Counterinsurgency Research Articles

Experiential Learning and Peacekeeping

ABSTRACT Experiential learning, at its core, is a self-driven process of acquiring knowledge from past experiences and applying it to new situations. This study delves into this process within the realm of peacekeeping, where the learning experiences of troop-contributing countries are particularly unique. These peacekeepers navigate the dual role of countering armed insurgencies through UN peacekeeping missions abroad while simultaneously addressing domestic security challenges through counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Although extensive research has examined how COIN experiences shape peacekeeping strategies, the translation of peacekeeping experiential learning to domestic contexts remains to be determined. By focusing on India as a case study, this research illustrates that peacekeepers are open to learning from their peacekeeping experiences. However, the successful application of this learning in domestic settings is determined by more than just their capacity to learn. It is also shaped by the nature of the supportive learning environment that may sometimes create a gap between international peacekeeping and its application to domestic operations.

Mosaic; counter-insurgency approaches and the war against the Islamic state in Mozambique

ABSTRACT Following the defeat in Afghanistan there have been several discussions over the failure of western and western allied counter-insurgency strategies. These discussions often assume that winning a counter-insurgency is dependent on choosing the right strategy to win, and ideal type strategies are often sketched up to provide possible alternatives. However, in practice, counter-insurgency often becomes a process of arranging and organizing various goals, capacities, and organizational legacies. This article analyzes the counter insurgency in Mozambique and finds that it was formed by economic interests and organizational legacies, though it was not an entirely rational activity to win a war. On the ground practices have been the result of several approaches creating a dynamic counter-insurgency assemblage that transcends ideal type counter-insurgency strategies. The article suggests that this might be the cases for many counter insurgency campaigns.

Medical Intelligence In Counter-Insurgency (COIN) And Counter-Terrorist (CT) Operations

Medical intelligence (MEDINT) is now regarded as critically important across a broad spectrum of security concerns. Its usual functions are either in force protection, evaluating risks to personnel at the tactical and operational levels, or, at a strategic level, in considering threats to the health and stability of nation-states. The uses of MEDINT in Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) have received little attention except in so far as they overlap with these concerns; for example, where they involve matters of force-protection or the threat of bioterrorism. But this was not always so. In the past, information relating to health and medicine was considered crucial to the success of COIN operations, if not to domestic terrorism. By adapting some of these techniques to contemporary practice, and utilizing technologies that were not available in former times, we can use MEDINT in innovative ways to exploit the vulnerabilities of hostile groups and to isolate them from surrounding populations. This paper indicates some of the ways in which intelligence from a range of sources can be utilized to engage with communities more effectively; to anticipate the behavior of target groups/individuals; to determine their whereabouts, interactions and supply chains; and ultimately to exploit their weaknesses or dependencies. The paper is not intended as definitive but as a starting point in a conversation as to how MEDINT could or should contribute to CT and COIN operations.

Papua Conflict: An Article Review from the Best Conflict Resolution Method

This article is aimed to review conflict resolution process of Armed Criminal Group in Papua (KKB). This study is a scientific-article review using comparison technique, which compares horse trading method, counter-insurgency (COIN) model, and Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) to later review the best method in conflict resolution and renew or develop it. This study starts from revealing the background of Armed Criminal Group (KKB) happening in Papua, and then discussing conflict resolution process referring to the separatist movement development from KKB using horse trading method, which is proven effective to resolve this conflict if it is supported by the trust between two parties to have a dialogue where both parties are allowed to deliver their purposes openly. It is different from the application of McCormick’s COIN strategy model which narrowly fails in resolving Papua conflict, and even is possible to create a chance of the new dynamics’ existence in its international dimension, so it is needed to have a new interpretation towards COIN model in Papua, which is by giving solution to conflict-root elimination instead of total elimination by military. Meanwhile, applying Military Operations Other Than War approach (OMSP) is mandatory which is done by every country in order to tackle separatism movements. By those three models mentioned earlier, several strategic steps are formulated later in conflict resolution of Armed Criminal Group (KKB) in Papua.

