Deng Xiaoping Research Articles

1989년 천안문 사건과 그 이후 - 역사의 중첩과 트라우마의 재생산

The 1989 Tiananmen incident is generally regarded as a liberal democratic movement resisting dictatorship. The interpretation gained further momentum as it was viewed as the anti-dictatorial democratic movements in East Asia, and the anti-socialist revolutions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, if you take a closer look at the development of the movement and the aspects of the resistance, the Tiananmen incident was a hybridized social movement with the class struggle and the democratic socialist movement within the socialist system.<BR>Meanwhile, the 1989 Tiananmen incident is regarded as a democratic movement strongly influenced by the West since its reform and opening up, and in stark contrast to this, the Cultural Revolution is viewed as a totalitarian madness in which a dictator Mao Zedong mobilized the people to regain his power. However, if you look at the Tiananmen incident in the context of the movement for resistance from the base layer that appeared in modern Chinese history intermittently, you can see that it overlaps with the Cultural Revolution in many aspects. In particular, Deng Xiaoping and other old party leaders had traumas in the Cultural Revolution at the time, so they saw the Tiananmen incident as a renaissance of the Cultural Revolution and strongly mobilized state violence to suppress it.<BR>The armed suppression of the Tiananmen incident in 1989 reduced the power of the stratum social forces, and China has changed into a neoliberal regime with Chinese characteristics that combines authoritarian rule and marketization. In the process, inequality and materialism have led to another new social movement in China, but the Chinese Communist Party has again imposed a strong crackdown on them due to the Tiananmen Square trauma. It is worth noting how the newly formed resistance movement will evolve in this overlap of history.

Can International Law Help Resolve the Conflicts Over Uninhabited Islands in the East China Sea?

Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping once famously urged that resolution of disputes with China’s neighbors over uninhabited islands be put off to a later generation, stating: “Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. The next generation will certainly be wiser.” Such sage advice seemed practical at the time, freeing China and its neighbors to focus on more pressing trade and economic development efforts. The wisdom of continuing deferral of the disputes over uninhabited islands is now in doubt, at least when peaceful alternatives may be considered. Beyond the rapid economic development and the consequent explosion of resource demands that has occurred since Deng uttered these words, technological development has made these deep seabed resources more readily accessible. Added to this has been China’s rapid economic development and associated military rise, encouraging China’s expanded attention to territorial sovereignty and resource claims in its periphery. Increased military confrontations over disputed islands have added to the urgency of this matter, and an impasse has prevailed. This article focuses on comparable disputes over two groups of uninhabited islands — the Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese) Islands and the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands — that may be pivotal to unraveling a series of volatile maritime disputes between Japan and South Korea, on the one hand, and Japan and China, on the other. The Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located respectively in the Sea of Japan (known as the East Sea in Korea) and the East China Sea. This narrowing of the topic to these two particular island disputes and related maritime issues is offered in the hope that these two sets of disputes may hold some keys to the wider, more factually complex debate stretching across the region, both north to the Yellow Sea and south to the South China Sea. At the same time, there is hope the Japan-South Korea dispute may inform options available for the China-Japan dispute.

