Deterrence Model Research Articles

Intended and Unintended Consequences of Prison Reform

Since the 1970s, U.S. federal courts have issued court orders condemning state prison crowding. However, the impact of these court orders on prison spending and prison conditions is theoretically ambiguous because it is unclear if these court orders are enforceable. We examine states’ responses to court interventions and show that these interventions generate higher per inmate incarceration costs, lower inmate mortality rates, and a reduction in prisoners per capita. If states seek to minimize the cost of crime through deterrence, an increase in prison costs should lead states to shift resources from corrections to other means of deterring crime such as welfare and education spending. However, we flnd that court interventions, that are associated with higher corrections expenditures, lead to lower welfare expenditures. This suggests that the burden of increased correctional spending is borne by the poor. Furthermore, states do not increase welfare spending after their release from court order; making the reduction in welfare spending permanent. Thus, our results suggest that states do not respond to prison reform in the manner prescribed by the deterrence model. States’ responses to prison reform are most consistent with the predictions in the empirical public flnance literature that indicate stickiness in expenditure categories and that increases in spending in programs that afiect the poor generate declines in expenditures in other program that are also targeted to the poor.

Poverty, Inequality, Political Instability and Property Crimes in Pakistan: A Time Series Analysis

Abstract In a formal econometric analysis of crime statistics in Pakistan, this paper estimates five systems of equations determining crime rates against property, conviction rates and police and justice input using time series annual data. The study finds substantial empirical support for the model of crime, punishment and deterrence based on economic theory. The main conclusion of the study is that in the fight against crime Pakistan needs to divert resources from the provision of legal justice through various deterrence measures, like a large police force, conviction and punishment, towards the provision of social justice in the form of the fight against poverty, inequality and unemployment and maintenance of political stability. Resources also need to be diverted from punishments to apprehension of criminals.

Shop Crime and Deterrence: Evidence on Shoplifting among Young People in the Youth Lifestyle Survey (YLS)

I use data from the 1998 Youth Lifestyle Survey to assess empirically the link between perceived deterrence and criminal involvement. I concentrate on shop theft and two specific deterrents: The perceived probability of detection and the perceived consequences stemming from detection in terms of job loss. The estimation of the deterrence model reveals that perceived deterrents significantly influence criminal activity. I investigate whether perceptions are determined simultaneously with crime, through learning in the light of personal experience. To overcome this simultaneity problem, I use an instrumental variables strategy to estimate the deterrence model. Recent techniques of propensity score matching algorithms developed are also considered. The results are robust and consistent with the deterrence theory.

The effects of sanctions and stigmas on cyberloafing

Cyberloafing has become a pervasive problem for many organizations and some researchers have suggested that a deterrence approach utilizing acceptable use policies for Internet-based applications coupled with mechanisms designed to monitor employee Internet usage and detect unauthorized usage can be an effective way to reduce it. However, the results of studies that have examined the effects of acceptable use policies and detection mechanisms on reducing cyberloafing are mixed. This study attempts to reconcile those inconsistencies by using an experiment to show that the deterrence model affects various types of cyberloafing differently. The results reveal that individually, threats termination and detection mechanisms are effective deterrents against activities like viewing pornography, managing personal finances, and personal shopping, but must be coupled together and actively enforced to dissuade activities like personal emailing and social networking.

Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not to Be Inflicted Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed

Law enforcers frequently issue warnings, as opposed to sanctions, when they detect first-time offenders. However, virtually all of the law and economics literature dealing with optimal penalty schemes for repeat offenders suggest that issuing warnings is a sub-optimal practice. Another observed phenomenon is the joint use of warnings and sanctions in law enforcement: person A may receive a sanction, whereas person B is only warned for committing the same offense. This situation can be explained through the use of hybrid warning strategies, a concept not yet formalized in the law enforcement literature, where law enforcers issue warnings to and sanctions to of first-time offenders. This article uses a two-period optimal deterrence model to provide a rationale as to why it may be optimal to issue warnings. When uninformed individuals are present and their punishment is assumed to be costly, there is a trade-off between such costs and reduced levels of deterrence. Depending on the cost structure associated with the punishment of uninformed individuals, warning strategies, including hybrid ones, may be optimal. A secondary contribution of this article is to point out that lack of information concerning laws may lead to optimal escalating punishments for repeat offenders.

