De Caelo Research Articles

Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretaione (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 1 17 Charles E. Butterworth, translator. Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretaione. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xx + 193. $~.5 o. The volume is the first in a projected series of translations from the Arabic of Averroes's so-called "middle commentaries" on Aristotle's logical works, and on the Rhetoric and the Poetics. Averroes (1126-1198 ) wrote three different kinds of commentaries on Aristotle: short "epitomes," exhaustive "long" commentaries, and--as here--intermediate or "middle" commentaries. The purpose of these last appears to have been to explain the text of Aristotle clearly and concisely, with a minimum of digression. (Nevertheless, as Butterworth points out, the Middle Commentary on the De Interpretatione strays rather far from Aristotle's own work.) These new translations of the middle commentaries are based on the most recent critical editions now being published by the American Research Center in Cairo. The Middle Commentary on the De lnterpretatione has never before been translated into any language exce.pt Latin and Hebrew. But a previous English translation of the Middle Commentary on the Categories appeared as recently as 1969.' In his Preface, Butterworth explains why a new translation is appropriate. The previous translation was based on the Bouyges edition of the Arabic text, published in 193a. Since that time, several other manuscripts of the Arabic text have been located. Moreover, the Leiden manuscript on which Bouyges mainly based his edition appears to reflect an earlier and less polished redaction of the text. The Florence manuscript on which the most recent critical edition (and Butterworth's translation) is based seems to present Averroes's own revised and improved version of the text, done some six months after the version that stands behind the Leiden manuscript. Butterworth's Preface also briefly retells the still fascinating story of the preservation and transmission of Aristotle's works, of how they were translated first into Syriac, then frmn Syriac into Arabic, and finally from Arabic into Hebrew and Latin. But it would be a mistake to think (and here Butterworth's remarks might leave the reader with the wrong impression) that the Latin West obtained the texts of Aristotle only or even primarily via this circuitous route through the Arabic. On the contrary, as B. G. Dod observes, "There is a tenacious legend that the West learnt its Aristotle via translations from the Arabic, but the fact is that the West turned to Arabic-Latin translations only in default of the more intelligible Greek-Latin ones. The only translations from the Arabic to achieve wide circulation were the De caelo, Meteorologica IIII , De animalibus and Metaphysics, and all of these except the De animalibus were quickly displaced by William of Moerbreke's versions."' ' Herbert A. Davidson, translator, Averroes"Middle Commentaryon Porphyry'sIsagoge, Translatedfrom the Hebrew and Latin Versions, and on Aristi~tle'sCategoriae,Translatedfrom the Original Arabic and Latin Versions, "Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem," vol. I, a, x-z (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1969). z Bernard G. Dod, "Aristoteleslatinus," in Norman Kretzmann, et at., The CambridgeHistoryof Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Ch. ~, 45-79, at 52. Moerbeke's translations were directly from Greek. 1 I8 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ~4: ~ JANUARY 198( To possess and read the texts of Aristotle, however, is not automatically to under stand them. Here Latin translations of the Arabic commentators, and particularly o Averroes, were of decisive importance. So true is this that,just as the Latin West calico Aristotle "the Philosopher," so too Averroes was called simply "the Commentator" everyone knew who was meant. Nevertheless, in the case of the Categoriesand DeInterpre tatione, Averroes's importance in this regard was minimal. For not only had the Latin possessed these Aristotelian works ever since Boethius's translations in the sixth century They also had Boethius's own commentaries on them, commentaries far more elaborat~ and detailed than Averroes's concise presentations in his Middle Commentaries. In addition to the Preface, the present volume contains a separate Introduction tc each of the two works translated here, separate outlines or tables of contents for eac] of the translations, the translations themselves, and an...

On the Sense and Authenticity of De caelo 280 A27-34

Previous articleNext article No AccessOn the Sense and Authenticity of De caelo 280 A27-34Kenneth QuandtKenneth Quandt Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Classical Philology Volume 79, Number 3Jul., 1984 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/366859 Views: 1Total views on this site Copyright 1984 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Saving the appearances of the appearances: The foundations of classical geometrical optics

