Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach Research Articles

A Cooperative Game Theoretical Approach to Distributed Iterative Command Governor Schemes

A novel distributed Command Governor (CG) supervision strategy relying on cooperative game theoretical concepts is presented for multi-agent networked systems subject to pointwise-in-time coordination constraints. Unlike non-cooperative distributed CG schemes, here all agents contribute individually to the minimization of a global performance index. As a result, these methods are able to achieve Pareto-optimal solutions, not only in steady-state conditions as the non-cooperative ones, but also during transients and are not hampered by the presence of undesirable non-Pareto Nash-equilibria or deadlock situations. Other noticeable difference with respect to non-cooperative methods is that all agents need to exchange data among them several times within a decision step in order to coordinate their local optimization procedures and arrive to the optimal solution. The properties of the algorithm are fully investigated. A final example is presented where the proposed distributed solution is contrasted with both centralized CG solutions and distributed CG methods based on non-cooperative game theoretical concepts.

A sequential cooperative game theoretic approach to scheduling multiple large-scale applications in grids

Scheduling large-scale applications in heterogeneous distributed computing systems is a fundamental NP-complete problem that is critical to obtaining good performance and execution cost. In this paper, we address the scheduling problem of an important class of large-scale Grid applications inspired by the real world, characterized by a huge number of homogeneous, concurrent, and computationally intensive tasks that are the main sources of performance, cost, and storage bottlenecks. We propose a new formulation of this problem based on a cooperative distributed game-theory-based method applied using three algorithms with low time complexity for optimizing three important metrics in scientific computing: execution time, economic cost, and storage requirements. We present comprehensive experiments using simulation and real-world applications that demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in terms of time and fairness compared to other related algorithms.

Editorial for CollaborateCom 2011 Special Issue

Editorial: Collaboration is an essential cornerstone of modern computing. Enabled by cloud computing, new wireless networks, ubiquitous mobile devices – to name just a few – the new collaborative ecosystem promises a potential that far exceeds our current capabilities. And as the world heads towards unlimited connectivity and global mobile computing, future collaboration solutions that fully realize this potential will require advances in networking, technology and systems, user interfaces and interaction paradigms, and interoperation with application-specific components and tools. As a nexus for collaborative computing, the Seventh International Conference on Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing (CollaborateCom 2011) serves as a premier international forum for discussion among academic and industrial researchers, practitioners, and students interested in collaborative networking, technology and systems, and applications. In total, we received 62 submissions to CollaborateCom 2011. After a rigorous review and follow-up discussions, the Program Committee selected 19 papers for acceptance (a rate of 30 %). Following the completion of the conference, the Program Committee selected three of the best papers from the conference that best exemplify the themes of CollaborateCom and mobile computing for special invited submission to this issue. These three papers underwent a series of new reviews and revisions before appearing as you will find them here. In the first paper titled “Data Replication in Cooperative Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: A game theoretic replication algorithm using volunteers' dilemma,” Hirsch and Madria propose a new replication scheme to strategically balance the constrained resources inherent in a mobile computing environment through a cooperative game theoretic approach. Nodes within the network collaborate via cooperative replica caching decisions to achieve overall improved query response times while reducing the query error rate and energy utilization. The second paper titled “Combining Mobile XMPP Entities and Cloud Services for Collaborative Post-Disaster Management in Hybrid Network Environments,” by Klauck and Kirsche presents a new system design that integrates portable devices and autonomous sensors through XMPP with the flexibility of cloud services to support post-disaster management. Through implementation and evaluation of two prototypes, they derive new insights into the practical application of XMPP and potential enhancements in hybrid (ad hoc and infrastructure) network scenarios. In the third paper titled “ChameleonSoft: Software Behavior Encryption For Moving Target Defense,” Azab and Elotweissy propose a biologically-inspired defense system that employs multidimensional software diversity to overcome the vulnerability of the persistent software monoculture. The system – ChameleonSoft – is built over a celloriented architecture, applying a multidimensional spatiotemporal diversity and hot shuffling of variants, hence effecting software execution behavior encryption, as well as adjusting its system policies at runtime to meet the continual change in the operational environment. As you read this issue, we believe you'll find that the selected papers make significant contributions to J. Caverlee (*) Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA e-mail: caverlee@cse.tamu.edu

