Democratic Russia Research Articles

Influence of zemstvo self-government on process of national constitutionalism development in late XIX – early XX centuries

Problem Setting . The article describes the activities of the zemstvo self-government which had a significant impact on the process of national constitutionalism development in the late XIX – early XX centuries. The actuality of the topic. Zemstvo self-government got significant practical experience of legal oppositional activity, which is an important element of constitutionalism. Within the territory of ethnicUkraine, zemstvo constitutionalism combined two components: All-Russian and national. The purpose of the article. All-Russian zemstvo constitutionalism had features of legal, semi-legal and illegal activities, which were represented by liberal and radical wing of zemstvo liberal-democratic movement respectively. In the All-Russian context, zemstvo radicals advocated the idea of establishing constitutional order in the Russian Empire, which involved constitutional recognition of democratic rights and freedoms, equality, parliamentary system and establishment of a constitutional monarchy, decentralization of power, political pluralism. The national component of zemstvo constitutionalism, which was formed at the beginning of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905–1907, had illegal character and its essence can be described by the fact that some zemstvo liberals insisted on the need to restore the Ukrainian state in the form of autonomy within democratic Russia. Representatives of both components of zemstvo constitutionalism aimed to implement their constitutional ideas through reforms. Zemstvo constitutionalism reached its highest peak at the beginning of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905–1907. In early XX century zemstvo liberals took active part in activities of bourgeois-democratic political parties. Development of Russian and Ukrainian political parties led to a split in the radical wing of zemstvo liberal-democratic movement on the national basis. Some zemstvo leaders joined the All-Russian Party of Octobrists and Constitutional Democrats. Head of Poltava provincial board F. A. Lyzohub was a well-known figure in the Party of Octobrists. P. Chyzhevskyi and M. Rusov became active participants of the Ukrainian Democratic-Radical Party and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party respectively. The Sheremet brothers were members of the Ukrainian People’s Party. Conclusions. Some liberal zemstvo-constitutionalists who adhered to the moderate position raised the question of democratization of zemstvo self-government without changing the foundations of autocratic regime. They took shape of the moderate wing of zemstvo liberal-democratic movement. To democratize zemstvo self-government, the main course of zemstvo-constitutionalists’ activities consisted of the claims to the government to change the system of zemstvo bodies, reform of the electoral system, expand powers of zemstvo bodies, limit powers of local administration concerning control of zemstvo bodies’ activities.

WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

ПРОБЛЕМАТИКА НАЦИОНАЛИЗМА В ИНФОРМАЦИОННОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ ЛДПР

ПРОБЛЕМАТИКА НАЦИОНАЛИЗМА В ИНФОРМАЦИОННОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ ЛДПР

Heretical geopolitics of Central Europe. Dissidents intellectuals and an alternative European order

This paper analyses the emergence, spread and demise of a coherent program of radical geopolitical revision developed in East European dissident circles in the 1980s. Its foundation was the insistence on the need to completely overthrow the post-Yalta, bipolar division of Europe, combined with an emphasis on the priority of human rights in political and peace issues, as well as the belief in the value of the CSCE process. It was also marked by explicit consent for the reunification of Germany as well as the insistence on the need for a democratic Russia to be part of a wider European setup. Through seminal documents, such as the Prague Appeal of 1985 intellectuals, like Jaroslav Šabata, as well as his Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian counterparts, were able to convince large parts of the western peace movement and some political circles to adopt the “heretic” perspective. The paper also shows how a seemingly “cultural” discourse of Central Europe, put forth by intellectuals and artists can, together with the “Yalta debate” of the mid-1980s, be read as a specific (critical) geopolitical project. Finally, the post-communist foreign policies of the dissident-led governments are investigated in an attempt to explain the partial demise of “heretical geopolitics”.

Echoes of Berlin, 1989: Post-Soviet Discourse and the Rhetoric of National Unity

Just as the popular imagination became inflamed by the events of 1989, and the “fall of the wall” was commonly taken as a sign of the inevitability of a new, open, free, and democratic Eastern Europe, so too was the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 taken as a sign of the inevitability of a new, open, free, and democratic Russia. Although the events in Berlin were significant in spurring changes onward, with different rhetorical choices by Soviet and Russian leaders along the way history could have been written quite differently. The central concern of this article is to show how these rhetorical choices shaped the future of post-Communist transition in the Russian Federation. We proceed chronologically, examining key moments in the rhetoricity of the Russian transition from Communism toward its current form of governance.

