Industrial Espionage Research Articles

Prosecuting Foreign States

In recent years, the Department of Justice has shown increased interest in prosecuting entities associated with foreign states for activities including cybercrime, economic espionage, and sanctions violations. It has also sought third-party evidence from foreign state-owned entities in connection with high-profile criminal investigations, including the Mueller investigation. These actions raise fundamental questions about the immunities of foreign states and state-owned entities from U.S. criminal proceedings. This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of—and answer to—these basic questions. In doing so, it upends the widespread but misleading perception that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) provides the sole basis for exercising jurisdiction over foreign states in every context. The better view is that the FSIA neither authorizes nor prohibits criminal proceedings. Until Congress enacts appropriate legislation, claims to immunity from such proceedings will remain a matter of common law. The common law of foreign state immunity from criminal proceedings warrants legislative attention. First, Congress can and should make explicit that the FSIA only governs civil proceedings. Second, it should clarify that state-owned enterprises are not entitled to blanket immunity from criminal proceedings simply because they are majority-owned by foreign states. Misapplying the FSIA’s expansive definition of “foreign state” to preclude criminal proceedings can impede the effective investigation and prosecution of foreign corporations whose activities have a significant impact in the United States, and that international law does not necessarily view as entitled to immunity. The default position should be that foreign state-owned companies are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts, at least with respect to their commercial activities.

Are hotel managers taught to be aggressive in intelligence gathering?

The study examines the ontological similarity between the concept of competitor orientation and questionable intelligence-gathering efforts. Respondents from the hotel industry were surveyed with self-administered questionnaires. Exploratory factor analysis was carried out to identify the structure underlying variables of market orientation and ethical judgment on questionable intelligence-gathering efforts. The results suggest that the surveyed hotel managers are unable to distinguish the legitimate tactics of competitor orientation from the questionable practice of industrial espionage.

CORPORATE CYBERESPIONAGE: IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTION PART 2

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to present an argument for a methodology to detect and prevent cyber-based corporate espionage. The focus of this paper will be on the human domain and how it affects control measures in the electronic and physical domain of cybersecurity. The reason for this approach is because the human domain has consistently been identified as the irrational and unpredictable component in cybersecurity. Human actions, when related to cyber-based corporate espionage, cannot be described through rudimentary factors supporting causation for “betrayal” and the motivation to compromise proprietary technology and economic information belonging to a business entrusting its secrets with an employee. The underlying issue is about how to identify a potential actor willing to compromise their “integrity” in exchange for personal gain or personal interest even when the penalty will be far greater than the reward. The next step is to propose preventative measures to either dissuade such behavior or expose a threat actor intending to compromise a corporation’s information assets.

The Economic and Innovation Impacts of Trade Secrets

Trade Secrets are a flexible innovation tool that are used across sectors and types of firms. This report summarises and critiques the publicly available academic and grey economic literature on trade secrets and highlights key innovation aspects. Developed for the UK Intellectual Property Office as a research paper, the report finds that Trade secrets can both enable or hinder innovation. Other key points: Trade secrets are particularly important to UK firms in the R&D services, tech, and across manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. Larger firms rely on trade secrets more than smaller firms. Trade secrets can be highly valuable firm assets, although most trade secrets are not. Firms choose trade secrets to maintain a competitive advantage by avoiding the disclosure associated with other types of IPR. However, trade secrets are vulnerable to reverse engineering and misappropriation or theft. Cybertheft and economic espionage are increasing concerns. Trade secrets serve as a substitute or complement to patents. Most trade secrets cover non-patentable innovation such as marketing and organisational innovations. Trade secrets support innovation but also restrict knowledge flows and labour mobility. Stronger policy benefits existing trade secrets holders and encourages investment in R&D, yet reduces future innovation and creates barriers to entry. However, many questions remain and the empirical evidence base for trade secrecy is weak. This report finds that further work is needed to develop an evidence base for trade secrets, and that exploration of key themes such as the interaction of trade secrets with patentability could better inform policy.

