The accuracy of carbon emission data is essential for various disciplines to maintain reasonable expectations and certainty regarding the carbon emission rights trading market. However, the management of carbon emission data quality faces many challenges, especially due to the harmful behavior of enterprises that falsify such data, which seriously disrupts the order and credibility of the carbon market. Currently, few studies focus on the behavior and mechanism of corporate carbon emission data fraud, which requires an in-depth stakeholder analysis to obtain theoretical and empirical support for the formulation of effective regulatory policies. To investigate the influence of government regulation and media monitoring on addressing enterprise carbon emission data falsification, as well as to analyze the game behaviors and equilibrium outcomes among the government, media, and enterprises under different policy combinations and market environments, this study develops an evolutionary game model incorporating the government, media, and enterprises as three key stakeholders. Furthermore, numerical simulations are conducted for empirical validation. The key findings of this research highlight the significant impact of government regulation and media monitoring on deterring enterprise carbon emission data falsification, thus effectively reducing falsification motives and behaviors and enhancing the quality of carbon emission data. Additionally, the game between the government, media, and enterprises reveals the existence of multiple evolutionary stable strategies. Of these, the optimal strategy is the comprehensive implementation of all three elements: government regulation, media monitoring, and corporate integrity disclosure. This paper comprehensively examines the influence of government regulation and media monitoring on enterprise carbon emission data falsification and addresses the gaps in existing research. Moreover, it provides theoretical guidance and policy recommendations for establishing a high-quality carbon market.