1 Simplicius, at third hand from Eudemus through Sosigenes, reports that Plato proposed the by now dog-eared problem of finding "by the supposition of what uniform, circular, and ordered motions the appearances of planetary movements could be saved" (Tivojv vnoredevrœv of' ofxaXcbv xai eyxvxMojv xai rerayfievojv xivtjoeojv ovvrjeorai oiaoojOfjvai rei neql rovc Tikavwjbievovc (paivo/ueva, In Aristotelis De caelo commentarla II, 12, 221a30-32, ed. I. L. Heiberg, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 7 [Berlin, 1894], p. 493). Moreover, Simplicius continues, it was Eudoxus, Plato's student, who first responded to the challenge by devising his theory of homocentric spheres. So if Simplicius is to be credited, Plato, by inspiring Eudoxus, was responsible for the birth of classical mathematical astronomy. Now whether it was Plato himself, or Eudoxus, who actually set out the problem has been a somewhat vexed issue, but on the whole it is accepted that the idea of regularizing the apparent planetary vagaries by means of uniform circular motion is at least consonant with Platonic doctrine (c/., however, J. Mittelstrass, Die Rettung der Phanomene [Berlin, 1962]). More vexed is the issue of what the challenge itself really intendedan issue raised to prominence by Pierre Duhem in his ZQZEIN TA A "to save" appearances meant to fit them into a preconceived mathematical model without regard for the physical reality or truth of the model itself. In short, saving the appearances was a positivist endeavor. The second alternative/school was fundamentally "realist"; it was not enough to frame an adequate mathematical hypothesis. The hypothesis itself had to reflect the real, physical nature of things. Duhem clearly had methodological fish to fry; he wanted to show that the seeds of modern science were not only sown by Plato and his astronomical followers but were nurtured (with some notable exceptions) throughout the middle ages and renaissance

Aristotle on Natural Place and Natural Motion

JNTERPRETERS OF ARISTOTLE have often assumed, though less often explicitly stated, that the function of natural place in Aristotle's sublunar sphere is to provide a cause (formal, efficient, or final) for the natural motion of the elements. It is suggested that there is some sort of attractive power of the place on the moving element. On this interpretation a body is said to move to its natural place because of a power that that place has over that particular kind of body. This attractive power of natural place is often cited as evidence that Aristotle's physics is teleological in character. I The passages from Aristotle which are usually cited in support of this interpretation are Physics IV 1, 208b9-10 and De caelo IV 3, 310a30-35. In the Physics, according to a misleading, standard translation, Aristotle writes:

On the Elements: Aristotle's Early Cosmology (review)

Book Reviews On the Elements: Aristotle's Early Cosmology. By A. P. Bos. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972. Pp. 154. $12.25) Aristotle's cosmology has been one of the favorite topics in the debate about the development of his thought ever since this discussion was started by Werner Jaeger's famous book in 1923. Among the cosmological writings the De Caelo especially invites such discussion because it seems to have been one of the manuscripts which Aristotle used time and again as lecture-notes, making additions which are sometimes difficult to reconcile with the rest of the text. There are, e.g., passages which exclude (cf. I, 9, 279a 30ft.; II, 3, 286a9ff.; 287b15) and others which assume an unmoved mover as the supreme cosmological principle (cf. II, 6, 288a29ff.); and while at times Aristotle seems to be giving a mechanistic account of the motion of the heavenly bodies we also find him attributing soul and life to them (cf. II, 2, 285a30, etc.). But while there is general agreement among those scholars who believe in an evolution of Aristotle's thought about the lack of unity in his doctrine, there is very little agreement about the actual stages of Aristotle's cosmology, from a possible early Platonic system down to the theory of a multitude of unmoved movers as in Met. A 8. In fact it seems, as Bos points out in chapter I of his book, as if the critical approach to the text of the De Caelo only leads to the effect that more and more passages are explained as later additions--whether by Aristotle himself or after his death by the notorious redactor who struggled desparately to smooth down the breaches in Aristotle's lecture-notes. In view of this unsatisfactory state of the discussion, Bos attempts to arrive at a new synthesis by pointing out two clearly distinguishable parts in the De Caelo which represent two different stages in Aristotle's thought. Through a careful analysis of the text and a comparison with other Aristotelian writings he hopes to prove that orignially De Caelo I, 1-3 and III had formed a unitary treatise which contained Aristotle's early doctrine of the five elements, the aether (material of the heavenly spheres and stars) and the four "sublunary" elements, fire and air, water and earth. This treatise Bos supposes to have come from a period when Aristotle first took a critical attitude toward certain Platonic doctrines (pp. 126, 131)---at a time when Plato perhaps was still alive and possibly even responded in the Laws to Aristotle's criticism of the Timaeus. For Bos, "On the Elements" preceded the De philosophia (pp. 122ff.), and may have been part of Aristotle's earliest work on physics, a "m0~ tp6o~c0;" of which other parts have been preserved as Books I and II of the extant Aristotelian Physics (pp. 101ft.). 1 Only much later was this writing on the elements inserted into the manuscript on cosmology, expanded and split for convenience' sake into two separate parts (p. 106). Such is the general outline of Bos's interpretation. The difficulties of his task are obvious; for even the sympathetic reader will hardly be able to follow his argumentation with anything but the attitude "in dubio contra reum." For though there are undeniably close connections between I, 1-3 and III, the question remains whether there are sufficient reasons which compel us to assume that the rest of Book I and Book II must be later additions and may not rather have been composed at the same time as the part dealing with the elements.2 1 As evidence for its existence Bos takes the beginning of the Physics where Aristotle announces that he would be occupied with knowledge "where there are principles or causes or elements." The original work "On nature," according to Bos contained precisely these three parts: one book on "archai," one on "aitiai," and one on "stoicheia" (see pp. 103ft.). 2 Book IV seems to be relatively independent and may indeed have been added later by Aristode. [227] 228 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY As his starting point Bos takes the introduction to Book III (298a24-b8), which...

