Coup In Egypt Research Articles

Ideology, Polarization, and News Culture: The Secular-Islamist Tension in Turkish Journalism

What role does political ideology play in the production of news in a contentious cultural context? To address this question, this article investigates how Turkish Islamic conservative journalists produced and circulated representations of two dramatic events in 2013: the Gezi Park protests in Turkey and the military coup in Egypt. I chose these two cases because the Islamic political bias and activism that shaped the production of news about these two events are symptomatic of the way in which Islamism as a political ideology instrumentalizes news making. Based on newsroom ethnography conducted at an Islamic national mainstream television channel in Turkey between 2011 and 2014, the article demonstrates how Islamism shapes the ways in which Islamic conservative journalists interpreted and articulated the two events in the newsroom, and represented them in news coverage. In this context, journalistic practice gains an ideological character when the journalists utilize journalistic representations as strategic instruments to advance the political agenda of Islamic conservatives against secular forces in Turkey. As the polarization between Islamic and secular groups is based on cultural distinctions, I argue that the political ideology determining journalistic practices is defined not only by party affiliations or socioeconomic class positions but also by the common cultural ways of living and thinking of journalists who work and live as members of a sociocultural group. Islamic ideology serves as a social cement that creates bonds among the IslamicTV journalists as a sociocultural group, and a degree of unity and common purpose in their professional practices.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

Partisans’ and Civil Elites’ Role in Supporting Military Coups: The Case of the Egyptian Elites

The study reported in the article below tried to examine partisans’ and civil elites’ role in military interventions and coups. The 2013 Egyptian coup d'état that took place on 3 July 2013 was used as a model of analysis. Concisely, this study sought to identify the defining characteristics of the partisans and civil elites who supported that military coup in Egypt, including their social origins, their level of education, their views of democracy and constitutional legitimacy as well as the nature of their allegied tie-up with the armed forces. In order to do just this, the study used Samuel Huntington's hypothesis as a theoretical framework of analysis. Accordingly, elites’ support for military coups underlies weakness (and therefore ineffectiveness) of the country’s civil institutions as well as absence of institutional political channels that regulate competition and conflict between parties with differing interests and resources. An immediate outcome of such a state of affairs was that partisans and civil elites had demonstrated their superiority over the army as they possessed the means of power that enabled them to impose their control. The findings of the study showed that those partisans and civil elites, formed by mechanisms based on mutual interests and wealth, are only theoretically oriented in the sense that they only accept the principles of democracy and constitutional legitimacy in the event that they lead to their arrival to power. However, if that legitimacy comes from other political currents, (e.g. The Muslim Brotherhood), they soon turn against it.

The Role of External Actors in the Unmaking of the Egyptian Revolution

In 2013, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, was overthrown by a military coup. Since then, the country has undergone serious setbacks in terms of democracy, individual freedoms and social justice. Egypt’s failed revolution and the military coup in Egypt could not be thought independent from the role of external actors either directly or indirectly involved in this process. Despite their political rhetoric emphasizing democracy promotion and political reforms, both the US and the EU failed to pursue consistent and contributory policies in promoting democratic transition in Egypt in the fear that the electoral victory of Islamist groups would harm their interests in the region. On the other hand, the Gulf monarchies played a pivotal role in the entrenchment of the military rule by providing financial and political support to the military-backed government as a shield against the democratically elected regime in Egypt. This article investigates how the policies adopted by Egypt’s key allies, the European Union, the United States and the Gulf Monarchies, in the face of the January 25 revolution and 2013 military coup impacted the trajectory of Egypt’s political transition. The main thesis of the article is that the policies pursued by the external actors created a political environment unconducive to democratic change in Egypt.

ІДЕОЛОГІЧНА ТА ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНА КОНКУРЕНЦІЯ ТУРЕЧЧИНИ ТА ОАЕ: ТОЧКИ СПІВПРАЦІ Й ЗІТКНЕННЯ

Вивчено еволюцію відносин Туреччини та ОАЕ на тлі комплексу проблем регіону Близького Сходу. Акцентовано на змінах зовнішньополітичного курсу Туреччини, починаючи від 2002 р. (прихід до влади Партії справедливості й розвитку): відродження ідеології пантюркізму (неопантюркізм), розповсюдження ідей неоосманізму, озвучення претензій на регіональне лідерство на Близькому Сході, претендування на роль посередника у вирішенні складних регіональних конфліктів і т. ін. Відзначено, що в ході цих процесів близькосхідна політика Туреччини щораз частіше вступає в конфронтацію з інтересами як провідних акторів міжнародної політики, так і країн регіону. ОАЕ визначено серед тих держав, у відносинах із якими наявна висхідна динаміка розбіжностей та напруги. Відтак мета дослідження – вивчення точок зіткнення інтересів Туреччини та ОАЕ, виявлення принципових відмінностей інтересів двох країн у регіоні Близького Сходу, а також наслідків зіткнень цих інтересів.
 Аргументовано, що нинішні відносини Туреччини й ОАЕ характеризуються мінливим поєднанням доволі агресивної ідеологічної та геополітичної конкуренції, з одного боку, і ситуативної стратегічної співпраці – з іншого. Підкреслено, що ОАЕ є в групі опозиційно налаштованих до нинішнього зовнішньополітичного курсу Р. Т. Ердогана держав. Констатовано зниження від початку «Арабської весни» показників співпраці Туреччини та ОАЕ за одночасного наростання міждержавної конфронтації. Це відбувається попри відсутність в ОАЕ, на відміну від багатьох держав Близького Сходу, османського минулого й трагічно забарвленої історичної пам’яті щодо турків. Відмінності між державами наявні в частині ставлення до руху «Братів-мусульман», військового перевороту 2013 р. у Єгипті, проблеми блокади Катару, створення буферної зони на північному сході Сирії, конкуренції інтересів у країнах Африканського Рогу, відносин зі сторонами громадянської війни в Лівії тощо. Аналіз специфіки відносин Туреччини з ОАЕ дає підставу припустити про відхід Туреччина від курсу на побудову політики «нуль проблем із сусідами», а відтак – посилення геополітичної ізоляції Туреччини.

