Cyber Activities Research Articles

Uloga digitalnih tehnologija u organizovanom kriminalu

Cyberspace has become a place where Internet users, in addition to performing everyday activities, such as communicating with other users, having fun or doing business, can very easily become victims of various cybercriminal activities. Criminals have improved and adapted their traditional criminal methods and with the help of digital technologies, they can harm both gullible individuals and governments themselves. Unlike real space, in the digital environment, cybercriminals can remain anonymous and avoid sanction by the authorities. Such cybercrime groups are often organized and operate at the international level, which makes it even more difficult to identify criminals. The aim of this paper is to inform about the methods used by individual cybercriminals, but also organized criminal groups, and suggests the need for international joint cooperation of all competent authorities, but also the need to inform and harmonize laws in this domain, in order to combat such illegal cyber activities more effectively.

Digitalna pismenost kao sredstvo prevencije protiv sajber kriminala

It is difficult today to imagine how a person would function in modern society without the use of Internet-based technologies. Everyday interactions that take place in the digital environment permeate all spheres of society, enabling communication, entertainment and business of users. However, the lack of technological skills and digital literacy in a large number of people increases the chances of them becoming victims of various types of cybercrime activities. Such activities can often have very severe physical, material and emotional consequences for Internet and social networks users. Also, it is not uncommon for the victim's interaction with a malicious cybercriminal to lead to tragic consequences. This problem especially affects the youngest population, who spend time every day in a virtual environment, often without the necessary technological skills and experience, but also without parental supervision. The fact that the number of young users of digital technologies is increasing every day on the world level should alert experts in this field, but also the governments of all countries to take this phenomenon more seriously. Digital literacy is emerging as an indisputable starting point that can be the most effective means of combating such malicious cyber activities.

The Anonymity of the Dark Web: A Survey

The dark web is a section of the Internet that is not accessible to search engines and requires an anonymizing browser called Tor. Its hidden network and anonymity pave the way for illegal activities and help cybercriminals to execute well-planned, coordinated, and malicious cyberattacks. Cyber security experts agree that online criminal activities are increasing exponentially, and they are also becoming more rampant and intensified. These illegal cyber activities include various destructive crimes that may target a single person or a whole nation, for example, data breaches, ransomware attacks, black markets, mafias, and terrorist attacks. So, maintaining data privacy and secrecy is the new dilemma of the era. This paper has extensively reviewed various attacks and attack patterns commonly applied in the dark web. We have also classified these attacks in our unique trilogies classification system. Furthermore, a detailed overview of existing threat detection techniques and their limitations is discussed for anonymity providing services like Tor, I2P, and Freenet. Finally, the paper has identified significant weaknesses that make the dark web vulnerable to different attacks.

Security Threats and Legalities with Digitalization in Nepal

As the process of digitalization spreads globally, daily dependence on cyberspace is increasing. With the rise of criminal incidents in cyberspace, it has begun to pose security threats that disrupt peace and order. In a chaotic situation with the global pandemic of Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), digitalization has become a mandatory process in the world. Along with the mandatory process of digitization and increasing trend of digitalization in Nepal, there is also a possibility of security threat. This research paper seeks and examines policies and laws that the Government of Nepal has formulated to reduce the security threat and it explored to find out what types of security threats were seen from cyberspace in Nepal during several lockdown periods during 2020 AD. The study concludes that Nepal has laws to legalize digital activities with constitutional rights to do cyber activity. But does not have enough laws and policies to address the emerging cyber threat environment because of the long process of passing the law and lack of sufficient interest and knowledge on lawmakers. The risk of cyber security in Nepal seems to be high due to non-implementation of the policies and rules issued by the government itself, low level of cyber security awareness among the people, lack of strong defense system and policy on cyber-attacks.

EFEKTIVITAS PERAN UU ITE DALAM RANGKA MELINDUNGI SERTA MENJAGA SELURUH AKTIVITAS SIBER YANG ADA DI INDONESIA

The issuance of Law Number 11 of 2008 concerning Electronic Information and Transactions (UU ITE) made Indonesian law enter a new phase. The existence of the ITE Law is intended to answer all legal issues that are often faced in the cyber world related to the delivery of information, communication, and / or transactions electronically. This law is also expected to be able to regulate all matters in the cyber world. As a pioneer of cyber law in Indonesia, the ITE Law still has various shortcomings in its implementation. So that effectiveness in protecting cyber activities in Indonesia has not been achieved. However, to achieve the objectives of the ITE Law to be effective and efficient, there needs to be cooperation between the community and the government. This synergy will eventually be able to realize the complete principle of checks and balances. After all, the implementation of the law in the empirical aspect must be guarded so that the spirit of the law itself can be preserved.

