Counterattitudinal Arguments Research Articles

Confronting Core Issues: A Critical Assessment of Attitude Polarization Using Tailored Experiments

A long-standing debate in political psychology considers whether individuals update their beliefs and attitudes in the direction of evidence or grow more confident in their convictions when confronted with counter-attitudinal arguments. Though recent studies have shown that instances of the latter tendency, which scholars have termed attitude polarization and “belief backfire,” are rarely observed in settings involving hot-button issues or viral misinformation, we know surprisingly little about how participants respond to information targeting deeply held attitudes, a key condition for triggering attitude polarization. We develop a tailored experimental design that measures participants’ core issue positions and exposes them to personalized counter-attitudinal information using the large language model GPT-3. We find credible evidence of attitude polarization, but only when arguments are contentious and vitriolic. For lower valence counter-attitudinal arguments, attitude polarization is not detected. We conclude by discussing implications for the study of political cognition and the measurement of attitudes.

Biased political reasoning and relational inferences in a small-group deliberative context

Theorists of deliberative democracy envision a citizenry engaged in collective reasoning about public issues on the merits of rival arguments. Partisanship undermines this ideal when it causes people to discount counter-attitudinal arguments, independent of their quality. Empirical deliberative theory lacks an account for what mechanism mitigates this bias in small-group settings. To close that theoretical gap, this study draws on Relational Framing Theory and identifies a relational component of the reasoning process. Participants rated the relevance of dominance/submission and affiliation/disaffiliation relational frames after a small-group deliberation. This perception influenced participants’ decisions to endorse arguments as legitimate public reasons. Implications for deliberative theory, research, and practice are discussed.

Nudging Resisters Toward Change: Self-Persuasion Interventions for Reducing Attitude Certainty.

To identify effective self-persuasion protocols that could easily be adapted to face-to-face clinical sessions or health-related computer applications as a first step in breaking patient resistance. Two self-persuasion interventions were tested against 2 controls in a between-subject randomized control experiment. GuidedTrack-a web-based platform for social science experiments. Six hundred seventeen adult participants recruited via Mechanical Turk. The experimental interventions prompted participants for self-referenced pro- and counterattitudinal arguments to elicit attitude-related thought (ART) and subsequent doubt about the attitude. The hypothesis was that the self-persuasion interventions would elicit larger and more frequent attitude certainty decreases than the controls. In the experimental groups, we also predicted a correlation between the amount of ART and attitude certainty decreases. Changes in attitude certainty were measured by participants' pre- and post-ratio scale ratings; ART was measured by the number of words participants used to respond to the interventions. Analysis of variance (ANOVA), χ2, and correlation. A goodness-of-fit χ2 showed that the number of participants who decreased their attitude certainty was not equally distributed between the combined experimental groups (n = 104) and the combined control groups (n = 39), χ2(1, n = 143) = 28.64, P < .001. Within each intervention, goodness-of-fit χ2 with a Bonferroni correction ( P = .01 or .05/4) indicated there were significantly more "decreasers" than "increasers" in intervention 1, χ2(1, n = 86) = 6.16, P = .01, but not intervention 2, χ2(1, n = 84) = 2.02, P = .16, the nonsense control, χ2(1, n = 42) = .22, P = .64), or the distraction control, χ2(1, n = 34) = .02, P = .89. A 1-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for intervention on mean certainty change ( F3,613 = 4.62, P = .003). Five post hoc comparisons using Tukey's honest significant difference (HSD) test indicated that the mean decrease in attitude certainty resulting from intervention 1 (M = -3.29) was significantly larger than the mean decrease in attitude certainty resulting from the nonsense control (M = -0.62, t = -2.72, P = .03), the distraction control (M = 0.11, t = 3.48, P = .003), but not intervention 2 (M = -0.87, t = -2.54, P = .06). Attitude-related thought was significantly correlated with attitude certainty change in intervention 1, r(158) = -.17, t = -4.28, P = .02, but not intervention 2, r(161) = -.002, t = -.03, P = .98. The implication for clinical practitioners and designers of health applications is that it may be worthwhile to let patients elaborate on their personal reasons for initially forming an unhealthy attitude to increase doubt about the strongly held attitude.

