De Caelo Research Articles

Elements, Homoeomers, and the Constitution of Natural Substances

This paper argues that the four elements exist in different ways in mixtures and homogenous parts of substances. According to Aristotle’s definition in De caelo, the elements exist in virtue of themselves in the compound bodies which they compose. However, if we assume that they exist in the same way in hylomorphic compounds as they exist in the compound bodies which they directly compose, a discrepancy arises between Aristotle’s definition of element and his hylomorphic theory, because the elements cannot exist potentially, on the one hand, as the elements themselves, and, on the other hand, as the matter of a hylomorphic compound, at the same time. To solve this problem, homogenous bodies have been distinguished into mixtures and homogenous parts of hylomorphic individuals. According to Aristotle, it is only in mixtures that the elements exist in potentiality, while in the formation of the homogenous parts of a new substance generated from the mixtures, the elements which exist in the mixture are destroyed so that they can no longer exist in the hylomorphic compounds as themselves.

Colloquium 3 Inclination and the Place of the Elements in De Caelo

Abstract In De Caelo III 2, Aristotle observes that each element is determined by an intrinsic principle to move to its proper place: earth downward, fire upward, and water and air to their respective places in the middle. However, how are we to determine the cause of elemental motion? Aristotle admits that this ranks among the most difficult problems (μάλιστα δ’ ἀπορεῖται) as it is directly related to the argument of Physics VIII 4, which defends the view that whatever is in motion is moved by something. The question of how the elements move is not resolved until we are presented with his definition of inclination (ῥοπή) in De Caelo IV 1. Inclination is the nature of each element to move to its proper place. Aristotle concludes that the principle of inclination is a cause of motion continuously orienting the elements toward their proper places by activating that which is potentially heavy or potentially light. In what follows, I shall demonstrate the internal coherence of Aristotle’s natural philosophy by deploying inclination as a principle of motion and rest to define the nature of each element. This account of inclination as a principle of motion is consistent with Aristotle’s definition of nature in Physics II 1. As an active principle of motion, inclination is identified with the activity (ἐνέργεια) of the element enacting and maintaining its own end (ἐντελέχεια) by being at rest in its proper place. As a passive principle of motion, inclination is identified with the passivity of the element to be moved to its proper place by another element insofar as the respective element undergoes generation or substantial change.

Colloquium 3 Commentary on Hayes

Abstract In his paper, Josh Hayes argues that inclination (ῥοπή) is the nature of each element. It is an active and passive principle that explains why the elements move to their proper places. Thus, according to Hayes, by introducing inclination in De Caelo IV 1, Aristotle posits a single explanatory factor that accounts for all elemental motions. By doing so, he answers the question, posed in Physics VIII 4, of what the cause of elemental motion is. In my comments, I will contest these claims. Aristotle’s theory of elemental motion does not rely on a single explanatory factor; yet, it is not, as Hayes claims, incoherent. Instead, the different strands merely reflect the special nature of the elements.

Robert Grosseteste’s Translation of Simplicius’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo: Tracking down a Second Manuscript and the Greek Model

The note surveys the reception history of Robert Grosseteste's Latin translation of Aristotle's De Caelo and of Simplicius's commentary on the same treatise. It presents the analysis of previously unnoticed fragments from a second manuscript of the translation. Their discovery necessitates the revision of earlier ideas about the limited dissemination of the text. The note also confirms a neglected hypothesis about the Greek model that Grosseteste used for his translation. A late-15th-century manuscript must be considered a direct copy of Grosseteste's lost Greek codex.

The American De coelo: Heaven and Earth in the New World’s First Printed Work on Natural Philosophy

The article analyses Alonso de la Vera Cruz’s ideas on cosmography, including both celestial and geographical conceptions, displayed in De coelo from his Physica speculatio (1557). This book introduced in New Spain the hegemonic natural knowledge of the time as well as alternative ideas. At the same time, living for years in the New World, de la Vera Cruz drew on his own experience when discussing the qualities of the Americas and their inhabitants. Unlike the imperial cosmography of the time, he valued not only the natural qualities of those lands but also their inhabitants, which had important social implications. We argue that De la Vera Cruz reinterpreted European notions to adapt them to the Americas and, at the same time, developed a local perspective that transferred the idea of centrality from Europe to the New World. In doing so, he had to mediate with both local and transatlantic interests and visions. Reissued three more times in Salamanca since the 1569 edition, the Physica speculatio included references to the coasts of the American continent, which constitutes an exception to the secret nature of this kind of cosmographical information in the Ibero-American world.