Along the Academe‐Policy Frontier: A Tribute to Aileen S.P. Baviera

Along the Academe‐Policy Frontier: A Tribute to Aileen S.P. Baviera

Confucius Institutes: A Planetary Philosophical Gift

The article discusses the philosophical component of the Chinese project for the harmonization of cultures promoted by modern Confucius Institutes. The author research the formation of the Confucian culture of Tao, the creation by Confucius (551–479 BC) of the first Chinese philosophical school as well as the dictionary of universals of Confucian culture. In Confucianism, on the basis of the archetype of the Tao culture, a model of “moderate prosperity” ( xiaokang ) is built. This model involves the implementation of five programs: the global foreign policy program (pacification of all four cardinal points around the Middle Country), the cultural program (the Middle Country is chosen as the meeting place for all peoples), the internal political capital-government program (the calming and integration of internal provinces around the Capital of the Middle Country), the moral and ethical program (peace of mind and peace of the people of the Middle Country), the program of state unity (ensuring the integrity of the Middle Country). The key role in the xiaokang project is played by the perfection of man, the achievement of a harmonious balance of physical and mental virtues, the formation of personality of junzi as the ideal person of future civilization. Although the concept of xiaokang appeared in separate medieval treatises of the epochs of Jin (265–420) and Song (960–1279) dynasties, the xiaokang returns to the forefront of Chinese history at the end of the 19 th century during the movement for the modernization of the country. Xiaokang is interpreted by the reformers of China, in particular, Kang Youwei, as a necessary stage in building a society of “great unity” ( datong ). The “Architect of Chinese Reforms,” Deng Xiaoping, introduced the concept of “modestly prosperous family” ( xiao kang zhi jia ), the xiaokang of the “Four Chinese Modernizations.” The project of the formation of “community with shared future for mankind,” currently implemented by China, is based on a Confucian vision of the development of society and the world. In 1994, the International Confucian Association was created in China, and, since 2004, the deployment of a network of Confucius Institutes around the world began. The author concludes that Confucian culture has a supra-ethnic value because it opens the prospect of a new type of globalization, when cultures, preserving their originality but complementing each other by archetypes, form a single universal human paradigm.

The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s New Era: Implications for the United States and Taiwan

Xi Jinping’s rise to power has heralded a new foreign policy that is more assertive and uncompromising toward China’s neighbors, the United States, and the rest of the world. This change presents challenges for the United States and Taiwan in particular which must be addressed with a sense of urgency due to Xi Jinping’s ambitious objectives and his firm grip on the levers of power which increase the likelihood that the Communist Party and government of China will seek to achieve them without delay. This paper reviews changes to Chinese foreign policy in the Xi Jinping era and argues how the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over time has increased the threat to Taiwan, with concurrent risks for the United States. Taiwan and the US can address the challenge presented by China by strengthening their relationship to adapt to the new era under Xi Jinping’s leadership. According to CIA (2018), China’s economy now stands at approximately US$12 trillion, second only to the United States (CIA [2018]. World fact book). Unlike in 1978, China’s economy today is dependent on access to globally sourced raw materials, and access to overseas consumer markets for its industrial and consumer goods. This dependency on overseas markets has increased China’s global presence and interests, driving the need to protect them. The Chinese Government’s now ample resources have been allocated to both hard and soft power means toward this purpose. The PLA has greatly benefitted from economic development and the expansion of the Chinese economy, transforming from a backward institution focused on private-sector moneymaking into the sharpest tool of China’s power and influence. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China’s foreign policy and strategy have undergone a dramatic shift away from Deng Xiaoping’s focus on increasing domestic productivity and avoiding potentially costly overseas entanglements. The confluence of accumulated national wealth, diplomatic, economic, and military power, and the will to use those levers of power, has dramatic implications for the United States and China’s neighbors. A more assertive China, confident in its wealth, power, and international status, is increasingly unafraid of overt competition with its neighbors and the United States, unwilling to back down or compromise in the face of disputes. This dynamic has resulted in a new paradigm in the Indo-Pacific region that is unlike previous challenges of the past 40 years. The shift in China’s foreign policy and the PLA’s modernization threaten to challenge the credibility of US security assurances and alliances in the region, making the cultivation and strengthening of the US–Taiwan relationship, and the network of US bilateral alliances in the region an urgent imperative.

The invaluable experience

PurposeThis writing examines the remarkable career of the founding East Asian scholar at Montreal's Concordia University. He was the individual who did more than merely a college professor after 37 years there. He had helped to shape a new course in Sino-Canadian relations.DesignThis paper will look at an element of soft power engagement between Canada and China before Deng Xiaoping's Open Door Policy. It also examines Concordia's achievement in establishing a China foothold in the early-1980s.FindingsCanada has always been a pioneer in engaging Red China. Despite not having formal diplomatic ties until October 1970, Ottawa never abandoned its wish to seek a friendship with Beijing. Amidst the thawing China–Canada relations since 1970, Concordia University recruited a 25-year-old graduate student named Martin Singer to inaugurate its East Asian courses. Singer's auspicious academic career not only gave him to organize Canada's first and the largest student delegation to China but also enabled him to pioneer the first joint-postgraduate studies program between a Chinese and a Western postsecondary institution. He was also a key player in establishing a novel and unique relationship between the PRC and the Western world.OriginalityThis paper provides a glimpse into China's early experience in engaging the world as it left behind decades of communist isolation. It also highlights how serendipities allowed people and institutions to advance in the wake of this exciting period in modern Chinese history.

