It has been a long time since the international community was united and confident in its handling of complex, human-made emergencies. The generally acknowledged success of the military response to Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and of peacekeeping operations such as those in Cambodia, Namibia, and Mozambique in the early 1990s, gave way to the debacle of the international in Somalia in 1992-1993; the pathetically inadequate response to genocide in Rwanda in 1994; and the utter inability of the UN presence to prevent the murderous ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica in 1995. NATO's in Kosovo in 1999 brought matters to an intensely controversial head. Security Council members were divided; the justification for military action without new council authority was asserted but largely unargued; the moral or justification for the action, on the face of it much stronger, was clouded by allegations that the triggered more carnage than it averted; and the means by which the NATO allies waged the war continue, justly or not, to be much criticized. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan defined the problem in the starkest and clearest terms in his address to the General Assembly in September 1999, going so far as to suggest that the classical concept of state may have to yield in some circumstances to the sovereignty of the individual: If is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica--to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? ... But surely no principle--not even sovereignty--can ever shield crimes against humanity.... Armed must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder, it is an option that cannot be relinquished. [1] He described the unfinished political business in these terms: It is essential that the international community reach consensus--not only on the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place, but also on ways of deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom. [2] The immediate response to the secretary-general's challenge was a General Assembly debate, which, perhaps unsurprisingly, revealed more division than emerging consensus. Those delegates who chose to emphasize the virtues of either intervention, on the one hand, or the protection of state sovereignty, on the other, far outnumbered those seeking to find a workable accommodation between the two concepts. Disappointing as this initial response may have been, a number of efforts have since been made by governments--as well as academics, who continue to make voluminous, and often very helpful, contributions to the debate--to initiate a more systematic discussion of the issues at stake. The United Kingdom, for example, has produced a paper recommending specific criteria to guide the Security Council in its deliberations on intervention. [3] In the public arena, the most prominent and important of the early government responses to the secretary-general's challenge have been the studies commissioned by Denmark, through the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI); [4] the Netherlands, through its Advisory Council on International Affairs; [5] and Sweden, through its International Commission on Kosovo, chaired by Richard Goldstone and Carl Tham. [6] In one way or another, all have retained the terminology of humanitarian intervention and argued for a distinction to be drawn between legal and legitimate interventions. The New International Commission There was still, however, an evident need for the issues to be addressed in some way that recognized the starkness of the divisions--essentially, between North and South--evident on the floor of the General Assembly, and for some effort to be made to bridge them, not only intellectually but politically. …
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