The So-called Sempiternalism of the Early Academy

Abstract It is a well-established opinion in the literature that the immediate circle of Plato’s disciples maintained that the generation of the cosmos described in the Timaeus was to be understood as an illustrative, or educational metaphor. On this account, Plato’s students were the first to hold an eternalist, metaphorical reading of the generation of the world, challenged by the Peripatos. When criticising their position in the De Caelo, however, Aristotle describes Early Academic philosophers as holding the more nuanced view that the world is ‘indestructible and yet generated’ (ἄφθαρτον μὲν […] γενόμενον δέ). Is it possible to make any sense of this formulation and restore a different position for Early Academic philosophers? In this paper, I claim that the standard reading can be challenged and that there is ground to believe that Speusippus and Xenocrates held that the world is generated but everlasting. What they denied having happened in time and said should be understood as an illustrative metaphor is the transition from the absence of an order to order or, in other words, the cosmogonic process itself.

Jerome of Moray: a Scottish Dominican and the evolution of Parisian music theory 1220–1280

ABSTRACTThis article examines the Tractatus de musica of Jerome of Moray (‘de Moravia’), affirming his Scottish identity, as proposed by Michel Huglo in 1994. It argues that the Tractatus de musica presents an important overview of Parisian music theory in the thirteenth century, relating to both chant and mensurable music in that century, because it combines the views of several generations: the Positio discantus vulgaris, which he says was used ‘among the nations’; the De mensurabili musica of John of Garland, who corrected its deficiencies; and the treatises of Franco of Cologne and Petrus Picardus. It considers Jerome's career in three phases: his exposure to music and music theory in Scotland; his studies in Paris, most likely under John of Garland, perhaps at the cathedral school of Notre-Dame; and his involvement in the liturgical reforms within the Dominican Order, implemented by its Master, Humbert of Romans in 1256. Rather than assigning Franco's Ars cantus mensurabilis to 1280 (as proposed by Wolf Frobenius) and Jerome's Tractatus to sometime after this, I suggest that Jerome was exposed to John of Garland's teaching in the 1240s and that the Franconian system may have started to gain ground in the 1250s. Jerome compiled his Tractatus over a period of time, adding an excerpt about cosmic music from the commentary of Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle's De caelo perhaps as early as 1271 or 1272, in response to the criticisms of John of Garland and his followers being made by Johannes de Grocheio.

A természeti létezők tipológiája Arisztotelésznél (Első rész)

The first part of the paper (appearing here) examines the typology Aristotle proposes as the extension of the term “things that exist by nature” in Physics B.1 and compares it to passages containing similar typologies in the Aristotelian corpus, most importantly Metaphysics D.8, Z.2, H.1, De Caelo G.1, and Meteorology A.1. The comparative analysis shows that – even though Aristotle introduces the lists in different philosophical contexts and one can find several instances of discord between them – there is a remarkable coherence between his verbal definitions of what exactly the items are the subtypes of. Part Two (appearing in the next issue) will first show that the structuring principles behind the lists can be ordered into a series developed rather consistently according to the same blueprint. After comparing this virtual series with what we can say about the chronological order of Aristotle’s works, the paper will attempt to explain the structural coherence by analysing the interplay between Aristotle’s concepts of nature and of substance and go on to discuss, from this angle, Aristotle’s revisionist treatment of the items on the lists one by one: the elements, inanimate natural objects, living beings and their parts, celestial bodies, and the heaven. Based on the findings, at the end of the paper a cautious attempt is made at an interpretation of the Aristotelian concepts of nature and substance in terms of the sociology of knowledge.