EU-Egypt Rapprochement Post-2013: A Play in Five Acts

The European Union (EU) was unsure how to react to the 2013 military coup in Egypt. It had pledged to end unconditional cooperation with despotic rulers in its Southern neighbourhood, but deemed a popular military regime more capable of stabilizing the country. The Egyptian leadership’s main concern, in turn, has always been regime survival. Initially, this meant warding off the most pressing domestic challenges by silencing all opposing voices and manifesting its power grip; an endeavour for which it did not consider the EU to be helpful. As a consequence, relations cooled down, but both sides began to reach out to each other shortly thereafter. This article describes and explains the gradual rapprochement by tracing how and why the EU’s and Egypt’s perceptions, priorities and policies changed over time. It argues that the EU sought closer relations due to the accelerating migration challenge and terrorist threat as well as Egypt’s strategy to diversify its foreign relations and underscore the country’s importance. Once it had regained control over the domestic setting, the Egyptian government, in turn, shifted its attention to overcoming the economic crisis, which it perceives as the main threat to regime survival in the long-run. Hereby, the EU shall play a key role.

Traces of a Revolution

Traces of a Revolution

CLEANSING THE NATION OF THE “DOGS OF HELL”: ʿALI JUMʿA'S NATIONALIST LEGAL REASONING IN SUPPORT OF THE 2013 EGYPTIAN COUP AND ITS BLOODY AFTERMATH

AbstractThis article contributes to an emerging scholarly debate over the support displayed by key Azhari ʿulamaʾ for the 3 July 2013 coup in Egypt and the subsequent massacres of anticoup protesters. I focus on the Islamic legal justifications articulated by the former grand mufti of Egypt ʿAli Jumʿa, which academics have contextualized primarily in relation to quietist precedents from late medieval Islamic political thought or his Sufi background. By contrast, I consider Jumʿa's justifications as representative of a nationalist discourse that has its historical origins in the protonationalism of Rifaʿa al-Tahtawi (d. 1873). My argument has wider implications for our conceptualization of the contemporary Islamic tradition. If, as scholars have argued, the Islamic tradition is a framework for inquiry rather than a set of doctrines, then in the 19th century a concern for the nation and its future became a key part of that framework. I contend that these additions came to redefine the worldview and politics of the ʿulamaʾ in terms of national progress and its horizon of expectations.

Hamas and the Springs of Others

The encounter between Gaza, Hamas and the Arab Spring was unique. In particular, the unimaginable events of 2011-12 in neighbouring Egypt briefly unblocked a radical geopolitical dead-end for both Gaza and Hamas since the 2008-09 Israeli war on the Strip. The week-long war of November 2012 came to crown what seemed an unstoppable, regional ascendancy for Hamas, in its various overlapping guises as national liberation and resistance movement ; de facto part of the regional Muslim Brotherhood family on the rise ; sweeping winner of the last (and its only) elections ; and incumbent government without power outside of Gaza under siege. The 2013 coup in Egypt, followed by the unprecedently bloody 2014 war, put a brutal end to hopes that the regional Spring might prove Gaza’s salvation. This article examines the lasting meaning of this « 2012 moment » in Palestinian collective memory ; the relationship it reinvented between Gaza and Hamas ; and how, despite its brevity, that moment may have paradoxically reinforced the ability of both Gaza and Hamas to endure the Israeli-Egyptian siege, now a decade old.

Turkey’s reaction to the coup in Egypt in comparison with the US and Israel

In this study, Turkey’s reaction to the ousting of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt is studied in comparison with one regional and one global actor with a democratic regime. This study aimed to examine the dynamics of Turkey over-signalling negatively to the coup in comparison with Israeli and American reactions. In comparison with Turkey’s reaction, the US shyly signalled positively in statements and used financial means against the coup hesitantly. Israel pursued a ‘strategic silence’ approach and eschewed signalling at all. It is seen that all three countries’ motivations were dominantly material, and no country reacted with purely normative motivations. The US and Turkey applied a selective normative approach according to their material motivations. While Turkey focused on the illegitimacy of the coup, the US focused on the illiberal policies of Morsi whereas Israel openly avoided adopting a normative approach.