Localization of the counterinsurgency in Sinai: A case study on integrating local population into counterinsurgency combat operations in Sinai

AbstractIntegrating local militias in the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Sinai has achieved tangible successes. The presence of local fighters contributed to the penetration of the Islamic State—Sinai Province network. The integration of locals into the ongoing COIN process has imposed a degree of local participation in local governance and decision‐making. Nevertheless, this article argues that there are two approaches to local integration into the COIN operation; the first is institutional integration, in which the state integrates local fighters at an institutional level in the ranks of the security apparatus. The second is the collaborating militia approach. In this pattern, the state resorts to warlords and tribal chiefs to mobilize irregular militias, coordinating with the regular forces in the COIN process without formally merging them into security institutions’ ranks. The Egyptian model in the Sinai is one of the latter type. The collaborating militia integration approach into COIN operations contributes to wooing elites to create narrow patronage networks of cronies, preventing systematized community participation in the decision‐making process, which leads to keeping the factors of rebellion alive below the surface even if the rebels are defeated militarily.

The trouble with TESSOC: the coming crisis in British and allied military counterintelligence doctrine

ABSTRACT This article examines the evolution of UK military doctrine on counterintelligence (CI), one of the more consistently troubled aspects of military doctrine in general and intelligence doctrine in particular. We argue that current UK and NATO CI doctrine are in thrall to a deeply problematic defining concept in TESSOC (Terrorism, Espionage, Sabotage, Subversion and Organised Crime) that conflates an intractably diverse assortment of security threats under CI. Furthermore, TESSOC is the latest embodiment of a slow, century-long oscillation between two different basic concepts of CI. The first focuses purely on human threat vectors (referred to here as Human Threat CI or HTCI) while the latter entails a more comprehensive, all-source range of adversary technical and open as well as human source intelligence activities (designated Multidisciplinary CI or MDCI in US doctrine). That oscillation is driven largely by the balance between conventional and asymmetrical operations in defence priorities and recent campaign experience. TESSOC is a legacy of the recent, pre-Russo-Ukraine War emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Consequently, UK and allied military counterintelligence doctrine are entering the second quarter of the 21st Century fundamentally ill-equipped to cope with strategic peers and their use of full-spectrum and hybrid strategies.

Progovernment militias, identity leadership, and ethnic defection: Evidence from Israel's recruitment of the South Lebanese Army

AbstractEthnic defection has been identified as a potential game changer in conflicts. However, the factors that enable this process require further study. One factor that has been often overlooked is that of social identity and, more particularly, identity leadership. Ethnic defection is a social as much as it is a political process. Incumbents who can utilize this element may be more successful in encouraging a continuous and more persistent process of ethnic defection. A particularly useful tool for counterinsurgency (COIN) leaders to function as identity leaders is that of militias. Traditionally perceived in the literature as ad hoc outcomes of defection, this article demonstrates how militia recruitment can serve as a platform for recruiters to serve as identity leaders and create among recruits a distinct sense of identity that further distances them from other group members and strengthens their group identity. Success in enabling this group categorization could pave the way for more defectors to switch to the government side in a way less relevant than material incentives. The article illustrates this process by employing the case of Israel's recruitment of Shi‘a defectors into pro‐Israel militias in South Lebanon and the Security Belt during the 1980s and 1990s.

Critical Analysis of the Nepali Army’s Counter Insurgency Campaign Against Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

Nepal witnessed an insurgency within its territory for a decade from 1996 to 2006. Nepali army, the national armed force, along with other security forces, conducted the counter-insurgency campaign within the broader campaign of the Nepalese government. This paper examines the growth of Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the government's initial response, and finally the army's campaign against the insurgents. Using the information presented in academic and government literature as well as the experience gained by the researcher himself, it concludes that the army was successful in tactical battles against the Maoists but could not gain complete victory at the strategic level. The paper also examines the challenges faced by the army during the campaign, and the wider concepts coming out from the overall critical analysis of the campaign.