Johannes Kepler. The Sun as the Heart of the World

In two early unpublished texts (a Disputation in favor of Copernicus of 1593 and the Apologia pro Tychone against Ursus of 1600), Kepler argued with the Pythagoreans that, contrary to Aristotle ( De caelo, ii, 13), the geometrical center of the cosmos coincides with its natural center. Since the Sun is the body that occupies this central position, Kepler conceives it as the heart of the world and the principle of planetary motion. In the following study, we examine how Kepler further develops this pivotal theme in a letter to Herwart von Hohenburg of 25 March 1605 and later in the Dissertatio cum nuncio sidereo (Prague, 1610) as well as in a German translation and critical commentary of the Aristotelian chapter, which ultimately remained unpublished as well.

Argumentos y Explicaciones en De Caelo 2

The main concern of this paper is the problem of method in De Caelo (Book 2 and some related treatises), which has been recently invigorated by the supposition of Aristotle’s acceptance of two standards of justification. Whereas the φυσικῶς argument comes close to demonstrative knowledge, the εὐλόγως argument relies on more general assumptions and allegedly points towards argumentative justification (sometimes associated with dialectic). With a view to better understanding how empirical criteria for theories, teleological principles, and the resolution of difficulties are laid down to provide as much causal explanations as possible, we take side here in the debate about the very purpose of Aristotle’s using of justification by argument in scientific contexts. Our main claim is that although only reasonable proofs can be worked out in empirically underdetermined domains, this in no way amounts to endorsing an alternative to the norms of inquiry Aristotle upholds in natural science.

On Aristotle’s arguments for the Earth’s smallness: argumentative gaps and context

In the last chapter of the second book of his De Caelo, Aristotle argues for the Earth’s smallness. In this paper I will differentiate between three relevant ways in which this feature can be understood, and I will explain how Aristotle’s arguments relate to them. I will argue that Aristotle’s arguments, as they are presented in the relevant passages, are not conclusive, and finally I will provide a plausible context which might help understand Aristotle’s text.

Une occasion manquée? La critique implicite de la chôra dans le livre III du De caelo d’Aristote

Book III of Aristotle’s De caelo does not feature the Platonic concept of χώρα as a main protagonist. Through mere scarce allusions, Aristotle tends to treat it as just another concept of matter, reminiscent in many respects of those of Presocratic philosophers. In this paper, I argue that this biased presentation should be interpreted as Aristotle’s implicit refusal to acknowledge the role of the χώρα in Plato’s reform of participation, which is expounded in the Timaeus. I refer this refusal to Aristotle’s complex epistemological and methodological criticisms of Platonic paradigmatism. Reconstructing this implicit dialogue between Plato and Aristotle also sheds a new light on the stakes and consistency of book III of De caelo, which had remained elusive in earlier approaches. I suggest that book III does not aim to propose a consistent account of the four elements or of generation, but to build a new Aristotelian framework as an answer to the aporiai of Plato’s Timaeus.

Circular Motion and Circular Thought: ASynthetic Approach to the Fifth Element in Aristotle's de Philosophia and de Caelo.

Scholars have long considered de Philosophia and de Caelo to be in contradiction regarding the nature of the heavenly bodies, particularly with respect to the activity proper to the element composing them. According to the accounts we have of de Philosophia, Aristotle seems to have put forth that stars move because they have minds, and, according to Cicero's account of the lost text, they choose their actions out of free will. In de Caelo, however, Aristotle seems only to consider that stars engage in the activity of circular motion because it is in their nature to do so, as it is in the nature of, e.g. fire to move upwards or Earth to move downwards. In this paper, I argue against the longstanding view that there is an incompatibility between these two "early" cosmological texts of Aristotle. I aim to show that these two texts endorse complementary, not contradictory, views of the heavenly bodies. I argue that in de Philosophia, Aristotle attributes to stars the intellective counterpart of the spatial motion which is developed in greater depth in de Caelo, while in de Caelo, we see hints of Aristotle's view in de Philosophia that the stars are also minds and are able to rationally cognize their particular good- a point which is shown in de Caelo 292a18-293a14, where Aristotle attributes both life and praxis to the heavenly bodies. The overarching view which I present of these two texts is that while de Caelo approaches the heavenly bodies qua bodies and de Philosophia approaches them qua minds, they are still examining one and the same substance and that Aristotle has not changed his mind regarding the basic nature of such a substance in the (supposed) interim between writing de Philosophia and de Caelo. Rather, we find echoes of de Caelo in de Philosophia, and echoes of de Philosophia in de Caelo, which speaks to the fact that Aristotle maintains one view of the heavenly bodies which he presents over the course of these two texts.

