fear exists despite the declassification of a 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) key judgments summary stating that the Iranian nuclear weapons development program was frozen in 2003 and did not appear to have been restarted as of the publication of the report. (1) In elaborating on this NIE in early 2008, the then-Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Michael McConnell, told Congress that he regretted the wording of the document because he felt it left the erroneous impression that Iran had given up on obtaining nuclear weapons. (2) The entire history of the Iranian nuclear technology program, including previous efforts to keep the enrichment effort secret, suggests that Tehran will almost certainly continue to pursue a nuclear weapons capability despite some reassuring factors noted in the 2007 NIE. The NIE itself acknowledges the existence of a secret program, simply by noting its apparent suspension. Iran's continuing and declared focus on nuclear enrichment is particularly disturbing since the development of a large-scale enrichment capability is the most technologically challenging aspect of the effort to construct a nuclear weapon (despite the alternative uses of this technology for peaceful purposes). (3) Additionally, according to a variety of public sources, the Israeli intelligence agencies believe that Iran has made greater progress in moving toward a nuclear weapons capability than is reflected in the NIE or Admiral McConnell's recent comments. (4) British and French leaders have been sufficiently concerned by Iranian activities to issue strong warnings about potential problems from nuclear adventurism. (5) The questions that arise are how dangerous will an Iran armed with nuclear weapons be, and what will be the primary targets for Iranian nuclear weapons should Tehran obtain such a capability? In particular, the incendiary rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggests that it is reasonable to wonder if there is a high risk that Iran will attack Israel with nuclear weapons during some future period of high Israeli-Iranian tension (such as might emerge out of a new Lebanon war similar to that of 2006). A related question is what can Israel do about such a situation? This article forecasts a serious chance of failure in the current American and global efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons regardless of whether such attempts are pursued through the use of economic and political sanctions or air strikes. It is doubtful that either option can guarantee the end of the Iranian nuclear program for reasons to be discussed later. The more radical option of air strikes has a significant potential to undermine other western goals in the Middle East, including stabilizing Iraq, while failing to do much more than delay the Iranian weapons program for a few years at best. An alternative possibility is that Israel as a potential Iranian strategic adversary will be able to establish a system of deterrence and missile defense based on a combination of technology it already possesses or is developing. Such a system would seriously limit (perhaps even overcome) the chances of a successful Iranian strike against Israel, while raising the cost of even an unsuccessful attack to apocalyptic levels for the Tehran regime. Ideally, Israeli-sponsored deterrence will not have to be maintained indefinitely if the United States and Europe can generate a diplomatic strategy for managing Iranian power, especially if a more moderate leadership eventually emerges in Iran. In this regard, some (but not all) Israeli leaders have not ruled out the possibility that the United States can achieve important diplomatic gains that will benefit Israel in negotiations with Iran. (6) Israeli Concerns Regarding Iran Israel has a unique historical legacy, making it especially sensitive to military threats from hostile powers such as Iran. …

Proliferation Logics and Our Nuclear Future in the 21st Century

[ 114 ] asia policy Proliferation Logics and Our Nuclear Future in the 21st Century Christopher A. Ford Both of these valuable books offer country-specific case studies bracketed by more broadly analytical framing essays, but Etel Solingen’s Nuclear Logics is as much a work about international relations theory as an examination of the cases she presents. Nuclear Logics uses its case studies to test specific theories of state behavior against each other in an attempt to explain instances in which countries in East Asia and the Middle East have eschewed, or indeed abandoned, nuclear weapons programs. Solingen critiques traditional approaches to understanding such decisions, makes a case for models in which domestic political dynamics help explain behavior, and offers her own explanatory framework to help explain not only individual national examples but also the differences in overall regional nuclear weapons “trajectory” between a seemingly rapidly arming Middle East and a still (mostly) weaponsfree East Asia outside of China. The Long Shadow, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, is less broadly theoretical, offering a series of separately authored case studies that provide assessment and analysis of the perspectives that today’s nuclear weapons possessors in Asia (here rather broadly construed to include the United States, on account of the enduring U.S. role and alliance commitments along the Pacific Rim) bring to the issue of nuclear weapons policy. Alagappa’s introductory and concluding essays wrap these individual cases together, providing overall context and a lucid interpretation that highlights the continuing salience of nuclear weapons in the approaches that most of these countries adopt toward national security. Between them, these two books offer the reader valuable perspectives on the proliferation and nuclear weapons dilemmas of the 21st century. Interestingly, neither volume has much of anything to say about Europe, a continent that has seen its share of governments both abandoning nuclear weapons programs and maintaining sophisticated nuclear arsenals for long periods of time. It might be too much to infer that Europe is not a particularly interesting or important region from the perspective of how nuclear policy debates will play out in this new century, but the conclusion is tempting. christopher a. ford is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. He can be reached at . [ 115 ] book review roundtable • nuclear logics & the long shadow Neither broader issues of nuclear disarmament nor those of proliferation are likely to be resolved or much advanced in Europe itself. European diplomats and national leaders may or may not play significant roles as the international community struggles with these challenges, but the locus of both the main problems and the possible solutions arguably lies elsewhere—in the wide swathe of territory stretching from North Africa across the Asian land mass to the Korean Peninsula, upon which these books focus their attention. Nuclear Logics Solingen’s book is the more ambitious of the two, insofar as Nuclear Logics suggests a theory of how countries make decisions about whether to engage in nuclear weapons development. On the way there, she offers closely reasoned critiques of other theories of state behavior, specifically traditional “neorealist” structural power perspectives that see state behavior as relatively straightforward responses to strategic stimuli, the sort of “neoliberal” institutionalism that regards international institutions as shaping state perspective and choices, “constructivist” understandings that stress the constraining effect of behavioral norms, and “democratization” theses that view behavior through the prism of regime type. It is hard not to agree with Solingen that, as applied at least to nuclear proliferation decisions, these theories do indeed suffer from significant weaknesses. In Solingen’s analysis, these difficulties are both theoretical and practical, insofar as both different outcomes among seemingly similarly situated countries in her case studies and logical weaknesses internal to some of the theories examined together strongly suggest the need to give more attention to domestic political models of behavior. When multiple pathways could plausibly be defended as the “obvious” response to strategic dilemmas (the problem of neorealist “equifinality”), for instance, or further explanation is...