Collaborative Sub-Channel Allocation in Cognitive LTE Femto-Cells: A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach

In this paper, formation of stable coalitions of users, each exploiting resources in a femto-cell, and the resource allocation in each femto-cell is investigated in a UMTS long term evolution (LTE) network. We study a downlink scenario where users collaborate to increase network throughput and, simultaneously, attempt to increase their own payoffs. Payoffs to the users are defined as the monetary equivalent of the individual users' achievable throughput in the specified coalition structure. A distributed game-theoretic resource allocation mechanism is developed whereby users autonomously decide which sub-channel in which coalition to join. If each user operates according to the proposed algorithm, the sum throughput of all links converges with probability one to its maximum feasible value.

A suboptimal joint bandwidth and power allocation for cooperative relay networks: a cooperative game theoretic approach

In commercial networks, user nodes operating on batteries are assumed to be selfish to consume their resources (i.e., bandwidth and power) solely maximizing their own benefits (e.g., the received signal-tonoise ratios (SNRs) and datarates). In this paper, a cooperative game theoretical framework is proposed to jointly perform the bandwidth and power allocation for selfish cooperative relay networks. To ensure a fair and efficient resource sharing between two selfish user nodes, we assume that either node can act as a source as well as a potential relay for each other and either node is willing to seek cooperative relaying only if the datarate achieved through cooperation is not lower than that achieved through noncooperation (i.e., direct transmission) by consuming the same amount of bandwidth and power resource. Define the cooperative strategy of a node as the number of bandwidth and power that it is willing to contribute for relaying purpose. The two node joint bandwidth and power allocation (JBPA) problem can then be formulated as a cooperative game. Since the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to the JBPA game (JBPAG) is computationally difficult to obtain, we divide it into two subgames, i.e., the bandwidth allocation game (BAG) and the power allocation game (PAG). We prove that both the subgames have unique NBS. And then the suboptimal NBS to the JBPAG can be achieved by solving the BAG and PAG sequentially. Simulation results show that the proposed cooperative game scheme is efficient in that the performance loss of the NBS result to that of the maximal overall data-rate scheme is small while the maximal-rate scheme is unfair. The simulation results also show that the NBS result is fair in that both nodes could experience better performance than they work independently and the degree of cooperation of a node only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to improve its own performance.

Optimal power control for wireless cooperative relay networks: a cooperative game theoretic approach

SUMMARYWireless nodes operating on batteries are always assumed to be selfish to consume their energy solely to maximize their own benefits. Thus, the two network objectives, that is, system efficiency and user fairness should be considered simultaneously. To this end, we propose two game theoretic mechanisms, that is, the signal‐to‐noise ratio (SNR) game and the data‐rate game to stimulate cooperation among selfish user nodes for cooperative relaying. Considering one node could trade its transmission power for its partner's relaying directly, the strategy of a node is defined as the amount of power that it is willing to contribute for relaying purpose. In the SNR game, selfish nodes are willing to achieve SNR increases at their receivers, while in the data‐rate game the nodes are willing to achieve data‐rate gains. We prove that each of the games has a unique Nash bargaining solution. Simulation results show that the Nash bargaining solution lead to fair and efficient resource allocation for both the cooperative partner nodes in the Pareto optimal sense, that is, both the nodes could experience better performance than they work independently and the degree of cooperation of a node only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to improve its own performance. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How to Share Sequential Liability: A Cooperative Game Theoretical Approach