Turkey's Failed Policy toward the Arab Spring: Three Levels of Analysis

Why did Turkish policies toward Syria and Egypt in 2011–15 largely fail? At the individual level, the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan was plagued by populism in the sense that he uses foreign policy issues for the sake of domestic party politics without pursuing long-term international strategies. At the state level, Turkey's military and diplomatic capacity was not sufficient to shape the political transformations in Syria and Egypt. At the international level, Turkey could not effectively respond to the challenges of the Iranian-led and Saudi Arabian–led blocs. The former supported the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the latter backed the military coup in Egypt. Turkey needed the support of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies against these two rival blocs. However, Erdogan's populist discourse and tendency toward Islamist authoritarianism further deteriorated Turkey's relations with its Western allies.

The World is Not Enough

Following the argument that the very act of reporting shapes the raw material of news, this investigation examines “Us” and “Them” dichotomization as it is routinely insinuated into news narratives. Specifically, this investigation analyzes 215 articles from the “hard news” and commentary sections of the International Herald Tribune (IHT), the globally circulating, hard-copy emissary of The New York Times. Us/Them dichotomization pervasively structures news narratives in IHT with the United States cast as “Us” and the rest of the world largely constructed as “Them”. Whereas We are orderly, harmonious, and steeped in democratic mystique in IHT's news narratives, They are characterized by constant struggles for unity and all shades of illiberalism (e.g., Statism, corruption, mayhem). These constructions mutually reinforce each other when they appear side by side on newsprint, day after day. Particular emphases in the analysis concern coverage of China, Russia, the coup in Egypt, the “world historic” gravitas of Barack H. Obama, and the aftermath of Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing.

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Introduction: We studied different causes of patient admission, types of trauma, and patient outcomes in a general intensive care unit (ICU) in Cairo university school of medicine. We hypothesized that governmental violence against protesters after the military coup on July 3rd 2013 might change the pattern of our ICU patients Methods: All patients admitted to a Ten-bedded ICU between 1 September 2012 and 31 August 2012 were enrolled in the study. Pre-coup period was compared to Post-coup period as regards ratio of trauma patients, type of trauma, and site of injury Results: Total number of admitted patients in our ICU was 312, the most common causes for ICU admission were trauma (45%) followed by sepsis (35%), medical causes (14%), and burn (6%). Head trauma patients represented 44% of trauma patients. Post-coup period showed a significant increase in the ratio of trauma patients compared to Pre-coup period (67.2% Vs 39.8%, P value =0.01). As regards Type of trauma a significant increase in gunshot injuries was reported in the Post-coup period compared to Pre-coup period (46.2% Vs 18.5%, P value =0.025). Sites of injury were Head and neck (44%), abdomen (43%) and peripheral vascular injury (13%) Conclusions: The political situation after the military coup in Egypt markedly increased the ratio of critically ill trauma patients especially gunshot injuries. Head and neck are the most common sites for injury

Can Egypt Actually Avoid a Civil War? Lessons Learnt from Algeria

In the light of the military intervention to depose the first democratically elected president in Egypt, Muhammad Morsi on July 2, 2013, there had been immediate calls to avoid a downfall to civil war. The analogy of the military coup in Egypt and the Algerian scenario of 1992 has haunted all intellectual and political circles ever since. The fears of an escalation of violence against the army and its supporters from secularists and the Mubarak regime loyalists emerged right away. The recent upsurges of violence are reminiscent of the Algerian Civil War that engulfed the country for a whole decade following the cancellation of the electoral process of 1992. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) engaged in a wave of guerrilla warfare that plagued the country in what was dubbed “The Red Decade”. The political impasse in Egypt will certainly lead to the insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood members and fundamentalist Muslims to restore their highjacked legitimacy. The question is whether Egypt will fall prey to radicalism and be involved in a “dirty war” or it will be able to avoid such a calamity.

The Northeastern Triangle: Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan

The Triangle may be viewed as a regional subsystem articulating power relationships between core and periphery. The core can be seen as an unevenly weighted dumbbell consisting of Cairo and Khartoum connected by the Nile. The periphery consists of Libya and the upper reaches of the Nile that escape the control of the Egyptian and Sudanese governments. The challenge to this regional subsystem is that Libya, with help from the other peripherals, might grab the dumbbell. Under modern conditions, established states usually dominate their peripheries, although energetic peripheries can budge inert centers. Two attempted coups against Qaddafi in March 1985 reflected serious dissension within his military establishment. Since then overt U.S. actions against Libya have strengthened Qaddafi's regime at home and in the region. Dysfunctional U.S. policies, coupled with a deteriorating Egyptian economy, could precipitate a Nasserite, anti-American coup in Egypt and dramatic regional realignments.

The Military Coup in Egypt: an Analytic Study

The Military Coup in Egypt: an Analytic Study