Case study: A different face of the rules of evidende of U.S. in the economic espionage trials

Case study: A different face of the rules of evidende of U.S. in the economic espionage trials

Privacy Issues in Cyberspace: An Indian Perspective

Cyber privacy is controversial and as yet unresolved question in legal jurisprudence all around the world. In the new millennium, the present universe is encompassed by the power of new mantra namely ‘Information Technology’. The sempiternity of knowledge in the lap of ‘Information and Communication Technology Revolution’ has staggeringly brought the privacy of individuals into the forefront of the Jurisprudential consciousness. To what degree citizens of democratic nations would be willing to surrender their sensitive information is debatable. However, it is the responsibility of legal domain to prepare an adequate policy for the protection of privacy on the internet form cyber snooping, cyberstalking, corporate espionage, devasting cyber-attacks and website defacement. The computerization of society has important and possibly unsettling implications that invite a re-examination of the privacy in cyber world. This article has focused on the (i) Analysis of the novice modes of the tarnishing privacy in cyberspace in India and (ii) Legal control mechanism to combat commission of crimes.

CORPORATE CYBERESPIONAGE: IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTION PART 1

The purpose of this paper is to present an argument for a methodology to detect and prevent cyber-based corporate espionage. The focus of this paper will be on the human domain and how it affects control measures in the electronic and physical domain of cybersecurity. The reason for this approach is because the human domain has consistently been identified as the irrational and unpredictable component in cybersecurity. Human actions, when related to cyber-based corporate espionage, cannot be described through rudimentary factors supporting causation for “betrayal” and the motivation to compromise proprietary technology and economic information belonging to a business entrusting its secrets with an employee. The underlying issue is about how to identify a potential actor willing to compromise their “integrity” in exchange for personal gain or personal interest even when the penalty will be far greater than the reward. The next step is to propose preventative measures to either dissuade such behavior or expose a threat actor intending to compromise a corporation’s information assets.

Industrial espionage – A systematic literature review (SLR)

Industrial Espionage (IE) is an umbrella term covering a complicated range of activities performed to gain competitive advantages, resulting in a huge amount of financial loss annually. Currently, techniques generated by rapid developments of Internet of Things (IOTs) and Data Science are enabling a massive increase of both frequency and power of IE related activities in our increasingly challenging global commercial environment. Thus, an in-depth understanding of IE is necessary. In this paper, we report a comprehensive Systematic Literature Review (SLR) of current English literature on IE. Particularly, we systematically: i) identify key features of IE by analysing its current definitions, and coin our own working definition; ii) discuss the current state of research on IE from different academic disciplines; iii) highlight some key challenges in the current state of research on IE; and iv) identify some possible trends in its future development. Further, based on our findings, we call for more multi-disciplinary/multi-agency research on IE in order to construct a comprehensive framework to combat IE.

Economic Outcomes of Corporate Espionage

Economic Outcomes of Corporate Espionage

CUMHURİYET’İN İLK YILLARINDA ADANA’DAKİ İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT YUVASI: GİLODO NEBATİ YAĞ VE SABUN FABRİKASI

Öz: Rusya’dan Wrangel Ordusu ile gelen ve bu orduda subay olan S.Rafael Gilodo, Mütareke sırasında İstanbul’da İngiliz istihbaratının Beyoğlu ve Kadıköy kısımlarını idare eden Rus Yahudilerindendir. 1924 yılında kardeşi ile birlikte İstanbul’dan Adana’ya gelerek bir süre pamuk ticareti yapmıştır. Adana’ya gelişinden bir yıl sonra İngiltere’den getirdiği makinelerle kendi ismini taşıyan fabrikasını kurmuştur. Fabrika kendi ismini taşımakla birlikte, sermayesi ve idaresi tamamıyla İngilizlerin kontrolündedir. Elindeki maddi imkânlarla ve bazı memurların da desteği ile kısa sürede büyüyen bu fabrika, kuşkulu yabancılarla temasta olan bir yabancı istihbarat yuvası hâline gelmiştir. Fabrika; Adana’da İngilizlerin istihbarat yuvası olduğu, askerî, siyasî ve iktisadi casuslukla meşgul olduğu ihbarı ile emniyet tarafından denetim ve gözetim altına alınmıştır. Fabrikada çalışan tüm üst düzey idareci ve çalışanların, bütün hareket ve faaliyetlerinin takibi yapılmıştır. Bu kapsamda; fabrika dışındaki seyahat ve temasları kontrol altında tutularak casusluklarını ispatlayabilecek tüm şüphe çeken davranış ve vaziyetleri rapor hâline getirilerek Dahiliye Vekâletine bildirilmiştir. Adana’da pamukçuluğu öldürmeyi hedefleyen çalışmaların yanı sıra Yahudi işleri ile alakadar oldukları, Filistin’e gidecek Alman Yahudilerine her hususta yardımcı oldukları tespit edilmiştir. İşte bu çalışmada; Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivinde 11312-36numaralı dosyada kayıtlı bulunan belgeler ve takip raporları değerlendirilecektir. Abstract: S. Rafael Gilado, who came from Russia with the Wrangel Army and was the Officer in this Army, is one of the Russian Jews who administered the Beyoğlu and Kadiköy sections of British Intelligence in Istanbul during the Armistice. In 1924, he came to Adana from Istanbul with his brother and traded for a while. A year after his arrival in Adana, he established his own factory (by his name) with the machines he brought from England. Besides the factory carries his own name, its fund and administration are completely under the control of the British. This factory, which has grown in a short time with the financial possibilities, it has and the support of some officers has become a foreign intelligence center that is in contact with suspicious foreigners. The factory was taken under control and surveillance by the police with the notice of the British were an intelligence center in Adana and were engaged in military, political and economic espionage. All movements and activities of all senior administrators and employees working at the factory were followed. Within this scope; By keeping the travel and contacts outside the factory under control, all suspicious behaviors and situations that could prove their spying were reported and informed to the ministry of interior In addition to its efforts aimed at killing cotton in Adana, it has been determined that they are interested in Jewish affairs and they help German Jews who will go to Palestine in every respect. Here in this study; Documents and follow-up reports recorded in the file number 11312-36 in the Archives of the Police headquarters will be evaluated.