Aristotle, De Caelo 279 a 18–35 (or 279 b 3), a “Fragment” of the Lost Aristotelian on Philosophy

Aristotle, De Caelo 279 a 18–35 (or 279 b 3), a “Fragment” of the Lost Aristotelian on Philosophy

Aristotle's Theology: A Commentary on Book Λ of the Metaphysics (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 523 Aristotle's Theology: A Commentary on Book A of the Metaphysics. By Leo Elders. (Assen, The Netherlands: Royal VanGorcum Ltd., 1972) In 1961 Leo Elders published a book under the title Aristotle's Theory o] the One with the subtitle "A Commentary on Book X of the Metaphysics." Five years later he published Aristotle's Cosmology, subtitled "A Commentary on the De Caelo." Continuing his "commentary " approach to Aristotle's works, he returns in the present work to the Metaphysics, restricting himself in this case to an examination of Book Lambda. The author is convinced that the "central doctrine of the Book is the conception of an unmoved Mover, who is unchangeable and eternal; his being is subsistent thinking; he is the final cause of all movement and the Good desired by the cosmos" (p. 1). In addition to a detailed commentary on each of the ten chapters of Book Lambda, the book contains seven introductory chapters which discuss the relation of Aristotle's theology to that of his Greek predecessors, particularly Plato, and attempts to solve such problems as the date and structure of Metaphysics Lambda and its place in the Aristotelian corpus. The author believes Metaphysics Lambda to be a collection of short studies which belong to mature Aristotelianism but do not form a coherent treatise. Because the eighth chapter asserts a multiplicity of Unmoved Movers, which runs counter to the position taken in the rest of the book, Elders takes the position that the eighth chapter is a short essay by one of Aristotle's collaborators or students which was inserted into the book by a later editor. One of the significant difficulties with the book is that the author reads a number of anachronistic ideas back into Greek philosophy. He assumes that we all know, especially the author himself, what "theology" means to the Greeks and that whatever its meaning it is not only continuous with the Christian conception of theology but can best be understood with the aid of the Christian approach to theology. Is it not best to regard the Unmoved Mover simply as the Perfect Scientist or Perfect Knower, the final cause of those who desire knowledge? Of course, it is true that Aristotle refers to the Unmoved Mover as divine (theos)----what,after all, deserves the designation "divine" except that which is perfect and eternal, and the final goal of man's intellectual activity? As the author states in the Preface that "one of the leading thoughts of the commentary is that there is a real continuity between Academic theories and Aristotle's doctrine of the Unmoved Mover" he devotes considerable attention to various aspects of Plato's thought. Here he frequently succumbs to the temptation to read a number of Neoplatonic, Pythagorean , and even Christian ideas into the Greek philosopher, and fails to distinguish Plato from "the Platonists" mentioned by Aristotle (el. pp. 276, 291, and 292). Such passages as Metaphysics 1090b20-24 and 1090b31 ft. do not necessarily refer to Plato himself but could easily mean some unidentified members of his school. In the introductory chapters especially, Elders attributes to Plato a number of theories which derive from other sources, frequently with little or no direct textual justification for so doing. For instance, he says that "a great number of texts indicate that Plato made the One a principle beyond being, and thus beyond thinking" (p. 16). His only corroborating evidence is that this is "implicitly contained in the famous text of Rep. 509B" (footnote 7, p. 16). Earlier he has said that "Plato developed a theory of principles according to which all essences are connected with the supreme principle, which, in his later years, Plato called the One" (pp. 8-9). Again, the only textual evidence he mentions is several passages from the Republic, which have at best a tenuous connection with such a theory and which were certainly not written during Plato's "later years." The book also suffers from a number of organizational problems. In an attempt to bring together the opinions of other scholars on the issues at hand, the author continually mixes up secondary literature and interpretations with the problems he poses...