Sharing a damage that has been caused by several individuals is a difficult problem that courts often face. Even if there exist basic principles and rules to apportion damages among them (like for instance in the third Restatement of Torts promulgated in May 1999), legal scholars are still looking for a systematic method. We analyze these issues from a cooperative game perspective. Assuming that a monetary value has been attached to the additional injury caused by each actor, that problem is modeled as a transferable utility game to which standard solution concepts are then applied. The resulting game is convex. Its core is the set of non-objectionable adjudications and the Shapley value is a fair compromise between these various judgments. Asymmetries can be accommodated by assigning weights to tortfeasors. The resulting asymmetric Shapley value is a core allocation and, vice versa, weights can be associated to any core allocation. As a by-product, this paper illustrates how the cooperative approach may bring useful insights into legal questions. Furthermore, it shows that the Shapley value is of particular interest in a legal context because it is founded on axioms that are in line with fundamental principles of private law.

A cooperative approach to collusion in auctions

The elegant Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism is well-known for the strong properties it offers: dominant truth-revealing strategies, efficiency and weak budget-balance in quite general settings. Despite this, it suffers from several drawbacks, prominently susceptibility to collusion. By jointly setting their bids, colluders may increase their utility by achieving lower prices for their items. The colluders can use monetary transfers to share this utility, but they must reach an agreement regarding their actions. We analyze the agreements that are likely to arise through a cooperative game theoretic approach, transforming the auction setting into a cooperative game. We examine both the setting of a multi-unit auction as well as path procurement auctions.

Cooperation-based resource allocation and call admission for wireless network operators

The increasing number of radio access technologies and the availability of multi-radio devices boost the need for novel resource allocation schemes in cellular networks. This paper uses a cooperative game theoretic approach for resource allocation at the network level, while utilizing simultaneous use of available radio interfaces at the device level. We model resource allocation management using the well known bankruptcy model and apply Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution method to find a distribution rule, based on which we propose resource allocation and call admission control schemes. Performance analysis of our allocation and control schemes demonstrates significant improvements over previous approaches in terms of utilization of the available bandwidth and the number of call drops. We also study the performance of proposed approach for different operator policies.

A game theoretic approach for interbasin water resources allocation considering the water quality issues

In this paper, a new game theoretic methodology is developed for interbasin water transfer management with regard to economic, equity, and environmental criteria. The main objective is to supply the competing users in a fair way, while the efficiency and environmental sustainability criteria are satisfied and the utilities of water users are incorporated. Firstly, an optimization model is developed to proportionally allocate water to the competing users in water donor and receiving basins based on their water demands. Secondly, for different coalitions of water users, the water shares of the coalitions are determined using an optimization model with economic objectives regarding the physical and environmental constraints of the system. In order to satisfy water-quality requirements, the impacts of decreasing the instream flow in donor basin are estimated using a water-quality simulation model, and the required treatment levels for effluents discharged into the river, downstream of the water transfer point are determined. Finally, to achieve equity and to provide sufficient incentives for water users to participate in the cooperation, some cooperative game theoretic approaches are utilized for reallocation of net benefits to water users. This model is applied to a large-scale interbasin water allocation problem including two different basins struggling with water scarcity in Iran. The results show that this model can be utilized as an effective tool for optimal interbasin water allocation management involving stakeholders with conflicting objectives subject to physical and environmental constraints.

A game theoretic approach for trading discharge permits in rivers

In this paper, a new Cooperative Trading Discharge Permit (CTDP) methodology is designed for estimating equitable and efficient treatment cost allocation among dischargers in a river system considering their conflicting interests. The methodology consists of two main steps: (1) initial treatment cost allocation and (2) equitable treatment cost reallocation. In the first step, a Pareto front among objectives is developed using a powerful and recently developed multi-objective genetic algorithm known as Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II). The objectives of the optimization model are considered to be the average treatment level of dischargers and a fuzzy risk of violating the water quality standards. The fuzzy risk is evaluated using the Monte Carlo analysis. The best non-dominated solution on the Pareto front, which provides the initial cost allocation to dischargers, is selected using the Young Bargaining Theory (YBT). In the second step, some cooperative game theoretic approaches are utilized to investigate how the maximum saving cost of participating dischargers in a coalition can be fairly allocated to them. The final treatment cost allocation provides the optimal trading discharge permit policies. The practical utility of the proposed methodology for river water quality management is illustrated through a realistic case study of the Zarjub river in the northern part of Iran.