The economic impact of cyber terrorism

What is the economic impact of cyber terrorism? Can organizations achieve strategic advantage in the cyber terrorism game? A general game theoretical model is proposed to study the optimal information systems (ISs) security investment and then applied to compare the losses caused by cyber terrorists and common hackers. Literature is reviewed on IS security, game theoretical models of IS security, cyber terrorism, cyber deterrence and IS security breach function. Simulations with varying levels of attacker’s preference, breach function sensitivity and deterrence level are carried out to determine sensitivity to the optimal IS security investment. Results suggest that organizations should invest more to protect their strategic information systems against cyber terrorists who have long-term goals.

Why the Police Have an Effect on Violent Crime After All: Evidence from the British Crime Survey

We present evidence that the use of police statistics as a source of crime data can seriously bias empirical tests of the model of deterrence. We use data for 21 areas in England and Wales in 2001–8. In addition to police-recorded crime data, we use victim-reported crime data from the British Crime Survey that are unaffected by changes in public reporting of crime and police recording of crime. We find that the estimated effect of the number of police on recorded and victim-reported crime is similar for property crime but different for violent crime. Our findings suggest that higher numbers of police not only reduce crime rates but also increase the share of crime, and in particular violent crime, that finds its way into police statistics. The resulting estimation bias is found to be large.

Employee Misuse of Information Technology Resources: Testing a Contemporary Deterrence Model

ABSTRACTRecent research in information systems and operations management has considered the positive impacts of information technology (IT). However, an undesirable side effect of firms’ increasing reliance on IT to support the distribution and delivery of goods and services to customers is a greater exposure to a diverse set of IT security risks. One such risk is intentional employee misuse of technology resources. In this article, we draw upon modern deterrence frameworks to develop a predictive model of technology misuse intention that incorporates formal and informal sanctions as well as employment context factors. The model specifies previously untested relationships between formal and informal sanctions, thereby providing fresh insight into the role of sanctions in deterring technology misuse in organizations. Our results suggest that a predisposition toward the need for social approval and moral beliefs regarding the behavior are key determinants of technology misuse. Contrary to criminological research that has questioned the relative importance of formal sanctions in the deterrence process, we also found that the threat of formal sanctions has both direct and indirect influences on technology misuse intention. Further, from an employment context standpoint, employees who spend more working days away from the office (i.e., “virtual” mode) appear more inclined to misuse their organization's technology resources. The findings have implications for the research and practice of technology management.

A Formal Model of Economic Cooperation and Conflict Deterrence in Anarchy

This paper uses a formal model to analyze the relationship between interstate military conflicts and international trade and economic cooperation. The paper studies an infinitely repeated game. In the game, two states set their defense expenditures to deter the other from starting a war and changing the status quo. The solution concept for the game is Markov perfect equilibrium where players make their decisions basing only on the last period conditions of the game. The model shows that a greater offense advantage in war increases defense spending, a higher level of war destruction costs lowers defense expenditures, a higher time discount factor leads to higher defense spending and, a larger pool of resources in the possession of the states reduces defense expenditures. The model also discovers that a higher level of trade and economic cooperation between nations reduces military spending while a higher level of unrealized potential gains from trade and economic cooperation intensifies political economic contest between nations and increases defense spending. The paper applies the insights to understand various well known topics in history. These include: how mercantilism and associated protectionist measures made wars more frequent among the European great powers during the early modern era of colonization; the relationship between competitive protectionisms of the interwar period, the associated Great Depression, the resultant rise of extreme nationalisms and, the final occurrence of World War Two; the link between costs of destruction from nuclear exchanges, gains from international economic arrangements of the Breton Woods system and, the peace after World War II under American leadership.

NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING: ALLOWING FOR INCONSTANT PROBABILITY OF DETECTION AND FREQUENCY MEASURES OF VIOLATION WITHIN DYNAMIC DETERRENCE FISHERY MODELS

Abstract. The dynamic deterrence model (DDM) represents an analytical framework widely used for analyzing compliance with fishery regulations aiming for sustainable fishery management. However, applications of the DDM have so far been limited to the case of constant probability of detection that assumes independence of the length of time to detection. This paper modifies the DDM to allow for more flexible and broader specification by introducing, for the first time, two important variables to the supply of offences function, namely evasion activity and enforcement efforts and accommodating inconstant probability of detection specifications. Determinants of probability of detection are specified and important potential extensions of the modified DDM are discussed in this paper. The relative magnitude of the effects of each of these determinants on probability of detection, however, remains an important empirical question that requires further investigation for prioritization of policy actions.

A Cyberwar of Ideas? Deterrence and Norms in Cyberspace

This article relates American efforts to develop strategic ‘cyber deterrence’ as a means to deter adversarial actions in and through global cyberspace. Thus far, interests- based cyber deterrence theory has failed to translate into effective American policy and strategy, due to a divergence between the operational idiosyncrasies of cyberspace and an over-reliance on Cold War models of deterrence. Even while explicit cyber deterrence strategy falters, the United States is pursuing a normsbased approach to cyber strategy generally, and hopes to derive deterrent effects from its attempts to broker international agreements pertaining to the ‘rules of the road’ for the proper and productive use of cyberspace. The United States is not the only norm entrepreneur in this policy space, however, and this article examines how a range of other state and non-state actors are complicating efforts to develop normative regimes that might reduce risks to and from cyberspace. The article concludes that a norms-based approach to cyber deterrence might engender deterrent effects at the state level but is unlikely to do so in the case of ‘rogue’ states and many non-state actors. States will continue, therefore, to develop punitive deterrence capabilities to respond to these actors.

Uncovering Entry Deterrence in the Presence of Learning-by-Doing

This paper investigates a signaling entry deterrence model under learning-by-doing. We show that a monopolist’s practice of entry deterrence imposes smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare gains) when learning effects are present than when they are absent, making the intervention of antitrust authorities less urgent. If, however, the welfare loss associated to entry deterrence is still significant, and thus intervention is needed, our paper demonstrates that the incumbent’s practice of entry deterrence is easier to detect by a regulator who does not have access to accurate information about the incumbent’s profit function. Learning-by-doing hence facilitates the regulator’s ability to detect entry deterrence, thus suggesting its role as an “ally” of antitrust authorities.

The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and Incapacitation

Economic analyses of criminal law are frequently and heavily criticized for being unable to explain many criminal law rules and doctrines that people find intuitively just. Existing economic models cannot properly explain, for instance, why criminal law distinguishes between (i) repeat offenders and first-time offenders, (ii) murder and voluntary manslaughter, and (iii) remorseful and non-remorseful offenders. In this Article, I propose a new and richer economic theory of crime that captures the rationales behind these practices, and potentially behind many other important criminal law principles and doctrines. Unlike an overwhelming majority of previous economic analyses, my theory accounts not only for the deterrent effect of criminal punishment, but also for its incapacitative effect. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it acknowledges the fact that people have fluctuating, rather than constant, criminal tendencies. That is, it recognizes that some people who ordinarily would rarely if ever consider committing a wrongful act can, in rare circumstances, lapse into committing a crime. Surprisingly, these two simple but critical concepts have never been jointly considered in an economic analysis of crime even though their inclusion appears to be an obvious extension of the standard crime and deterrence model formalized almost half a century ago by Gary Becker.The threat of imprisonment deters crime, but even when deterrence fails and a crime is committed, imprisonment benefits society by preventing the criminal from committing further wrongs outside prison for the duration of the sentence. Because these incapacitative benefits exist only if the offender would commit more crimes if left at large, the more strongly we believe that a criminal is dangerous, the stronger the rationale for imprisonment. But since people have fluctuating criminal tendencies, the mere fact that a person committed a crime reveals imperfect information regarding his likelihood of recidivating. As such, the offender’s criminal history and the circumstances surrounding the crime reveal important pieces of information that can be used to update our beliefs concerning the offender’s expected dangerousness – that is, to distinguish those who have made an uncharacteristic mistake from the dangerous and reckless criminals. Capturing the interaction between the incapacitation function of imprisonment and potential offenders’ fluctuating criminal tendencies allows the model to supply specific, consequentialist justifications for repeat offender laws, voluntary manslaughter laws, and the treatment of remorse in criminal law. Going forward, this more nuanced approach will provide a clearer lens through which to view other pervasive elements of criminal law, such as the mens rea requirement, and to revisit the normative prescriptions of the previous generation of economic analyses.

Certainty and Severity of Sanctions in Classical and Behavioral Models of Deterrence: A Survey

This survey summarizes the classical fundamentals of modern deterrence theory, covers major theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of certainty and severity of punishment (and the interplay thereof) as well as underlying methodological problems, gives an overview of limitations and extensions motivated by recent findings of behavioral economics and discusses 'rational' deterrence strategies in subcultural societies.

Enhancing tax morale with marketing tactics: A review of literature

There is a general consensus that developing economies need better infrastructure to foster economic growth and hence they need wider tax bases. The problem is how the tax base can be broadened. Traditionally, deterrence models have placed more emphasis on punitive choices to increase tax collections. However, these models have failed to yield desired results, especially in countries where governance mechanisms and legal frameworks are weak. In recent times, the attention has been diverted to the role of intrinsic motivation of taxpayers in increasing the tax base. In this paper, we discuss several marketing tactics that can be used to enhance tax morale. In doing so, we draw on existing theories and available empirical research in the domains of marketing and taxation.

Applying an extended model of deterrence across cultures: An investigation of information systems misuse in the U.S. and South Korea

Intentional employee misuse of IS is a global problem. Research suggests that security countermeasures can deter misuse by increasing the perceived certainty and severity of punishment for such behavior. However, the value of generalizing this work beyond Western cultures is open to question. In our study, we examined whether national culture influenced the deterrent capabilities of security policies, security education, training, and awareness programs and computer monitoring. Using U.S. and Korean samples, we found evidence that the deterrent effect of certain security countermeasures varied between the two countries, as did the influence of age and gender. The results have implications for information security management practices in global businesses.

Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence

It is generally agreed that the conviction of an innocent person (type-I error) should be avoided even at the cost of allowing a certain number of acquittals of criminals (type-II error). The high standard of evidence that is usually required in criminal procedure reflects this principle. Conversely, the established model of optimal deterrence that follows the seminal work of Becker (1968) shows that the two types of error are equally detrimental in terms of deterrence and thus it prescribes the minimization of the sum of errors with no primacy given to type-I errors over type-II errors. This paper explains that when the costs of punishment are positive, and guilty individuals are, on average, more likely to be found guilty than innocent ones, wrongful convictions are more socially costly than wrongful acquittals. This justifies the bias against wrongful convictions without resorting to any ad hoc assumption about the relative weight of the two errors.

Why do farmers behave as they do? Understanding compliance with rural, agricultural, and food attribute standards

Agricultural production experiences a shift in underlying institutions during the last years., Importance of private stakeholders like retailers, processors, consumers as well as tax payers is, emerging. Eligibility for single farm payments and marketing of products is linked to compliance with, diverse codes of practice and standards. Voluntary certification schemes are not only relevant with, respect to agriculture's traditional activity (i.e. food production), but is also highly relevant in case of, rural policies. Examples are the EU's agri-environmental schemes, aimed at preserving biodiversity, landscape elements, etc., which are characterized by voluntary participation and the contractual, commitment to apply certain standards. However, these relationships are highly characterized by, information asymmetries. Economic literature offers several approaches to analyse similar relations. The classical approach bases on the assumption of utility maximising agents that will comply with, rules as long as the net utility of compliance will be higher than the net utility of an offence. Recent, evidence challenges this result. Experiments show that people behave more honest than the classical, deterrence model predicts. Main objective of the paper is to compare the various approaches to explain, compliant behaviour. Additionally, an outlook for empirical applications of the theoretical framework, developed here is given to motivate further research. However, our outlook shows that the selection of, appropriate variables to analyse compliance empirically is open to debate.

Social Capital, Rehabilitation, Tradition: Support for Restorative Justice in Japan and Australia

This paper investigates the attitudes and beliefs that the public hold about criminal behaviour in Japanese and Australian society, with a view to uncovering sources of resistance to, and support for, restorative justice. The study draws on a survey of 1,544 respondents from Japan and 1,967 respondents from Australia. In both societies, restorative justice met with greater acceptance among those who were (1) strong in social capital, (2) believed in offender reintegration and rehabilitation, (3) saw benefits for victims in forgiveness, and (4) were advocates for victims’ voices being heard and amends made. The alternative ‘just deserts’ and deterrence models for dealing with crime were grounded in attitudes of punitiveness and fear of moral decay, and reservations about the value of reintegrating and rehabilitating offenders. Like restorative justice supporters, ‘just deserts’ and deterrence supporters expressed concern that victims’ voices be heard and amends made. Winning public support for competing institutional arrangements may depend on who does best in meeting expectations for meeting the needs of victims.

The Effect of Leasing versus Buying on Entry Deterrence

Models of entry deterrence typically require that incumbents possess a cost advantage as a prerequisite for deterring entry. Potential entrants possess a cost advantage over incumbents, however, if input costs fall over time. This paper models the behavior of an incumbent and a potential entrant when the input cost falls over time and the firms have the option of buying or leasing the input. The model shows that if the future cost savings from new technology exceed the marginal transaction costs of leasing the current equipment, then leasing increases the incumbent's ability to deter entry. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.