Management of High-velocity Firearms Injury in Counterinsurgency Area: A Single-Center Study

Abstract Background: High-velocity firearms injuries in counterinsurgency (CI) areas are different from civilian injuries in terms of mechanism of injury, pathophysiology, management, and outcome. Hostile environments and difficult terrain are the main roadblocks in providing quality first aid and timely evacuation, which leads to compromised outcomes. This study was designed to analyze the epidemiology, management modalities, and complications of firearm injuries referred to a trauma care center in a counterinsurgency (CI) area. Methodology: This is a single-center prospective observational study over 3 years at a trauma care hospital in the Union Territory of Kashmir in India. All patients with firearm injuries sustained during CI operations were part of the study cohort. Patient profile, evacuation modalities, time elapsed since injury, and treatment modalities, including complications, were analyzed. Results: Four hundred and eighty patients were admitted over 3 years. The mean time elapsed in reaching the hospital was 7 h. Gunshot injury was the most common mechanism in 58% of the patients. 21.3% were priority I, 45.0% were priority II, whereas 33.7% were priority III. One hundred and fifty-four patients required definitive operative management. Lower extremity was the most common site. Sixty (12.5%) had penetrating abdominal trauma and 27 (5.6%) had vascular injury. Six patients succumbed to death postoperative due to various reasons. Conclusions: High-velocity firearms injury is a common cause of morbidity and mortality in military combat operations. This study highlights the challenges faced in managing high-velocity firearm injuries in such a large cohort of injured patients.

Reframing nationalism and national identity in Anek

ABSTRACT Foregrounding Anubhav Sinha's Hindi mainstream film Anek (released on 27 May 2022), I will draw upon the discourses of nationalism and nation to examine the issues of separatist insurgency, violence, and militarization in the Northeast from the affective and performative lens in order to unsettle the reified categories of identity politics. As ‘nation-building' has important implications for nationalism and the nation-state, an attempt is made to map out the contours of the historical legacy of state formation in the Northeast India, which is characterized by ‘ethnic polities’ of Northeast groups with a connection to a real or imagined homeland, and the recurrent politics of subnationalism. Delineating the current scholarship on the relationship between hot and banal nationalism, an endeavour is made to offer new ways to understand insurgency and counter insurgency in the Northeast. Lastly, the paper explores how sports serve as a galvanizing force for mobilizing national identity and unity.

From ‘Butcher and Bolt’ to ‘Bugsplat’: Race, Counterinsurgency, and International Politics

Beginning in the early 2000s, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan revived interest among security studies scholars in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Yet most studies of COIN in mainstream security studies have not explored the role of race, despite the fact that the principles of COIN warfare were developed during the colonial period when racialized visions dominated world politics. We argue that mainstream security scholars tend to overlook race for two interconnected reasons: first, they treat race as an emotional and interpersonal phenomenon, and second, they assume that racial hostility will manifest in intense and indiscriminate violence. We argue instead that race should be understood as a particular kind of social ontology, one that places human communities into socially reductionist hierarchies based on assumed bio-cultural traits. We then examine how different kinds of racial ontologies were used in the colonial period to develop different kinds of COIN doctrines, whether punitive or paternalistic in character. We demonstrate how these different racialized COIN frameworks informed state practices on the battlefield through a comparative illustration of two COIN campaigns: Britain on the “North-West frontier” of India in the late nineteenth century and the United States along the “Af-Pak border” in the early twenty-first century.