Pio IX e La Rinascità del Tomismo by Antonio Piolanti

BOOK REVIEWS 939 the invention of the microscope. And in the " Brief Catalogue of Authentic Works" at the end Weisheipl frequently makes the notation "No English translation" when in fact such translations do exist: for example, the Sententia de caelo et mundo, Sententia super libros de generatione et corruptione , and Sententia super Meteora have all been translated into English by R. F. Larcher and P. H. Conway, Columbus: College of St. Mary of the Springs, 1963-1964; the polemical treatise De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes has been done by Cyril Volaert et al., Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964; and the De mixtione elementorum, by V. R. Larkin in Isis, 51 (1960), pp. 67-7~. Yet these are but minor defects, hardly worthy of mention, that in no way detract from what is obviously the best biography of Aquinas now available, in English or in any language. The Catholic University of America Washington, D. C. WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P. Pia IX e La Rinascita del Tomismo. By ANTONIO ProLANTI. Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1974. Pp. 113. The sixth centenary of the death of St. Thomas (1874) was hailed by the then Pontiff, Pius IX, as paralleling the significant celebration of a few years earlier (1867) of the 18th centenary of the deaths of Saints Peter and Paul: Hos inter laetos eventus sicut iam anno millesimo octingentesimo sexagesimo septimo celebravimus decimi octavi saecularis anni, quo Principes Apostolorum proprii sanguinis testimonio traditam confirmavit Evangelii doctrinam, sic celebraturi nunc sumus sextum saecularem annum depositionis Angelici Doctoris, Sancti Thomas Aquinatis, a Divina Providentia largiti ad eamdem doctrinam miro modo illustrandum.... These words of Pope Mastai express the genuine high value in which throughout his life he held the Angelic Doctor and for the rebirth of whose teaching he labored unceasingly. For this reason it should be noted that the later encyclical Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII, together with his proclamation of St. Thomas as Patron of Catholic Schools, were the fruits of the long period of promotion and encouragement on the part of Pius IX to reawaken in the Church and in the world an appreciation of St. Thomas and his teaching. The author of this brief account of the rather forgotten relationship of Pio Nono to the rebirth of Thomism is Postulator of the Cause of canonization of Pius IX, Secretary of the Pontifical Roman Theological Academy, Vice President of the Pontifical Acardemy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and, 940 BOOK REVIEWS among other achievements of publication, founder and director of the Biblioteca per la Storia del Tomismo, of which this monograph is number 8. His study is based on hitherto unknown or forgotten or undervalued and thus not previously considered testimonies. It is divided into nine chapters. Chapter I introduces us to the thomistic formation of Giovanni Maria Mastai Ferretti. His early acquaintance with St. Thomas was augmented and deepened in his further studies at the Collegio Romano and the Accademia Ecclesiastica where he had as professor the convinced Thomist Canon Giuseppe M. Graziani. The latter's influence on the Thomistio:: orientation of Mastai as theological student and as pontiff was immense. Chapter II surveys the magisterial documents of the thirty-two year pontificate. The first, the encyclical Qui Pluribus (1846) , was the charter of the pontificate, the leitmotiv of the papal teaching: the concord and mutual assistance of reason and faith. By means of the many documents of Pius IX the teaching of St. Thomas found its way into the Constitutions of Vatican I. Pius IX (Ch. III) defended the value of the scholastic and thomistic methods (cf. Denz.-Schon. fl814, fl880, fl876-2880, fl918). Monsignor Piolanti (Ch. IV) singles out the Dominican Order as one of the recipients of the papal encouragement in the revival of Thomism and the Jesuit Order with its role in the Civilta Cattolica. Chapter V describes the efforts of the pope to protect, develop, and increase Thomistic centers both in Rome and throughout Italy, such as the schools of Perugia under Cardinal Gioacchino Pecci (Leo XIII) and Naples under Cardinal Sisto Riario Sforza. His interest naturally extended to the doctrinal formation of the clergy. Chapter VI relates the pontiff's promotion of the sixth...

‘Planets’ in Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff.

In four of the last five numbers of the JHS, Doctors D. R. Dicks and D. O'Brien have disputed about Simplicius De caelo 471.1 ff. (DK 12A19), which runs (in part, 471.2–6): καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῑ [i.e. ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἀστρολογίαν] περὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν πλανωμένων καὶ περὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ ἀποστημάτων ἀποδέδεικται Ἀναξιμάνδρου πρώτου τὸν περὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ ἀποστημάτων λόγον εὑρηκότος, ὡς Εὔδημος ἱστορεῖ τὴν τῆς θέσεως τάξιν εἰς τοὺς Πυθαγορείους πρώτους ἀναψέρων. In his History of Greek philosophy (i 93), Professor Guthrie translates the latter part of this as follows: ‘(…speaking of the planets) “Anaximander was the first to discuss their sizes and distances, according to Eudemus, who attributes the first determination of their order to the Pythagoreans.”’ Guthrie, Dicks and O'Brien all agree that πλανωμένων is accurately translated as ‘planets’; they also evidently agree that Anaximander would not have distinguished the planets from the fixed stars, at least in this matter; and consequently Guthrie (op. cit. i 95) finds Simplicius' statement about Anaximander ‘confusing’; Dicks finds it ‘nonsensical’; and O'Brien speaks of Simplicius' ‘rather ragged context’, and supposes that Eudemus was actually speaking, not of planets, but of sun, moon and stars, i.e. that Simplicius has quite misrepresented his source.

Priesthood: Reflections on the Synod ‘Working Paper’ I. Priest and Parish

Then they sang the second verse of the Tantum ergo and Canon O’Hanlon got up again and censed the Blessed Sacrament and knelt down and he told Father Conroy that one of the candles was just going to set fire to the flowers and Father Conroy got up and settled it all right... Canon O’Hanlon stood up with his cope poking up at his neck and Father Conroy handed him the card to read off and he read out Panem de coelo praestitisti eis ....Sunday evening service in a West Riding town forty to sixty years ago was not very much different from the scene in the church at Sandymount on Bloomsday. For the priests it marked the end of a quite heavy Sunday, the climax of a by no means easy week. Two Masses in the morning with a sermon at each, fasting from midnight perhaps until 1 o’clock, baptisms and children’s service, rosary—or Vespers—or Compline, another sermon, and Benediction. On the Saturday five or six hours’ confessions. In this town as in many others of its kind, from Friday night to Sunday afternoon, all the time left over from church services and absolutely necessary meals and rest, was spent in house to house collecting. The parish priest might reserve to himself the task of counting or he might share it with the curates, thus lengthening the weekend’s work to Monday midday. For some this might be followed by recreation on the golf links and dark murmurings with other clerical companions about the tyranny of parish priests. For the rest of the week, two hours of every day would be taken up with Mass and Office, there would be at least one evening service with a sermon, perhaps a confraternity meeting, instruction of converts (most of them marrying Catholics), a weekly visit to the school, visiting both of the sick and well (the latter being questioned, if necessary, about attendance at Mass and Easter duties). A conscientious priest might use some of the time left over to prepare his sermons.

Aristotle's Cosmology: A Commentary on the De Caelo

Aristotle's Cosmology: A Commentary on the De Caelo

H. FRAENKEL, Einleitung zur kritischen Ausgabe der Argonautika des Apollonios (Abh. der Ak. d. W. in Göttingen, Philol.-Hist. Kl., 3. Folge, 53). Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964. 163 S. Pr. DM 23.-

190 I will mention just two other points. (I ) In II. II Aristotle himself says that up till that moment he had not advanced any arguments against the theory of the Ideas. Hence the early dating of the II. cannot be correct. (2) With regard to fr. 5 of the Eudemus B. does not follow During, who declares it to be spurious, and in this he is certainly right. But that the of this fragment or 7axeZ in De caelo I 9 would mean the Prime Mover, is far from convincing. On the whole Dr. B.'s work is interesting

Scientific Procedure in Aristotle's ‘de Caelo’

It is difficult to deduce the Aristotelian scientific procedure — to take his abstract statement of the nature of science and to show that his actual method in a particular work is adequately explained by the initial definition. Yet Aristotle's actual method is worth getting at. It provides insight into Aristotle and into Greek thought, and it sheds light on the course of ideas during the centuries which have been scientifically Aristotelian. In the following pages, I have tried to discover and to describe the method at work in a particular scientific treatise. The unit chosen for study is the first book and a half of the De caelo. Here it is that Aristotle develops his highly influential science of the celestial bodies.