Anxiety, Sophistication, and Resistance to Persuasion: Evidence from a Quasi‐Experimental Survey on Global Climate Change

Our contribution deals with the emotional and cognitive foundations of resistance to persuasive information. We rely on an original quasi‐experimental protocol that simulates the flow of information and the respondents' reactions to persuasive arguments on global climate change. Respondents in a representative sample (N = 604) were asked if they supported reduction of economic activity to reduce climate warming and were then provided, based on their support or disapproval for this first argument, with counterattitudinal arguments to test their resistance to persuasion. This article highlights that sophistication strengthens resistance to persuasion, whereas anxiety has a double effect: directly, it decreases resistance; indirectly, it interacts with political sophistication and makes sophisticates less likely to resist persuasion when facing arguments inconsistent with their previous beliefs. Nonanxious citizens, in turn, are more likely to resist persuasion when their political sophistication increases. We also provide evidence that the joint effect of anxiety and sophistication is moderated by the ideological identification of respondents.

Morningness–eveningness orientation and attitude change: Evidence for greater systematic processing and attitude change at optimal time-of-day

This study examines the relationship between morningness–eveningness orientation and time-of day on attitude change, and tests the hypothesis that people will be more persuaded when tested at their optimal time-of-day (i.e., morning for M-types and evening for E-types) than non-optimal time-of-day (i.e., evening for M-Types and morning for E-types). Two hundred and twenty participants read a message that contained either strong vs. weak quality counter-attitudinal arguments (anti-voluntary euthanasia) in the morning (9.00a.m.) or in the evening (7.00p.m.). When tested at their respective optimal time-of-day (for both M- and E-types) there was a reliable difference in attitude change between the strong vs. weak messages (indicating message processing had occurred) while there was no difference between strong vs. weak messages when tested at their non-optimal time-of-day. In addition, the amount of message-congruent thinking mediated the attitude change. The results show that M- and E-types pay greater attention to and elaborate on a persuasive message at their optimal time-of-day, and this leads to increased attitude change, compared to those tested at their non-optimal time-of-day.

Self-Affirmation through the Choice of Highly Aesthetic Products

Abstract Just as good looks bestow an unconscious “beauty premium” on people, high aesthetics bestows an unrecognized benefit on consumer goods. Specifically, choosing a product with good design affirms the consumer’s sense of self. Choice of a highly aesthetic product was compared with choice of products superior on other attributes including function, brand, and hedonics to show that only aesthetics influences a consumer’s personal values. In study 1 a prior self-affirming task leads to a decrease in choice share of a highly aesthetic option. Studies 2 and 3 mimic prior research on self-affirmation with, however, choice of a highly aesthetic product replacing a traditional self-affirmation manipulation. Choosing a product with good design resulted in increased openness to counter-attitudinal arguments and reduced propensity to escalate commitment toward a failing course of action. There are numerous implications of this form of self-affirmation, from public policy to retail therapy.

Reducing prejudice via cognitive dissonance: Individual differences in preference for consistency moderate the effects of counter-attitudinal advocacy

Individual differences in preference for consistency (PFC) and their interplay with situational variables were studied in relation to effects of counter-attitudinal advocacy on prejudice. German adults (N = 202) who initially had relatively high prejudice toward Turks generated counter-attitudinal arguments favoring integrated housing of Turks and Germans. Freedom of choice (low, high) and self-threat (low, high) were manipulated; PFC (low, high) was measured and used as a third independent variable. Control participants generated arguments on a neutral topic. Dependent variables were discomfort at integrated housing and generalized prejudice toward Turks. Results showed that PFC moderated effects of choice and self-threat: Discomfort and prejudice were lowest for high-PFC participants who had generated counter-attitudinal arguments under high choice and high self-threat.

Tell me more: The effects of expressed interest on receptiveness during dialog

Two studies investigated the effect of expressed interest on individuals’ openness to opposing viewpoints and perceptions of debate counterparts. Participants in Study 1 engaged in an online conversation with a purported debate counterpart who did or did not express interest in the participants’ viewpoint by asking an elaboration question—that is, a question geared at soliciting additional information. Compared to control participants, participants who received a question rated their debate counterpart more favorably, were more willing to engage in future interaction with their counterpart, and acted in a more receptive manner. Study 2 tested the effects of instructions to prepare elaboration questions on listeners’ responses to a speaker offering counter-attitudinal arguments. Preparing questions caused participants to be more open to the idea of having a conversation with the speaker, to make more positive attributions about typical proponents of the speaker’s viewpoint, and to judge the conclusions of the speech as more valid. Theoretical and practical implications of this research are discussed.

The Effects of Causal Uncertainty, Causal Importance, and Initial Attitude on Attention to Causal Persuasive Arguments

In two studies, we examined how individual differences in causal uncertainty (CU), causal importance (CI), and initial attitudes affected the processing of a persuasive message that contained causal or non–causal arguments. We predicted that high CU individuals’ doubts about their causal understanding of events would be activated when they were presented with counterattitudinal arguments. When these individuals also placed a high value on causal understanding (high CI), they should scrutinize any available causal explanations. As a result, they should be more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. In support of these predictions, we found in two studies that high CU/high CI participants were more persuaded by strong compared to weak counterattitudinal causal arguments. Mediational analyses in Study 2 revealed that high CU/high CI participants were more persuaded by strong causal arguments because they were more confident in them. Implications for the CU model and persuasion processes are discussed. Social psychologists long have been interested in how people understand the causes of events in the social world. Early attribution theorists argued that in order to predict and control their social environments, people attribute behavior and events to stable, underlying causes (Heider, 1958). This early work and subsequent research has provided us with a wealth of information about attribution processes (for a review see Gilbert, 1998) and the critical role they play in many different domains.

Morningness–eveningness orientation, optimal time-of-day and attitude change: Evidence for the systematic processing of a persuasive communication

This study investigates the effects of morningness–eveningness orientation and time-of-day on persuasion. In an attitude change paradigm, 120 female participants read a persuasive message that consisted of six counter-attitudinal arguments (anti-voluntary euthanasia) either in the morning (8:30 a.m.) or in the evening (7:00 p.m.). Attitude change was assessed by measuring attitudes towards the target issue before and after exposure to the message. Message processing was assessed by thought-listing and message recall tasks. Self-reported mood and arousal were monitored throughout. Participants were classified into M- and E-types according to their scores on the Horne and Östberg (1976) MEQ questionnaire. When tested at their respective optimal time-of-day (i.e., morning for M-types/evening for E-types), M- and E-types reported higher energetic arousal, greater agreement with the message, greater message-congruent thinking, and a propensity for superior message recall compared to M- and E-types tested at their nonoptimal time-of-day (i.e., evening for M-types/morning for E-types). The attitude change in those tested at their optimal time-of-day was mediated by the level of message-congruent thinking. Results are interpreted in terms of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion.

Perceptions of Entitativity and Attitude Change

The current work explored the properties of groups that lead them to be persuasive and the processes through which such persuasion occurs. Because more entitative groups induce greater levels of information processing, their arguments should receive greater elaboration, leading to persuasion when members of groups present strong (vs. weak) counter attitudinal arguments. Experiment 1 explored these hypotheses by examining if idiosyncratic perceptions of group entitativity and manipulations of argument strength affect attitude change and argument elaboration. Experiment 2 experimentally manipulated group entitativity and argument strength independently to examine the causal relationship between entitativity, attitude change, and argument elaboration. In both experiments, it was found that groups greater in entitativity were more persuasive when presenting strong (vs. weak) arguments and induced greater argument elaboration. Implications for our understanding of entitativity, persuasion, and information processing about social groups are discussed.

Changement d'attitude et fausse attribution : effet de la centration sur le comportement de soumission

Résumé Dans le paradigme de la soumission forcée (ou de la soumission induite), les sujets réduisent classiquement leur dissonance en modifiant leur attitude dans le sens d'une rationalisation du comportement de soumission. On sait toutefois qu'un tel changement d'attitude n'est pas systématiquement observé. Il n'est plus observé notamment en présence d'une source de fausse attribution (effet de fausse attribution). Les deux expériences rapportées montrent qu'il suffit de recentrer les sujets sur leur comportement de soumission pour retrouver le changement d'attitude. Dans la première expérience, les sujets sont conduits à rédiger un essai contraire à leur conviction en présence d'une source de fausse attribution (ultrasons) ou en son absence (sans ultrasons). La moitié des sujets sont invités à lire leur essai et à comptabiliser les arguments qu'il contient (avec centration), l'autre pas (sans centration). Comme attendu les sujets de la situation ultrasons/centration rationalisent leur comportement de soumission contrairement aux sujets de la situation ultrason / sans centration. La seconde expérience montre que c'est le dénombrement des arguments qui est le facteur déterminant. Mots clés : fausse attribution, dissonance, centration, soumission forcée, changement d'attitude.

An affirmed self and an open mind: Self-affirmation and sensitivity to argument strength

Self-affirmation seems to enable an individual to objectively evaluate information that would otherwise evoke a defensive reaction. If this objectivity reflects freedom from self-evaluative concerns, affirmation should sensitize people to central cues of a persuasive message, like argument strength. If affirmation simply induces agreeableness or trivializes the issue, affirmed participants should not particularly heed argument strength. Affirmed and non-affirmed participants rated the persuasiveness of pro- and counterattitudinal arguments that varied in strength. Among participants who rated their attitudes as personally important, self-affirmation decreased bias and increased sensitivity to argument strength, as predicted by self-affirmation theory.

On the Risks of Recycling Because of Guilt: An Examination of the Consequences of Introjection1

The present study sought to examine the influence of introjected beliefs on individuals’ vulnerability to counterattitudinal arguments. University students’ reasons for engaging in proenvironmental behaviors were assessed prior to their reading excerpts from a counterattitudinal article. The excerpts were written by a personally attractive or unattractive author and contained either weak or strong arguments against recycling. Our results show that individuals who were highly introjected about recycling (e.g., “I recycle because I would feel guilty if I didn't”) were influenced by the personal attractiveness of the source but not by the strength of the specific arguments. Specifically, a thought‐listing procedure revealed that introjection was associated with generating more favorable thoughts and fewer counterarguments about the anti‐recycling message when the author was personally attractive than when he was unattractive.

Desire for control and reaction to proattitudinal and counterattitudinal arguments

The role of motivation for control in an individual's reaction to persuasive arguments was examined. Subjects scoring either high or low on an individual difference measure of “desire for control” (DC) were exposed to a position on the Equal Rights Amendment with which they either initially agreed or disagreed. It was found that more often high-DC subjects exposed to a proattitudinal message changed their attitudes in the direction advocated than did low DC subjects. Conversely, more often low-DC subjects exposed to counterattitudinal arguments changed their attitudes in the direction of the advocated position than did high-DC subjects. The findings suggest that a motivation to control events may be operative in some attitude-change situations.

THE ROLE OF BIASED SCANNING IN COUNTERATTITUDINAL ADVOCACY

Two experiments tested the biased-scanning hypothesis that high financial inducement leads to greater cognitive contact with counterattitudinal arguments and thus to greater attitude change. In Experiment I, given time to listen to only half of the pro- and counterattitudinal material, role-players attended primarily to counterattitudinal arguments. In Experiment II, given sufficient time to listen to all material, role-players sought out pro-attitudinal material first, regardless of inducement. No differences in biased scanning or attitude change were observed as a function of financial inducement. Contrary to the “open-mindedness” formulation, results were interpreted in the framework of reactance and of self-immunization to persuasion.