Chauvinism or Chaos

The author argues that the return of Crimea to Russia, events in and around Ukraine, and associated tendencies in Russian domestic politics have created a new reality for Russian society. Many liberals consider declining Russian influence in the world a necessary condition of internal liberalization, while many of those who favor an independent role for Russia in the world and the strengthening of its influence are proponents of an authoritarian or even Stalinist internal regime. As a result, Russians face the unpalatable choice between a democratic Russia that has been reduced to a junior partner of the West and a strong Russia with a dictatorial nationalist regime that is a threat to all its neighbors. The author proposes a third option that would meet the aspirations of the majority by combining a normal moderate patriotism with an equally moderate liberalism.

The death of Stalin - was it a natural death or poisoning?

The death of Stalin - was it a natural death or poisoning?

Uuemaid uurimusi külma sõja ja Nõukogude Liidu lõpust [Abstract: New research on the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union

This article reviews three new books on the history of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, focusing in particular on the authors’ views on the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and early Estonia-Russia relations. “Cold War: an international history” by Carole K. Fink is a useful textbook for university students and teachers. Its main objective is not to ohver new perspectives on the history of the Cold War, but rather to summarize the main ongoing debates and to write a concise and readable narrative. The strength of Fink’s text lies in its chronological scope: it starts in 1917, seeing the Bolshevik revolution as the trigger for the Cold War, and finishes with the September 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers, which she considers the mark of the end of the post-Cold War era. “The last empire: the final days of the Soviet Union” by Serhii Plokhy is, in scope and intent, a very different book. This is a detailed autopsy of the last months of the Soviet Union’s struggle for its life, covering the period from July to December 1991. Plokhy’s main argument is that the demise of the Soviet empire was not an inevitable outcome of the end of the Cold War, most importantly because of the consistent and strong support of the Bush administration for Gorbachev’s program to save the Soviet state. This support was maintained until the Ukrainian referendum for independence in November 1991. The fate of the Soviet Union, according to Plokhy, was thus decided primarily by Ukraine. Mati Graf’s book “Impeeriumi lopp ja Eesti taasiseseisvumine 1988–1991” seems to support the view that the Soviet Union had a chance to survive the August Coup, even after the declarations of independence by the three Baltic states. But the Baltic states were an exception among the Soviet republics, for they had the internationally recognized status of being illegally occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union. It is not entirely clear, however, whether Graf actually accepts this point of view, because he contends that the legal position of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was similar to that of the Russian SFSR. Graf’s strength lies in the detailed documentation of Estonia’s process of secession from the Soviet Union. It is not often realized that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania managed not only to declare the restoration of their independence, but also to secede from the Soviet Union according to Soviet laws. The article concludes by discussing Estonia’s early relations with the new, democratic Russia led by Boris Yeltsin. It is still a matter of debatte whether there were “missed chances” in Estonian-Russian relations in the early 1990s. Graf supports the view that Estonia made several mistakes that alienated those forces in Russia that were most sympathetic toward Estonia. This is contested by other scholars. Be that as it may, more thorough research on Estonian-Russian relations, in the context of Russian engagement with the West in the 1990s, would be rewarding for anyone wanting to understand East-West relationships in the post-Cold War era. KEYWORDS: Cold War, Soviet Union, Baltic states, Russia, Perestroika, international systems

RUSSIAN PROVINCE IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY COMITEE'S ACTIVITY (BASED ON MATERIALS OF TAMBOV STATE)

This article is concerning the analysis of events taken place in the period of The Emergency Comitee in Tambov State. The research is based on materials of printed mass media, documents of state archive of social and political history of Tambov region, the memories of participator and witnesses. Research objective : to evaluate the reaction of regional elites, communal structures and organizations for creation and activity of The Emergency Comitee. Methods of research : analysis, synthesis and compilation, based on the generally accepted principle of historicism and objectivity. Results: with the use of archive documents, materials of printed mass media, the memories of witnesses it came to reconstruction of chronology of events happened in Tambov and Tambov state in the period of Emergency Comitee activity. The performed analysis makes it possible to make some conclusions about a reaction on the state of emergency of partial and soviet government of Tambov state, that can be characterized as expectant and pragmatic. The activity of activists and deputies of the "Democratic Russia" and "Memorial" confronting the Emergency Comitee is now studied. The scope of results: historical and political science. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12731/2218-7405-2013-10-31

The Effect of Labor Migration on the Diffusion of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Republic

Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the emigration episode that started in the late 1990s strongly affected political preferences and electoral outcomes in Moldova during the following decade and was eventually instrumental in bringing down the last ruling Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasi-experimental context studied and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.