油価高騰がもたらしたもの

The year 2008 was the historical and memorable year from the view of crude oil prices. Skyrocketing oil prices resulted from the following reasons. The first reason is the rapid economic growth in BRICs such as China and India. The second reason is rebirth of nationalism in major oil producing countries. The third reason is financial capitalism of crude oil future market. Now, the major players in NYMEX (New York Mercantile Exchange) are financial institutions, hedge funds and commodity index funds. The movement of crude oil prices depends on sentimental factors such as crude oil stock level and nuclear weapon development in Iran. On July 11 2008, crude oil prices reached recorded 147.27 dollars per barrel. And then, crude oil prices fell rapidly to 30 dollars per barrel after the bankrupt of the famous investment bank. I think neither 150 dollars per barrel nor 30 dollars per barrel are adequate prices which reflected the fundamental of world demand and supply of crude oil. The excessive fluctuation of crude oil prices gives the great damage to all consumers and companies. The future of world economy depends upon the success of green new deal policy of the United States.

The Obama Administration and US Policy in Asia

American preoccupation with the global economic recession and conflicts in Southwest Asia and the Middle East indicated that US relations with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region were likely to be of generally secondary importance at the start of the Obama administration. In Asia, the economic crisis put a premium on close US collaboration with the major economies, China and Japan, and on avoiding egregiously self- serving economic practices that could prompt protectionism and curb world growth. Apart from the Middle East-Southwest Asian region, the other major area of US security concern in Asia was North Korea. North Korea's escalating provocations created a major international crisis in 2009 that forced the Obama government to change priorities and give top-level attention to dealing with Pyongyang. The provocations included a long range ballistic missile test, a nuclear weapons test (North Korea's second), withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks and resumption of nuclear weapons development. Longstanding US concern with the security situation in the Taiwan Straits declined as President Ma Ying- jeou reversed the pro-independence agenda of his predecessor and reassured China. The Obama government seemed poised to build on and make a few needed adjustments to Bush administration policies towards regional allies and emerging powers, China and India. Early indicators suggest that enhanced US activism and flexibility in Southeast Asia may represent a significant change in US policy in Asia under an Obama administration that otherwise seems generally inclined to adhere fairly closely to pragmatic and constructive US approaches to key Asia issues in recent years.

Terrorism Prevention and the Right of Preemptive Self-Defense

The concept of right of self-defense has long been recognized under international law. In general, its legitimacy and necessity have been rarely challenged and almost universally accepted by states. The actual application of the concept to a specific situation, however, almost always has led to fierce confrontation among interested parties regarding whether the international situation at issue indeed warrants exercise of the right of self-defense. This is mainly caused by a fact-specific and case-specific nature of the concept. Therefore, when a “prospective element” is added to this already laden and fiercely debated concept, and thus when the debate is about whether an uncertain future event may authorize the exercise of the right of self-defense, the issue inevitably invites further complication. Apparently, this seems to be what is going on with respect to the concept of so-called “preemptive self-defense.” The preemptive self-defense (or anticipatory self-defense) is generally understood to be an expansion of the traditional right of self-defense. It appears that the issue of preemptive self-defense first appeared in 1967, when Israel initiated military operation against Egypt based on intelligence that its Arab neighbors were allegedly planning to attack Israeli military positions. Israel again resorted to preemptive self-defense in 1981 by raiding and destroying a nuclear power facility in Iraq, also based on the information that Iraq was allegedly engaged in the development of nuclear weapon that could be used against it. Given the fact that the 1981 raid was not triggered by the information of imminent attack as shown in 1967, the aerial raid 2 JEAIL 2008 Terrorism and the Preemptive Self-Defense 291

The World vs. Kim Jong-il: The Legal Case Against a Nuclear-Armed North Korea

This paper focuses on the international legal issues surrounding the alleged nuclear-weapon program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea. The DPRK has withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the first country to do so, and apparently is proceeding with the development of nuclear weapons. The regional Six-Party Talks, discussing North Korea's nuclear disarmament, have been unproductive. The international community, led by the United States, is verging on more coercive, even punitive, action. Before legally taking those actions, a case probably will be presented to a world forum that North Korea has violated international law. The relevant issues involve the right to withdraw from the NPT, the continued relevance of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, legal structures established by the United Nations and United States to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the UN Security Council's general powers to preserve international peace. The case against North Korea has strengths, but so does North Korea's legal defense, including allegations that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is inconsistently applied and that the nuclear powers have failed to comply with their disarmament obligations. At issue is not merely the DPRK's nuclear-weapon program but the continued significance of the current non-proliferation system.

Half-Lives and Half-Truths: Confronting the Radioactive Legacies of the Cold War (review)

Reviewed by: Half-Lives and Half-Truths: Confronting the Radioactive Legacies of the Cold War Robert C. Kiste Half-Lives and Half-Truths: Confronting the Radioactive Legacies of the Cold War, edited by Barbara Rose Johnston. Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007. ISBN 978-1-930618-82-4; x + 326 pages, tables, figures, maps, notes, references, index. US $27.95. While the nuclear era began with the development and use of atomic weapons by the United States near the end of World War II, the focus of this volume is the ensuing cold war between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The book’s thirteen chapters are authored or coauthored by fifteen anthropologists, most of whom have studied the culture and history of science, documented the legacy of the cold war, and conducted research with the aim to assist communities harmed by the arms race. The chapter by editor Barbara Rose Johnston, “Half-Lives, Half-Truths, and Other Radioactive Legacies of the Cold War,” introduces the volume. While several nations are known to have nuclear weapons (including China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), others have the technical capacity to develop them. Drawing on the nuclear history of the United States and the Soviet Union, Johnston makes several observations that are of general relevance. The nuclear programs of both nations have had and continue to have devastating consequences for the peoples involved. Uranium mining and processing, weapon production facilities, the testing of nuclear weapons, and nuclear waste dumps have created “radiogenic communities.” Such communities suffer from unseen dangers of radiological contamination, which result in an increased incidence of a variety of cancers and other illnesses, miscarriages, births of congenitally deformed children, difficulties of caring for disabled children, and cause people to live with fear and anxiety over inter-generational and other long-term and unknown effects of radiation. Johnston notes that the ability of communities to comprehend, confront, [End Page 500] and address environmental and health problems is strongly linked to and constrained by a number of variables. The victims of radioactive pollution are psychologically traumatized and often stigmatized by neighboring peoples. They are relatively powerless and have a low position in the larger scheme of things. They are often indigenous peoples living on traditional or tribal lands in remote areas and are relatively poor. Very importantly, they are deprived of basic information. National security is the most commonly advanced rationale for the development of nuclear weapons. The cold-war security state required control over the science involved, the production of weapons, and the dissemination of information. Secrecy allowed the systematic use of half-truths and misinformation to pacify and alleviate public concerns, and detached scientists caught up in their work often lost sight of basic human needs and welfare. Animals are commonly used in laboratory research, and in reference to Marshall Islanders, Johnston quotes one researcher: “these people are more like us than mice” (25)—an astounding remark that seems to suggest the view that indigenous peoples are creatures of a lower order than the rest of humanity. Three chapters focus on the US nuclear testing program in the Pacific. Johnston’s chapter, from which the above quote was drawn, provides essential historical background. Holly M Barker, a researcher and, until 2008, adviser for the government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, reviews the major issues and problems that have challenged that small island nation. David H Price provides a biographical sketch of Earle Reynolds, a physical anthropologist turned cold-war dissident, who gave up his career to challenge US nuclear activities in the Pacific. The remaining chapters provide a larger context, which allows a better understanding of US nuclear activities both at home and abroad during the cold-war era. The United States has conducted nuclear tests and related activities in the Pacific Islands and the western United States, including Alaska. In the Pacific, 67 atmospheric tests were conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958. Other tests were conducted on Johnston Island, and, in conjunction with the United Kingdom, on Christmas and Malden Islands in Kiribati. The people of...