Targeting Revolutionaries

Abstract This essay traces the emergence of the carceral warfare project, a clandestine campaign to infuse US prisons with the logics and techniques of counterinsurgency. First exposed by Black Liberation Army member Dhoruba bin-Wahad, the project came into being between 1970 and 1978. The article begins by discussing the theory undergirding the carceral warfare project, a reactionary idea known as “the issue exploitation thesis.” Starting in 1970, seasoned cold warriors renovated their long-standing arguments against communism for application against imprisoned Black revolutionaries. Next, the FBI’s little-known Prison Activists Surveillance Program (PRISACTS) is discussed. Focusing on the words and deeds of George Jackson and Donald Bordenkircher—two central figures positioned on opposite sides of the struggle—the essay shows how the bureau used PRISACTS to treat carceral spaces as zones of counterrevolutionary warfare. Although the FBI officially discontinued PRISACTS in 1976, the final section argues that the FBI’s counterrevolutionary methodology had already been integrated into state prison systems by this date. Ultimately, this essay demonstrates that through prisons, internal security operatives engage in a plausibly deniable form of counterinsurgency warfare that seeks to isolate political prisoners from each other, from the general prison population, from their outside networks of support, and even alienates them from themselves.

Settler colonial counterinsurgency: Indigenous resistance and the more-than-state policing of #NoDAPL

In 2016, the US-based private military contractor TigerSwan was denied a license to operate in North Dakota. Nonetheless, it coordinated a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign employing war-on-terror tactics, brutalizing Indigenous and allied water protectors associated with the Indigenous-led movement to stop the Dakota Access Pipeline (#NoDAPL) on Standing Rock Lakota territory. This article takes COIN as an analytic to show that US settler colonialism is a multilateral, internally conflicted, and anxious mode of power. The settler state both depends upon and disavows anti-Indigenous and anti-Black violence enacted by rogue civilian individuals and organizations, a phenomenon here termed ‘more-than-state policing’. The repression of #NoDAPL was not solely a boomerang by-product of the global war on terror but rather exposes an established infrastructure of settler colonial COIN intrinsic to US normal politics, in which Indigenous resistance and sovereignty are constructed as metastasizing, viral threats to settler colonial legitimacy. As modern COIN warfare has evolved from four centuries of North American settler colonial invasion and governance, settler colonial studies are key to grasping 21st-century topics of war, imperialism, securitization, resource extraction, and climate justice.

“Phantom operators”: special operations forces and asymmetric warfare in Northern Nigeria.

ABSTRACT Across the world, Special Operations Forces (SOFs) play a leading role in asymmetric warfare. The unique trainings, skills, weapons, and equipment of these elite Tier 1 operators, differentiates them from conventional forces, making them the preferred choice in complex environments. SOFs are ideally deployed for short operations, which include direct action missions, hostage rescue, hunting high-value targets (HVTs), mobility operations, intelligence operations, airborne operations, counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and covert operations among others. While the literature has mostly focused on the utility of major powers’ SOFs in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with little attention on Africa’s SOF’s, this paper examines the origins, evolution, composition, and deployments of Nigeria’s SOFs specifically in the Northeast, Northcentral, and Northwest theatres of operation, against the Boko Haram insurgency and armed banditry, respectively. Drawing on primary data from interviews with key informants and other secondary data sources, the paper interrogates the successes, challenges, and prospects of Nigeria’s SOFs. The strategic utility and overreliance on Nigeria’s SOFs by political leaders and the Military’s High Command puts a strain on their strategic value which potentially undermines their strategic efficacy as a force-multiplier in the long run, against unconventional threats.

Locating Counterinsurgency in Media on Kashmir in a Post-Neo-Liberal Framework

Using critical media theories of framing, propaganda and agenda-setting that intersect, the author attempts to unravel the links between counterinsurgency (COIN) and media in India-administered Kashmir against the backdrop of a post-neo-liberal framework as an example of hegemony armoured by coercion. The author will reframe COIN as a state response to a people’s movement for self-determination. An analysis of the effects of the post-neo-liberal framework on the governing class that enacts COIN strategies through the media will not only illuminate the machinations of the media but will also unravel its social and cultural effects and their role in perpetuating an unjust social order in a contested space. An examination of the roots of ethnonationalism will expose the media’s nexus with power and the nature of COIN operations through the media in Kashmir.

