Deductive Theory Research Articles

PROSPECTIVE CASE STUDY DESIGN FOR DEDUCTIVE THEORY TESTING.

The paper advances a prospective case study research design in social sciences as an alternative to traditional post-hoc case study research in deductive theory testing. It is argued that some limitations of post-hoc qualitative methods in deductive theory testing can be alleviated by using a prospective case study design, where the researcher formulates a set of theory-based hypotheses in respect to the evolution of an on-going social process and then tests these hypotheses at a pre-determined follow-up time in the future by comparing these hypotheses with the observed process outcomes using

Culture and the Sense of Justice

This article examines the intersection of culture and the sense of justice, summarizing a cumulative framework for analyzing human justice judgments that has emerged from several decades of social science research. It outlines a comprehensive guide to the terms and factors where culture may manifest itself and proposes a protocol for discerning the operation of culture. Methodological issues related to the conceptualization and operationalization of justice processes are addressed throughout. The first section develops a framework for justice analysis, distinguishing between ingredients thought to be universal and ingredients in which culture may operate. The second section discusses deductive theories in justice analysis and provides an illustration, in which one of the theories yields implications for individualism and collectivism, thus showing how justice processes can generate phenomena that come to be viewed as culturally based. The concluding section briefly discusses agendas and research designs for empirical analysis of justice and culture.

The Tripartite Structure of Social Science Analysis

The goal of sociology, and all social science, is to produce reliable knowledge about human behavioral and social phenomena. To reach that goal, we undertake three kinds of activities: theoretical work, empirical work, and, even more basic, we develop frameworks that assemble the fundamental questions together with the fundamental tools that will be used to address them. This article examines the three sets of activities and their interrelations. Both deductive and nondeductive theory are highlighted, as are three kinds of empirical work—testing the predictions of deductive theories, testing the propositions produced by nondeductive theories, and extratheoretical measurement and estimation. Illustrations are drawn from the fields of status, justice, and migration.

On the Warsaw interactions of logic and mathematics in the years 1919–1939

The article recalls shortly the early story of cooperation between the already existing Lvov philosophical school, headed by Twardowski, and the just then establishing Warsaw mathematical school, headed by Sierpiński. After that recollection the article proceeds to contributions made by men influenced by the two schools. Most prominent of them was Alfred Tarski whose work in those times, concentrated mainly upon the theory of deduction, axiom of choice, cardinal arithmetic, and measure problem, has been described in some detail.

Some Weakened Gödelian Ontological Systems

We describe a KB Godelian ontological system, and some other weak systems, in a fully formal way using theory of types and natural deduction, and present a completeness proof in its main and specific parts. We technically and philosophically analyze and comment on the systems (mainly with respect to the relativism of values) and include a sketch of some connected aspects of Godel's relation to Kant.

The study of things I have never seen.

Tinbergen defined structure as the momentary condition of an organism. Inference, interpretation, and theory were reserved for answering the "why" questions. Mason, however, observed that the study of behavior is incorrigibly mentalistic. Description seems barren compared to the richness supplied by creative intelligence. Exciting intervening variables such as learning, intention, and selective pressures can only be examined using inference, logic, and powerful deductive theories. For more than 100 years people have argued the two extremes: should science be restricted to the directly observable, or expanded to include what professional judgment could provide? I have devoted my life to the study of aggression and dominance, yet I have directly observed neither. I point to some behavior as an example of aggression, but I cannot provide an operational definition of what I mean. I will never know if another intends harm. I will never know if another is aware of the functions that behavior serves, and the outcomes that I confuse with past selective pressures and motivation. In a world where our subjects face extinction, perhaps it is wise to use computer simulations, to ask colleagues to rate their impressions, and to use logic to deduce behavior. The new "data" may be very useful. Still, I will miss actually watching what animals really do, even if I always describe it in terms of what I infer.

The Need to Account for Uncertainty in Public Decision Making Related to Technological Change

In the extreme, there are two opposing approaches to technological development: The empirical iterative approach (also called ‘‘trial and error’’) versus the deterministic predictive approach (also called ‘‘design’’). In scientific terms, the first is based on association and the latter is based on causality. In Europe, the latter developed as a consequence of the Renaissance, based on a combination of induction (data) and deduction (theory). The ‘‘success’’ of the Western world is based on the design approach. In contrast, China developed the empirical approach to perfection, in which respect they scored much better than the Western world. During the last century there have been an increasing number of environmental ‘‘surprises’’ as a consequence of economic development in the Western world. Many of these detrimental impacts on the environment have occurred due to disregarded knowledge or ignorance with respect to the causality (cause-effect relationship) between the pressures on the environment and consequences to the environment. The precautionary principle has been introduced as a means of dealing with uncertainty and ignorance in decision making. There is need for a change of paradigm from an elitist, narrow approach to an approach that recognises how far we may be from the ability to predict accurately the consequences of technological changes. This uncertainty has to be accounted for in order to prevent surprises. In case of recognised ignorance, solutions have to be flexible and robust, especially in situations involving irreversibility of the consequences of the decision. When recognising uncertainty and ignorance, the empirical iterative approach has its virtue as adaptive management.

