Abstract
Theorists of deliberative democracy envision a citizenry engaged in collective reasoning about public issues on the merits of rival arguments. Partisanship undermines this ideal when it causes people to discount counter-attitudinal arguments, independent of their quality. Empirical deliberative theory lacks an account for what mechanism mitigates this bias in small-group settings. To close that theoretical gap, this study draws on Relational Framing Theory and identifies a relational component of the reasoning process. Participants rated the relevance of dominance/submission and affiliation/disaffiliation relational frames after a small-group deliberation. This perception influenced participants’ decisions to endorse arguments as legitimate public reasons. Implications for deliberative theory, research, and practice are discussed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
