Development Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

Japan in 2002: An Up-and-Down Year, but Mostly Down

Japan in 2002 continued to grapple with many of the same economic problems it has faced over the past 10 years, with a familiar lack of success. Although the economy has not imploded, as some feared last year, it is showing few signs of staging a sustained recovery. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro remained in office, but almost all of his efforts to reform the moribund economic system were watered down by resistance from affected groups. The foreign policy agenda was dominated by the growing crisis over North Korea's intensification of its nuclear weapons development program. This crisis cancelled out Koizumi's earlier progress at normalizing relations with Pyongyang.

Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement

Nearly half a century after the fighting stopped, the 1953 Armistice has yet to be replaced with a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War. While Russia and China withdrew the last of their forces in 1958, the United States maintains 37,000 troops in South Korea and is pledged to defend it with nuclear weapons. In Korean Endgame, Selig Harrison mounts the first authoritative challenge to this long-standing U.S. policy. Harrison shows why North Korea is not - as many policymakers expect - about to collapse. And he explains why existing U.S. policies hamper North-South reconciliation and reunification. Assessing North Korean capabilities and the motivations that have led to its forward deployments, he spells out the arms control concessions by North Korea, South Korea, and the United States necessary to ease the dangers of confrontation, centering on reciprocal U.S. force redeployments and U.S. withdrawals in return for North Korean pullbacks from the thirty-eighth parallel. Similarly, he proposes specific trade-offs to forestall the North's development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in conjunction with agreements to denuclearize Korea embracing China, Russia, and Japan. The long-term goal of U.S. policy, he argues, should be the full disengagement of U.S. combat forces from Korea as part of regional agreements insulating the peninsula from all foreign conventional and nuclear forces. A veteran journalist with decades of extensive firsthand knowledge of North Korea and long-standing contacts with leaders in Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang, Harrison is perfectly placed to make these arguments. Throughout, he supports his analysis with revealing accounts of conversations with North Korean, South Korean, and U.S. leaders over thirty-five years. Combining probing scholarship with a seasoned reporter's on-the-ground experience and insights, he has given us the definitive book on U.S. policy in Korea - past, present, and future.

Bioethics: Are Our Priorities Right?

Neither biologists nor nonbiologists in today's society are paying adequate attention to the escalating ethical issues raised by the human predicament, and the expertise of biologists seems to demand they make additional contributions to environmental ethics, broadly defined. Massive environmental destruction and the development of biological and nuclear weapons have changed the world; cultural evolution of ethics has not kept pace. “Bioethics” must be expanded from its focus on medical issues to consider such things as the ethics of preserving natural capital for future generations and those of dealing with overconsumption. Bioethics should examine issues as diverse as the ethics of invading Iraq to increase the role of the rich in generating climate change and the ethics of the Lomborg affair. Achieving a sustainable global society will require developing an agreed-upon ethical basis for the necessary political discourse, and the time to start is now.

Measurement of Nagasaki Pu Global Transport Rates, Comparing with SO2 from Historic Volcanic Eruptions

An artificial single dose contaminant was released at Nagasaki, Japan on August 9, 1945 detonating plutonium (10-15 kg) atomic bomb. A portion, 1.2 kg of 239Pu was fissioned releasing 21 kt TNT energy along with various fission products. The rest of the unexpended fissile material, 239+240Pu; 13.8 kg (3.49 x 1013 Bq), was dispersed into the atmosphere along with a fission product, 137Cs, 23.4 g (7.44 x 1013 Bq). The fate of 239+240Pu and 137Cs was investigated by analysing both local and global fallout.The highest concentration of 239+240Pu was 64.5 mBq/g (181 mBq/cm2) while it was 188 mBq/g (526 mBq/cm2) for 137Cs both at 2.8 km east from the hypocentre. The total amount of deposition in the local fallout region of 264 km2 was 37.5 g (9.48 xl010Bq) for 239+240Pu and 3.14 mg (5.88 x 1010Bq) for 137Cs. The ratio of the local fallout against the total amount of the radionuclides released was 0.27 % for 239+240Pu and 0.134 % for 137Cs.Recent advancements in analytical technology made it possible for artificial radionuclides released from the Nagasaki explosion to be detected in the Arctic ice core layer of 1945. The 239+240Pu and the 137Cs, were measured by collecting 10 ice cores on the Agassiz ice cap, Ellesmere Island, Canada. The deposition was 0.16 juBq/cm2 for 239+240Pu and 20 μBq/cm2 for 137Cs. During the atmospheric testing, the deposition of 239+240Pu and 137Cs varied more than 100 times with the highest peaks of over 50 μBq/cm2 for 239+240Pu and over 800 μBq/cm2 for 137Cs both occurred in 1962. Analyzing Arctic data, there are many new information for long global transport, the history of nuclear weapons development etc.

