Cyber Actions Research Articles

The Russian-Ukrainian War and Its Impact on Cyber Security in NATO and the EU

Since early 2022, before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, cyberspace has been extensively utilised, with cyber operations playing a pivotal role in information concealment, deception, and attacks on critical infrastructure. Warfare has evolved, growing more intricate, and the amalgamation of cyber actions with hard power effects is progressively causing greater disruption. Cyber actions have extended beyond Ukraine’s borders, influencing neighbouring NATO and EU member states. These incidents are as pertinent as they are perilous for the security of states on the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. This article explores the imperative for alliance cooperation and the development of cyber capabilities, doctrines, and strategies to foster a security environment conducive to the region. As a NATO and EU member state situated on the Eastern flank, Romania must remain a bastion of stability and a provider of security in the region. The alliances Romania is part of must adapt to confront these challenges.

Războiul ruso-ucrainean și impactul său asupra securității cibernetice în NATO și în UE

Since early 2022, before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, cyberspace has been extensively utilised, with cyber operations playing a pivotal role in information concealment, deception, and attacks on critical infrastructure. Warfare has evolved, growing more intricate, and the amalgamation of cyber actions with hard power effects is progressively causing greater disruption. Cyber actions have extended beyond Ukraine’s borders, influencing neighbouring NATO and EU member states. These incidents are as pertinent as they are perilous for the security of states on the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. This article explores the imperative for alliance cooperation and the development of cyber capabilities, doctrines, and strategies to foster a security environment conducive to the region. As a NATO and EU member state situated on the Eastern flank, Romania must remain a bastion of stability and a provider of security in the region. The alliances Romania is part of must adapt to confront these challenges.

Waterfall: Cascading Effects of a Strategic Cyber Campaign

This article uses a potential invasion of a western Pacific island nation as a hypothetical case study to examine a possible strategic cyber campaign, illustrating the need to consider the prioritization, sequencing, degree of engagement, and degree of coordination of cyber actions.

Engaging with emerged and emerging domains: cyber, space, and technology in the 2022 NATO strategic concept

ABSTRACT Cyber, space, and emerging technologies have transformed the strategic environment. Since the last publication of the NATO Strategic Concept, the Alliance has responded to this changing environment by addressing emerged and emerging threats at differential rates of operational and policy planning. Now, NATO must seek to holistically integrate these domains into the forthcoming strategic concept to increase the resilience and effectiveness of the Alliance. An adaptable and resilient Alliance that responds to the challenge of cyber, space, and emerging technologies will be best realized through three primary avenues. First, reaching preemptive consensus on actions short-of-force and consensus on space and cyber actions that trigger Article 5 will enhance collective defense and crisis management. Second, communication of capabilities and resolve will promote deterrence and enhance cooperative security among member states. Finally, cooperation with industry partners and among Allies to maintain a cutting technological edge is essential for NATO’s collective defense against emerging threats and enhances cooperative security through a common strategic culture of innovation. It is essential that NATO prevents cyber, space, and emerging technologies from being understood and actioned in isolation, and instead thoughtfully integrates technologies into the Alliances’ key tasks.

Obstacles to Criminal Law Enforcers in Overcoming the Hoax-Spreading Crime

This study discusses efforts to tackle the crime of spreading hoaxes in cyberspace through criminal law and reveals the obstacles law enforcers have in tackling these crimes. The writing method used was a normative juridical approach, analytical descriptive. The results of this study are that law enforcers should be qualified, organized, structured to unite communities specializing in handling all types of cyber actions, given certain tools and facilities such as educated and skilled human workers, good organization, adequate equipment, sufficient finances for tackling cybercrime, especially the spread of false information/fake news (hoax).

EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ORDER IN THE INFORMATION AREA THROUGH DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

Hybrid threats cover the whole spectrum of fake news, cyber/information warfare. They periodically impose the multimedia agenda in all known spaces to man. If for the Earth’s natural spaces, we have norms and customs respected international, the navigation in the digital space does not confer to the user the same protection given by a code of laws accepted worldwide, although we have a new set of instruments with shield role against dangers called cyber security. In order for this cyber security to be accepted by as many (non) state actors as possible, we need international norms, built by professionals with expertise and proactive thinking. The people with specific responsibilities for negotiating such rules are diplomats, in this case we have the digital diplomats. What is their purpose? What is the connection between hybrid warfare, digital diplomacy and humanitarian law? These are questions that we answer through this research. In the structure of the paper we used concepts from International Humanitarian Law (IHL) norms that can be adapted to cyber operations and hybrid threats. In the case of the use of aggressive cyber actions and cyber capabilities, the competence of current international law is the objective of the article for the emergence of the right to self-defence. Then, we look at aspects of military actions involving cyberattacks, designed on the spectrum of the cyber operation, and these cyber actions will be examined applying principles established by existing laws.

