Critique Of My Work Research Articles

Response to Tara Mendola's "Where Do We Go From Here? Reading 'Arab Women's Writing' Today" College Literature 36.3 (Summer 2009): 221-29

Response to Tara Mendola's "Where Do We Go From Here? Reading 'Arab Women's Writing' Today" College Literature36.3 (Summer 2009): 221-29 Brinda J. Mehta Response to Tara Mendola's "Where Do We Go From Here? Reading 'Arab Women's Writing' Today" College Literature36. 3( Summer2009): 221-29 [Review by Tara Mendola ] I am responding to a review of my book, Rituals of Memory in Contemporary Arab Women's Writing(2007) by Tara Mendola, which was previously published in College Literature(Mendola 2009). While reviewers are free to express their opinions, I am alarmed by the extremely partial and misleading critique of my work in this particular review essay. The deliberate omission of key chapters is very disturbing. Three of the most important sections on Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq are not even mentioned. The chapter on Palestine is nearly forty-eight pages (28-75). The chapter on Lebanon and Iraq (188-227) comprises another forty pages, while the discussion of Algerian author Malika Mokkeddem (76-120) also remains unacknowledged. I question the reviewer's choices, given her chapter-by-chapter analysis of Nawar El-Hassan Golley's edited volume Arab Women's Lives Retold: Exploring Identity through Writing, which precedes the critique of my book. Given the current geopolitical situation in the world today, and the politically charged situations in Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon, I am very concerned that the review chose to eliminate even a brief mention of these chapters. This critical excision is particularly curious given the review's own lamentations on the situation in Gaza when she references Golley's anthology. To quote: "As I write this review in the aftermath of the latest violent convulsion in Gaza, over a thousand human beings have been slaughtered, more wounded—each one someone's child. And so, the image of the maternal body ridden with the detritus of war which it cannot expel appears a particularly appropriate way for this volume to conclude" (Mendola 2009, 226). Ironically, the opening chapter of my book focuses on the situation of Palestinian refugees in the decimated camp of Tal Ezza'tar located in East Beirut from 1968 to 1982. The destruction of the camp by a Lebanese-Israeli coalition is a historical fact fictionalized in Liana Badr's The Eye of the Mirror. This novel highlights the pre-Intifada resistance of Palestinian mothers and daughters who attempt to "wage peace" through creative, non-violent activism as a response to the masculinist ethics of war. These narratives simultaneously [End Page 223]contest and conform to dominant gender ideologies, as the women provide a gendered account of the Palestinian resistance struggle in Lebanon. The chapter also explores the link between trauma and the memory of occupation. None of this is mentioned in the review, even though historical and literary accounts of Tal Ezza'tar occupy such an important place in Middle Eastern politics and literature. I remain equally baffled by the complete negation of Chapter Five, "Cities Under Siege and the Language of Survival in Hanan Al-Shaykh's Beirut Bluesand Nuha Al-Radi's Baghdad Diaries," even though the reviewer cursorily dismisses Hanan Al Shaykh as a popular Lebanese writer: "Again the usual works of Fatima Mernissi, Assia Djedbar [Djebar], and Nawal El Saadawi appear, joined by popular Lebanese author Hanan al-Shakh [Shaykh]" (Mendola 2009, 226). Beirut Bluesis an important novel on the Lebanese Civil War, in which Al Shaykh memorializes her beloved city in the language of the blues and artistic creation, while criticizing the impact of war on civilians. Baghdad Diaries, and the follow-up essay "Twenty-eight Days in Baghdad," go a step further by chronicling the devastation of Baghdad in postmodern warfare using first-hand narration. The author Nuha Al-Radi died in 2004, a victim of the after effects of radiation generated by uranium deposits and cluster bombs used during the U.S. coalition-led "Shock and Awe" campaigns. Al-Radi uses the medium of recycled Embargo Art to make a political statement about the invasion and occupation of Iraq, trade sanctions, and popular resistance to war. However, the reviewer states in her introductory paragraph: "Listed in the introduction...

Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context

In this extensive article I revisit my earlier writings from the 1970s that deal with tort liability in both stranger and consensual arrangements. On the former, I examine Stephen Perry’s 1988 critique of my work, and more recent contributions by Joshua Getzler and Benjamin Zipursky, to defend the view that a rigorous conception of causation under a theory of strict liability is neither logically impossible nor practically unworkable. In so doing, I reexamine the earlier efforts by writers such as Joseph Beale and H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré on causation in order to show how some controversial moves within their theories can be clarified without having to resort to the standard views of causation that work off the notion of “but for” causes. In addition, I explain, in connection with the critique of Jill Horwitz, why some form of a negligence system remains appropriate for medical malpractice cases. In these consensual cases, doctrines of charitable immunity for nonprofit institutions often removed the need to investigate the basis of liability. But once those were removed, a contractual system, which in practice would never embrace a strict liability rule, would often turn to some form of negligence, often coupled with institutional changes, such as arbitration and explicit limitations on contractual damages.

The Essential Idea of the Blues Formula: A Response to David Evans

I would like to thank the editors of the Journal of American Folklore for inviting me to respond to David Evans's Formulaic Composition in the Blues: A View from the Field (2007), and I also thank Evans for taking the time and energy to write his critique of my work. In the following pages, I will answer Evans's major arguments, many of which stem from his view of the blues formulaa view at odds with the one I describe in my book (Taft 2006). I agree with his assessment of my transcriptions: there are many errors and quite a few howlers. But I transcribed I heard, making use of question marks where I did not feel confident enough to guess, and bracketing words and phrases in aster isks where I was unsure of my transcription. While I obviously would have preferred my transcriptions to be entirely accurate, Evans's corrections to my transcriptions are, as he admits, what I heard on the original recordings, since the singers left no written versions of their (2007:497 n. 2). I am sure that Evans has a better ear than I, and his transcriptions of particular words and phrases may well make more sense than mine. Transcribing for the purposes of formulaic analysis, however, pres ents a problem: one is likely to hear formulas or formulaic language where they might not exist, because one is predisposed to looking for formulas-a situation that would work against any objective analysis of the blues formula. For this reason, I tried not to prejudge the lyrics and erred on the side of some mishearings. One of my strategies for countering inaccuracies in the transcriptions was quan titative. By transcribing a corpus of over two thousand blues songs, my percentage of inaccuracies-perhaps 10 percent of the words in any given song-would become statistically less significant than if I had analyzed only a few hundred lyrics. My inaccuracies, in fact, tended to make my corpus seem less formulaic than it actually was, since the words and phrases that I misheard often excluded those parts of a song from identification with any particular formula. For example, considering my transcription of Bo Weavil Jackson's 1926 recording Poor Boy Blues, Evans cor rects Thinking about the wire that my brown had sent to Thinking about the words that my brown had said. My phrase is found nowhere else in the corpus,

The Something We Can Do

AntipodeVolume 40, Issue 3 p. 389-395 The Something We Can Do David Domke, David Domke Department of Communication, University of Washington, Box 353740, Seattle, WA 98195, USA; [email protected]Search for more papers by this author David Domke, David Domke Department of Communication, University of Washington, Box 353740, Seattle, WA 98195, USA; [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 18 April 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2008.00605.xCitations: 1Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume40, Issue3June 2008Pages 389-395 RelatedInformation

Reconsidering feminisms and the work of Norbert Elias for understanding gender, sport and sport-related activities

This paper reconsiders the relationships between feminist perspectives and the figurational/process-sociological perspective of Norbert Elias for understanding gender, sport and sport-related activities. The main aim of the article is to respond to Colwell's claim that there are differences between feminist and figurational approaches to understanding and explaining gender that potentially negate the possibility of being a feminist and figurational sociologist at the same time. The paper makes a contribution to the wider discussions about the adequacy of Elias's work in understanding gender and sport, and the potential of blending feminist and figurational perspectives on sport and gender. It introduces the principles underlying feminist and figurational approaches to sociology. The key features of the ongoing debate about the differences between feminist and figurational approaches are briefly outlined. I reply to Colwell's criticisms of my work and revisit issues surrounding the role of values and evaluation in sociology. Involved-detachment is introduced as a feminist interpretation of Elias's theory of ever changing balances of involvement-detachment. The final part of the paper presents some reflections about working with involved-detachment in specific research on women's involvement in sport-related fitness activities.