Heat, Pneuma, and Soul in Ancient Philosophy and Science ed. by Hynek Bartoš and Colin Guthrie King

Reviewed by: Heat, Pneuma, and Soul in Ancient Philosophy and Science ed. by Hynek Bartoš and Colin Guthrie King Rhodes Pinto Hynek Bartoš and Colin Guthrie King, editors. Heat, Pneuma, and Soul in Ancient Philosophy and Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. x + 380. Cloth, $99.99. This unfortunately titled volume offers a collection of fourteen essays and two introductions, many of which stem from a 2014 conference, Aristotle and His Predecessors on Heat, Pneuma, and Soul, which is a more honest reflection of the contents, given its exclusion of the Stoics. Of the essays, eight are devoted to Aristotle (mainly to biological and zoological topics), four to Presocratic natural philosophy, one to Plato, and one to the De Spiritu. The poor titling and somewhat oddly circumscribed selection of who and what receives attention, however, do not detract from the quality of the contributions themselves, which is largely excellent. One highlight is Simon Trépanier's account of soul in Empedocles, the most sophisticated account yet developed. Trépanier argues that soul is a fire-air mix, an early pneuma theory. In animals, this mix is in the blood around the midriff, thus reconciling the reports linking soul to fire or air and to blood while allowing for metempsychosis. Another highlight is Gábor Betegh's wide-ranging and generally deflationary piece on fire and heat as a source of motion in the Presocratics and some Hippocratics. In particular, his discussion of Democritus constitutes a significant advance in the understanding of Democritus's atomic theory. The piece also features the volume's only discussion of Heraclitus. The understudied Diogenes of Apollonia's ontology receives a dedicated chapter by Bryan Reece, though Reece inexplicably neglects half of the key evidence, namely Diels-Kranz (DK) B5, especially its invocation of tropoi of air and of "what is called 'air' by humans." Thomas Johansen presents a compelling argument that in the Timaeus the process of nutrition for all living creatures is the causal responsibility of the world-soul (via its rotation and thereby the mixing and separation of the elements). Still, I was left wondering about the teleology. Mortal creatures' nutrition appears not to be an aim of the world-soul, nor is it a stated aim in the Demiurge's crafting of the world-soul. Perhaps the teleological responsibility lies with the visible gods, who form mortals with confining bodies such that nutrition can occur via the world-soul's causation. That fits well with the Demiurge's address to the visible gods (41a–d), though, if correct, it would suggest that the (confining structure of the) body has a slightly greater role in the account of nutrition than Johansen grants. Several chapters address the motions in sperma within Aristotle's account of reproduction. The interpretation given in Karel Thein's chapter is unlikely to win advocates. Employing a connection suggested at GA II.3, 736b37–737a1, Thein argues that "the motion proper to the seed … is not due to any external mechanical impulse" (193); rather it is, like that of aether in the De Caelo, "due to an inherent animation" (200), which does not involve soul. Hence he asserts that "the state of being animate, ἔμψυχον, is not always and necessarily connected to being a soul or having a soul" (194–95). Even setting aside his claim that Aristotle speaks of aether in the De Caelo as "animate (ἔμψυχος)" (196), for which I find no textual evidence, and the implausible strain on the Greek language, Thein's position leaves problematic how the motion in pneuma is caused. Several remarks—"its power to move itself" (193) and "ongoing self-animation" (196)—evidently treat it as self-motion, while another describes it as "apparently unanalyzable" (196), but neither of those positions squares with Aristotle's understanding of the causation of motion in Physics VIII. [End Page 511] By contrast, Jessica Gelber's chapter convincingly argues that the motions of heat and cold in the sperma are the "tools" or "intermediate agents" (245) used by—and thus caused by—the nutritive soul of the male parent. Gelber's take dovetails nicely with the following chapter by Patricio Fernandez and Jorge Mittelmann, who find further instances...