Features of Ensuring Cybersecurity of the Critical Infrastructure of the State

One of the most important tasks of national security in modern conditions is to ensure the security and stable functioning of critical infrastructure of the state. Control systems are an integral and most vulnerable part of critical infrastructure facilities. This determines the importance of ensuring they are protected from destructive cyber actions. Destructive cyber actions in it is accompanied, as a rule, by chain effects and synergistic effects that systematically influence and cover all other spheres of the life of society and the state, both in ordinary and, especially, in critical conditions. The authors systematically and comprehensively analyzed and presented in the article the results of investigations of the features of destructive cyber actions in the critical infrastructure of state, counteracting them and protecting from them.

Beyond tit-for-tat in cyberspace: Political warfare and lateral sources of escalation online

AbstractAt present, most scholarship on the potential for escalation in cyberspace couches analysis in terms of the technological dynamics of the domain for relative power maneuvering. The result has been a conceptualisation of the logic of operation in cyberspace as one of ‘tit-for-tat’ exchanges motivated by attribution problems and limited opportunity for strategic gain. This article argues that this dominant perspective overlooks alternative notions of how cyber tools are used to influence. This, in turn, has largely led scholars to ignore second-order effects – meaning follow-on effects triggered by a more direct outcome of an initial cyber action – on domestic conditions, institutions, and individual stakeholders. This article uses the case of cyber-enabled political warfare targeting the United States in 2016 to show how escalation can occur as a second-order effect of cyber operations. Specifically, the episode led to a re-evaluation of foreign cyber strategy on the part of American defence thinkers that motivated an offensive shift in doctrine by 2018. The episode also directly affected both the political positions taken by important domestic actors and the attitude of parts of the electorate towards interference, both of which have reinforced the commitment of military planners towards assertive cyber actions.

The Dark Age of Online Civil Society


 
 
 Online civil society is vulnerable to various malicious actors who conduct cyberattacks against individuals, companies, and governments. Victims of these attacks are using strike backs, hack backs, and defensive cyber actions as a means to send a message to the attacker, we are not a victim (Neal, 2019). My research presents one model of “revenge attacks” whereby the individual defends themselves online without the assistance of government.
 
 

Information and psychological confrontation in Ukraine

Today, the information war is a total phenomenon where it is impossible to determine its beginning and end. This is the existence of a struggle between states with the help of information weapons, that is, it is open and hidden targeted informational influences of states on each other in order to gain an advantage in the material sphere, where informational influences are influences by means of such means, the use of which allows you to achieve your goals. Four approaches to the definition of information war are described, containing political, legal, socio-economic, and psychological actions, involving the capture of the enemy’s information space, the destruction of his communications, deprivation of means of transmitting messages, etc., as well as conceptual issues and the basics of network-centric theory control systems and the organization of military operations and cyber actions or cyber war. The implementation of the cybernetic approach strategy for organizing actions during military operations was studied to obtain the maximum effect from the impact on three areas - moral, mental, physical, and the sufficiency of such an approach to increase the mobility, accuracy and firepower of weapons was determined. Impact on such centers causes changes in the management processes of the objects of influence and consequently affects the whole system. It is characteristic of such a theory that the degree of influence of the center of gravity on the whole system depends on the degree of its closeness to the central ring. According to J. Warden's theory, the objects of influence are the connections between the rings and the connections within the rings themselves. Thus, differentiation of subjects or objects of influence on the rings allows to identify in them those that are related to the cyber infrastructure. And the tools or means of influence are political, informational, economic and military, which affect objects or centers of gravity. Also investigated the effect on the most vulnerable objects using the system of the cybernetic approach, which allowed to assess its application in modern conditions of development of strategy and tactics of the struggle in the information field.