Structure, Agency and Ideology: A Response to Zeba Crook

Responding to Zeba Crook’s essay on ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, and his critical remarks on my Ethnography of the Gospel of Matthew, this article first addresses Crook’s criticisms of my work, arguing that it is not rightly characterized as an ‘all agency’ approach. It then discusses Crook’s own proposals concerning the different ratios of agency and structure in different cultures. My response argues that all cultures involve agency, and all cultures involve agents acting in structured ways, and that a better focus might be on the importance of hierarchy, power and ideology within social structures, since the ability of individuals to exercise transformative agency depends on their position. Literature, as I argued in my Ethnography, provides a significant way in which the marginal or weak can exercise a form of agency, as is the case within Matthew’s specifically constructed literary world.

THE CASE OF THE CRITICS WHO MISSED THE POINT: A REPLY TO WEBSTER ET AL.*

Webster et al.’s (2006) critique of my work with Daniel Kessler largely misses the point of the original article. In reading Webster et al., one is led to believe that our conclusions were based primarily, or even exclusively, on an analysis of the timing and magnitude of fluctuations in crimes covered by Proposition 8 in California before and after the law went into effect. This is simply not the case. We could not have been more explicit in our original article in emphasizing that inference based on that source of variation is likely to be highly misleading.1 The results we report in the original article are based on comparisons of eligible and noneligible crimes, and the differential patterns of these sets of crimes inside and outside of California. Webster et al. is an article that largely is devoted to criticizing us for a set of arguments we simply never made. Nothing in Webster et al. calls into question the analysis that we actually did carry out. When I replicate the original analysis, adding additional years of data or using monthly data rather than annual data, as Webster et al. suggest, the results remain completely consistent with the findings originally reported in Kessler and Levitt (1999).

Dr. Hirshbein Replies

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Letter to the EditorFull AccessDr. Hirshbein RepliesLAURA D. HIRSHBEIN, M.D., Ph.D., LAURA D. HIRSHBEINSearch for more papers by this author, M.D., Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Mich.Published Online:1 Sep 2005https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.162.9.1759AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail To the Editor: Dr. Geller criticizes my article for failing to take appropriate notice of the history produced by psychiatrists, particularly Walter Barton and Dr. Geller himself. First, Dr. Geller complains that I did not use Walter Barton’s history of APA in my article. Although it is true that I did not employ Barton’s framework for my historical analysis (for reasons I will explain below), I did, in fact, cite Barton’s history in my article (reference 175). Second, Dr. Geller points out that I did not cite his 1994 article that explored the themes of the APA presidential addresses. I appreciate Dr. Geller calling my attention to his article, but I disagree with his implication that his article and my article went about the same task in different ways (his was organized by themes, while mine was organized by time periods). There is more of a difference than just organization between our articles; we were actually engaged in very different projects with very different ideas about what it means to study history. Dr. Geller focused his article on common themes as they recurred in the APA presidential addresses, while my article analyzed change over time in how history was used to reflect shifting professional concerns within psychiatry.Dr. Geller’s criticisms in part seem to reflect the dissatisfaction of an author who has written on a similar topic and wants his contribution to be recognized. But on another level, Dr. Geller’s criticism of my work—in particular, his complaint that I did not adequately work within the framework provided by past psychiatrists who have studied history—echoes an old and familiar argument within the history of the medical community (a community comprising both professional historians and physicians) about who owns the history of medicine. Physicians have long claimed that they are the only ones with the necessary expertise to describe the history of their discipline, while historians have countered by pointing out that physician-authored histories tend to be overly internalist (that is, centered only on activities of the profession to the exclusion of the social, political, or cultural contexts of professional activities).As both a psychiatrist and a professional historian, I attempted to sidestep this particular issue in this article by analyzing the ways in which the APA presidents’ use of history changed over time. Although Barton delineated how he thought the history of the association should be framed, what I showed is that psychiatrists over time have used history in a variety of different ways. Furthermore, psychiatrists (in common with other professionals) have selected the parts of their history that fit within their professional interests at the time that they were writing the history. Dr. Geller’s article, in fact, is a good example of this. Dr. Geller assembled the APA presidential remarks in six thematic areas—areas that he self-consciously chose because they were relevant to contemporary psychiatry.One of the most exciting things about the APA presidential addresses is that they are tremendously rich sources for a variety of possible historical analyses. What I did in my article was not to attempt to use the addresses to describe the history of APA but rather to explore the many ways in which the histories of APA have changed over time. I certainly did not intend to offend anyone who has written on the history of American psychiatry. Instead, what I hoped to do with my article was to join other discussions on the ways in which histories of psychiatry (not just the subjects of history) change over time (1).Reference1. Micale MS, Porter R (eds): Discovering the History of Psychiatry. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994Google Scholar FiguresReferencesCited byDetailsCited byNone Volume 162Issue 9 September 2005Pages 1759-1759 Metrics PDF download History Published online 1 September 2005 Published in print 1 September 2005