The Effect of Labor Migration on the Diffusion of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Republic

Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the emigration wave that started in the late 1990s strongly affected electoral outcomes and political preferences in Moldova during the following decade and was eventually instrumental in bringing down the last ruling Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasi-experimental context studied and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.

Establishment of political and diplomatic relations between Lithuania and France in 1918-1920: Exchange of mistrust

In 1918, the Lithuanian state was re-established referring to the principle of self-determination of nations. Hence, the first Lithuanian government expected to receive the due support and recognition from the most powerful winners of World War I, including France. However, one of the most influential architects of 'New Europe', the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, conceived this new Baltic state as a potential territory of democratic Russia, which the French allies seeked to restore, and later on of Poland. According to this politician who presided at the Paris Peace Conference, Lithuania was meant to become a federal part of one of these states. His rather skeptical attitude towards the statehood of Lithuania emanated from doubts as to whether a new state would be able to retain its political autonomy while bordering with Germany and the Soviet Russia; such opinion also resulted from aspirations to consolidate a 'cordon sanitaire' between the two potential enemies of France. Another important factor was the sense of mistrust with regard to the state that had been created on the Germany's occupied territory. Members of the Lithuanian delegation headed by the minister of foreign affairs Augustinas Voldemaras were present at the Paris Peace Conference and intermediated between their own and French governments, but could not dissipate the atmosphere of mistrust in the state being represented. Another intermediary, the French military mission headed by a lieutenant-colonel Constantin Reboul, was the first unit representing the Entente in Lithuania. C. Reboul's proposals to enter into commercial relations and send some of the military training instructors as well as munition to the Lithuanian armed forces did not receive the expected support in France. The advantages offered under the strengthened French cultural influence, i.e. training instructors at military school, charity of vaccination against zymotic diseases and some favourable political proposals, were all outweighed by the sense of mistrust expressed by the Lithuanian government with regard to the mission which initially had been made welcome. Such an obvious lack of confidence resulted from C. Reboul's tireless efforts to bring Lithuania and Poland together, with the aim at forming a common federal state. The mission encouraged the French government to concede the Klaipėda Region (Memel Territory) to Lithuania. However, it was France that from 20 January 1920 became in charge of the Region as the administering state. The emerged obstacle in the way of annexing the seaboard areas with the Port of Klaipėda resulted in the Lithuanian government's dissatisfaction, which in turn raised new difficulties for a benevolent cooperation with both the French government and its respective mission. The Lithuanian government deliberately put economic and political pressure on the Klaipėda Region administration governed by the General Dominique Joseph Odry, with the purpose to take control over the Region as a matter of urgency. The unfavourable attitude of the Lithuanian government and the public towards the French policy was anchored by the demarcation line which was defined at the time when Poland laid its claims to the southern and eastern territories of Lithuania. The second demarcation line, determined by the Marshal Ferdinand Foch, was met in an especially adverse manner. The demarcation lines, which were supposed to divide the territories of the states temporarily at war, eventually led to the long-lasting issue of Vilnius Region. The French government provided the necessary financial aid and trainings, thus strengthening the Polish Army, but did not preclude its ally from advancing on the Lithuanian territory. Therefore, the Lithuanians considered the French government as a culprit of the Polish military aggression. The public discontent reached its apogee on 17 August 1919 when demonstrations and meetings were held against the French policy. The Cabinet of Alexandre Millerand, in function from 20 January 1920, was less tolerant towards the Polish political pressure on Lithuania. His political decisions were an ice-breaking point of the bilateral relations, though short in duration and fragile. On May 11, the French government de facto recognized the Lithuanian government. Such diplomatic gesture was met rather unresponsively, being cast into shadow by other political events. After the areas of interest in Europe had been divided among the great powers, Great Britain became prevalent in the Baltic states. Improvement of the relations was then interrupted by the coup of Lucjan Żeligowski in October 1920. The French military mission provided support to the participants of the coup, since Georges Leygues' government was in favour of Poland, but such an attitude provoked a new major wave of mistrust with regard to France. In summer 1920, Lithuania was no longer conceived by the French politicians as the land of nowhere, quoting Alfred Jarry's "Ubu Roi", although only a few among them could have been truly in sympathy with this new state.