Operational Efficiency of Computer Networks under Conditions of Malicious Cyber Activity

Operational Efficiency of Computer Networks under Conditions of Malicious Cyber Activity

A review of cyber security attack trends in Kenya

The COVID 19 pandemic led to a situation where Kenyan institutions were forced to embrace remote learning, remote working and e-commerce services. These basically led to an upsurge in financial cyber activity and with it came an upsurge in cybercrime. This paper conducted a review of available secondary data on cyber attacks in Kenya with the aim of identifying the most popular trends embraced by attackers while perpetrating cyber-attacks on financial institutions and their clients. The paper was also able to obtain a ranking of the most popular trends associated with attacks within the Kenyan cyber space. Keywords: Cybersecurity, cyber-attacks, cybercrime, malware, phishing DOI: 10.7176/JIEA/11-2-09 Publication date: November 30 th 2021

ATTRIBUTION OF CYBERATTACKS AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ENSURING RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR IN CYBERSPACE

Growing impunity in cyberspace is cause by the lack of responsibility for the most serious cyberoperations that present a threat to both state and non-state actors. The only possible solution is to trace such cyberoperations to those who stand behind them. Since the seriousness of consequences increases in case of state-committed cyberattacks, the article deals with the issue of attribution of cyberattacks to states with the aim of ensuring responsible behavior of all states in cyberspace. The existing practice of public attribution and features of cyberoperations, as a rule, requires not only performing legal attribution, but also technical and public (political) attribution. Author thus starts with analyzing the current state of affairs – public attribution of cyberattack, its effectiveness and the role of private sector in attribution (decentralized attribution to support or deny government`s finding). The article also examines the customary basis for attributing state-related cyberattacks contained in the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the Application of International Law to Cyberoperations. Although public attribution is, indeed, a step towards responsible behavior in cyberspace, legal attribution may contribute even more. In this article increased attention is paid to the test of effective control, which is used to attribute internationally wrongful acts to states committed by non-state actors acting under its control or direction. Finally, it concludes that global efforts are needed to ensure responsible behavior in cyberspace, especially in the context of international security. For this, states should get into partnership with private sector in performing attribution of cyberoperations and apply to international bodies, which have jurisdiction over state claims and are able to perform legal attribution for the purpose of establishing state responsibility. Only in this way it will be possible to guarantee responsible behavior of states in cyberspace, and create a common understanding and approach against cyberoperations committed by non-state cyber actors.

PUBLIC ATTRIBUTION OF CYBERATACS BY EU MEMBER STATES AND THE APPLICATION OF CYBERSANCTIONS BY THE UNION TO CYBERATTACKS THREATENING THE UNION OR ITS MEMBER STATES

The article examines the issue of public attribution of cyberattacks threatening the European Union or its Member States, and effectiveness of the adopted «cyber diplomacy toolbox» within the Framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities. Since public attribution of cyberattacks is a sovereign political decision, which differs from legal attribution for the purpose of invoking state responsibility under Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, author defines the rationale behind decisions to attribute or not to attribute cyberattacks to a particular state by examples of the Netherlands and France. While the Netherlands insist on deterrent effect of public attribution, France believes in the effectiveness of attribution provided to the allege wrongdoer by diplomatic channels. In the article, the effectiveness of cybersanctions implemented at Union level against a limited range of cyberattacks threatening the Union or its Member States was also under assessment. Article concludes that imposition of targeted sanctions in conjunction with sectoral sanctions will increase sanctions` purposes to coerce, constrain, and to signal. However, nowadays only targeted sanctions against individuals and legal entities are foreseen by the EU`s decision. At the same time, this fact does not exclude the possible application of sectoral sanctions against the most serious cyberattacks against EU` or its member states` infrastructure. Finally, the article justifies the possibility of using attribution reports prepared by the private sector to include individuals in the sanctions list if the attribution of Member States is based on intelligence that they do not wish to disclose. Moreover, malicious cyberoperations affect not only states`, but also private sector`s, interests. Private IT and cybersecurity companies thus have a chance to prove their ability to produce detailed and reliable reports on attribution of cyberoperations. Author is convinced both centralized (governmental) and decentralized (private) attribution of cyberattacks is necessary for correctness of findings.

United States Joins with Allies, Including NATO, to Attribute Malicious Cyber Activities to China

In July, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and other allies attributed a variety of malicious cyber activities, including the Microsoft Exchange hack, to China. This joint attribution builds on commitments made in June summits with NATO, the G7, the EU, and the United Kingdom, and is consistent with the Biden administration's multilateral approach to confronting cybersecurity threats and China more generally. Still, critics question whether the administration's efforts will succeed in altering the behavior of states that pose cybersecurity threats to the United States.