Comment on “Accurate ground-state phase diagram of the one-dimensional extended Hubbard model at half filling”

It is shown that Guoping Zhang's results [G. P. Zhang, Phys. Rev. B 68, 153101 (2003)] for the charge-density wave-phase boundary in the half-filled one-dimensional extended Hubbard model are incorrect and that his criticism of my work [E. Jeckelmann, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 236401 (2002)] is groundless.

To the Editors

It is unusual to respond to a book review of another scholar's book, but since reviewer Oleg Khlevniuk and the editors of Kritika saw fit to publish a review of Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov's Stalin's Loyal Executioner that Khlevniuk transformed into a lengthy and substantial criticism of my work (Kritika 4, 3 [2003]: 760-67), I would like to make a few comments.

The Military and Legalism: A Response to Paul Sigmund

AlthoughArgentina and Brazil initially received more attention in that regard, Chile is a tempting new examplebecause retired General Augusto Pinochet, once a symbol of utter impunity (even entering theChilean Senate), was transformed into a rumpled octogenarian, and for the most part disappearedfrom public view (though not from public discourse). His successors in the role of army Commander-in-Chief began speaking in new terms, eschewing Pinochet’s intentionally inflammatory rhetoric,and even conceding that officers involved in human rights abuses could be brought before civiliancourts. In this vein, Paul Sigmund comes to the conclusion –based in large part on criticism of mybook on Chilean civil-military relations –that legalism has finally been restored to Chilean civil-militaryrelations (Sigmund, 2003). My own contention is that although Chilean governments have madeimportant strides, the legal foundations of military influence remained in place. I have elsewherecalled this “inching toward democracy” (Weeks, 2003). In this short response, I will address boththe criticism of my work and Professor Sigmund’s own hypothesis.I was surprised that Professor Sigmund stated that I do not define “salient interests” (Sigmund,2003: 248). I will not belabor the point, but rather refer the reader to my book where betweenpages 13 and 17, I address that very issue in detail (Weeks, 2003b: 13-17). The military is interestedin many issues, but attaches different importance to each interest, which in turn affects the waythey react to the expansion of civilian authority over those issues.Next, he claims that I “[do] not believe that the military will agree to the abolition of their appointedsenators” (Sigmund, 2003: 248). In fact, I argue that the military designated senators (not themilitary as a whole) very likely will not vote themselves out of power. The sentence Sigmund quotesfollows a discussion of the possibility of getting votes for such civil-military reform: “These votespotentially could come from members of the Concertacion who are named designated senators,but the military senators will not likely acquiesce to dismantling the system ” (Weeks, 2003: 161).The armed forces may, in the future, feel compelled to “agree to” the abolition of designatedsenators (perhaps as part of some political bargain) but as yet it has not come to pass.Professor Sigmund also quotes my book with regard to the solution of the 1993 boinazo, whichrequires elaboration. The concessions did not simply involve “an agreement on the treatment ofhuman rights cases ” (Sigmund, 2003: 247). As I point out, they also involved firing a Subsecretaryof War (Marcos Sanchez) that the army disliked, as well as compelling the Aylwin government to

