Carol Gould's Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights is ambitious attempt to synthesize many of disparate direc tions in which contemporary political theory pursues its con cerns about human rights and democracy. Drawing upon her own previous analysis of democracy in Rethinking Democracy, Gould argues our increasingly globalized and sometimes terror ized world ... requires framework in which expanded vision of democracy and broadened conception of human rights are essential, and essentially intertwined. (264) There is essen tial good sense in this integrative approach, and breadth and depth of Gould's thoughtful arguments in suggesting need to combine pieces of justice, rights, care, recogni tion, gender analysis, et. al., are worthy of careful consideration. Gould is one of few political theorists, for example, to take seriously as concept in democratic theory and to try to integrate with concepts such as justice.1 In this commen tary I want to consider ways in which Carol Gould has incorporated feminist ethic of into her overall argument, which leads to two basic questions: First, how does Gould under stand care, and to what extent is her understanding true to ways in which feminists talk about care? Second, how does Gould's incorporation of shed light on her overall argument about democracy and human rights? In end I shall try to point to some future directions for further consideration arise out of tensions discovered in this analysis. First, we need to explore what approach entails, and Gould's understanding of this approach. Care plays role of intellectual supporting actor in this work, where Gould's main emphasis in book is to argue for kind of intersociative democracy (3) in which both democracy and human rights are important, but where there is root...that normatively grounds conceptions of both justice and democracy, and this common root is freedom, understood in its complexity as an of self-development or self-transformation as process over time, [interpreted] as characteristic mode of human agency or life activity (33). What kind of supporting role can play in such framework? Interestingly, Gould divides up main characteristics of and brings them forth as appropriate for her analysis of democracy and human rights, in turn. When she is offering alternative to account of deliberative Gould Stresses account of makes it primarily about feelings, especially about empathy (e.g., 10) and reciprocity (43-44). To Gould, contributes to democratic in its emphasis on specific individuality of persons (45), concern for shared responsibility for work itself (45), and the concern for vulnerable, as type of political and social care, entails support of, or participation in, programs provide for welfare of ...dependent members of community... where ... one of aims of is elimination, where possible, of conditions of dependence (45). It is worth noting what Gould thinks of each of these features of that can usefully be generalized to larger context of democratic communities (45). What is interesting about this approach of care, then, is Gould sees it primarily as personal, as providing some training in responsibility, but only political when it concerns providing for vulnerable. Gould does assert there is nothing espe cially new about this contribution to democratic community, since she has previously argued as well the very notion of equal rights in participation in shared decision making connotes common interest in common activity, as well as in process of decision making about activity (45-46). But is only about new way to define a common interest in common activity? Gould's own further considerations belie idea language of interests will here suffice. As Gould turns to her discussion of and human rights, she rightly states it is curious has had no impact on discourse on human rights (143) because the connection between rights and is deeper than heretofore supposed (144). In describing how can affect discourse on human rights, Gould stresses three qualities of care: first, if rights rest upon claims of recognizing humanness of others, then is intrin sic to starting point for human rights. Second, she explains any notion of relations entails conception of responsibility, and responsibility to and for others is also important in under standing human rights. And third, she returns to human rights tied to understanding of as form of political or policy concern with rights of subsistence. Care thus plays role sometimes as emotion, sometimes as approach to politics. It even shows up as piece of a certain globalization of care as people's concerns more frequently extend to others at distance (207). However, Gould's inconsistent
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Aug 22, 2008
Chris Jenks + 1
Open Access