STATE ACTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL SECURITY THREAT IN CASE OF CYBERCRIME SECURITIZATION

<p>In the current security concept, there are some changes to the current security object. This is due to the increasingly broad understanding of security objects. This study examines the emergence of cyber issues as a new threat to state security. Cyber actions in the virtual world are developing along with the rapid technology development. Moreover, the state policy on cyber issues is considered as a new threat to individual security. The development of that state security issue is being debated among the theoreticians of international security studies. The concept of securitization explains the phenomenon of cyber issues and receives the attention of many states. Securitization carried out by the United States on Cybercrime issues becomes the initial trigger in viewing cyber actions as a new threat to state security. The object of this paper is more focused on State policy in dealing with cyber threats. Afterward, state policy in facing the cyber threat is seen from the perspective of human security from UNDP. Therefore, there is a debate about the desired security object. State actions to reach state security are then considered as individual privacy security. So, international security now does not only focus on state objects but also on individual, environment, economy, and identity. Thus, every action taken in securing an object does not pose a threat to other security objects.</p><div><p class="Els-keywords">Keywords: Cybercrime, State Security, Human Security, Securitization</p></div>

Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions, which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. Here, the authors investigate the impact to the cyber-physical power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary. The findings show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The physical impact from cyber actions was analysed in cases of DER providing distribution system voltage regulation and transmission system support. Finally, recommendations are presented for minimising the risk using engineered parameter limits and segmenting the control network to minimise common-mode vulnerabilities.

Susceptibility and resilience to cyber threat: Findings from a scenario decision program to measure secure and insecure computing behavior.

Interest in the individual differences underlying end user computer security behavior has led to the development of a multidisciplinary field of research known as behavioral information security. An important gap in knowledge and the motivation for this research is the development of ways to measure secure and insecure cyber behavior for research and eventually practice. Here we report a study designed to develop a technique for assessing secure and insecure cyber behavior for broad research use. The Susceptibility and Resilience to Cyber Threat (SRCT) is an immersive scenario decision program. The SRCT measures susceptibility to cyber threat and malicious behavior as well protective resilience actions via participant responses/decisions to emails, interactions with security dialogs, and computer actions in a real-world simulation. Data were collected from a sample of 190 adults (76.3% female), between the ages of 18–61 (mean age = 26.12). Personality, behavioral tendencies, and cognitive preferences were measured with standard previously validated protocols and self-report measures. Factor analysis suggested a 5 item secure actions scale and a 9 item insecure actions scale as viable to extract from the SRCT responses. Statistically analyzable distributions of secure and insecure cyber behaviors were obtained, and these subscales demonstrated acceptable internal consistency as hypothesized. Associations between SRCT scales and other indices of cyber behavior, as well as self-reported personality, were lower than predicted, suggesting that past research reporting links between self-reports of personality and self-reported cyber-behavior may be overestimating the links for actual cyber actions. However, our exploratory analyses suggest discrepancies between self-report and actions in the SRCT may be an interesting avenue to explore. Overall, results were consistent with theorizing and suggest the technique is viable as a construct measure in future research or as an outcome variable in experimental intervention designs.

Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events?

Recent years have seen growing concern over the use of cyber attacks in wartime, but little evidence that these new tools of coercion can change battlefield events. We present the first quantitative analysis of the relationship between cyber activities and physical violence during war. Using new event data from the armed conflict in Ukraine—and additional data from Syria’s civil war—we analyze the dynamics of cyber attacks and find that such activities have had little or no impact on fighting. In Ukraine—one of the first armed conflicts where both sides deployed such tools extensively—cyber activities failed to compel discernible changes in battlefield behavior. Indeed, hackers on both sides have had difficulty responding to battlefield events, much less shaping them. An analysis of conflict dynamics in Syria produces similar results: the timing of cyber actions is independent of fighting on the ground. Our finding—that cyber attacks are not (yet) effective as tools of coercion in war—has potentially significant implications for other armed conflicts with a digital front.