Industrial espionage revisited: Host country–foreign multinational corporation legal disputes and the postcolonial imagery

In this article, we take a postcolonial management approach to exploring the lingering significance of postcolonial imagery in shaping legal disputes between host country and foreign multinational corporations. We apply a critical discourse analysis to the Korea versus Orbotech industrial espionage lawsuit, in which the Korean government accused a foreign multinational corporation of leaking its ‘national core technology’. Through this analysis we demonstrate how industrial espionage discourse was used to fight Korea’s negative reputation as a technological imitator, associate Korea with global technological leaders, and disassociate itself from other ‘imitators’. In response, Orbotech’s industrial espionage discourse has aimed to reproduce Korea’s imitator stigma. Our findings highlight the continual role of the imagined North/South and West/rest symbolic boundaries in constructing global business hierarchies even when the marginalized party—Korea—has already moved to the elite economies club. While international management studies rarely address industrial espionage beyond its technical meaning, we underline the embeddedness of industrial espionage as a discourse in maintaining and disrupting the geopolitical business landscape.

The Rise of Industrial Espionage and How to Prevent It

Innovations in digital technology are progressing at an unprecedented rate, and countries and all types of actors are capitalizing on these advancements. Moreover, if first adopters can obtain the digital technology without spending the lengthy time and ample funds for research and development of it, but rather through industrial espionage, this gives countries the potential global advantage without the costs. Included are further details on the rise of industrial espionage, its key issues, and effects on the internet and network security, the applicable hacking attacks and countermeasures, and major predictions and future issues.

Corporate intelligence: modern view and development trends

Corporate intelligence — this term has only recently appeared in our country, but it is already widely used in business. And even managed to acquire stereotypes: some consider corporate intelligence analogous to industrial espionage, others imagine it as a game of office workers in « James Bond», and the rest do not understand why it is needed in the enterprise. Corporate intelligence specialists analyze available information and check all market sources in order to make an assessment of all possible threats and risks to the business.

Cyber Threat Actors for the Factory of the Future

The increasing degree of connectivity in factory of the future (FoF) environments, with systems that were never designed for a networked environment in terms of their technical security nature, is accompanied by a number of security risks that must be considered. This leads to the necessity of relying on risk assessment-based approaches to reach a sufficiently mature cyber security management level. However, the lack of common definitions of cyber threat actors (CTA) poses challenges in untested environments such as the FoF. This paper analyses policy papers and reports from expert organizations to identify common definitions of CTAs. A significant consensus exists only on two common CTAs, while other CTAs are often either ignored or overestimated in their importance. The identified motivations of CTAs are contrasted with the specific characteristics of FoF environments to determine the most likely CTAs targeting FoF environments. Special emphasis is given to corporate competitors, as FoF environments probably provide better opportunities than ever for industrial espionage if they are not sufficiently secured. In this context, the study aims to draw attention to the research gaps in this area.