Homocentric Spheres in de caelo

It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's starting point in the development of his cosmological ideas was the Platonic system described in the Timaeus, and this seems a natural assumption to make. But it is not clear at what stage Aristotle abandoned this system for the theory of homocentric spheres propounded by Eudoxus and Callippus,l nor is the development of this theory itself certain. We must not assume without reason that Aristotle had already adopted the theory at the time when he wrote De Caelo; but in one chapter at any rate, Bi 2, there is clear evidence that he had done so,2 and I wish first to consider the form which the theory takes in that chapter. In Metaphysics A 3Aristotle mentions three versions of the theory: that of Eudoxus, that of Callippus and his own. It is generally agreed that while the first two of these differ from one another only in detail, the third differs in principle from them both. The theory as originally formulated by Eudoxus was purely an abstract mathematical construction representing the paths followed by the heavenly bodies; Aristotle gave it an entirely new character by turning it into a mechanical system of physically existing spheres by means of which the celestial motions are produced.4

Ecpyrosis in Heraclitus: Some Comments'

IN Phronesis 3, Ig9 8, 7 S ff., Mondolfo re-evaluated the evidence of Plato and Aristotle for ecpyrosis, periodical conflagration, in Heraclitus. I have written elsewhere on this subject and confine myself to comments on Mondolfo's new arguments. The situation before Mondolfo was that most critics accepted one passage in Aristotle (de caelo A I 0, 279 b I 2ff.) as indicating ecpyrosis in Heraclitus. Another passage (Physics rP , 205 a i ff.), which used to be taken as pointing in the same direction, has been differently explained by Cherniss, who has won many converts including myself. Plato, on the other hand, was thought to have written nothing to suggest an ecpyrosis in Heraclitus, but on the contrary to have excluded this possibility at Sophist 242 DE, the passage about the Sicilian and Ionian muses. Mondolfo now argues that this passage is not incompatible with a cycle of cosmic conflagrations; and that the passage from the Physics, despite Cherniss, does nevertheless suggest it. Mondolfo concludes that since, as Cherniss wrote, Aristotle had the books of the Presocratics 'presumably in their complete form,' then, if Aristotle assigned ecpyrosis to Heraclitus and Plato did not preclude it, Heraclitus must in fact have believed in a periodical total conflagration. (i) It should be remembered, what I think Mondolfo does not mention, that in any case Theophrastus definitely ascribed ecpyrosis to Heraclitus; and that many of his judgements indubitably came from Aristotle. In the present case he supported his view by referring to three statements by Heraclitus (frr. 30, 3 I, 90), all of which he misinterpreted to some extent by taking cosmological incidents as cosmogonical ones. Thus there is nothing startling in the idea that Aristotle may have assigned ecpyrosis to Heraclitus in two places, not merely in one. The effect would be to remove any doubts about the meaning of the de caelo passage (doubts which have lurked somewhat amorphously, and without help from the text, in some minds including my own). If Aristotle certainly assigned ecpyrosis to Heraclitus, but Plato excluded it, then either Plato was wrong or Aristotle was misled by something he found in Heraclitus perhaps those fragments later cited by Theophrastus. (2) But if, as Mondolfo and many others assume, Aristotle had the whole of Hew aclitus's book 'in front of him' (to use a favourite phrase of Burnet's), and read it all carefully and sympathetically, then he cannot have

The Cosmogony of Anaxagoras

M { UCH has been written during The last thirty years or so on the subject of the basic ingredients of Anaxagoras' universe,' but comparatively little attention has been paid to the cosmogonical process by which Anaxagoras believed the universe to have developed out of those ingredients into its present state. That process is my subject, but before dealing with any part of Anaxagoras' physical theories it always behoves a writer to explain how he hiimself understands Anaxagoras' first priniciples. There is, we are told, a constant, infinite, and infinitely divisible amount of matter in the universe (Frags. 1-7, Diels-Kranz). Since all things are infinitely divisible, they cannot be composed of a finite number of Empedoclean type elements, for any such theory entails a limit to divisibility (cf. Arist. de Caelo 305 a I). It would seem to follow that if there is an infinite number of substances in the phenomenal world there must be an infinite number of primary substances. Parmenides had already shown that the Real must be unchanging; but an infinite number of homogeneous, unchanging, entities (such as Melissus hinted at, DK 3o B 8) could only explain an unchanging universe. Consequently Anaxagoras' entities are not homogeneous. As he reiterates, e 7rocVTL tvTo (0pop svearLV. Frag. 4 and the phrase 67MaMCEp pte of the universe. It is over the precise meaning of ncxv-d and 7caNxT0 that scholars especially disagree. I agree, following the ancient commentators, with Bailey, Cherniss, Raven, and Mathewson, that Tannery, Burnet, and Cornford were wrong in thinking that the 'portions' that are in everything are just the traditional 'opposites' or opposite 'quality-things.' I, too, take the view that Anaxagoras meant to include anything that his predecessors had thought of as primary, including the Hot and the Cold (Frag. 8), the Wet and the Dry (cf. Anaximander), the Bright and the