Edmond Halley's Contributions to Hydrogeology.

Edmond Halley's Contributions to Hydrogeology.

Cosmologia e ética

O presente artigo tem como ponto de partida a investigação de como um sistema cosmológico específico pode determinar um sistema ético e moral específico. Demonstraremos isso através de uma análise da crítica do filósofo italiano Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) ao descobrimento da América em seu livro De Triplice Immenso et Mensura (1591). Bruno insere o problema da descoberta da América como uma descoberta semelhante aos novos feitos celestes de sua época, nos quais a visão apocalíptica da América poderia ser julgada como resultado de uma falsa cosmologia e antropologia, uma errônea concepção das relações humanas com a divindade.
 Na primeira parte apresentaremos o efeito nefasto decorrente de um princípio errado, ou seja, a conquista da América sob dois pontos centrais. Primeiro, como Cristovão Colombo inseriu a descoberta da América no esquema apocalíptico do final dos tempos. Segundo, apresentaremos alguns pontos que foram o cerne do debate na Europa do século XVI sobre se os povos indígenas deviam ou não serem escravizados e convertidos ao cristianismo através de relatos da disputa de Valladollid .
 Numa segunda parte, apresentamos o princípio de tal efeito nefasto segundo Bruno, ou seja, a cosmologia e filosofia natural de Aristóteles no De Caelo.
 A terceira parte, a qual daremos maior ênfase, expõe a crítica de Giordano Bruno no De Immenso (1592), obra cosmológica, onde o filósofo argumenta contra a cosmologia aristotélica. Nosso foco é em como Bruno constrói um argumento filosófico em que uma concepção cosmológica errada de um cosmos fechado, hierárquica, ordenada do mais denso ao imaterial, resulta num sistema ético violento e injusto, uma moral que idealiza um lugar literalmente mais “alto”, o céu dos deuses, e um lugar literalmente mais baixo, morada dos corpos perenes e dos seres pecadores, nossa morada.

Proof by Assumption of the Possible in Prior Analytics, 1.15; How Not to Blend Modal Frameworks

The present paper aims to show that the reconstruction of the formal framework of the proofs in Pr. An. 1.15, as proposed by Malink and Rosen 2013 (‘Proof by Assumption of the Possible in Prior Analytics 1.15’, Mind, 122, 953-85) is due to affront a double impasse. Malink and Rosen argue convincingly that Aristotle operates with two different modal frameworks, one as found in the system of modal logic presented in Prior Analytics 1.3 and 8-22, and one occurring in many of Aristotle’s works, such as the Physics, De Caelo and the Metaphysics. However, they misconstrue the latter framework. More precisely, they misconstrue the domain of significance of what they call the ‘Principle of Necessitation’. As a consequence, bringing the two frameworks into one results into a contradictory modal logic. On the other hand, if the Principle of Necessitation is rectified, the proofs put forward by Malink and Rosen in the same paper are no longer available.

Simplicius et la rotation des astres : histoire d’une scolie du Petit Commentaire de Théon d’Alexandrie

Theon of Alexandria’s Little Commentary to Ptolemy’s Handy Tables, written in the 4th century, was a very successful astronomical treatise during Late Antiquity and the whole Byzantine era, as one can see from the numerous scholia from different periods found in the Greek manuscripts from the 14th to the 16th century. One of these scholia has a very original history : it is a reshaped excerpt from Simplicius’ commentary to Aristotle’s De caelo, in which the author mentions Ptolemy’s “ tables” and deals with the question of the rotation of celestial bodies. Relying on the main manuscript witnesses, this scholion is here edited for the first time. Moreover, its complete textual history will be considered, from its redaction by Simplicius and its transfer to the margins of Theon’s commentary – which may have been an initiative of Stephanus of Alexandria (6th c.) – until the different textual versions found in the Greek astronomical manuscripts until the Renaissance.