Intellectual property right infringement, state involvement in industrial espionage, and North-South trade

Abstracts Despite the recent trade war triggered largely by Chinese firms’ intellectual property infringement, the literature on the role of state-sponsored industrial espionage in the trade war is limited. To explore this, we construct an endogenous choice game where a South government chooses whether to support a domestic firm’s industrial espionage while a North government chooses whether to retaliate with a tariff. The main finding shows that cooperation between countries (no infringement/no tariff) leads to a higher level of social welfare than under a trade war. In addition, cooperation is more stable when the South government has a stronger tendency to support its domestic firm’s intellectual property infringement. However, the cooperation becomes less stable as the technology gap between the countries narrows. Our findings help predict that the ongoing trade war between the United States and China will continue if China narrows the technology gap.

ЕКОНОМІЧНИЙ СКЛАДНИК СТРАТЕГІЙ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ РОЗВИНУТИХ КРАЇН

The article provides a comparative analysis of the structure and content of strategic documents governing the national security of developed countries. It has been identified that national security strategies focus on military, political and defense components. Given the urgent need to address food security, achieving sustainable economic growth and sustainable development is increasingly being addressed by economic security. This leads to an increase in the development of strategic and programmatic documents in developed countries. Contradictory trends of changing time periods for the adoption of national security strategies have been identified. This is a manifestation of the growing timing of approved strategies (long-term). However, with the growing uncertainty of the global economic environment, there is a permanent review of strategic documents and their updating. The differentiation of economic development strategies through the specifics of the national economy and the security environment has been proved. Over time, strategies have become increasingly homogeneous due to the increased impact of global determinants of economic security common to all countries. The processes of informatization and digitization are increasingly affecting the economic development and security of countries, which is taken into account when developing national strategies. Most developed countries are implementing cyber security or digital security strategies. Due to the influence of stronger leaders, the degree of uniformity of strategies and programs is increasing. The threats to economic security in the form of unfair competition, economic espionage, food security, information security of national companies, investment danger, transnational terrorism, trade imbalances have been identified. It is determined that the geopolitical and geo-economic position of the countries influences the content of national security strategies in terms of its economic component. Developed countries that play a systemic role in the world economy link the prospects of implementing security strategies with the need to build a new international economic order in which they seek to participate actively.

China's Pursuit of Cyberpower

China's Pursuit of Cyberpower Adam Segal (bio) China is one of the most active cyberspace players in the Asia-Pacific, developing and deploying cyber capacities in pursuit of its economic, political, and strategic objectives. Chinese computer network operations are conducted to strengthen the competitiveness of China's economy, accelerate the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), weaken opponents of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), resist international pressure and foreign ideas, and offset U.S. dominance in conventional military capabilities.1 Beijing is also aggressively supporting the indigenous innovation of emerging technologies that will give it new capabilities in cyberspace, especially 5G, artificial intelligence, and quantum information systems. Although Western governments often dismiss comments from Chinese foreign ministry officials declaring China the world's biggest victim in cyberspace as distractions and diversions, Chinese officials do in fact see their cybersecurity as weak relative to the degree of threat and the capabilities they perceive from potential adversaries, the United States in particular.2 As the July 2019 defense white paper puts it, "Cybersecurity remains a global challenge and poses a severe threat to China."3 Perhaps the clearest evidence that the leadership sees China's situation as precarious is the speed with which it has addressed what it sees as two major sources of weakness: an underdeveloped cybersecurity regulatory framework and widespread dependence on foreign technology in critical networks. Over the last five years, China has rapidly developed new cybersecurity institutions, laws, guidelines, and standards and has moved to replace foreign suppliers with domestic counterparts. [End Page 60] Both Chinese capabilities and vulnerabilities are likely to increase in the next five years. This combination of strengths and weaknesses means that China is primarily a cyberespionage threat to the Asia-Pacific. While the potential for Beijing to use more disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against an adversary in a regional conflict is high, especially against command-and-control systems, CCP leaders are likely cognizant that China is vulnerable to similar attacks. This essay introduces the range of Chinese cyberoperations and the organizational structure that supports and conducts them. It also highlights significant weaknesses in Chinese cyberdefenses, such as an underdeveloped cybersecurity industry and lack of investment and expertise. The essay concludes that the combination of the Chinese economy becoming more reliant on information and communications technologies and the PLA becoming more dependent on digital systems has resulted in Chinese leaders becoming more sensitive to China's vulnerability to cyberattacks. China's Cyberattacks The vast majority of computer attacks originating from China have targeted private-sector companies in an effort to steal intellectual property, trade secrets, and other information that could help China become more economically competitive. President Xi Jinping set a goal for China to become a "world-leading" science and technology power by 2049, and the country has significantly ramped up spending on research and development; expanded enrollment in science, technology, engineering, and mathematic disciplines at universities; and pushed specialized industrial strategies in emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum research, and next-generation communication technologies. China has also, however, directed cyber industrial espionage at high-technology and advanced manufacturing companies in the United States, Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia.4 Hackers have reportedly targeted the negotiation strategies and financial information of firms in the energy, banking, law, and pharmaceutical sectors. In an operation known as Cloud [End Page 61] Hopper, Chinese hackers, allegedly from the Ministry of State Security, breached at least a dozen cloud providers over several years, which allowed them access to data from hundreds of companies.5 The damage this theft inflicted on the victims' economies, or, conversely, how much it helped China's economy, is unknown. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence estimated in November 2015, however, that all cyber-enabled economic espionage, not just Chinese activity, costs the U.S. economy $400 billion per year.6 State-supported hackers also use cyberattacks to steal military secrets to accelerate the PLA's modernization and gather political information on agencies, institutions, and individuals that might have an impact on Beijing's foreign policy or threaten domestic stability. While Andrea and Marco Gilli have argued that the complexity of modern weapon systems makes it...

