Deontological Moral Judgments Research Articles

Rational intuitions: How reason underlies deontological moral judgments

ABSTRACT Joshua Greene’s dual process account contends that deontological moral judgments are the result of intuitions that are automatic, emotional and arational. Deontological intuitions cannot be trusted, Greene argues, because they are arationally acquired and deployed. However, the empirical evidence taken to support this view is methodologically flawed and does not support the utilitarianism-rational and deontology-emotional links that dual process theorists postulate. Instead, the available evidence supports a social domain account of moral development, in which the acquisition of moral intuitions is a rational process. That is, one acquires moral intuitions through repeated exposure to and reasoned engagement with moral information. The deployment of moral intuitions is not arational merely because it is not easily open to introspection. Indeed, if introspection were the sine qua non of rationality, then it would follow that the deployment of consequentialist intuitions is also arational. Although deontological intuitions are not infallible, the infirmities of deontological intuitions are equally shared by utilitarian intuitions. Thus, contrary to Greene’s recommendation, one need not abandon her deontological moral intuitions. Instead, intuitions – be they deontological or consequentialist – can be useful tools to guide moral reasoning.

Verification of the Japanese Version of Greene’s Moral Dilemma Task’s Validity and Reliability

The moral dilemma task developed by Greene et al., which comprises personal and impersonal moral dilemmas, is useful for clarifying people’s moral judgments. This study develops and validates a Japanese version of this questionnaire. Ten new questions were added to the Japanese version using back-translation, and its internal validity was tested. A second survey was conducted among the same participants one month after the first survey (n = 231). The intraclass correlation coefficient through retesting was found to be 0.781. Test-retest, internal consistency, and criterion-related validity were confirmed by retesting the Japanese version of the moral dilemma task. Moral judgments differed in gender, with women and men tending to be more utilitarian in situations where emotions were less and more likely to be involved, respectively. The association between age and deontological moral judgments was also observed.

Effect of subclinical depression on moral judgment dilemmas: a process dissociation approach

Dual-process theory of moral judgment indicates that moral decision-making is guided by emotional or cognitive processing, competing with each other. While emotional processing overwhelms cognitive processing, individuals preferentially make deontological judgments. Further, while cognitive processing dominates emotional processing, individuals preferentially make utilitarian judgments. This theory predicts that individuals with subclinical depression associated with emotion regulation deficits may deliver more utilitarian judgments. Experiment 1 indicated that higher depressive symptoms predicted utilitarian judgment. However, previous studies have not determined why individuals with subclinical depression make a utilitarian judgment. Thus, Experiment 2 employed the process-dissociation approach, which can separately measure the relative strength of individual deontological and utilitarian inclinations. Deontological inclination (parameter D) was associated with emotional processing, whereas utilitarian inclination (parameter U) was related to cognitive processing. In Experiment 2, the two groups (higher depressive symptoms/minimal depressive symptoms) completed the moral task of the process-dissociation approach to investigate the underlying mechanism. There was a significant interaction effect between the group and parameter of process dissociation. Parameter D in the higher depressive symptoms group was weaker than in the minimal depressive symptoms group. Individuals with subclinical depression bias their utilitarian judgments by making fewer deontological moral judgments.

Breakdown of utilitarian moral judgement after basolateral amygdala damage

Most of us would regard killing another person as morally wrong, but when the death of one saves multiple others, it can be morally permitted. According to a prominent computational dual-systems framework, in these life-and-death dilemmas, deontological (nonsacrificial) moral judgments stem from a model-free algorithm that emphasizes the intrinsic value of the sacrificial action, while utilitarian (sacrificial) moral judgments are derived from a model-based algorithm that emphasizes the outcome of the sacrificial action. Rodent decision-making research suggests that the model-based algorithm depends on the basolateral amygdala (BLA), but these findings have not yet been translated to human moral decision-making. Here, in five humans with selective, bilateral BLA damage, we show a breakdown of utilitarian sacrificial moral judgments, pointing at deficient model-based moral decision-making. Across an established set of moral dilemmas, healthy controls frequently sacrifice one person to save numerous others, but BLA-damaged humans withhold such sacrificial judgments even at the cost of thousands of lives. Our translational research confirms a neurocomputational hypothesis drawn from rodent decision-making research by indicating that the model-based algorithm which underlies outcome-based, utilitarian moral judgements in humans critically depends on the BLA.