Cyberstalking: are we on the same (web)page? A comparison of statutes, case law, and public perception

PurposeAs society becomes more technology oriented, cyberstalking is becoming an increasing concern. The purpose of this paper is to compare US state and federal statutory and case law to a survey of public perception of cyberstalking to examine if cyberstalking laws reflect public opinion.Design/methodology/approachA national sample of 303 participants ranging in age from 18 to 69 years (M=33.35, SD=10.45) completed a novel cyberstalking survey and demographic questionnaire. The survey encompassed participants’ perceptions about the scope of cyberstalking as a crime, views on punishment of cyberstalking, and behaviors they have engaged in online or experienced from others that could constitute cyberstalking.FindingsFindings indicated numerous areas of disagreement between public perception and statutory case law, such as a public preference that cyberstalking be treated as a separate offense from stalking, that a threat of violence is not required for behavior to constitute cyberstalking, and that there should be a private civil cause of action for cyberstalking. Findings also indicated that a substantial minority of participants had engaged in or been the victim of cyber actions that could be considered cyberstalking, and that the public preferred sanctions other than incarceration for cyberstalking.Originality/valueThis is the first study to examine whether cyberstalking policy in the USA reflects public perception of cyberstalking.

The Impact of Cyber Conflict on International Interactions

Analysts suggest that the rise of the cyber domain of combat has led to a revolution in military affairs and have greatly changed how society interacts with the Internet. The structure and content of interactions on the battlefield have supposedly changed in light of this development. In the rush to note the changing face of conflict, few scholars have actually examined the impact of cyber conflict on foreign policy relationships. Here we use weekly events data to examine exactly what happens between countries when cyber conflict is utilized as a foreign policy choice. Using a previously constructed data set of cyber actions, we measure conflict and cooperation after a cyber operation to understand the true impact of this new way to arm a state and society. We find that only one method of cyber malice, denial of service, and one tactical goal, seeking a change in behavior in the opposing side, impacts conflict–cooperation dynamics between states.

Deep web: aproximaciones a la ciber irresponsabilidad

<p>La Deep web o Hard web es una parte gigantesca de las plataformas virtuales indetectables donde ocurren ciberacciones que tienen como precedente el ocultamiento de la identidad del usuario y han dado pie a la tergiversación del concepto de persona y a la utilización de la web de una manera irresponsable —en algunos casos— para causar desazón, para perseguir o a veces hackear bancos, entidades y cuentas privadas. Este es un artículo de reflexión para analizar los alcances de la práctica de esconder acciones en Internet y de modificar el rostro en la cibersociedad contemporánea. Con esta reflexión se pretende llamar la atención acerca de la responsabilidad que tenemos a la hora de entrar en el mundo del Internet y se analiza los peligros que estas prácticas conllevan.</p>

Internet censorship in South Africa: a brief exposé of negative and positive trends

This article investigates internet censorship in South Africa using a set of negative and positive internet censorship trends adapted from Bitso, Fourie and Bothma (2012) to raise awareness in light of increasing global internet censorship and South Africa’s involvement in a proposal for inter-governmental policy on the internet. Both positive and negative internet censorship trends are noted. The investigation reveals that South Africa has the highest level of media freedom in Africa. However, there are three concerns highlighted that might have a bearing on internet censorship in South Africa. Firstly, there is the formulation of legislation that might impact on the use of information, in particular the Protection of State Information Bill (2010). As such, various campaigns and cyber actions were made against this Bill because it is deemed to entrench information censorship. Secondly, there is the hacking of South African government websites, including that of the police on more than one occasion. This warrants internet censorship in order to combat crime as well as to ensure safety and security. Thirdly, there is the increasing challenge of spam and malware that calls for filtering to protect systems such as servers.

Cyber Actions by State Actors: Motivation and Utility

I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.—Albert Einstein 1 Covert action is as old as political man. The subversive manipul...

Passage to cyberactivism: how dynamics of activism change

AbstractThe boost to activism to which the internet has largely contributed has been underlined by financial and image issues growing from hacker attacks and the online promotion of activist groups. Emergency corporate counteractions with regard to these cyber threats have not analysed this new phenomenon. The state of the research in this area has consistently remained at the period before the development and widespread use of the internet. Cyberactivism, therefore, is a cyber phenomenon without a clear meaning or a clear definition.In order to understand cyberactivism, it is important to understand that it is much more than simply about hacking and activists' online promotion. It is a new phenomenon, growing out of activism but changing the pressure on corporations. With the internet, new dynamics of issue selection have been established and a different aggregation within groups has taken place. A new organisational set‐up among activist groups puts new pressure on corporations, which must develop new strategies concerning online rules. Cyber actions are originated by individuals triggering a spontaneous relationship between many users. The pressure is no longer the result of a long aggregation into association, but of an immediate and spontaneous network of relationships. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications