From external success to internal collapse: the case of democratic Russia

Abstract

THE DISMANTLING OF THE FIRST UMBRELLA MOVEMENT for political parties in post-Soviet Russia, Democratic Russia, is in many ways just as spectacular as its initial coming into being. Having effectively pressed for independence in 1990 through its group of deputies in the RSFSR Congress and mobilised some 150,000 activists in the spring of 1991 in support of Boris El'tsin's presidential candidacy, the mass movement was reduced by 1992 to a 'tin can, rattling down the stairs of history, leaving a sound of emptiness behind it'.' By late 1991 and early 1992 Democratic Russia leaders were accusing each other of having 'Bolshevik' leanings and endangering Russia's democratic project by engaging in organisational intrigues and power plays. When liberals in government came looking for political support in 1992 they found a movement in demise. As Gaidar observed, 'by the end of 1992 the democratic movement in Russia was a rather pitiful structure ... The most powerful organisation in our part of the political spectrum, Democratic Russia, was falling apart'.2 Although never a coherent organisation, the factionalism and internal conflicts inside Democratic Russia and its constituent parties have been viewed as 'more pervasive and more crippling in its effect than in most other cases'.3 Especially during the latter part of 1991, Democratic Russia experienced tormenting splits and internal contention over frames for collective action, organisational schemes and friends and foes among elites to such an extent that organisational coherence was undermined. The immediate effect of these divisions was that the political opportunities provided by the gradual relaxation of state-society relations under Gorbachev did not produce a viable pro-democratic opposition structure. To be sure, Democratic Russia was never intended as anything other than an alliance of alliances. Still, several attempts were made to consolidate the movement as an organisation, and even a political party with clear rules for membership and a distinct party programme. This process failed utterly, and the once powerful movement was reduced to a support movement for economic reforms and an executive tool for popular mobilisation. This article seeks to employ the literature on resource mobilisation to explain the failure. Theorists argue that this approach deals 'in general terms with the dynamics and tactics of social movement growth, decline and change'.4 Central resources are access to media, authorities (influential allies) and other parties, and the interaction between movement organisations. Two arguments will be central. First, it will be argued that all movement organisations will seek to consolidate once the initial aim