Routine Activities Theory in cyber victimization and cyberbullying experiences of Turkish adolescents

ABSTRACT The Routine Activity Theory proposes that the presence of a suitable target and a motivated offender in the absence of capable guardianship predict criminal behaviors. Prior research has utilized the theory to explain varied cyber victimization in different western and eastern cultures. The purpose of this study is to test the effects of adolescents’ online behaviors on cyber victimization and cyberbullying experiences from the Routine Activities Theory framework. Therefore, through this study, the paper expands upon this research to examine the cyber activities of Turkish adolescents on both cyber victimization and cyberbullying experiences. The participants were 1046 high school students between the ages of 14–18. According to the findings, Turkish adolescents’ cyberbullying and victimization experiences could be predicted from their cyber activities after controlling for gender. The results revealed the role of target suitability, exposure to a motivated offender and capable guardianship on both cyber victimization and cyberbullying in a more comprehensive model based on the Routine Activities Theory. Altogether, the findings provide evidence-based strategies for cyberbullying and victimization prevention at schools.

‘Antisocial Behaviour, Unfriendly Relations’: Assessing the Contemporary Value of the Categories of Unfriendly Acts and Retorsion in International Law

Abstract This article considers the international law categories of unfriendly acts and retorsion in the modern context. To date, these categories articulating the freedoms that States enjoy below the threshold of international wrongfulness have received little attention in academic debate. But we consider both categories are of increasing relevance in the context of modern international conflict (in the broadest sense) and inter-State competition, particularly in relation to the regulation of hostile cyber activity between States. Unfriendly acts denotes State activity which, while lawful as a matter of international law, would nonetheless not be welcomed by the States it targets. Retorsion covers another sub-set of lawful but unfriendly State activity, substantively the same as unfriendly acts but done in response to prior unwelcome acts of other States. Having defined these categories, including by reference to a survey of contemporary State practice and judicial treatment, this article then considers why their utility and relevance to States are increasing. The article ends on the cautionary note that while unfriendly acts and retorsion may be increasingly necessary and desirable to States as international law tools as hostile activity occupies more of the space below forcible acts, they equally need to be properly understood and ‘handled with care’ by international lawyers, to ensure they are not bestowed with legal characteristics they do not possess, unduly constraining States in the process. The risk of misuse of these categories by States also needs to be kept in mind.

The Infodemic as a Threat to Cybersecurity

ABSTRACT The infodemic has become a means to facilitate the exploitation of weaknesses in digital networks and launch cyberattacks against vulnerable communities and vital services, highlighting a lack of cybersecurity in critical infrastructure. This paper will delve into the caveats of the cyber threats posed by the infodemic and what it means for the broader network of cybersecurity and the protection of human rights in cyberspace. It will also examine the damage sustained by vulnerable groups as a result of cyberattacks, particularly in light of COVID-19. The infodemic has created a situation where malicious cyber actors spread false information to manipulate human nature and deceive individuals, leaving them susceptible to devastating attacks that risk producing physical and financial harm. This has the effect of undermining human security, dignity and equity in cyberspace. The situation is further exacerbated by the lack of accountability that operates as a carte blanche for cybercriminals to continue with illicit operations against vulnerable persons.

Evolution and Trends of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents since 2017

The industrial control systems (ICSs) that manage our critical infrastructure are increasingly converging with corporate networks and the Internet as technology and businesses prioritize digital connectivity. These connections make them more vulnerable and available to malicious cyber actors who traditionally targeted the companies' more public‐facing information technology (IT) networks. This paper will review select publicly reported cyber incidents to highlight the continued and growing threat to ICS devices and operational technology (OT) environments. It will summarize the incident and when available, will provide information on the cyber actors, the vulnerabilities they exploited, and any publications the U.S. Government (USG) provided in response. Data belonging to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be used to highlight quantitative trends concerning ICS incidents. This paper builds on “History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents” (Hemsley & Fisher 2018), a paper that highlighted select noteworthy threats and incidents to ICS systems up to 2017. This paper will similarly review select incidents occurring after the last previously reviewed incident, Triton/HatMan, December 2017, and will note ICS incident trends including IT/OT convergence and advances in cyber‐threat actors' capabilities in observed in the examined incidents.