Model Building With Prospect Theory: A Cognitive Approach to International Relations

Despite the growing call for new models of politics grounded in the capacities of real–world decision–makers, much international relations theory still incorporates rationalist assumptions. Scholars defend such assumptions as the best way to produce parsimonious theoretical structures. Recent attempts to deploy prospect theory in the study of international politics are consistent with the call for empirically grounded models of political behavior. However, past attempts have often emphasized individualized comparisons of prospect theory with rational choice at the expense of building deductive theory. The analysis here demonstrates that prospect theory can produce deductive models for empirical comparison with those already manufactured under rational choice. The result is a new set of propositions concerning international politics securely anchored to the actual capacities of human actors.

The nature ofaxioms of physical theory

The evolution of the concept axiom and the basic principles ofthe construction of deductive theory are considered. The natureof axioms and the structure of their systems in the process ofaxiomatization of the built physical theories is investigated.

Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes

This article analyzes the susceptibility of areas of legal regulation to being organized or explained by top-down deductive theories of general applicability. It hypothesizes that at least three variables determine in part the likely relevance of general theories to sets of legal phenomena, ambiguity (gaps in the law), unpredictability (computational intractability), and the comparative need for specialized and common sense reasoning. We hypothesize that as ambiguity, unpredictability, and the utility of common sense reasoning go up, the amenability of a set of legal phenomena to general theoretical approaches decreases. We thus predict that the meaning of negligence will be resistant to theoretical approaches, both economic and corrective justice, and that the nature of antitrust law will embrace the microeconomic approach. We test these predictions in various ways and find support for both of them.

Model theory of deduction: a unified computational approach

Model theory of deduction: a unified computational approach

Model theory of deduction: a unified computational approach

AbstractOne of the most debated questions in psychology and cognitive science is the nature and the functioning of the mental processes involved in deductive reasoning. However, all existing theories refer to a specific deductive domain, like syllogistic, propositional or relational reasoning.Our goal is to unify the main types of deductive reasoning into a single set of basic procedures. In particular, we bring together the microtheories developed from a mental models perspective in a single theory, for which we provide a formal foundation. We validate the theory through a computational model (UNICORE) which allows fine‐grained predictions of subjects' performance in different reasoning domains.The performance of the model is tested against the performance of experimental subjects—as reported in the relevant literature—in the three areas of syllogistic, relational and propositional reasoning. The computational model proves to be a satisfactory artificial subject, reproducing both correct and erroneous performance of the human subjects. Moreover, we introduce a developmental trend in the program, in order to simulate the performance of subjects of different ages, ranging from children (3–6) to adolescents (8–12) to adults (>21). The simulation model performs similarly to the subjects of different ages.Our conclusion is that the validity of the mental model approach is confirmed for the deductive reasoning domain, and that it is possible to devise a unique mechanism able to deal with the specific subareas. The proposed computational model (UNICORE) represents such a unifying structure.

System, empire and state in Chinese international relations

Two criticisms have long been directed at the theorization of international relations (IR): ahistoricism and Eurocentrism. Westphalia, it is argued, has been so stigmatized that it has become synonymous with the beginning as well as the end of what we understand as international relations. Rationalist theorizing in general, of both the neorealist and neoliberal persuasions, has produced a set of deductive theories that aim and claim to transcend history.

Are ecological and evolutionary theories scientific?

Scientists observe nature, search for generalizations, and provide explanations for why the world is as it is. Generalizations are of two kinds. The first are descriptive and inductive, such as Boyle's Law. They are derived from observations and therefore refer to observables (in this case, pressure and volume). The second are often imaginative and form the axioms of a deductive theory, such as Newton's Laws of Motion. They often refer to unobservables (e.g. inertia and gravitation). Biology has many inductive generalizations (e.g. Bergmann's Rule and 'all cells arise from preexisting cells') but few, if any, recognized universal laws and virtually no deductive theory. Many biologists and philosophers of biology have agreed that predictive theory is inappropriate in biology, which is said to be more complex than physics, and that one can have nonpredictive explanations, such as the neo-Darwinian Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection. Other philosophers dismiss nonpredictive, explanatory theories, including evolutionary 'theory', as metaphysics. Most biologists do not think of themselves as philosophers or give much thought to the philosophical basis of their research. Nevertheless, their philosophy shows in the way they do research. The plethora of ad hoc (i.e. not universal) hypotheses indicates that biologists are reluctant inductivists in that the search for generalization does not have a high priority. Biologists test their hypotheses by verification. Theoretical physicists, in contrast, are deductive unifiers and test their explanatory hypotheses by falsification. I argue that theoretical biology (concerned with unobservables, such as fitness and natural selection) is not scientific because it lacks universal laws and predictive theory. In order to make this argument, I review the differences between verificationism and falsificationism, induction and deduction, and descriptive and explanatory laws. I show how these differ with a specific example of a successful and still useful (even if now superseded as explanatory) deductive theory, Newton's Theory of Motion. I also review some of the philosophical views expressed on these topics because philosophers seem to be even more divided than biologists, which is not at all helpful. The fact that biology does not have predictive theories does not constitute irrefutable evidence that it cannot have them. The only way to falsify this philosophical hypothesis, however, is to produce a predictive theory with universal biological laws. I have proposed such a theory, but it has been presented piecemeal. At the end of this paper, I bring the pieces together into a deductive theory on the evolution of life history traits (e.g. clutch size, mating relationships, sexual size dimorphism).