The Modern Foreign Policy of Russia

Over the two decades of post-Soviet history of modern Russia, its foreign policy has gone through several distinct periods and long-term trends. 
 The periodization of the new Russia’s foreign policy includes a “romantic” or “Kozyrev’s” period, during which the leaders of a democratic Russia tried to integrate the country into a system of institutions and partnerships with the leading Western states. Kozyrev’s departure from his post as foreign minister in January 1996 and the arrival of a new foreign minister, who would later become the Prime Minister, a “political heavyweight” of modern Russia Yevgeny Primakov, marked a change in the strategic direction of the country’s foreign policy. The key definition of this period was “multipolarity.” 
 The arrival of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin in early 2000, marked a new stage in the development of Russia’s diplomacy. At first it was characterized by attempts to build relations of partnership on an equal footing with Washington and NATO countries in the anti-terrorist coalition, and then, from about 2003, by a gradual build up of contradictions between Russia and the United States. During this period (2000-2008) a special feature of Russia’s foreign policy was its increased assertiveness in relation to the neighboring CIS countries. After the election of Dmitry Medvedev as president in March 2008 Russia has been busy searching for a new strategy for its foreign policy, which would retain some of the achievements of previous periods, but would also be more cooperative toward the leading nations of the world. Such policy should create a favorable external climate for the modernization of Russia’s political system and its national economy.

Yeltsin: a life

Even after his death in April 2007, Boris Yeltsin remains the most controversial figure in recent Russian history. Although Mikhail Gorbachev presided over the decline of the Communist party and the withdrawal of Soviet control over eastern Europe, it was Yeltsin-Russia's first elected president-who buried the Soviet Union itself. Upon taking office, Yeltsin quickly embarked on a sweeping makeover of newly democratic Russia, beginning with a program of excruciatingly painful market reforms that earned him wide acclaim in the West and deep recrimination from many Russian citizens. In this, the first biography of Yeltsin's entire life, Soviet scholar Timothy Colton traces Yeltsin's development from a peasant boy in the Urals to a Communist party apparatchik, and then ultimately to a nemesis of the Soviet order. Based on unprecedented interviews with Yeltsin himself as well as scores of other Soviet officials, journalists, and businessmen, Colton explains how and why Yeltsin broke with single-party rule and launched his drive to replace it with democracy. Yeltsin's colossal attempt to bring democracy to Russia remains one of the great, unfinished stories of our time. As anti-Western policies and rhetoric resurface in Putin's increasingly bellicose Russia, Yeltsin offers essential insights into the past, present, and future of this vast and troubled nation.

American Democratic Practice, France, and Russia: Institutions, Values, and Alternative Democratic Experience

The US emphasis on democratic procedures and property rights profoundly distinguishes the American polity from nearly all consolidated and newly emergent democracies; democracies that place stress on more egalitarian notions of social justice. Interrelating institutional arrangements and democratic values through an application of George Tsebelis's veto players theory and Isaiah Berlin's notions of positive and negative liberty, we juxtapose the American and French democracies as we assess Russia's post-Soviet democratic consolidation. We focus on the policy-making proclivities of these three states, and a combined application of the veto players framework and positive-negative liberty dichotomy reveals a US policy bias toward the status quo as contrasted with a French and Russian system bias facilitating more substantial policy change. The 1993–1995 Clinton health-care initiative, the 1997–2002 Jospin-Left program, with attention to the 35-hour workweek and associated policies, and the 2000–2006 Putin policy agenda, with attention to health care and housing measures, serve as national case studies to illuminate our arguments.