Roman Republican Augury: Freedom and Control by L.G. Driediger-Murphy

Reviewed by: Roman Republican Augury: Freedom and Control by L.G. Driediger-Murphy Andrzej Gillmeister Driediger-Murphy, L.G. 2019. Roman Republican Augury: Freedom and Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 304. ISBN 978-0-19-883443-4. £75.00. The author of this book has undertaken an interesting and very difficult task. The difficulty arises from the necessity of engaging with the masterful work of Jerzy Linderski, which has been the basic point of reference on augury for over thirty years,2 and also with the critical verification of the most recent literature on the subject, the most significant of which is the excellent work of Yann Berthelet.3 The work reviewed here is composed of an introduction, three well-developed chapters, and a short and a rather insufficient conclusion. Each part of the book is composed of sub-chapters. The extensive introduction (pp. 1–50) is of a largely methodological nature. It contains a competent discussion of the scholarship on the auspices up to the present day and outlines the author's main premises. The first chapter, 'Do as I say, not as I do? Report versus reality in augury' (pp. 51–126), is a masterful analysis of the sources concerning this ritual, aimed at proving the thesis that the rules of the auspices provided those who performed them with much less freedom than researchers had previously thought. Driediger-Murphy concludes that the Romans gave Jupiter the time and freedom to express his will, with which they felt connected. In any case, in the Republican period, 'they did not expect him to be silent' (p. 126). [End Page 264] In Chapter Two, 'Convenience or conversation: why "watching the sky" was more than wishful thinking' (pp. 127–60), the author considers servare de caelo as one of the augural techniques. It is mainly known for its use by M. Calpurnius Bibulus in 59 BC. Bibulus, fulfilling the role of consul along with Julius Caesar, used the sky-watching procedure for obstructive purposes. This commonly known use of augury, treated as proof of political exploitation, is interpreted by Driediger-Murphy as questioning the opinions of the Romans about their own religion and Jupiter's place within it. The chapter ends with a collection of sources concerning the Bibulus affair. The last chapter, 'Out of control: the effects of augury on Roman public life' (pp. 161–202), summarises Driediger-Murphy's comments on the role of the gods, particularly Jupiter, in augury. She argues that the main role in the procedure, binding for those who led the auspices, was played by the gods. The work finishes with a short conclusion (pp. 202–8) which briefly recapitulates the author's points in their entirety. The work contains an extensive bibliography and two useful indexes. Scholars of Roman religion are confronted by numerous limitations, the most basic being the impossibility of properly describing the context of the events referred to in the sources. This can clearly be seen in the case of Roman divination. The main problem for researchers is defining whether it belonged to the political or the religious order. Even taking into account the qualification that in Ancient Rome religion was inextricable from other aspects of social life, it is often assumed that it was of a political nature. But, as Driediger-Murphy rightly points out, this reduces religion, and in particular official divination practices, to a state function. In addition, the sources preserved up to the present day are extremely thin on descriptions or analyses of everyday, oft-repeated events during the lives of the Romans, such as the taking of auspices. Sources often provide information about exceptional situations and departures from the norm, usually not supplying what was actually considered the norm, since for contemporary readers this was obvious. This situation creates difficulties for scholars today for two reasons. First it makes it harder to draw general conclusions and second the danger arises of considering common phenomena to be exceptional. Driediger-Murphy is conscious of this. The main task that Driediger-Murphy has set herself is the reinstatement of the role of Jupiter in Roman augury. The author correctly observes that in the literature up until now, more space...

Air and Friction in the Celestial Region: Some medieval solutions to the difficulties of the Aristotelian theory concerning the production of celestial heat

This paper explores the medieval debates concerning problems with the Aristotelian theory of the production and transmission of solar heat as presented in De Caelo II, 7 and Meteorologica I, 3. In these passages, Aristotle states that celestial heat is generated by the friction set up in the air by the motion of celestial bodies. This statement is difficult to reconcile with Aristotle’s cosmology, which presupposes that the heavenly bodies are not surrounded by air, but by aether, and that the celestial spheres are perfectly smooth, and therefore cannot cause any friction. In their commentaries on De Caelo and on Meteorologica, the Latin commentators elaborated a model that solves these difficulties. In this attempt, they invoke a non-mechanical principle, namely celestial influence.