Anti‐Consequentialism and the Transcendence of the Good

Richard Boyd's Beings, Finite Goods1 is exactly sort of response a philosopher hopes to evoke. It is perceptive and fair-minded in its reading and criticism of my work, illuminating agreements and disagreements and motivations on both sides, and showing points at which my position stands in need of more adequate development. At same time it is much more than a response, offering a fuller and richer development, on several points, of what was already, in my opinion, most plausible and promis ing version of naturalist moral realism. Here I will try to respond in a similar spirit, though on a smaller scale, taking up first issues about consequential ism, and helplessness, and then more metaethical issues, involving what I have called the critical stance. I should say something at outset about my aims in engaging Boyd in debate, as I did already in my book (Adams 58-82).21 was and am arguing, of course, against Boyd's version of naturalism. But I was not and am not aim ing at a definitive refutation of his view. His is one of relatively few con structive nontheistic theories in metaethics against which I argue at any length in Finite and Infinite Goods and that is precisely because his theory is so close to mine in some ways that seeing why I differ with it may be par ticularly helpful in understanding motivation of my own view. I have not wanted to try to prove my own theory by refuting all main competing types of metaethical theory and then saying, 'See now; my view wins by default.' The problem with that strategy is that all known metaethical theories are attended with grave problems. No doubt each theory that's still seriously in running is commended in part by difficulties of others. But relatively little is gained by dwelling on those problems, because most of them are pretty well known already. The hard project, and only

How to Be an Intentionalist

The general aim of this paper is to establish the plausibility of a postfoundational intentionalism. Its specific aim is to respond to criticisms of my work made by Vivienne Brown in a paper “On Some Problems with Weak Intentionalism for Intellectual History.” Postfoundationalism is often associated with a new textualism according to which there is no outside to the text. In contrast, I suggest that postfoundationalists can legitimate our postulating intentions, actions, and other historical objects outside of the text. They can do so by reference to, first, philosophical commitments to general classes of objects, and, second, inference to the best explanation with respect to particular objects belonging to such classes. This postfoundational intentionalism sets up a suitable context within which to address Brown's more specific questions.

