This Article critiques the use of pro a method of defining corruption in campaign finance law cases. I argue first that pro has no definite meaning. Therefore, one doesn't avoid the problem of defining corruption by attaching quid pro quo to it. In the case law, sometimes it means explicit agreements, sometimes it means agreements about specific things, sometimes it is redundant, and sometimes it encompasses gifts in exchange for a promise to help out as opportunities arise, a definition that sounds very close to the influence seeking that a majority of the Court has previously categorized Second, I show that pro language has shallow roots. It is not a major part of traditional white collar criminal law doctrine: it appears through Buckley, and gets ported over to bribery laws. Relatedly, I show that pro is not a requirement in many states for proving bribery. Third, I argue that the use of pro a limit in criminal bribery law comes from Due Process and prosecutorial discretion, not from the meaning of corruption itself. This kind of limit makes sense when interpreting criminal laws: the same limits don't make sense when interpreting the constitutional meaning of corruption. Due Process-derived constraints should be understood for what they are, not definitional constraints. Fourth, I show how the importation of bribery law terms to constitutional law deliberations reflects a positivism that is uniquely poorly suited to corruption definitions. What the Court has already done in Citizens United, and seems poised to do in McCutcheon, is port over the definition of corruption from a smattering of “intent” based white collar criminal statutes in order to define the scope of corruption a (quasi-)Constitutional principle. The portage is done through the language of pro quo. As I argue in this piece, this transference is not justified, is bad history, and makes bad law. It is an early draft, and comments are welcome!