Revenue sharing in semiconductor industry supply chain: Cooperative game theoretic approach

This paper defines cooperation as the process of coordinating the objectives and activities of supply chain (SC) members. It also focuses on cooperation as a solution for hybrid coordination mechanism to form the basis for semiconductor industry supply chain management. In the complex and competitive environment of semiconductor industry supply chain, independent system members are facing the difficult task of providing/sharing incentives resulting from e-market activities in a fair and equitable manner. So, various other activities are necessary for the e-market to make revenue sharing operations more stable and reliable. In this context, the importance of coalition in enhancing the e-market capability, for revenue generation and sharing, is used to develop a possible mechanism for financial compensation to the supply chain members. Interpreting the supply chain as cooperation, the concepts of the Shapely value are used in this paper for analysing the revenue sharing problem. The motivation behind such a scheme is to align the supply chain members’ cost structure with the bidding value during auction and bargaining for e-procurement. The appropriateness of the Shapely value is verified to ensure that a stable solution exists. The practical implication of this paper is how to make right decisions about revenue sharing. The principal contribution of this approach is for establishing a pooling coalition in order to provide a stable and cooperative solution.

Basin-wide cooperative water resources allocation

The Cooperative Water Allocation Model (CWAM) is designed within a general mathematical programming framework for modeling equitable and efficient water allocation among competing users at the basin level and applied to a large-scale water allocation problem in the South Saskatchewan River Basin located in southern Alberta, Canada. This comprehensive model consists of two main steps: initial water rights allocation and subsequent water and net benefits reallocation. Two mathematical programming approaches, called the priority-based maximal multiperiod network flow (PMMNF) method and the lexicographic minimax water shortage ratios (LMWSR) technique, are developed for use in the first step. Cooperative game theoretic approaches are utilized to investigate how the net benefits can be fairly reallocated to achieve optimal economic reallocation of water resources in the second step. The application of this methodology to the South Saskatchewan River Basin shows that CWAM can be utilized as a tool for promoting the understanding and cooperation of water users to achieve maximum welfare in a river basin and minimize the potential damage caused by water shortages, through water rights allocation, and water and net benefit transfers among water users under a regulated water market or administrative allocation mechanism.

Coalitions

The game theoretic study of coalitions focuses on settings in which commitment technologies are available to allow groups to coordinate their actions. Analyses of such settings focus on two questions. First, what are the implications of the ability to make commitments and form coalitions for how games are played? Second, given that coalitions can form, which coalitions should we expect to see forming? I examine classic cooperative and new noncooperative game theoretic approaches to answering these questions. Classic approaches have focused especially on the first question and have produced powerful results. However, these approaches suffer from a number of weaknesses. New work attempts to address these shortcomings by modeling coalition formation as an explicitly noncooperative process. This new research reintroduces the problem of coalitional instability characteristic of cooperative approaches, but in a dynamic setting. Although in some settings, classic solutions are recovered, in others this new work shows that outcomes are highly sensitive, not only to bargaining protocols, but also to the forms of commitment that can be externally enforced. This point of variation is largely ignored in empirical research on coalition formation. I close by describing new agendas in coalitional analysis that are being opened up by this new approach.