How power affects moral judgments: The role of intuitive thinking

Power affects how people think about moral issues, and has been found to elicit deontological moral judgments. We hypothesized that powerholders' propensity to rely on intuitive thinking would trigger deontological moral choices. In two studies, power was induced by role simulation tasks and participants then made a judgment on a moral dilemma that did not involve bodily harm. In Study 1 memory cognitive load was manipulated to induce an intuitive processing style, and in Study 2 deliberation was induced by asking participants to deliver strong arguments. Results of Study 1 show that high power led to deontological judgments regardless of cognitive load, and cognitive load enhanced deontological preferences among powerless individuals. In Study 2 we found that deliberation shifted the judgments of powerholders toward utilitarianism. These results extend prior findings and reinforce the links between power and deontology. The findings suggest that powerholders' preference for deontological moral judgments is driven by their reliance on intuitive thinking.

The Influence of Situational Factors in Sacrificial Dilemmas on Utilitarian Moral Judgments

The standard way to test alternative descriptive theories of moral judgment is by asking subjects to evaluate (amongst others) sacrificial dilemmas, where acting classifies as a utilitarian moral judgment and not acting classifies as a deontological moral judgment. Previous research uncovered many situational factors that alter subject’s moral judgments without affecting which type of action utilitarianism or deontology would recommend. This literature review provides a systematic analysis of the experimental literature on the influence of situational factors on moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. It analyses 53 articles in detail and reports mean effect sizes, as well as operationalizations, for 36 situational factors that significantly influence moral judgment. Moreover, the review discusses how the impact of situational factors relates to a dual process theory of moral judgment. It supports the view that utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes and shows that the drivers of deontological judgments depend on valence.

Moral injury and the COVID-19 pandemic: A philosophical viewpoint

IntroductionMuch has changed in healthcare during the coronavirus disease (COVID)-19 pandemic. Medicine, a profession of traditional principles and virtues, has faced unprecedented challenges in the light of scarce and unequal distribution of ventilators, testing, and personal protective equipment. Healthcare workers have been- and are increasingly likely to be- forced into situations that require difficult decision making under life-and-death conditions. Concepts of “medical necessity” and “maximum benefit” challenge healthcare systems that already struggle to manage unequal treatment and access to services, giving rise to moral distress and moral injury on the front lines.MethodsThis article focuses on moral injury in the context of coronavirus disease (COVID)-19 pandemic. I review recent literature to highlight the psychological impact of many morally-injurious events that have been reported during the COVID-19 pandemic. With the help of a clinical vignette, I point out how healthcare systems adopt many utilitarian policies in times of excessive healthcare burden. A viewpoint is offered that many morally injurious events happen when healthcare workers, traditionally practicing Kantian and virtue ethics, are forced to follow utilitarian policies of healthcare system.ConclusionOne form of moral injury may arise from inherent conflicts between individual deontological moral judgments and organizational utilitarian moral judgments. More research is needed to validate the philosophical viewpoint as well as to explore whether increased awareness and education of key principles within moral philosophy can better equip healthcare workers in situations when public health takes precedence over individual health.

The Effects of Social Perception on Moral Judgment.

When people express a moral judgment, others make inferences about their personality, such as whether they are warm or competent. People may use this interpersonal process to present themselves in a way that is socially acceptable in the current circumstances. Across four studies, we investigated this hypothesis in Chinese culture and showed that college student participants tended to associate others’ deontological moral judgments with warmth and utilitarian moral judgments with competence (Study 1, Mage = 21.1, SD = 2.45; Study 2, Mage = 20.53, SD = 1.87). In addition, participants made more deontological judgments after preparing to be interviewed for a job requiring them to be in a warm social role, and more utilitarian judgments after preparing for a job requiring them to be in a competent social role (Study 3, Mage = 19.5, SD = 1.63). This effect held true in moral dilemmas involving different degrees of hypothetical personal involvement, and appeared to be mediated by the perception of others’ expectations (Study 4, Mage = 19.92, SD = 1.97). The results suggest an important role for social cognition as an influence on moral judgments in Chinese culture.

Personality and moral judgment: Curious consequentialists and polite deontologists.

How does our personality relate to the ways in which we judge right from wrong? Drawing on influential theories of moral judgment, we identify candidate traits that may be linked with inclinations toward (a) consequentialist judgments (i.e., those based on the outcomes of an action) and (b) deontological judgments (i.e., those based on the alignment of an action with particular moral rules). Across two studies (total N=843) we examined domains and aspects of the Big Five in relation to inclinations toward consequentialist and deontological judgments. In both studies, we found a unique association between intellect (curiosity, cognitive engagement) and consequentialist inclinations, in line with the view that deliberative cognitive processes drive such inclinations. We also found a consistent unique association between politeness (respectfulness, etiquette) and deontological inclinations, in line with the view that norm-adherence drives such inclinations. Neither study yielded a significant unique relation between deontological inclinations and compassion (sympathy, empathic concern)-or any other emotion-infused trait (e.g., Neuroticism)-as would be expected based on emotion-centered views of deontological moral judgment. These findings have implications for theories of moral judgment, and reveal how our personality may guide our approach to questions of ethics and morality.

