GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE LOCATION OF COTTON PRODUCTION William H. Bailey Geographers who seek an understanding of the arrangement of agricultural land use should be aware of the influence of government policy on farmers' decisions. Recent changes in federal cotton policy have been closely associated with significant changes in the distribution of cotton production in the United States. Two weaknesses of federal cotton production-control programs have long been recognized : 1) hindrance of expansion of cotton production in areas better suited to produce the crop under emerging market and technological conditions; and 2) subsidization of cotton production in marginal areas. (1) Changes in federal cotton policy since the mid-1960s, however , removed these obstacles and accelerated the relocation of cotton production from marginal to more optimal growing areas. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between locational shifts in cotton farming and certain key provisions of federal cotton programs in effect since 1966. BACKGROUND. The federal government began purchasing surplus cotton in 1929 to relieve cotton producers of the debilitating effects of cyclic fluctuations in cotton prices and output levels. (2) A huge cotton surplus mounted, however, because of decreasing demand and increased production fostered by relatively high guaranteed price supports . Surplus needed prevention. The government assumed responsibility for the economic survival of American cotton farmers with the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of the 1930s and retained this burden until recently. Two persistent features of cotton programs have been: 1) acreage allotments and marketing quotas to restrict the volume of output in order to increase the market price of cotton, and 2) price support subsidies in the form of Dr. Bailey is Assistant Professor of Geography at Eastern Kentucky University in Richmond, Kentucky 40475. 94Southeastern Geographer direct payments and Commodity Credit Corporation ( CCC ) purchases to insure income stability for cotton farmers. Assignment of allotments and quotas to farms according to production history fixed the locations of production. (3) This practice was a barrier to the expansion of individual cotton operations and to the opening of new areas. (4) Although limited expansion and relocation of production occurred in years when restrictions were relaxed, or when loopholes were enacted into the law, the controls hindered changes otherwise warranted by changing market conditions and technology. Chief among the changes in market conditions have been increasing production costs and greater competition from foreign cotton and synthetic fibers. (5) Technological progress in cotton production has favored production in areas suited to large scale operations employing large machines. Before 1966 the major loophole permitting relocation of cotton allotments was the "release and reapportionment" provision begun in 1960. Allotment holders no longer producing cotton could release their allotments annually for reapportionment to growers requesting more production allocations, but this provision by no means resulted in the needed redistribution of allotments. Released allotments were made available first to growers within the county where the release originated . Surplus released allotments in a county were surrendered to the state for reapportionment among farmers requesting them in other counties. There was little chance that a grower would receive an adequate allotment for significant acreage expansion because reapportioned allotments were divided equally among growers requesting them. The only competitive advantage was shared by growers in major release counties. Although many of these growers managed marginal operations compared to those in other regions where releases were slight, they were able to keep cotton "at home" as long as they were given first pick of released allotments and were able to expand their operations. The "neotenant" described by Prunty and Aiken operated in this manner. (6) Released allotments were annually returned to the control of the original holder, who decided whether to retain or to release the allotment during the next year. The stage was set for a new federal cotton policy to remove locational constraints on cotton production in areas where cotton can be produced most efficiently. (7) By 1966, a combination of factors threatened the United States cotton industry: Vol. XVIII, No. 2 95 1)16 million bales of surplus cotton, of which 14.5 million bales were government owned through CCC purchases; 2)high price supports which fostered production of the surplus and raised the ire of taxpayers; 3...
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