The Military and Legalism: A Response to Paul Sigmund

Abstract

AlthoughArgentina and Brazil initially received more attention in that regard, Chile is a tempting new examplebecause retired General Augusto Pinochet, once a symbol of utter impunity (even entering theChilean Senate), was transformed into a rumpled octogenarian, and for the most part disappearedfrom public view (though not from public discourse). His successors in the role of army Commander-in-Chief began speaking in new terms, eschewing Pinochet’s intentionally inflammatory rhetoric,and even conceding that officers involved in human rights abuses could be brought before civiliancourts. In this vein, Paul Sigmund comes to the conclusion –based in large part on criticism of mybook on Chilean civil-military relations –that legalism has finally been restored to Chilean civil-militaryrelations (Sigmund, 2003). My own contention is that although Chilean governments have madeimportant strides, the legal foundations of military influence remained in place. I have elsewherecalled this “inching toward democracy” (Weeks, 2003). In this short response, I will address boththe criticism of my work and Professor Sigmund’s own hypothesis.I was surprised that Professor Sigmund stated that I do not define “salient interests” (Sigmund,2003: 248). I will not belabor the point, but rather refer the reader to my book where betweenpages 13 and 17, I address that very issue in detail (Weeks, 2003b: 13-17). The military is interestedin many issues, but attaches different importance to each interest, which in turn affects the waythey react to the expansion of civilian authority over those issues.Next, he claims that I “[do] not believe that the military will agree to the abolition of their appointedsenators” (Sigmund, 2003: 248). In fact, I argue that the military designated senators (not themilitary as a whole) very likely will not vote themselves out of power. The sentence Sigmund quotesfollows a discussion of the possibility of getting votes for such civil-military reform: “These votespotentially could come from members of the Concertacion who are named designated senators,but the military senators will not likely acquiesce to dismantling the system ” (Weeks, 2003: 161).The armed forces may, in the future, feel compelled to “agree to” the abolition of designatedsenators (perhaps as part of some political bargain) but as yet it has not come to pass.Professor Sigmund also quotes my book with regard to the solution of the 1993 boinazo, whichrequires elaboration. The concessions did not simply involve “an agreement on the treatment ofhuman rights cases ” (Sigmund, 2003: 247). As I point out, they also involved firing a Subsecretaryof War (Marcos Sanchez) that the army disliked, as well as compelling the Aylwin government to