A self-organizing group management middleware for mobile ad-hoc networks

The growing proliferation of portable devices, along with the recent advances in Mobile Ad-Hoc NETworks (MANETs) technology open a new technology scenario where users require to collaborate together with their neighbors any-where, at any-time, and without the need of a priori planned communication infrastructure. However, the highly dynamic nature characterizing MANETs, the impossibility of manual or centralized configuration of these environments, along with the heterogeneous capabilities of user devices complicate much collaboration management and call for the investigation of novel solutions with self-organization properties. Groups and superpeer-based Peer-to-Peer (P2P) models and architectures seem particularly well suited for supporting collaboration in MANETs. The paper proposes CAMPE, a self-organizing group management solution, able to compose logical groups of peers with similar interests and goals, to partition groups in different management domains, and to assign differentiated management roles to available peers according to trade-off solutions between a multiplicity of possibly inconsistent and contrasting management criteria, e.g., peer proximity and mobility patterns. In particular, the CAMPE self-organization support adopts a cooperative game-theoretical approach to collaboration management and bases all management decisions on Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques.

High Level Planning of Reconfigurable Enterprises: a Game Theoretic Approach

Reconfigurable Enterprises (REs) represent production networks made of different and geographically dispersed plants that, in case of unpredictable market changes, can be reconfigured in order to gather a specific production objective. However, REs effectiveness and efficiency depend on the extent to which global performance is obtained. Basically two approaches are available to reach coordination: centralised or decentralised planning tools. In this paper, the authors propose a novel cooperative game theoretical approach for distributed production planning at high level of a RE; the proposed approach has been benchmarked in front of both a distributed one, based on negotiation, and a centralized one.

Water Resources Allocation: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach

Water allocation is essentially an exercise in allocating available water to various demanding users. Water allocations merely based on a water rights approach usually do not make efficient use of water for the whole river basin. Meanwhile, an economic efficient water allocation plan cannot be well implemented if the involved participants or stakeholders do not regard it as being fair. A cooperative game theoretic approach is proposed to solve water allocation problems in two steps: (1) initial allocation of water rights to water users or stakeholders based on existing water rights systems or agreements, and (2) reallocation of water to achieve efficient use of water through water transfers. An illustrative example is utilized to show the effectiveness and potential advantages of this approach.

Multi-objective discrete optimization of laminated structures

The paper is dedicated to the multi-objective optimal design of laminated composite structures. In order to provide sound-engineering designs, a few alternative and/or conflicting objectives must be taken into account. It is reasonable to consider the multi-objective optimization as a sensible enrichment with respect to single objective optimization, since the solutions are enforced to result optimal at the same time with respect to different objectives. Multi-objective optimization methods gained in the last years a growing interest in engineering, due to the possibility to determine a design possessing at the same time optimality with respect to different conflicting requirements. This problem is approached and suitably solved by Evolution Strategies, a computational algorithm based on Darwinian theories, that allow to solve optimization problems without using gradient-based information on the objective functions and the constraints. The presence of multiple objectives has been taken into account coupling the algorithm with a cooperative game theoretic approach and, for sake of comparison, with other methods, such as weighted objectives or Trade-off. With the game theoretic approach, all objective functions have the same importance, and the optimal solution is found using a bargaining function. The ply orientations in the stacking sequence of the laminate are the assumed design variables, of discrete type, a common situation in engineering practice. The results obtained for two different typical laminate designs show the effectiveness of the proposed method.

Capability based formulation and solution of multiple objective cell formation problems using simulated annealing

An integer multiple objective non‐linear mathematical programming formulation is developed for simultaneously forming part/machine cells. In the proposed model, generic capability units which are termed as resource elements are used to define the processing requirements of parts and processing capabilities of machine tools. Machine capabilities are not generally taken into account in the previous cell formation procedures. Explicit consideration of unique and overlapping machine capabilities can result in better manufacturing cell designs with higher utilisation levels and less machine duplication. The proposed cell formation model has distinguishing features. Several important cell formation objectives, such as minimisation of part dissimilarity (based on production requirements and processing sequences of parts) in formed cells, minimisation of cell load imbalance, and minimisation of extra capacity requirements for cell formation, are considered. In order to solve the mathematical programming model, a simulated annealing algorithm is developed. Cooperative game theoretic approach is applied for evaluating multiple objectives.

Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach

In this work we define the game of the alternatives for each preference profile, and establish relations between scoring rules and cooperative solution concepts for that game, such as the family of semivalues and the family of least square values.