250 SAISREVIEW "approach through individual moves . . . Informal arms control has been far more successful than formal. The process can be initiated when a U.S. Defense Secretary would tell the Soviets the nature of an informal deal and then tell Congress. If the Russians would proceed with x, he will then be back to Congress to request y." However, this approach will raise administration rivalries over who has the mandate to negotiate with the Soviets. Also, congressional involvement at an early stage ofthe negotiations will result in more partisan skirmishes, which can diminish the chances of reaching a consensus. In addition, this proposal is not good for the workings ofthe international system. It will render the arms control process among different countries and regions a highly fragmented process, often without the knowledge and supervision of superpowers and other countries. As many Third World countries move to build their own ballistic missiles, future arms control agreements among different regions and countries in the world will move more towards bilateral talks without the need for global supervision and sanctions. Adelman's hope for more successful summits and a more effective arms control process can be achieved if the summits inaugurate arms control negotiations, and if the progress on negotiations is reviewed at subsequent summits. Despite its skepticism, Adelman's book gives an important account of U.S.-Soviet relations and of arms control negotiations at a very critical time in the relations of the two superpowers. Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform. By Anders Àslund. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989. 269 pp. $38.50/cloth, $12.95/paper. Reviewed by Roberta Waxman, M.A. Candidate, SAIS. "This is likely to be the last chance Soviet communism gets to reform," asserts Anders Àslund in his recent study of Soviet economic reforms. Pointing to the problems of other centrally-planned economies that moved towards reform and the endemic inadequacies of the Soviet economic system, Aslund is rather pessimistic about short-run prospects for perestroïka. In this book, Àslund carefully details decisions made by key actors in the Soviet Union, not only uncovering the underpinnings of the Soviet economic system, but also revealing some of the structure of the decision-making process. Àslund brings his knowledge of economics and his experience as a Swedish diplomat in Moscow to this meticulous discussion of Soviet economic reform from 1985 to 1988. He concentrates on two periods: from 1985 to 1987, which he describes as a time of "learning and conceptualization," and from 1988 to 1990, when the Soviets are implementing and improving their program. In the first two chapters, Àslund establishes a framework for the detailed documentation of reforms discussed in the next four chapters. His first BOOK REVIEWS 251 chapter presents a condensed summary of the origins of current economic reforms, briefly tracing contemporary viewpoints back to earlier reforms and indicating lessons learned from these attempts. Chapter two presents a wellrounded picture of the issues and advocates of the debate, from Mikhail Gorbachev, labelled a "radical reformer" and referred to as the "star of this book," to Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, a "moderate reformer," to the reactionary Yegor Ligachev, currently chairman of the Central Committee Commission on Agriculture. This chapter provides a backdrop for the many voices throughout the rest of the book, culled from interviews, news articles, speeches, and decrees. In the next four chapters, Aslund weaves together the political and economic developments of the reform efforts, focusing more on internal political dialogue than on deep economic analysis. He traces arguments from academics and political officials, giving an idea which viewpoints carry more weight when policy is made. The result is a detailed account ofthe dynamic decision-making process under Gorbachev in such key areas as price reform, decentralization, foreign trade, and the role of the party in the economy. Aslund explains in his introduction that he wants to "concentrate on the present reform process" and assumes the reader's knowledge of the Soviet political and economic system. Without a broader contextual and historical setting, the author's discussion of today's reforms as they relate to the 1965 reform program and Brezhnev's attempts to rejuvenate the economic system lacks a...