„Burza nad Pekinem”. Przyczyny, przebieg i konsekwencje kryzysu w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej w 1989 r. w świetle archiwów Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej

The aim of the article is to present the genesis, progress and consequences of the so-called April–June Incidents of the 1989 in Beijing. The People’s Republic of China experienced serious internal crisis that year resulting in massive students demonstrations brutally suppressed by army. The crisis ended up with the political downfall of the China Communist Party’s General Secretary Zhao Ziyang replaced by Jiang Zemin who continued the so-called “policy of openness” and reforms on Deng Xiaoping’s terms.

Settling the Sino–Russian Border Issue: Land in Exchange for a Strategic Partnership?

China has been committed to resolving its border disputes with Russia since the late 1980s and expedited this move in the wake of the Cold War in the hope of removing what has been referred to as the ‘biggest obstacle’ to the establishment of a strategic partnership with Russia. In so doing, China pursued three interconnected objectives. The first relates to China’s strategic and security environment that, in the Chinese perspective, has worsened since the United States has unilaterally engaged in a policy of China-containment. The second objective is to maintain China’s economic growth through a partnership with its resource-abundant neighbour. Chinese political leadership and academics have considered economic modernisation as their ‘paramount’ task since Deng Xiaoping launched market reform in the late 1970s. The third objective is to fulfil China’s dream of restoring its past glory by rising in the global power hierarchy and reshaping the current world order more to its liking.

Institutional Changes and the Possible Role of the Military in Transition to the Post-Xi Jinping Leadership

Two institutional conditions have driven the heavy involvement of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in domestic politics after 1949. The first is "symbiotic" Party–army relations as evident in the extensive and entrenched personal networks in the PLA that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping could count on for support in times of political crisis. The second is civilian governance failure that incentivised these leaders to leverage the military for domestic politics. This article shows major changes in these conditions in the post-Deng era, which reduced the PLA's role in domestic politics. With reference to these changes, the article explores the PLA's possible role in transition to the post-Xi Jinping leadership.

At the juncture of reform: heritage making of an industrial town in Pearl River Delta region

ABSTRACTIn October 2017 at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping declared the arrival of ‘the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics’, which is believed to herald a period distinct from Deng Xiaoping’s era of Reform and Opening-up since the late 1970s. Concepts of ‘cultural confidence’ and ‘the China dream’, ‘the great rejuvenation’ marking the new historic period have actually been conceived as early as the mid-1990s and fully unfolded since the early 2000s. Therefore, the turn of the century marks the transition between the reform era and the ‘new era’. During this juncture, the emergence of heritage making became a signature phenomenon. It plays a prominent role in reshaping the cultural identity of common Chinese people, their perception of everyday tradition and the cultural orientation of economic life. This essay examines the heritage making of the town of Dongkeng, an ordinary industrial town located in the Pearl River Delta area, a symbolic region of the Reform and Opening-up. As the labour-intensive economic model went into crisis in the early 2000s, culture – especially folk and traditional culture – was adopted by local governments to earn new scoring points of economic growth and urban regeneration. Based on policy analysis and fieldwork interviews, I examine how the town tactically made use of intangible heritage to re-organize local cultural resources. Heritage making became the response to the town’s desire of economic restructuring in the process. It also refashions the cultural narratives of economic restructuring. The essay concludes that the heritage process is one of re-organizing and interweaving everyday traditions and practices into local economic schemes, and this consolidated orientation of cultural identity characterizes China’s transition towards a ‘new era’ of socio-economic development.

The Four Principles that Formed the Basis of Friendly Relations between Japan and China: The China Policy of the Nakasone Yasuhiro Government

This article examines Nakasone Yasuhiro’s policy toward China as a politician, including his remarks in the Diet before appointment as prime minister as well as exchanges with Chinese leaders during his prime ministership. Nakasone raised Japan-China relations to a level called a “honeymoon” in the 1980s, at which time the four principles of Japan-China relations were shared and there was the prospect of continued friendly relations into the 21st century. Behind the emergence of this era was not only Japan’s support for China’s economic development through ODA, but also the closeness of the stances that both Japan and China held toward the Cambodia and Korean Peninsula issues at the end of the Cold War. This may have been because there was the possibility for both parties to share information and mutually support each other. Nakasone actively talked not only with Hu Yaobang but also leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. However, as Nakasone’s partner Hu Yaobang was dismissed and the Cold War approached its end, the “honeymoon” between Japan and China came to an end, and the four principles by Nakasone and Hu gradually became just one frame of history.

China's Expanding Engagement in Global Health

China's Expanding Engagement in Global Health Dennis Van Vranken Hickey (bio) For most of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, China was called, "the sick man of Asia (东亚病夫, dong ya bing fu)."1 But those days are over. As President Xi Jinping observed, "China has bid farewell to the problems that plagued its people for thousands of years, including hunger, shortages and poverty" (Yu 2019, 19). As described below, China is now one of the world's top economic, political and military powers. China: An Economic Power By the late 1970s, China had lived through more than a century of turmoil. Key drivers of the chaos included imperialist encroachment, the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the Chinese Civil War between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT), a series of natural disasters and the unsound economic policies embraced by Chairman Mao Zedong after "liberation" in 1949. All of this changed after Deng Xiaoping became the supreme leader in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the late 1970s and launched the so-called "reform era." But the country's economy did not really take off until after Deng made his landmark journey south to Shenzhen in 1992 and accelerated the "reform and opening up" process.2 Figure 1 (below) shows China's astounding gross domestic product (GDP) growth from the early 1990s onward. Since the 1990s, China has experienced a transition from a largely agrarian society with a planned socialist economy into a global economic powerhouse. The CCP calls the new approach "market socialism" or "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and bristles at suggestions that it strongly resembles capitalism. Whatever one calls it, the transformation has enabled China to become the second largest economy in the world—enjoying a double-digit annual growth rate from 2000 to 2010 [End Page 327] and roughly 7 percent since then. In the past decade, millions of Chinese have joined the middle class which now numbers roughly 400 million and is expected to exceed 550 million by 2022 (Iskyan 2016). The exploding middle class is playing a part in a governmental strategy that is expected to help the country's economy transition away from dependence on exports and toward domestic consumption (Zhang 2019). It appears that China is well on its way toward achieving the CCP's stated goal of creating a "moderately well-off society" by 2021. Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. China's GDP Growth in Current US Dollars Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2017&locations=CN&start=1961&view=chart. China: A Political Power As China's economy has exploded, the country's political influence has likewise grown. To be sure, economic partnerships seem to have largely paved the way. The PRC has surpassed the United States as the largest trading partner of numerous countries in the global south—particularly those in Africa and Latin America. And the country is "expected to spend over US$1 trillion on its "Belt and Road" initiative (BRI)—seven times the size of the Marshal plan in real dollars" (US Global Leadership Coalition 2018). [End Page 328] This ambitious project will integrate the economies of 65 countries that include 70 percent of the world's population, 30 percent of the GDP, and 75 percent of the earth's energy reserves. The land-based version of the new Silk Road consists of a series of economic corridors connecting the PRC with nations in Central and Western Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The sea-based Silk Road will traverse the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and eventually connect China to Central Asia, Africa and Europe. China has pledged not to transform itself into a "global hegemon" that "bullies" other countries (Yu 2019). Still, some suspect Beijing's motives as the government's leadership has increasingly pointed to the Chinese approach to development as an alternative pathway for states in the global south to follow. It has even established alternative international organizations—most notably the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)—to help the...

Women of Nanjing

Women of Nanjing May-lee Chai (bio) On a recent trip to Nanjing, I watch as a middle-aged woman, perhaps a little younger than I, walks down the sidewalk of Zhong Yang Boulevard with her dog, a fluffy white Bichon-like creature. The woman is swathed in layers of yellow chiffon like a bridesmaid. Judging by her age, I know she must have experienced at least part of the Cultural Revolution when everyone was forced to wear green or blue unisex pants and jackets. She must have lived through the early reform period, too, when student demonstrations echoed through the streets. If she is a local, then she must remember all the decades when there was no heat in the winter in Nanjing, despite the snow, nor air conditioning in summer, despite the heat. When the light changes, she bends over and picks up her dog and carries it across the street in her plump arms like a baby, then sets it down carefully on the other side. The dog dances a little on its hind legs after she puts it down, does a little flip, then eagerly follows her down the sidewalk. Sometimes a revolution looks like this: a yellow-clad middle-aged woman walking down the sidewalk with her pampered Bichon. ________ I remember when dogs were banned as pets, when the Communist Party referred to them as remnants of petty bourgeois elitism. When I was a foreign student at Nanjing University in the late 1980s, the Chinese students used to tell me stories of the pets they once had. There was a tiny break in the policy in the awkward transition years between Mao's death in 1976, signaling the end of the Cultural Revolution, and the start of the Open Door reform period under Deng Xiaoping, in December of 1978. No one knew how far the reforms would go or how fast. When one student was in elementary school, he remembered that suddenly it was legal to have pets in the city, and, like that, farmers from the countryside started bringing in puppies and kittens for sale. His family bought him a dog, just a tiny one, but the policy changed and pets were outlawed again. Maybe they were considered spiritual pollution. Maybe it was because rabies vaccines were rare and expensive and someone in the government felt they could be a health hazard in the densely populated cities. He'd already grown to love his dog, so his family conspired to hide it from the authorities. There were many people he remembered who did this, keeping their pets indoors, and bringing cats and dogs out into the alleys to play in the sun only when they were absolutely sure there were no police in sight. [End Page 27] He remembered it was on one such day that he was playing with his dog, just a small dog really, and he'd forgotten to pay attention or else the police had come very quickly, or maybe the police knew full well what people were doing with their secret, illegal pets and were lying in wait. He heard the whistle and then the police were there. His grandmother came out immediately—his parents must have been at work—and she held him while he cried. The policemen took his dog, along with the other pets that they rounded up from his neighbors' homes in the alley, and then they beat the animals to death with clubs, right there in the street. "I'll never forget," he said. ________ "I never thought I'd drive a car," the English professor tells me in the swank new restaurant she and her husband have invited me to try. She says she and her husband resisted buying a car, waiting much longer than any of their family, but then one Spring Festival they were stranded in a neighboring province, waiting for a train. There was a freak accident of some sort, and they had no way to get home. People with cars could take the brand new superhighways, but they had to wait, trapped in the train station for days with thousands upon thousands of other holiday travelers...

Human Rights in Xinjiang 1978-2007: Internationalisation of the Uyghur Dilemma and China’s Reaction

Since 1978 when Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership of China after the demise of Mao Zedong in 1976, the country witnessed dramatic changes in the human rights situation. These included freedom in performing religious obligations such as pilgrimage, for the Muslim Uyghurs and freedom to practice their culture and language. Hence, there was an overall improvement in human rights situation in Xinjiang province. However, in the late 1990s the Chinese Communist Party reverted to harsh policies once again. They declared the policy of ‘Strike Hard’ which sanctioned the use of torture and arbitrary detention as well as extra-judicial killings of the Uyghurs. This article examines the factors that have influenced China’s policies on the human rights condition in Xinjiang from 1978 until 2007. It also analyses the role of Uyghur diasporas in their struggle to internationalise the human rights issues in Xinjiang and China’s reaction towards the international pressures.

邓小平主政西南时期的民族团结思想研究

邓小平主政西南时期的民族团结思想研究

Китай: военно-технические и военно-морские аспекты лидерства

The rapid growth of Chinese military capabilities and the increasing role of the military – especially the naval – factor in the PRC politics in recent years can be perceived as a shift away from Beijing’s policy dating back to the “Reform and Opening-up”, which was expressly passive and peaceful. Meanwhile, the overall Chinese military potential growth is the result of the systematic implementation of policies rooted in the Deng Xiaoping’s era decisions. At the moment, the PRC is quickly closing the gap between the U.S. and Russia in the development of military technologies, and is even gaining leading positions in some areas. The study is aimed at revealing the origins of the current rise of China’s military power and its capability to reinforce its new proactive approach to world politics with necessary military resources. The main focus is on the analysis of the PRC naval forces as – along with the nuclear forces – they are the main tool for global projection of the state power. The study also addresses China’s other military capabilities, which enable it to influence the shaping of a new world order. It seems that in the 2020s, the PRC will already be able to support its foreign policy by using force efficiently, whereas containing China can be very costly and risky. The new Chinese blue water Navy will provide the mainstay of these capabilities, which will be additionally supported by the growing expeditionary capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force and the PLA Ground Force. The far-reaching plans to develop a maritime component for the PRC nuclear forces is another important factor influencing the Chinese naval development in a major war. The expected expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and the possibility of the country’s approach to a third great nuclear power status will greatly limit the U.S. ability to deter China in Asia and around the world.

Sino-jugoslovenski odnosi u periodu 1949-1977. godine - značaj posete Josipa Broza Tita NR Kini 1977. godine

Although Yugoslavia recognized the PR China immediately after its founding in 1949, Sino-Yugoslavian diplomatic relations were only established in 1955, due to bad relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In the period 1955-1977, relations between the two countries were marked by numerous ups and downs, primarily due to the relations between the two major powers (the USA and the Soviet Union), their influence on Yugoslavia and China, as well as many other key international events. However, for the results of this research, the most important period is the period after the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four in 1976, when the two countries thrived thanks to the drastic changes in their foreign policy appearances and assertive approaches and influences that projected in their region and in the globalized world to make a significant contribution to shaping the global structure. During the research, the author identified which factors positively influenced the strengthening of cooperation between the PR China and Yugoslavia. First, there is a convergence of the attitude about the fight against hegemonism and other global problems, as well as an effort to ensure that differences between them do not interfere with the cooperation. The establishment of the Sino-US relations was also very significant for the restoration of diplomatic and party relations with Yugoslavia. Particularly significant was China's "opening up" policy to the world and the fact that Yugoslavia was not the only example of an alternative model of socialism for the Chinese, but also a significant mediator in China's exit from self-isolation, its opening up to the Third World (Non-Aligned Movement), and developing relations with Eastern European countries and the so-called Eurocommunist parties in Italy, Spain, and France, they gave Yugoslavia and China a sound foundation first. Nevertheless, the author believes that a crucial factor in strengthening the relationship between the two countries was the visionary policies of two leaders, Josip Broz Tito and Deng Xiaoping, who marked the decades-long political and economic development of both states and paved the way for next generations of leaders. That is why Josip Broz Tito's visit to China in 1977 represents a major step forward in the relations between Yugoslavia and China, bearing in mind that it was the first visit of the President of Yugoslavia to China, during which diplomatic and party relations were restored, which contributed to strengthening the cooperation between the two countries at all levels. To prove the basic hypothesis that only after the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four (in 1976) gained the conditions to strengthen the Sino-Yugoslav relations, because it outweighed the influence of positive factors versus negative factors, during the research the author will use structural-functional analysis, induction, and deduction.

Hongkong — Specjalny Region Administracyjny Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej i praktyczna realizacja politycznej idei „jedno państwo — dwa systemy”

On 1 July 1997, the United Kingdom officially handed over the territory of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. This event had a symbolic meaning. It marked the end of a stage in China’s history which began in the middle of the 19th century and was described as a time of humiliation. Hong Kong was supposed to be an example of practical implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s political concept of “one country, two systems”, which assumed the possibility of functioning of different economic and political systems in one country. Despite the passage of time, questions remain as to what China’s attitude to the regained territory will be; to what extent the provisions of the 1984 agreement signed between the governments of the People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom and the 1990 Basic Law for the region will be respected by China, and thus what the political, economic and social situation in Hong Kong will look like until its complete reintegration, i.e., by 2047, and what the future of Hong Kong will be.