Operation Toba in Northeast Argentina: the spread of the State of Terror (1975–1977)

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how Argentine experience of internal repression was passed on to Paraguay as a result of the meetings between its intelligence services. The meetings were carried out by the military in the 1970s, aiming at joint operations of political persecution and extermination of the opponents of the dictatorships that prevailed in these two countries. The author analyzes documentation transmitted during the meeting called IIda Regional Bilateral Meeting of Intelligence between Paraguay and Argentina in 1978. Documentation reports to the Paraguayan military the strategies and tactics of war developed by the Argentine armed forces in the so-called Operation Toba. The importance of discussing Operation Toba is to demonstrate the similarity of the repressions that took place in other countries of the Southern Cone. The techniques and tactics used illustrate that such massacres have repressive synchrony and are consistent with a single internationalized process of repression. Although the repression called Operation Toba was developed only by the Argentine State, it demonstrates an international chain of repression, as well as the similarity in the modus operandi of the precepts of the widespread Counter-Revolutionary War Doctrine, developed by the French during the fighting in Indochina and Algeria in the 1950s.

American and Canadian engagements in the Afghanistan intervention: a neoclassical realist point of view

ABSTRACT In this article, I aim to explain why and how the United States and Canada adopted similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies between 2006 and 2011 to deal with the Afghan irregular warfare. During this time, the United States and Canada adopted with similar levels of intensity the “clear,” “hold,” and “build” COIN objectives; namely: (a) fighting against insurgency, (b) maintaining stabilized areas and training Afghan forces, and (c) helping reconstruct the absent, weak, or corrupt governance in Afghanistan. These similar engagement levels are surprising considering the periods between 2001 and 2005 and 2011 and 2014 when Canadian and American strategies were dissimilar as expected from their relative standing in the international system. I use a process-tracing methodology and neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy to unravel this puzzle.

Enforced Disappearances: A Major Human Rights Issue in Balochistan

Ever since Kalat rulers gave away the rule of their Kalat state comprising Balochistan, in the hands of Pakistan in 1948, the people of Balochistan have been demanding freedom and to declare it as an independent nation. Their demand slowly converted into a violent struggle and separatists resorted to insurgency, commonly known as ‘Baloch Insurgency’. Pakistan too resorted to counter insurgency, commonly known as ‘Pak Counter Insurgency.’ Pakistan adopted enforced disappearances as a major tool to suppress the violent struggle, by forcibly abducting family members of the suspect. The menace of enforced disappearance has now engulfed entire Balochistan province and no day goes without such acts of kidnapping, abduction, sexual assaults, killings and enforced disappearances, at some place or in some area of Balochistan. There is no end to such atrocities and genocide. There are severe violations of the human rights in the province. In the context, enforced disappearances of the people are a major human rights issue in Balochistan.

A counterinsurgent (COIN) framework to defend against consumer activists

A counterinsurgent (COIN) framework to defend against consumer activists

Networking the Counterrevolution: The École Supérieure de Guerre, Transnational Military Collaboration, and Cold War Counterinsurgency, 1955–1975

Abstract Over the past several decades, scholars have devoted considerable attention to tracing the influence of French counterinsurgency practices developed in Indochina and Algeria on other militaries during the Cold War. This article builds on that literature to offer an explanation for why French counterrevolutionary knowledge circulated so broadly, and to connect the French military more concretely to an emerging literature on anticommunist internationalism. At the center of French efforts, this article argues, stood the Army’s École Supérieure de Guerre (ESG) in Paris, which trained growing numbers of high-ranking foreign officers after 1945. The ESG taught counterrevolutionary warfare directly, but as this article argues, it also helped constitute an audience abroad for such ideas by cultivating affective bonds, strategic preferences, and personal connections over the longer term. In tracing the partnerships cultivated through the ESG in this period, this article also illustrates the broader entanglements between counterinsurgency, international military cooperation, and professionalization at midcentury. For military partners seeking to professionalize their own forces, the attractiveness of French doctrines lay as much in the easily accessible set of materials, training, and expertise the French military offered as in their capacity to combat subversion. By tracing the transnational networks of exchange knit together by military academies in this period, this article concludes, scholars can better historicize the rise of counterinsurgency as a key paradigm of cold warfare.