Abstract

The increasing degree of connectivity in factory of the future (FoF) environments, with systems that were never designed for a networked environment in terms of their technical security nature, is accompanied by a number of security risks that must be considered. This leads to the necessity of relying on risk assessment-based approaches to reach a sufficiently mature cyber security management level. However, the lack of common definitions of cyber threat actors (CTA) poses challenges in untested environments such as the FoF. This paper analyses policy papers and reports from expert organizations to identify common definitions of CTAs. A significant consensus exists only on two common CTAs, while other CTAs are often either ignored or overestimated in their importance. The identified motivations of CTAs are contrasted with the specific characteristics of FoF environments to determine the most likely CTAs targeting FoF environments. Special emphasis is given to corporate competitors, as FoF environments probably provide better opportunities than ever for industrial espionage if they are not sufficiently secured. In this context, the study aims to draw attention to the research gaps in this area.

Highlights

  • The managed information security strategy for an organization requires an approach based in risk analysis for efficient resource allocation and to document the due diligence required by law

  • While it is unlikely that a partner acts with malice, it is much more likely, that the trust placed in a partner can be exploited by malicious In Figure 3 we present the idea of a threat actor hierarchy

  • This paper analyzed cyber threat actors (CTA) listed by 22 different cyber security expert organizations

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Summary

Introduction

The managed information security strategy for an organization requires an approach based in risk analysis for efficient resource allocation and to document the due diligence required by law. Multiple common systems have been described for risk analysis These approaches present the identification of cyber threat actors (CTAs) as a critical step in successfully designing a robust cyber defense for an organization. Organizations may tend to consider just one or only a few sources of information and to orientate their actions according to the corresponding scope of the classified threat elements of the respective report. This may result in overlooking a certain emphasis that the majority of security organizations have identified as a risk factor or over-emphasizing a CTA with minor effect in operating a real environment. There is a tendency to focus on quantitative factors (i.e., the number of occurrences of different threat actors mentioned in the respective reports) rather than qualitative factors (i.e., a competitive analysis)

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