China: From Tiananmen to Neo-Stalinism

China's reversion to hard authoritarianism is no aberration. The development strategy formulated by Deng Xiaoping to modernize the Chinese economy under one-party rule generated endemic corruption and regime decay, but failed to institute genuine and enforceable political reforms that would prevent the return of a Mao-like figure. China's great leap backward since 2012 may dim the hopes of gradual evolutionary regime transition, but the pitfalls of strongman rule, dissipating economic dynamism under state capitalism, and escalating strategic competition with the United States will most likely reduce the long-term odds of the survival of the Chinese Communist Party.

Capitalism in China: The Case for International Solidarity

There is controversy in the UK labour movement over China. Arguments range from assertions that China remains a socialist state albeit in the primary stages to support for China on the grounds that a strong China is a counterbalance to US-led economic imperialism and military adventures. Putting the controversy aside, this article instead makes the case for the solidarity with Chinese workers and citizens on the receiving end of capitalist exploitation and state repression in the hinterlands and heartlands of this emerging global power. We equate resistance in China to resistance to authoritarianism in general, whether in the form of right-wing populism or one-party rule. Capitalist labour relations exist in China. Their reintroduction was a cornerstone of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s neoliberal strategy allowing a minority to get rich first. Which they did: the share of income earned by the top 10 percent of the population went from 27 percent in 1978 to 41 percent in 2015. In the same period, the share of the bottom 50 percent dropped from 50 percent to 27 percent1. China’s adoption of capitalism has lifted millions of people out of absolute poverty. But the cost of this transformation in terms of environmental degradation and social inequality must be a core concern of the international labour and trade union movement. Neoliberal globalisation teaches us that solidarity is not a national undertaking as capital and ideology cross borders with ease in search of new markets and opportunities for accumulation. We need to do the same. For example, trade unionists and activists everywhere can learn from the extraordinary strike wave in China’s auto parts industry in 2010 that generated wage rises of 20-30 percent. The global rise of populist authoritarianism and its nationalist ideologies renders global resistance even more important. In China, authoritarian rule has taken on an altogether more dangerous shade under Xi Jinping’s leadership as labour activists, feminists, minorities and human rights defenders and others have found to their cost2. Labour stat In China, capitalist labour relations are governed by laws that look reasonable on paper and indeed appear to buck the global neo-liberal trend of labour market deregulation. But they are widely ignored. The absence of core trade union rights such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining backed up by protection of the right to strike are collective rights denied to the Chinese working class. The notional right to strike was deleted from the Constitution of China in 1982 at precisely the time when China embarked on her journey from a command economy to a market economy. Nevertheless, it is not the case that capitalist labour relations in China allow predatory capitalists and their agents to operate at will. Labour scholars from different disciplines and perspectives such as Ching Kwan Lee, Pun Ngai, Chang Kai and Chris Chan acknowledge that the activism of the Chinese working class, including a reserve army of ruralurban migrants that numbers up to 250 million, has been central to a gradual tempering of capitalist exploitation in China. Capitalist exploitation has been institutionalised. A watershed moment in this process was the passing of three important labour-related laws in 2008 that most commentators agree were a response to rising levels of strikes and labour protests. The Labour Contract Law, the Labour Disputes Mediation and Arbitration Law and the Employment Promotion Law were testament to both the universalisation of capitalist labour relations in China; and Chinese Communist Party’s concern that the militancy and social unrest could develop into a threat to its one-party rule. In other words, the 2008 laws were an outcome of the growing capacity of a dramatically expanding working class to get its voice heard. The only legal trade union in China, the state-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), has failed to make its presence felt in capitalist firms and remains largely restricted to its traditional role as a welfare arm of the state in what is left of a restructured state sector i.e. good on picnics and birthdays for model workers; absent on collective bargaining and organising. Little wonder then that workers often take matters into their own...