Institutions and the supply of oil: A case study of Russia

In new institutional economics, the variance in institutions explains differences in cross-country output per capita. Institutions may also explain how the supply of oil is affected within oil-producing countries. For example in the early 1970s, as nominal oil prices increased from $3 per barrel to $11 per barrel, a number of OPEC oil producers changed the institutional environment by nationalizing their oil production and putting under government control all petroleum-related capital and infrastructure. This affected oil supplies. Similar institutional changes may be happening again now that oil prices are rising. In particular, the newly democratic Russia may be following the same path. The Russian government has already effectively taken over control of much of the oil production capacity in the country and is still heavily involved in natural gas production. In this paper, we will look at the Russian upstream oil industry as it changed from central planning to a market-oriented sector and is now swaying toward re-nationalization. Some of the laws and institutional transitions will be detailed in order to elucidate what has taken place.

Revolutionary passage: from Soviet to post-Soviet Russia, 1985-2000

Introduction: Passages One: The Specialist Rebellion in Moscow and the Genesis of a Revolutionary Situation Two: The Rise of Democratic Russia Three: Democrats on the Offensive Four: August 1991 and the Decline of Russia's Democratic Movement Five: Interregnum

From external success to internal collapse: the case of democratic Russia

THE DISMANTLING OF THE FIRST UMBRELLA MOVEMENT for political parties in post-Soviet Russia, Democratic Russia, is in many ways just as spectacular as its initial coming into being. Having effectively pressed for independence in 1990 through its group of deputies in the RSFSR Congress and mobilised some 150,000 activists in the spring of 1991 in support of Boris El'tsin's presidential candidacy, the mass movement was reduced by 1992 to a 'tin can, rattling down the stairs of history, leaving a sound of emptiness behind it'.' By late 1991 and early 1992 Democratic Russia leaders were accusing each other of having 'Bolshevik' leanings and endangering Russia's democratic project by engaging in organisational intrigues and power plays. When liberals in government came looking for political support in 1992 they found a movement in demise. As Gaidar observed, 'by the end of 1992 the democratic movement in Russia was a rather pitiful structure ... The most powerful organisation in our part of the political spectrum, Democratic Russia, was falling apart'.2 Although never a coherent organisation, the factionalism and internal conflicts inside Democratic Russia and its constituent parties have been viewed as 'more pervasive and more crippling in its effect than in most other cases'.3 Especially during the latter part of 1991, Democratic Russia experienced tormenting splits and internal contention over frames for collective action, organisational schemes and friends and foes among elites to such an extent that organisational coherence was undermined. The immediate effect of these divisions was that the political opportunities provided by the gradual relaxation of state-society relations under Gorbachev did not produce a viable pro-democratic opposition structure. To be sure, Democratic Russia was never intended as anything other than an alliance of alliances. Still, several attempts were made to consolidate the movement as an organisation, and even a political party with clear rules for membership and a distinct party programme. This process failed utterly, and the once powerful movement was reduced to a support movement for economic reforms and an executive tool for popular mobilisation. This article seeks to employ the literature on resource mobilisation to explain the failure. Theorists argue that this approach deals 'in general terms with the dynamics and tactics of social movement growth, decline and change'.4 Central resources are access to media, authorities (influential allies) and other parties, and the interaction between movement organisations. Two arguments will be central. First, it will be argued that all movement organisations will seek to consolidate once the initial aim

О контактах в эссеистике Мандельштама с философской прозой Герцена

The author studies multi-level links of Mandel´štam's intellectual prose with Herzen's tradition, starting from direct poet's assessments of Herzen's memoirs role for his spiritual formation. At the moment of the highest feeling of persecution the poet's thought applies to creator of “ free Russian word” dignity. The paper analyzes impact of the publicist's ideas on the evolution in Mandel´štam's disposition. Non-marked reminiscencies in poet-culturologist's silhouettes of philosophers, public men, poets and their epochs, clearly demonstrates original approach of his to tradition: modern art must creatively combine unveiling a human being in various branches of the humanistic literature of the past. In the spiritual life concept of democratic Russia, its opposition to bourgeois non-spirituality is clearly seen in the poetical core of links of lyrical prose of both poets, which allowed Mandel´štam to directly develop Herzen's metaphorical definitions of thought types spreading them over new intellectual spheres. Synthetic mentality of creative thought of two literary artists-philosophers is akin: reality tendencies, and art processes are realized by them not in single ideas but in developed metaphors, mobile rapprochement of various entity levels, retaining warmth of life itself.

The New Russian Criminal Code: A Window Onto Democratic Russia

AbstractNo Abstract