The Characteristics of Moral Judgment of Psychopaths: The Mediating Effect of the Deontological Tendency.

PurposeMany studies explore the relationship between moral judgment and psychopathy in western culture, but the mechanism underlying this relationship remains unclear. By far, no research about this topic in the background of Chinese culture exists. In the current study, we adopt one of the creative process-dissociation approaches to explore the relationship between the psychopath and moral judgment.MethodsAdopt the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathic Scale, the Chinese version of Interpersonal Reactivity and Process-dissociation approach to explore the relationship between the psychopath and moral judgment.ResultsTraditional utilitarian moral score of the high psychopathy group are significantly higher than that of low psychopathy group (t= 2.97, p<0.05), people with high psychopathy utilitarian tendency U factor score and people with low psychopathy have no significant difference (F= 0.85, p = 0.36).ConclusionIndividuals with high psychopathy tend to make fewer deontological moral judgments because of their decreased deontological tendencies rather than their increased utilitarian tendencies. They may make more acceptance choices not to increase the well-being of the majority of people, but because of their increased acceptance of hurting others in the moral dilemma.

The Influence of Situational Factors in Sacrificial Dilemmas on Utilitarian Moral Judgments

The standard way to test alternative descriptive theories of moral judgment is by asking subjects to evaluate (amongst others) sacrificial dilemmas, where acting classifies as a utilitarian moral judgment and not acting classifies as a deontological moral judgment. Previous research uncovered many situational factors that alter subject’s moral judgments without affecting which type of action utilitarianism or deontology would recommend. This literature review provides a systematic analysis of the experimental literature on the influence of situational factors on moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. It analyses 53 articles in detail and reports mean effect sizes, as well as operationalizations, for 36 situational factors that significantly influence moral judgment. Moreover, the review discusses how the impact of situational factors relates to a dual process theory of moral judgment. It supports the view that utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes and shows that the drivers of deontological judgments depend on valence.

The Normative Significance of Cognitive Science Reconsidered

Abstract Josh Greene famously argued that his cognitive-scientific results undermine deontological moral theorizing. Greene is wrong about this: at best, his research has revealed that at least some characteristically deontological moral judgments are sensitive to factors that we deem morally irrelevant. This alone is not enough to undermine those judgments. However, cognitive science could someday tell us more: it could tell us that in forming those judgments, we treat certain factors as reasons to believe as we do. If we independently deem such factors to be morally irrelevant, such a result would undermine those judgments and any moral theorizing built upon them. This paper attempts to bring charity, clarity, and epistemological sophistication to Greene's argument and those like it.

Do affective episodes modulate moral judgment in individuals with bipolar disorder?

BackgroundBipolar disorder (BD) patients experience altered emotional states and deficits in social adaptation that may also be involved in deontological moral judgments in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. MethodsIn the present study we compared the utilitarian responses of BD patients in their different states (euthymia, mania, depression) and healthy controls to moral dilemmas with low (impersonal dilemma) and high (personal dilemma) emotional saliency. ResultsOur findings revealed an increased tendency to utilitarian judgments in the three groups of BD patients in impersonal dilemmas relative to healthy individuals. In addition, utilitarian responses were increased during manic and depressive episodes in personal moral dilemmas relative to control group. Furthermore, we found no differences in social adaptation between utilitarian and deontological BD responders, though the depressive BD had a lower adaptation than the euthymic individuals. LimitationsThe recording of response times, the exhaustive control of medication effect, or the inclusion of a non-moral condition in the battery of moral dilemmas would provide a better characterization of moral judgment in BD. ConclusionsFor impersonal dilemmas, BD patients exhibited more utilitarian reasoning, which is also affected by emotional engagement for personal dilemmas during acute episodes of mania and depression. Social adaptation is not associated to utilitarian reasoning, but is rather influenced by mood state.

Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

AbstractIn 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.

Crítica a la naturalización del deontologismo en la teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral de Joshua Greene

En este trabajo me propongo cuestionar la tesis neuroética de Joshua Greene acerca del carácter esencialmente emocional de los llamados “juicios morales deontológicos”. Centrándome en su teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral cuestiono que solo y principalmente los juicios morales deontológicos sean intuitivos y no reflexivos. En segundo lugar, cuestiono que el juicio utilitarista pueda ser asimilable al cálculo matemático y que el juicio deontológico se reduzca al factor no reflexivo de la emoción. La principal objeción que planteo al naturalismo de Greene es pretender eliminar la justificación filosófica acerca de la validez moral que lleva a cabo el deontologismo en Kant, reduciéndolo exclusivamente a factores psicológicos y neurofisiológicos vinculados con la emoción.