The new contractualism and individualized personhood

A reply to Ramia Ramia's central point of criticism of my work on the new contractualism has it that I reject social protection and the importance of social protection in providing a restraint on the destructive effects of liberal market principles. He has constructed a straw person. I never designed my work on the new contractualism to make such an argument. Nor can it be argued that my work in this area unwittingly proposes that social protection is unnecessary once classical liberalism has been opened up to a more complex and more inclusive dynamic of individualization of the kind that I associate with the new contractualism. Most of the opposition to contemporary contractualism comes from those who champion either an older tradition of non-individualized collectivism or contemporary communitarianism. In this context, contemporaries who work within the intellectual traditions of social democracy and sociology need to think again when they are tempted to echo the communitarian rhetoric of condemnation of individualization, individualism and fragmentation. Are they going to recycle the old antinomy of individual and society, where, traditionally, social democracy and sociology have championed the latter term, or are they going to accept the ethical challenge of individuality and think about the social conditions of its possibility? If we are to use the metaphor of protection, we must ensure that we do so in a way that does not trap us within the old liberal equation of a need for protection with a lack of individuality. Historically, protection has been accompanied by the deprivation of freedom to those who have been seen to need it (see Yeatman, 1984). Welfare policy still operates in this way. The new contractualism thesis If we are to take individuality seriously, we have to take the rich tradition of liberal thought seriously because it gives us insight into the nature of individuality, although I want to argue this is individuality of a particular historical type. Liberalism centres on a particular conception of the human subject. This is an already fully formed individual who possesses mature contractual capacity and who exercises this capacity on behalf of his and (as it now is) her freedom to be both self-governing and self-reliant. This conception of the human subject is structured by its existence as an individualized unit of private property. It emphasizes the freedom of the individual to do as (s)he wills. Since individuals can function only with the assistance of others, liberalism has to admit this truth, but it does so in a way that sustains the private propertied atomism of the individual. It admits the dependence of the individual on others in two ways. First, by way of exchange with other individuals, where the nature of the exchange confirms each in his or her standing as private individuals free to do as they will. Second, by way of a private relationship of government or command over other individuals, where these others are positioned as subject to the will of the self-governing individual. Historically, these others have been wives, children and employees. Today, children are still positioned in this way especially if they are under the age of 12. Where the first type of relationship of the liberal subject -- the reciprocity of an exchange relationship -- offers recognition to the individuality of those party to it, the second type of relationship of the liberal subject is predicated on a profound inequality. The individuality of the patrimonial head of the unit concerned, whether it is a family or firm, swallows up that of his dependants. They are to have no individuality of their own for the duration of their dependence on his government of them. As Carole Pateman (1979) puts it in her account of the liberal theory of obligation, these dependants are so positioned that they are compelled to exchange their obedience for the patrimonial individual's protection of them. …

Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards

In an essay published in the October 1998 issue of the Virginia Law Review, Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards responds to my article analyzing the role of ideology in the D.C. Circuit's decisions concerning environmental regulation. It is somewhat sobering when one of the Nation's leading federal appellate judges criticizes one's work with great vehemence. Nonetheless, as this reply makes plain, Judge Edwards is simply wrong with respect to each of the numerous criticisms that he levels against my work. Not a single one of his arguments weakens in any way the force of my findings. The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the principal claims made in my article. Part II responds to the six sets of objections (each of which contains many independent components) that Judge Edwards levels against my methodology. Part III takes issue with arguments that Judge Edwards advances in support of his account of how the D.C. Circuit decides cases. Part IV explains why Judge Edwards' views concerning the role of empirical studies of the judicial function are misguided. This essay thus unfolds on two levels. First, it provides a methodical and detailed response to each of Judge Edwards' criticisms of my work. This response ought to be of interest not only to individuals who are trying to evaluate the validity of these criticisms but also to future empirical researchers, who might benefit from the discussion of the various methodological choices. Second, the essay is intended to cast some further light on the processes of adjudication, particularly in multimember courts, and on the use of empirical methods to study the judicial function. These issues are central to the work of a broader audience.

Marx, Malthus and the Greens: A Reply to Paul Burkett

[I am grateful to the editors for inviting me to reply to Paul Burkett's criticisms of my work, and also to Burkett himself for his systematic and scholarly attention. So far as I can tell, Burkett and I are in close agreement on some very important issues: that ecological degradation is of central importance politically, that its primary cause is the dynamics of specifically capitalist social and economic relations (not ‘industrialism’, ‘greed’, ‘modernity’, ‘anthropocentrism’, ‘science’, or whatever), that Marx's and Engels's materialist view of history is indispensable for any adequate theoretical grasp of our current predicament, that scientific and technical innovation are shaped by capitalist class relations, that the much vaunted aspiration to ‘sustainability’ is unachievable short of a fundamental and emancipatory transformation of social and economic life, and so on., I am grateful to the editors for inviting me to reply to Paul Burkett's criticisms of my work, and also to Burkett himself for his systematic and scholarly attention. So far as I can tell, Burkett and I are in close agreement on some very important issues: that ecological degradation is of central importance politically, that its primary cause is the dynamics of specifically capitalist social and economic relations (not ‘industrialism’, ‘greed’, ‘modernity’, ‘anthropocentrism’, ‘science’, or whatever), that Marx's and Engels's materialist view of history is indispensable for any adequate theoretical grasp of our current predicament, that scientific and technical innovation are shaped by capitalist class relations, that the much vaunted aspiration to ‘sustainability’ is unachievable short of a fundamental and emancipatory transformation of social and economic life, and so on.]