Efforts to Address Iraqi Compliance with UN Weapons Inspections

At the conclusion of the 1991 UN enforcement action against Iraq, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting the terms for a cease-fire. The resolution required, among other things, that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,” of all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and associated materials and facilities. Further, the resolution provided for the creation of a UN special commission to carry out “on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities,” and ordered Iraq to yield such weapons to the commission for “destruction, removal or rendering harmless.” Similar requirements were imposed with respect to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. While maintaining the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council allowed exports to Iraq of foodstuffs and medical supplies (on the condition that a UN sanctions committee had been notified) and also other commodities (if approved by the same committee). The Security Council decided that the sanctions regime would be lifted, however, once Iraq complied with its obligations on the destruction and monitoring of weapons of mass destruction.

Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia's Nuclear Cities

Since September 11, 2001, concern about an attack on the United States by terrorists using a stolen nuclear warhead or an improvised radiological weapon—a “dirty bomb”—has risen dramatically. In discussions about this threat, Russia is frequently mentioned as the most likely source of black-market nuclear skills and materials. In its 2002 report to Congress, for example, the National Intelligence Council noted that Russia’s nuclear security measures are still primarily oriented toward external threats and “are not designed to counter the pre-eminent threat faced today—an insider who attempts unauthorized actions.”1 Reports of Russian weapons experts sharing their knowledge with other countries have also proliferated.2 Whether through scientiac exchange visits, conferences, or email, Russian nuclear experts may be sharing sensitive information with others. Although many of these reports are anecdotal and few have been rigorously documented since the early 1990s, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has consistently reported to Congress its suspicions that Russian scientists are helping foreign countries pursue nuclear weapons development programs.3 Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia

Yours Faithfully

Reviews  YOURS FAITHFULLY P L. T Religious Studies / McGill U. Montreal, , Canada   @-.. Ray Perkins, Jr., ed. Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: a Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth in Letters to the Editor. Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, . Pp. xii, . .; pb .. lthough Bertrand Russell was obviously a prolific writer on numerous Atopics (technical philosophy, education, religion, political critique, women ’s rights, and nuclear disarmament), and published his views through various venues such as technical volumes, popular books, essays, scholarly articles, reviews, and pamphlets, there has been a neglect of Russell’s utilization of the newspaper’s “Letters to the Editor” section. In this accessible volume, Ray Perkins has collected and organized the letters to the editor published by Russell . Russell, from the first known letter in  to the final public statement on the Middle East crisis published posthumously in , published approximately  letters to the editor. Of these  are published in Yours Faithfully. Perkins begins with a helpful introduction (pp. –), placing the letters into the broader framework of Russell’s life. We are introduced, in a very basic sketch, to the development of Russell’s thought, encountering such major threads in Russell’s life as his early political interests (indicated in  with German Social Democracy, though pushed to the foreground with the First World War) and the developments in his philosophical theories from Principia Mathematica through Our Knowledge of the External World to Human Knowledge . We also meet various significant individuals in Russell’s life, such as his various wives and his colleagues both in philosophy and in activist work. Although Russell scholars will find this introduction somewhat simplistic, those non-specialists encountering Russell through this book will find the introduction helpful and clearly necessary in order to contextualize the letters.  Reviews The letters themselves are organized into chronological chapters. The first eight letters, “Early Letters”, are dated from  to . These are the earliest known published letters by Russell. Perkins then gives us those letters published during the First World War (–). The remaining letters fall into: “Between the Wars” (–); “World War Two and the Early Cold War” (–); “The Cold War and the Nuclear Peril” (–); and “The Cold War and American Militarism” (–). The final document is Russell’s posthumous  statement to the Conference of Parliamentarians in Cairo. Each chapter has a brief overview of the period in Russell’s life, further situating the letters. Perkins is also careful to offer introductions to each letter, and the occasional footnote to explain various references in the letters (names of individuals that may not be familiar to readers, major events referred to, etc.). Each letter is numbered sequentially, accompanied by the B&R number of the letter. Given Russell’s diverse interests, clearly reflected in these letters, Perkins has subdivided the last four chapters into thematic subsections. Those readers who are interested in Russell’s views on, e.g., religion, education, or Vietnam can find the relevant letters with ease. A comprehensive index also makes the collection accessible. The exact division of the chapters tends to reflect major shifts in Russell’s thinking as much as historical developments (the latter obviously affecting the former in any case). For example, the – break reflects both Russell’s move from England to the  and his departure from the pacifist stance of Which Way to Peace? The – break reflects Russia’s development of nuclear weapons and Russell’s shift towards mutual disarmament by both superpowers. And the – break reflects Russell’s intervention in the Cuban Missile Crisis as well as his reactions to the  involvement in Vietnam. Perkins has supplied us with an excellent collection of letters. Although some may ask how useful such a collection may be, I would contend that the letters are vital sources of information for Russell studies. First, from an historian’s perspective, the preservation and accessibility of primary material is a noble and worthwhile achievement. Perkins is to be commended for his efforts in drawing our attention to this material by blowing the dust off material that most would ignore. Second, the letters themselves are fascinating indications of shifts in Russell’s thinking, pointing out the nuances of such shifts as he engages in debate with various other voices over...

Citizenship and science*

The 20th century brought great changes: scientificadvances have improved transport, communication and informationfor millions but the development of nuclear and other weapons ofmass destructionhas threatened us all. Now we must continue our first stepstowards a war-free world by developing a loyalty to humanity;scientists must accept responsibility for their work and teachersneed to emphasize the global nature of science.

A perspective on public concerns about exposure to fallout from the production and testing of nuclear weapons.

Exposures of the American public occurred nationwide from the testing of nuclear weapons in the United States, the Pacific, and the former Soviet Union. After decades of diminished public awareness on the subject of health risks resulting from exposure to fallout, the release of the National Cancer Institute's 1997 report on nationwide exposure to 131I from the Nevada Test Site (NTS) has led to renewed interest. Public requests for information are focused on individual and family health problems, the right to credible and full disclosure of information, and the need for medical care and assistance for exposure-related health problems. Public concerns have been raised regarding: (a) the lack of information on the potential health risks from exposure to all biologically significant radionuclides in fallout; (b) the lack of independent oversight that includes public participation; (c) governmental portrayal of exposures averaged over very large segments of the population without identification of much larger values for individuals or population subgroups likely to be at highest risk; and (d) a governmental response to known or suspected human exposures that consumes large periods of time and devotes considerable funding to various research-related activities before serious consideration is given to addressing health care responsibilities to exposed individuals. To some extent, these complaints and concerns are rooted in the legacy of government secrecy surrounding the development and testing of nuclear weapons, public distrust of government sources of information about radiation exposures and health risks, and the imposition of past exposures without informed consent. Members of the public participating in the oversight of dose reconstruction projects and epidemiologic studies are requesting information on the total impact from all relevant sources of exposure at each site that might contribute significantly to an individual's risk, including exposure to local releases and to NTS and global fallout. Information is being requested on individual doses and risks from these cumulative exposures, with estimates of uncertainty, including estimates of the absorbed organ dose (as opposed to the effective dose), the risk of disease incidence as opposed to the risk of a cancer fatality, and the chance that a person's diagnosed disease was caused by past exposure (i.e., the probability of causation). This paper attempts to address some of these concerns. We conclude by noting that many individuals exposed in childhood during the 1950's to 131I in fallout from nuclear weapons production and testing would qualify for compensation and medical care if the present rules for the adjudication of claims for atomic veterans and radiation workers at DOE sites were to be extended to the public.

Portraits of science. "The most versatile physicist of his generation".

P. M. S. Blackett (1897-1974) entered Cambridge University and the Cavendish Laboratory as a young veteran of the first world war. His innovative research with the Wilson cloud chamber resulted in photographic evidence of nuclear transformation and the existence of the positron. In the 1950s and 1960s, he helped to pioneer the use of paleomagnetic evidence in support of the theory of continental drift. A leader of operational research during the second world war, Blackett became an outspoken critic in the postwar period of American atomic policy and British development of nuclear weapons, taking on a public role for which he was sometimes criticized.

North Korea's CB Weapons: Threat and Capability

Abstract Compared to the long-running problem of nuclear weapons development, the issue of North Korea's chemical/biological weapons threat began to gain momentum very recently, notably since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States last year. More recently, in his State of Union message to Congress, the US president alerted the world about the danger of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction including its chemical/biological threat. According to the ROK Defense White Paper, North Korea may have already produced somewhere between 2,500-5,000 tons of various lethal chemicals and it is also suspected of maintaining numerous facilities for cultivating and producing the anthrax virus and other forms of biological weapons. On the international level, North Korea has not yet acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which was concluded in 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations. Furthermore, it has paid little attention to the international efforts to strengthen the verification r...

Encyclopedia of the atomic age

The last half of the twentieth century has often been called the Age, a name that has not faded even with the end of the Cold War. Nuclear testing in India and Pakistan, along with continuing tensions over weapons development in Iraq and China, has kept issues surrounding the use of nuclear energy at the forefront of world consciousness. Written by an expert in nuclear history, the Encyclopedia of the Atomic Age is a definitive resource, with more than 500 well-researched, accessible entries on the people, events, and institutions that have shaped and defined this crucial historical era. The volume presents a balanced viewpoint on many of the hotly debated issues of the period, with international coverage of both the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the controversial arena of nuclear weapons development. Entries Include: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Niels Bohr; Cuban Missile Crisis; Enola Gay; Fail-Safe; Gamma radiation; Hiroshima; Isotope; Limited Test Ban Treaty; Meltdown; Nagasaki; Quantum Theory; Radioactive waste; Salt; I and II; Three Mile Island; Warsaw Treaty Organization; Yalta Conference; Zero Option.

The public health implications of combined exposure to multiple sources of131I released during the Cold War Era: Extension of dose reconstruction to risk analysis and beyond

During the past 15 years, doses have been reconstructed to members of the public who were exposed to radiation released from Cold War Era government facilities that supported the development and testing of nuclear weapons. A major component of these exposures resulted from releases of 131 I to the atmosphere. This paper addresses the public health implications of the combined exposures from the production of radioactive lanthanum at Oak Ridge which released 131 I, and 131 I deposited in the regions around Oak Ridge resulting from atmospheric weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site. Full application of uncertainty analysis is used to quantify estimates of thyroid dose, the excess lifetime risk of thyroid neoplasms, the risk of non-neoplastic disease at high exposures, and the probability that past exposure could be responsible for present thyroid disease. The results show that fallout 131 I is a substantial contributing factor to the total exposure and excess risk of thyroid cancer for those exposed as children residing downwind of local government installations. For many persons exposed in childhood, the upper confidence limit of the estimate of PC may exceed 50 %, regardless of the location where milk was produced.

The Death of a Treaty

ON OCTOBER 13, 1999, the U.S. Senate conspicuously failed to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT was the Clinton administration's major arms control initiative at the time, and the treaty's high-profile rejection was widely considered the president's worst foreign policy defeat in Congress. The vote was a stark 48 to 51-not even a majority in the treaty's favor, and far below the two-thirds required for approval. Despite the Democratic takeover of the Senate in 2001, the CTBT still sits with the Foreign Relations Committee, where it reverted at the end of the lo6th Congress. Even if the Senate were to act, the treaty's ratification by President George W. Bush seems most unlikely. The United States continues to maintain the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing that it has observed since 1992, but the administration argues that the war on terrorism may require the development of new tactical nuclear weapons and it wants to shorten the time that it would take for the United States to resume nuclear testing. Moreover, although Bush professes deep concern about the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the wake of September 1i, he shows little faith in the efficacy of treaty law as a means of thwarting it. The adminis tration has, to be sure, signed and sent to the Senate a two-page arms reduction treaty with Moscow. But it repeatedly said that such a treaty

Israel and the Bomb (review)

180 SHOFAR Winter 2001 Vol. 19, No.2 Roman relations. He takes as examples the symbolism ofploughing Jerusalem when it was reconstituted as Aelia Capitolina and a story of a rabbi who refused a gift from a Roman official. It should be clear from this brief summary that the section headings are rather arbitrary, and that some ofthe essays could just as easily be placed in a different part. One suspects that the divisions were imposed on this highly diverse collection to reassure the publisher of its thematic unity. But it should also be clear that this is a remarkably interesting and learned collection of essays, many of which open up new angles of approach to the study of Judaism in the Hellenistic, and more especially the Roman periods. The diversity of the essays offers something for many different interests. Gruen and Horbury are somewhat exceptional in the volume in focusing on literary evidence, mainly from the pre-Christian period. Seth and Daniel Schwartz deal with historical issues, also from the Hellenistic age. The predominant contributions of the volume, however, are to the social history of Jews in the Roman period. Isaac and Noy (and also Rajak) deal with archeological evidence; Cotton and Oppenheimer with legal documents; Baumgarten, Levine, and Williams with community organization (Baumgarten's essay deals mainly with the Hellenistic period); Satlow, Joshua Schwartz, and Stem (and also Rajak) with cultural values and assumptions. The essays of Satlow and Joshua Schwartz are noteworthy for their attention to aspects of culture that seldom receive attention in standard treatments; Baumgarten's work is important for its thorough-going sociological approach. But there is much to be learned from all these essays, and ifthey are characterizedmore by diversity than by thematic unity, they suggest that the same may be true of Judaism in the Greek and Roman periods. John J. Collins Divinity School University ofChicago Israel and the Bomb, by Avner Cohen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 470 pp. $29.95 (c). Israel's development of nuclear weapons, beginning about 40 years ago, and the attendant limitations on divulging information about the project officially, produce a fascinating story. Despite innumerable attempts to force the government to acknowledge that indeed it does possess the bomb, the standard position remains largely what it was in the 1960s: "Israel will not be the fIrst to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East." At one time, there might have been some doubt; the unusual formulation kept outsiders guessing. But now that it is widely accepted that Israel has such weapons, and in quantity, it is reasonable to ask whether the traditional policy still makes sense. Given the intense secrecy that has surrounded the project, Israel has never had a full-scale political debate on the subject ofnuclear weapons. With the genie out ofthe bottle, not only in the sensational fashion associated with Mordechai Vanunu's revel- Book Reviews 181 ations or in the journalistic treatment of Seymour Hersh, but finally in a scholarly format that adroitly uses recently released government archival material, perhaps the long-awaited debate canbegin. Butas Avner Cohen demonstrates so persuasively in this very thoroughly researched volume, the whole matter of nuclear weapons is such a sensitive issue that hardly anyone in Israel seems inclined to initiate public debate. Cohen analyzes the long-standing Israeli policy of opacity and demonstrates how it evolved in response to the necessities ofthe critical developmental period, when Israel was reluctant to confront openly the non-proliferation policies pursued by the United States. The U.S., for its part, played along by not compelling Israel to reveal the secrets ofthe Dimona reactor and even sent inspectors (to Israel they were just visitors) to the facility on a regular basis during the 1960s. However, Israel managed, through a combination of deception and delay, to prevent them from observing anything that might confirm the existence of a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, all of the visits were held on Saturdays at Israel's insistence, which minimized the contact between the visitors and regular personnel at the reactor. Thus the U.S. never gathered conclusive evidence about the program. Despite strong suspicions within the intelligence community, the political echelon never...

Security, nationalism and the pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles: The South Korean case, 1970–82

South Korea decided to develop nuclear weapons and surface‐to‐surface missiles in the early 1970s. The Park Chung‐hee administration made the decision because of its concern about a complete withdrawal of US forces from Korea following the Nixon Doctrine. Simultaneously, increasing nationalism within the administration, caused by its tumultuous relations with the United States, further strengthened such pursuits. Later, when faced with the US threat to withdraw security and economic assistance, the administration slowed down active development of nuclear weapons in 1976, but it continued missile development. However, the Chun Doo‐hwan administration, inaugurated in 1980 after military coup and massacre, froze all weapons‐related nuclear research and the missile programme. The Chun regime made such a change because it needed the support of the US to make up for its weakness in legitimacy and because the Reagan administration provided a solid defence commitment to South Korea.

The Bush Administration and the Prospects for US-North Korean Relations

Abstract The Bush administration which began its term in January of 2001 has the conception that today's international peace and stability, and the interests of the United States and its allies, are severely undermined by several countries and a few undesirable incidents, with North Korea's playing a critical role. To the Bush administration, Pyongyang is merely a failure case that maintains its power structure through counterfeit bills and narcotics trafficking, and by trying to occupy a favorable strategic spot through the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Now, as the United States sets its new security goal for North Korea—securing the transparency of its nuclear freeze, prohibition of the development of long-range missiles, and conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula—Washington and Pyongyang are expected to be involved in an unusually difficult tug-of-war which might accompany the recrudescence of the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis. The stage for compromise as a result of t...

Tangled Causes of the Bomb's Creators

In the Shadow of the Bomb Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the Moral Responsibility of the Scientist. S. S. Schweber. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000. 278 pp. $24.95, £15.95. ISBN 0-691-04989-0. Schweber, Bethe's authorized biographer, approaches the theme of scientists' moral responsibilities through a comparison of two prominent participants in the development of nuclear weapons. He considers the similarities and differences in their choices and in the consequences of their political involvements.

Sea changes in computational power: testing our metal

As deputy assistant secretary for research, development, and simulation in the US Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs, Gil Weigand provides programmatic and policy direction for the DoE's nuclear weapons research, development, and simulation work. In partnership with the national labs, he leads the effort to preserve the technology base and develop programs for the surety, reliability, military effectiveness, and credibility of the nation's nuclear-weapons stockpile.Prior to this job, Weigand was deputy assistant secretary for strategic computing and simulation and a senior information officer for the DoE Office of Defense Programs, where he led advanced initiatives in high-performance computer simulation, computation, and communications. In particular, he was responsible for directing the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, which has created leading-edge computational modeling and simulation tools necessary to move from test-based to simulation-based assessment and certification. The ASCI initiative is based on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an international treaty to move toward no nuclear testing announced by President Bill Clinton on 11 August 1995.Paul Messina now manages ASCI as DoE deputy assistant secretary for advanced simulation and computing for defense programs. He is on a two-year leave from the California Institute of Technology, where he is assistant vice president for scientific computing, a faculty associate in scientific computing, and director of the Center for Advanced Computing Research. He has a joint appointment at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory as manager of high-performance computing. Messina is also on leave from the position of chief architect for the National Partnership for Advanced Computational Infrastructure, where he established and led the Scalable I/O Initiative.Editor-in-chief George Cybenko recently talked to Weigand and Messina about their roles in ASCI and the Alliance Program, and their thoughts about where the high end of computational performance is headed.

10.14322/publons.r2936642

10.14322/publons.r2936642