Roman History, 58–56 B.C.: Three Ciceronian Problems

Est postridie decretum in curia, populi ipsius Romani, et eorum qui ex municipiis convenerant admonitu, ne quis de caelo servaret, ne quis moram ullam adferret. Pro Sestio, 129.Time and again Cicero abused Clodius for having, in his tribunate, both rescinded the lex Aelia Fufia of 153 B.C. and also destroyed the censorship. The ‘destruction of the censorship’ was, in fact, a seemingly just and reasonable bill to the effect that for the future no senator might be expelled from the Senate unless, after he had been given the opportunity of answering the charges against him, both censors were in agreement over his expulsion. It would, therefore, be reasonable to suppose that the ‘rescinding of the lex Aelia Fufia’, too, was far less drastic a measure than Cicero's vituperative language implies, even if there was not, as there is, abundant evidence in the years following Clodius' tribunate that the lex Aelia Fufia remained on the statute book.

The Physics of Local Motion

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION I T HE science of local motion is fundamental in natural philosophyo Locomotion is the primary kind of motion; it is generated last of the three kinds of motion so that in order of being it is first, as the Philosopher has observedo1 Thus, owing to its primacy, a proper knowledge of the nature of local motion is necessary for a full understanding of the first of the five ways by which St. Thomas establishes by reasoning the existence of God as the Author of Nature, namely, the argument from motion in the world.2 In the philosophia perennis, unfolded by Plato, Aristotle, the later Greek and Roman philosophers, and the Jewish, Arab, and Christian doctors of succeeding ages, motion is recognized as a transition from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; further, such a transition to actuality can only come about by the influence of something already in a state of actuality; hence we have the principle that whatever is in motion must be moved by anothero This principle illuminated the sciences of Nature and guided philosophers along sure paths during those ages in which the philosophia perennis was the inspiration of an but a few eccentric and misguided individuals. However, since the revolution in physical science in the seventeenth century and the appearance of sciences of Nature alien to the philosophia perennis, an entirely different doctrine concerning local motion has generally prevailed. Newton's first law of motion lays down that every body in the universe continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless compelled by external force to change that state, On Newtonian 1 Aristotle, de Caelo, 310 b 33-35; Physic., 243 a 12; 260 a 26-29; etc. 2 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3. 145 146 GAVIN ARDLEY dynamics a freely moving body does not require an external mover; a mover is required only to change the motion of the body, i.e. to cause acceleration, not to continue its steady state of motion; the Newtonian theory of locomotion thus evokes the principle of the inertia or impetus or momentum possessed by bodies. Newton's doctrine is thus quite at variance with the doctrine of Aristotle and SL Thomas according to which a moving body must be moved continuously by another agent if its movement is not to cease. The Newtonian system was not wholly new; it was rather the definitive form of doctrines of motion which were propounded in the fourteenth century by Jean Buridan, Nicolas Oresme, and others of the University of Paris; doctrines which became ever more widely disseminated until their final triumph in the seventeenth century with Galileo, Descartes, Newton and hosts of others who participated in the elan of the times. These doctrines of motion are quite foreign to the philosophia perennis; with the triumph of the impetus doctrine in the seventeenth century came the general abandonment of the traditional doctrine of motion; the ancient science of nature with its rich patrimony of so many centuries henceforth found no hearing in the universities of Europe; the ancient learning was preserved in obscurity by a discriminating few, for the most part in the seclusion of the cloister, while the learned world followed new and seductive paths. Further, not only were the Aristotelian doctrines of motion abandoned in the seventeenth century, but the whole framework of the philosophia perennis was given up at the same time by the generality of philosophers, and indeed has :remained in general oblivion to this day. There are no doubt many reasons for this great seventeenth century tidal movement in philosophical opinion, but prominent among them is this: it was believed very widely that the experimental physics of Galileo and Newton had overthrown the Aristotelian physics, and it was further generally believed that this defeat in the field of physical science was of such a fundamental character that the THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION 147 whole Aristotelian system was thereby rendered untenable, and that other philosophies of the world must be sought. The science of motion was certainly not the prime mover in the philosophical revolution; for that we must...

Robert Kilwardby’s Questions on the Metaphysics and Physics of Aristotle

ROBERT KILWARDBY’S QUESTIONS ON THE METAPHYSICS AND PHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE Robert Kilwardby, O. P. (t 1279), the famous master in Arts of Paris, who became a Friar Preacher, successively Provincial (1261), Arch­ bishop of Canterbury (1272) and finally Cardinal of Porto (1278), is too well known among medievalists to require introduction. His activities, both scientific and religious, have already been illustrated by competent authors.1 His literary bequest, as far as the grammatical, logical and theological works are concerned, even if mostly unpublished, is fairly well established; but his commentaries on the Physics, Metheors, De anima, De caelo et mundo, De generatione et corruptione, Metaphysics, and all the libri naturales, ascribed to him by the reliable authority of the catalogue of early Dominican writers, the so-called Stams Tabula,2 are hitherto unknown. Now two of these works, and let us add, the two most important ones, viz. the Questions on the Metaphysics and Physics of Aristotle, have come to our knowledge. This happened by a chance, inasmuch as our intention was not to search for Kilwardby’s works, but for those of Thomas Bungay, O. F. M. The cue was given us by A. G. Little, who speaking of Bungay’s commentary on the De caelo et mundo, contained in the ms. 509 of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, observes:3 “ The MS. contains anonymous questions on the Physics, Metaphysics, De anima and others, which may possibly be Bungay’s.” Though this statement is not a formal ascription, we considered it worth the trouble to obtain parts of this manuscript on microfilm. However, the reading of a few folios convinced us that the author of the questions on the Metaphysics as well as of the im­ mediately following questions on the Physics, could not be Thomas 1 The pertinent bibliography can be found in F. Stegmüller, Les Questions du Commentaire de Sentences de Robert Kilwardby, in Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, V I 1934, PP- 55"7° certa cog- tior, est talis: Philosophia est rerum nitio; et addit Gundissalinus: cum divinarum humanarumque cognitio, studio bene vivendi coniuncta. cum studio bene vivendi coniuncta. Ista autem definitio includit in se Res igitur divinae et humanae causam materialem et causam for- subiectum sunt totius philosophiae. malem et finalem. Materialem per Studium autem bene vivendi finis, hoc quod dicit: divinarum rerum et quia omnis cognitio ad honestam humanarum; causam formalem per. vitam ordinatur, sicut infra patebit.” hoc quod dicit: cognitio certa; finalem per hoc quod dicit: cum studio bene vivendi coniuncta.” Since this definition of philosophy can be foundentirely in St. Isidore, the author of the question on the Metaphysics reveals by the words “ et addit Gundissalinus” that he did not see it in the original, but only as it is quoted in the prologue of Gundissalinus’ De divisione philosophiae;8 therefore he must have thought that the second part was added by Gundissalinus. In the De ortu scientiarum the same definition is quoted correctly, and very likely from the original; hence, supposing the identity of the author, we could infer immediately that the questions on the Metaphysics were written before the De ortu scientiarum. b) The division of the sciences in our prologue is given only inciden­ tally and in abbreviated fashion; therefore it can be compared more aptly with the recapitulation of the De ortu scientiarum: 8 Cf. L. Baur, op. cit., pp. 369-75. 7 Etymol., II, c. 24, n. 1 (PL 82, 141 A). Besides this definition our author cites the threefold description of philosophy b y Isaac ben Salmon Israeli: 1. Philosophia est amor sapientiae; 2. Philosophia est assimilatio operibus Creatoris secundum virtutem humanitatis; 3. Philosophia est cognitio hominis sui ipsius; in the Liber diffinitionum, Lugduni 1515, f. 2b-c. Both this description and the definition of St. Isidore can be found also in Gundissalinus’ De divisione philosophiae, ed. cit., pp. 6 ff. 8 Ed. cit., p. 7. Robert Kilwardby’s Questions il Metaph., f. 53b. "Divisio autem philosophiae patet sic: quia quaedam est de divinis et quaedam de humanis. E t dicuntur res divinae . . . quia a Deo exeunt in esse. Res autem humanae dicun­ tur quae sunt a proposito, vel exeunt...

Time and Eternity

ed from thing numbered, but existing in thing numbered 2; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of number [ten], but by reason of thing numbered. The position is quite Aristotelian; piece of cloth does not stop being a piece of cloth at ,end of each yard and then begin again; it is one piece of cloth; and so in case of any extent, whether quentative sense, that of continuation in a given state, it implies to exist or be. When Agni is contrasted with other Gods, as the only immortal, he can be called visvayus., the of life, and this totality is analogous to fulness of a man's whole (sarvam aiyus) who does not die before old age. On atic as [like iayus] complete period, either of each particular life or of all existence, v. Aristotle, De Coelo 1. 9. 15; on aitov and x,ovos cf. Philo 1.496, 619 (Liddell and Scott). 12 This seems also to have been William of Ockham's view: his main purpose in Tractatus de successivis is to show that motion, place, and time are not entities separate from respective realities, viz., moved body, located body, and moved body in time. Ockham thinks this true opinion of Aristotle (P. Boehner, The Tractatus de Successivis attributed to William of Ockham, St. Bonaventura, N. Y., 1944, p. 30).