Patienters oplevede lidelse — perspektiveret i forhold til uhelbredeligt kræftsyge patienter

The article is based on a literature review on the concepts suffering and illness put into perspective of patients with incurable cancer. The article is divided into four parts: Illness defined in relation to disease, ideas about illness and suffering based on deductive theories, theories about patients lived experience of illness and suffering, and nurses experience of patients' suffering. The conclusion is that the nature of suffering experiences have not yet been clearly described according to individual groups of patients and that more research concerning suffering needs to be initiated by nurses.

Notes Towards a Semantics for Proof-search

Algorithmic proof-search is an essential enabling technology throughout informatics. Proof-search is the proof-theoretic realization of the formulation of logic not as a theory of deduction but rather as a theory of reduction. Whilst deductive logics typically have a well-developed semantics of proofs, reductive logics are typically well-understood only operationally. Each deductive system can, typically, be read as a corresponding reductive system. We discuss some of the problems which must be addressed in order to provide a semantics of proof-searches of comparable value to the corresponding semantics of proofs. Just as the semantics of proofs is intimately related to the model theory of the underlying logic, so too should be the semantics of proof-searches. We discuss how to solve the problem of providing a semantics for proof-searches which adequately models both operational and logical aspects of the reductive system.

The geometric content of the electron theory. (Part II) theory of the electron from start

From the considerations of the previous paper on the geometric content of the electron theory and the basic principles of the space-time-action relativity theory (START) we formulate a comprehensive and complete theory of the electron. Our approach contains, being a deductive theory, the results of density functional theory, wave function quantum mechanics, the classical theory of the electron, the description of the electron as a lepton in elementary particles theory and the fundamentals of both electrodynamics and electroweak interactions. The approach is otherwise selfcontained.

On the logic foundation of fuzzy reasoning

Fuzzy reasoning and fuzzy formal deduction theory are two closely related subjects and each of them has been investigated by many researchers. Unfortunately, it seems that the two branches have not been successfully connected. The aim of this paper is to establish a so-called quasi-propositional deductive system syntactically as well as semantically, and then set a logic foundation for developing the theory of fuzzy reasoning therefrom.

Reducing Uncertainty: A Formal Theory ofOrganizations in Action

This article presents a formal reconstruction of James D. Thompson's classic contribution to organization theory, Organizations in Action. The reconstruction explicates the underlying argumentation structure for Thompson's propositions‐‐literally, theorems or problems to be demonstrated. This allows Thompson's propositions to be derived as theorems in a deductive theory. As it turns out, the formal theory is based on general assumptions using only few primitive concepts. In addition, this theory explains why Thompson's propositions do not hold for noncomplex or “atomic” organizations (a restriction on the domain of application). Furthermore, this study reveals that organizations attempt to reduce constraints in their en‐vironment‐‐a heretofore unknown implication of the theory.

Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction.

This article examined syllogistic reasoning that differs from previous research in 2 significant ways: (a) Participants were asked to decide whether conclusions were possible as well as necessary, and (b) every possible combination of syllogistic premises and conclusions was presented for evaluation with both single-premise (Experiment 1) and double-premise (Experiment 2) problems. Participants more frequently endorsed conclusions as possible than as necessary, and differences in response to the 2 forms of instruction conformed to several predictions derived from the mental model theory of deduction. Findings of Experiments 2 and 3 showed that some fallacies are consistently endorsed and others consistently resisted when people are asked to judge whether conclusions that are only possible follow necessarily. This finding was accounted for by the computational implementation of the model theory: Fallacies are made when the first mental model of the premises considered supports the conclusion presented. Traditional applications of logic concern the validity of arguments, that is, proving that some conclusion is necessary given some premises. However, in everyday reasoning it may be just as important to decide whether some proposition is possible in light of the given information. Inferences of possibility occur whenever rules and regulations constrain a person's behavior rather than determine what it must be. For example, students choosing a degree program within a modular course structure will have many degrees of freedom but will have to respect constraints owing to timetabling restrictions, availability of teaching staff, prerequisite and corequisite relations between modules, and so on. Their decision making here involves inferring what is possible and then deciding between the possibilities identified. Most of the rules by which people live their lives in society, including criminal law, operate in a similar way. It is rarely determined by such rules that people must follow a particular course of action, but they are frequently constrained to act within a set of legal possibilities. The psychological study of deductive reasoning has been steadily increasing in recent years, and there are now many hundreds of experimental studies reported in the literature (see Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993, for a review). In view of the above remarks, however, there is a curious limitation