For almost two decades, a prevailing view has been that business turnaround processes should match the strategic or operating nature of the underlying problems. Based on their study of textile firms (Robbins and Pearce, 1992), Pearce and Robbins (1993) questioned this view, offering a model that suggests that retrenchment is a desirable initial response, regardless of the types of problems faced. This article describes a test of the Pearce/Robbins view that examined the value of retrenchment following the acquisition of 46 distressed firms. The present study, thus, extended the Pearce/Robbins findings and conclusions beyond the independent business focus of their own work to the postacquisition context. An empirical study of 46 distressed and recently acquired firms revealed no retrenchment effects of performance (p = 0.7027), although two other types of actions: (1) capital infusion; and (2) integration, did influence performance (p = 0.0198 and p = 0.0860, respectively). A negative interaction of degree of decline and capital infusion on performance was found also (p = 0.0564). The implications of these findings are discussed. Because no significant retrenchment effect was found, this raises questions about the generalizability of the Pearce/Robbins conclusions. Specifically, this study showed that retrenchment may not be a universally desirable stage in the business turnaround process because retrenchment did not seem beneficial following the acquisition of distressed firms. Therefore, this study identified a potential bound to the generalizability of the conclusions resulting from the Robbins and Pearce (1992) study. Although their conclusions may be valid for independent businesses, they may not apply to businesses recently acquired by other firms. A primary implication, therefore, is that the desirability of particular turnaround actions or processes may vary from one context to another. Furthermore, the present study found that, in the postacquisition context, efforts by corporate parents to facilitate turnaround by infusing capital into the distressed firms actually resulted in worse performance. In contrast, efforts to integrate distressed firm assets into other businesses within the parents' corporate portfolios proved to be beneficial.