Commercialising the service class and economic restructuring—a response to my critics

The Commercialisation of Accountancy is reviewed in this issue of AOS in two extended essays—one by Hugh Willmott and Prem Sikka (1997) and the other by Yves Dezalay (1997). Whilst agreeing with many of the insightful criticisms of my work, I would like to take this opportunity to defend elements of the text which were criticised. In particular, I would like to expand upon the criticism made by Willmott and Sikka that I should have examined how the economic restructuring of the past two decades has presented some accountants (and indeed other expert labour groups) with opportunities, whilst restricting the life chances of many others. I accept this criticism; however, I would argue that the inter- and intra-group struggles for position are implicit in the work throughout much of the text and that they are explicitly mentioned in chapter six and the conclusion (the chapters which deal with class). Dezalay also refers to this inadequacy and suggests that the work suffers from the binary simplicity of Perkin's thesis which emphasises the public sector-private sector divide (see Perkin, 1989). What follows will attempt to clarify my views in this area and to raise questions and point to future areas of research.

Response to Martin Glaberman; Reply to Nelson Lichtenstein

Martin Glaberman's political outlook stands in the long shadow cast by C.L.R. James and George Rawick, but his review (November 1996) of my recent biography of Walter Reuther does this scholarly tradition no credit. Glaberman buries a useful critique of my work beneath an assault so careless and confusing as to make one wonder if he understands the historical method, or perhaps more charitably, if he actually took the time to sit down and read the book. As a consequence, Glaberman often attacks me for agreeing with him, while ignoring those sections of the biography at which real political differences arise.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Historical and comparative perspectives on the Australian welfare state: a response to Rob Watts

In response to Rob Watts' critique of my work as being that of a non-historian and as being structural-functionalist in orientation, I simply plead guilty. I suggest, however, that there are extenuating circumstances in the fact that my work on the Australian welfare state is in no way intended to be a contribution to historical studies, but is rather a contribution to comparative social policy research utilising the proper sociological tools for that task. On the other hand, I plead wholly innocent of Watts' other charge that my research findings have somehow deflected Australian historians from their proper research tasks. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary—and Watts provides none—any defects in the work of historians of the Australian welfare state must be attributed to the deficiencies of that discipline and its practitioners, not to the influence of non-historians such as myself.

Smoking in the Washroom of the Chicago School: A Reply to Crespi: [Commentary

I would like to thank Greg Crespi (1997) for his comments on my chapter Legal Prohibitions as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law (Dau-Schmidt 1995). It's always fun to have one's work discussed in the main text of an article rather than in the footnotes, and his comments are both thoughtful and constructive. Like all good criticism, his comments have helped me sharpen my thinking on my work. However, because I disagree with him on his primary criticism of my work, I feel compelled to write this response. Crespi (1997:155-56) argues that although my approach of assuming endogenous preferences in analyzing certain legal institutions is interesting, I have not shown that the benefits of my approach, relative to the benefits the traditional Chicago School approach, exceed the costs of my approach relative to the costs of the traditional models. Crespi asserts that this is true for basically two reasons. First, he points out that people's preferences are hard to measure and that it is therefore difficult to specify a preference function and empirically test the predictive value of my models (p. 156). Second, Crespi observes that adopting the assumption of endogenous preferences precludes the use of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and requires one to resort to the more subjective theoretical construct of social welfare to evaluate the efficacy of public policies (pp. 157-58). Crespi concludes that, because of these facts, the approach of assuming endogenous preferences is empirically less useful and normatively more complicated than the tradi-