Disgust and Deontology: Trait Sensitivity to Contamination Promotes a Preference for Order, Hierarchy, and Rule-Based Moral Judgment

Models of moral judgment have linked generalized emotionality with deontological moral judgment. The evidence, however, is mixed. Other research has linked the specific emotion of disgust with generalized moral condemnation. Here too, the evidence is mixed. We suggest that a synthesis of these two literatures points to one specific emotion (disgust) that reliably predicts one specific type of moral judgment (deontological). In all three studies, we found that trait disgust sensitivity predicted more extreme deontological judgment. In Study 3, with deontological endorsement and consequentialist endorsement operationalized as independent constructs, we found that disgust was positively associated with deontological endorsement but was unrelated to consequentialist endorsement. Across studies, the disgust–deontology link was mediated by individual difference variables related to preference for order (right-wing authoritarianism and intolerance for ambiguity). These data suggest a more precise model of emotion and moral judgment that identifies specific emotions, specific types of moral judgment, and specific motivational pathways.

¿Conduce la neurociencia a una naturalización del deontologismo? «Juicios morales deontológicos» en perspectiva neuroética

A tenor de las investigaciones en el campo de la neuroética y más en concreto en la teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral en autores como Joshua Greene, nos planteamos la cuestión de si la neurociencia conduce necesariamente a una «naturalización del deontologismo». De este modo en nuestra comunicación ponemos en cuestión un modo de hacer neurociencia que pretenda reducir el deontologismo a un tipo de respuesta exclusivamente emocional. Frente a este modelo planteamos otra forma de hacer «neuroética» donde se consideren las estructuras psicofísicas de la moralidad sin incurrir en el reduccionismo miope naturalista. Se trata, por lo tanto, de descubrir la neurociencia de la ética, esto es, la naturaleza de la moralidad sin que eso implique reducir la moralidad a la naturaleza. Así entendida la neurociencia puede contribuir al trabajo interdisciplinar de comprender la vasta naturaleza humana en toda su amplitud.

Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought.

Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations (deontological judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their actions (utilitarian judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism – deontic introduction, the tendency to infer normative (‘deontic’) conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference). Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive (although value-laden) premises. This family includes deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research into deontic reasoning and informal inference.

Beyond Affective Influences on Deontological Moral Judgment: The Role of Motivations for Prevention in the Moral Condemnation of Harm.

Past research suggests that deontological judgments, which condemn deliberate harm no matter what the beneficial consequences, typically arise from emotional and intuitive reactions to the harm, whereas utilitarian judgments, which acknowledge the potential benefits of deliberate harm, typically arise from rational deliberation about whether these benefits outweigh the costs. The present research explores whether specific motivational orientations might, at times, increase the likelihood of deontological judgments without increasing emotional reactions. A meta-analysis of 10 newly conducted studies indicated that, compared with when focused on advancement ( promotion), when people were focused on security ( prevention) they made stronger deontological judgments in hypothetical moral dilemmas. Moreover, this effect could not be explained by participants' differing emotional reactions to the dilemmas when prevention-focused, but instead mirrored reports of their explicit reasoning. Implications for expanding current models of deontological and utilitarian moral judgment are discussed.

A Mind-Reader Does Not Always Have Deontological Moral Judgments and Prosocial Behavior: A Developmental Perspective.

The rationalistic theories of morality emphasize that reasoning plays an important role in moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Theory of mind as a reasoning ability in the mental domain has been considered a facilitator of moral development. The present study examined whether theory of mind was consistently positively associated with morality from middle childhood to late adulthood. Two hundred and four participants, including 48 elementary school children, 45 adolescents, 62 younger adults, and 49 older adults, completed theory of mind, moral judgment and prosocial behavior tasks. Theory of mind was measured with strange stories that tapped into an understanding of lies, white lies, double bluffs, irony, and persuasion. Moral judgments were measured with variants of the trolley dilemma. Prosocial behavior was measured through participants' performance in an interactive situation in which a helping request was made. The results indicated specific rather than similar developmental trajectories of theory of mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior. There was a quadratic trend in theory of mind, a combination of quadratic and cubic trends in deontological moral judgments and a linear decline in helping behavior. It is thus suggested that theory of mind may not be associated with morality in an unchanging way during development. Further results indicated that theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were negatively correlated for children, adolescents, and older adults but positively correlated for younger adults. Theory of mind and helping behavior were positively correlated for children but negatively correlated for adolescents. However, the relationships disappeared in adulthood. In sum, the present study reveals that theory of mind may be a nice tool for its facilitation of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior, but it may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Moreover, theory of mind may be a permanent tool for moral judgment development but a temporary tool for prosocial behavior development. Thus, the present study enriches the rationalistic theories of morality from a developmental perspective. Different relationships between theory of mind and morality from middle childhood to late adulthood are discussed.