Biden Administration Imposes Sanctions and Seeks to Cement Alliances to Counter China and Russia

The Biden administration's foreign policy emphasizes repairing U.S. alliances and returning the United States to a “position of trusted leadership” to counter increasing challenges from Russia and especially China. The U.S. Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), released in March 2021, notes that the United States must “contend with the reality that the distribution of power across the world is changing.” It highlights that China, which has “rapidly become more assertive,” is the only country “potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system,” while “Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage.” To reaffirm established international norms, the Biden administration has acted both unilaterally and in coordination with long-standing allies to impose sanctions in response to human rights abuses, malicious cyber activity, and election influence. The administration has also taken steps to cement alliances in the Indo-Pacific and with the West.

Too Close for Comfort: Cyber Terrorism and Information Security across National Policies and International Diplomacy

This article analyses the evolution and interplay of national policies and international diplomacy on cyber terrorism within and across the UNSC’s permanent five members and the UN process on cyber norms (GGE and OEWG). First, it reveals how – through the extension of preemptive measures to low-impact cyber activities and online content – national policies progressively articulate cyber terrorism as an issue of information security. Second, it problematizes how – through the adoption of comprehensive and imprecise definitions – the diplomatic language on cyber terrorism might lend international support to those authoritarian regimes keen on leveraging counter-terrorism to persecute domestic oppositions and vulnerable groups. Third, it concludes that – with UN diplomatic efforts increasingly discussing countering (dis)information operations – combining normative debates on cyber terrorism with those on information security requires precision of language to safeguard human rights globally.

Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities

Abstract As a response to the Russian invasion of Crimea, NATO returned to the core military concepts of deterrence and collective defence. This NATO adaption has recently come to include attempts to integrate offensive cyber effects into NATO force structure and response doctrine. The article argues—counter to what is publicly declared—that such an integration does little to strengthen NATO's deterrence posture and is unlikely to deter non-military, hybrid cyber activity below the threshold of collective defence. The article identifies several practical challenges to the current integration effort, which include the temporal dimension of developing exploits, battle damage assessment and deconfliction. With these challenges in mind, the article suggests that deploying minor and less resourceful cyber effects that cause persistent ‘cyber annoyances’ holds an unappreciated potential as they can drain opponent resources, disturb vital IT-systems and complicate decision-making. The article ends by arguing that NATO should not adapt its collective defence clause to cyberspace. A more active NATO in cyberspace risks undermining the cyber-intelligence norm that so far has prevented escalation and thereby increasing the likelihood that Russia misinterprets intelligence and active cyber defence activities as military preparation, armament or an attack in the making.

ISSUES OF INFORMATION SECURITY OF SOCIETY UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIGITAL ECONOMY

Cybercrime is a growing industry around the world imposing significant costs on firms. Cyber threats have driven companies to build layers of defenses, resorting to a variety of products and services developed by different cybersecurity vendors. The financial sector is a major target for cybercriminals. The pace of cyberattacks is accelerating too quickly for banks to rely on manual threat analysis and response. The financial organizations face a growing threat from malicious cyber activity. In the financial sector, speed of response is critical to identify and block cyber threats. Regulators are taking notice of the increased risk of cyber threats. Paper draws our attention to information protection system of bank.

Deconstructing the U.S. Policy of Indicting Malicious State Cyber Actors

In 2014, the United States Department of Justice unsealed its first indictment against foreign military hackers. Since then, the Justice Department has continued the practice, indicting military and intelligence personnel from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as hackers-for-hire working at the behest of State handlers. Debates over the propriety and efficacy of the indictments have discussed the benefits and downsides of the policy writ-large, but have not analyzed the indictments in-depth to deconstruct the policy and identify first principles. This paper analyzes all of the indictments publicly released thus far and characterizes them along several axes, including the status of the hackers, the goal of the operation, the identity of the target, and the crimes charged, with additional discussion about the techniques involved in the various operations. After examining the trends identified in the analysis, this paper proposes a more nuanced framework for deciding whether or not to indict malicious State or State-sponsored cyber actors and recommends policies that will help the U.S. combat malicious State activity in cyberspace.

Digital Retaliation? Denial-of-Service Attacks after Sanction Events

Abstract Conventional wisdom expects to see a rise in cyber activities around aggressive foreign policy events. In this article, I test this claim by investigating whether sanctions lead to an increase in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks using new data on DoS attacks measured from Internet traffic. Exploring the development of DoS attacks around sanctions imposed against Russia in 2014 indeed shows an increase of DoS attacks against several sanction sender states. Extending this case study to a systematic analysis, including all sanction threats and impositions made by the United States and the European Union between 2008 and 2016, shows no apparent patterns. When I exclusively consider sanctions against technologically advanced countries, however, the frequency of attacks rises systematically against the United States. It thus appears that states do not always have to expect a digital retaliation after aggressive foreign policies. Nevertheless, sanctioning countries may have to anticipate an increase in DoS attacks when their governments impose sanctions against technologically advanced countries.