Economic Cyber Espionage: A Threat to U.S. National Security and Violation of International Law

In this Article, I consider the problem of economic cyber espionage that targets the intellectual property of global corporations. The core claim of the article is that the TRIPS agreement, which is the World Trade Organization agreement dealing with intellectual property, should be interpreted to contain norms against economic cyber espionage. Doing so would permit Member States recourse to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body to assert claims of economic cyber espionage. I therefore argue that the WTO is the most effective institution to ensure compliance with norms against economic cyber espionage.

Market Must Be Defended: The Role of Counter-Espionage Policy in Maximizing Domestic Market Welfare

Countering economic espionage is becoming one of the priorities of the governments of advanced economies. The present paper takes a step forward in the theoretical analysis of the interaction between economic espionage and counter-espionage by focusing on the case of a market opened to international trade. This analysis represents a first approximation to an inquiry into the rationale for the influence of the market level of competition on the dynamics of such interaction. The results suggest that this influence is complex in the case of the effort exerted in economic espionage and the characteristics of market demand play an important role in it. In the case of the counter-espionage policy, concerned about the domestic welfare generated by the market, it is shown that the level of competition has a negative effect on the effort exerted in it, regardless of the characteristics of market demand and the espionage effort behavior.

ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATS AND ITS ROLE IN NETWORK SECURITY VULNERABILITIES

: The paper presents an overview of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), and its core concepts, life cycle and characteristic features. In addition, the key factors; actors, targets and motives of an APT were highlighted in detail. The critical challenges currently facing organizations due to APT attacks on its systems, networks and IT infrastructure were critically examined. Lastly, the potential strategies for mitigating APTs were identified and highlighted. The findings demonstrated that an APT is a series of long term, covert and persistent cyber threats that target, penetrate and exploit organizations, businesses or states to acquire valuable proprietary (industrial espionage) data or political reasons (activism) resulting in losses of over USD$500 Billion annually. Consequently, the prevalence and sophistication of APTs have soared astronomically accounting for 39% of all cyber-attacks on computer networks. Furthermore, the potential damage from APTs is responsible for 60-65% downtime, network disruption, and financial losses. Hence, the potentially damaging effects of APTs, has prompted various organizations to invest in cyber security programs and other mitigation strategies to timely detect, prevent and eradicate future APT attacks. The paper reveals that APTs can be mitigated by deploying computer analytics, network security mechanisms such as the “defense in depth” (D-in-D), network traffic introspection, and endpoint security measures. However, other strategies include the deployment of Advanced Persistent Security measures. In conclusion, the paper reveal that APTs pose significant threats to global computer networks and require considerable resources, and investment to forestall future problems.