Parliamentary Control Research Articles

The Nature of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau and Its Agreements

The Motor Insurers’ Bureau (mib) was formed in 1946 to provide compensation for victims of road traffic accidents from uninsured drivers and later untraced drivers. 1 The mib and its agreements have been criticised by academics due to potential gaps in coverage. 2 The mib agreements are seen as ‘an entirely novel piece of extra-statutory machinery’, 3 due to not being based in statute and therefore without parliamentary control. This has brought challenges involving issues of transparency when new agreements are created. Claims against the mib, particularly in relation to untraced drivers, have also been controversial. With the UK in a transition period in terms of its relationship with the EU and with the potential absence of a cause of action against the mib post-transition period, the question arises as to whether the mib should be put on a statutory footing. This article therefore aims to explore whether the mib should be put on a statutory footing. It will examine the relationships between the mib, its members, the state, and Parliament. It will further examine issues involving transparency and enforcement. It will go on to compare the Australian Capital Territory (act) approach in legislation with the United Kingdom (UK) approach, to see what will be gained or lost with the UK adopting the legislative route. It will then conclude on which, if any, examine potential reform options – radical or otherwise – might be usefully pursued to meet the criticisms of to the system in the UK.

New perspectives on the Europeanization of National Parliaments

See Rozenberg (2012). Auel, Katrin, and Oliver Hoing. 2015. National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times? West European Politics 38 (2): 375–395. Article Google Scholar Bergman, Torbjorn. 1997. National Parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: Notes on Empirical Variation and Competing Explanations. Journal of European Public Policy 4 (3): 373–387. Article Google Scholar Buller, J., and A. Gamble. 2002. Conceptualising Europeanisation. Public Policy and Administration 17 (2): 4–24. Article Google Scholar Council Directive No. 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds [Online]. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al28046. Accessed 3 June 2020 Exadaktylos, Theofanis, and Claudio M. Radaelli. 2009. Research Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanization. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 47 (3): 507–530. Google Scholar Karlas, Jan. 2011. Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs in Central and Eastern Europe: Explaining the Variation. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (2): 258–273. Article Google Scholar Ladrech, Robert. 1994. Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France. JCMS : Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (1): 69–88. Google Scholar Ladrech, Robert. 2010. Europeanization and National Politics. The European Union Series. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Google Scholar Olsen, Johan P. ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 5 (December 2002): 921–52. Radaelli, Claudio M. 2000. Whither Europeanization?Concept Stretching and Substantive Change. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 4, no. 8. http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm. Raunio, Tapio. 2009. National Parliaments and European Integration, What We Know and What We Should Know. ARENA Working Paper (online), No. 02, ARENA Centre for European Studies. Risse, Thomas, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso, eds. 2001. Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction. In: Transforming Europe—Europeanization and Domestic Change, 1–20. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Romaniello, Maria. 2017. The Italian Symmetrical Bicameral System in EU Affairs (Chapter 16). In The Italian Parliament and the European Union, ed. Nicola Lupo, and Giovanni Piccirilli, 285–304. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Google Scholar Rozenberg, Olivier. 2012. The Emotional Europeanisation of National Parliaments: Roles Played by EU Committee Chairs at the Commons and at the French National Assembly. OPAL, OPAL Online Paper Series, no. 7. Download references University of Luxembourg, 12-14 Rue Michel Rodange, 4660, Differdange, Luxembourg Estelle Badie You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar Correspondence to Estelle Badie. Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Reprints and Permissions Badie, E. New perspectives on the Europeanization of National Parliaments. Fr Polit (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-020-00125-7 Download citation Published: 20 June 2020 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-020-00125-7

Эволюция формы правления современного российского государства в условиях конституционной модернизации

The study analyzes the approaches, existing in sci-ence, to solving the issue of what kind of republics Russia belongs to. A critical assessment of the view that Russia is a presidential republic has been given. The thesis on the dominant position of the Presi-dent in the system of State power is supported by an analysis of his powers and the status of other State institutions. The conclusion about the evolu-tion of super-presidential republic in Russia into a mixed (presidential-parliamentary) republic is made. It is argued that the optimal form of state govern-ment for Russia is a mixed republic with strong presidential power. The model of a parliamentary republic for Russia is unsuitable. It is proposed to pass the federal constitutional laws on the President of the Russian Federation; on the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; on parliamentary control, and others.

Economic Disintegration? Political, Economic, and Legal Drivers and the Need for ‘Greening Embedded Trade Liberalism’

Abstract This contribution uses the examples of Great Britain’s withdrawal from the EU (Brexit) and US withdrawal from multilateral trade and environmental agreements for exploring political, economic, environmental, social, and legal reasons driving the backlash against economic integration agreements. In both examples, populist battle-cries for ‘taking back control’ and for lowering regulatory standards were followed by governmental attempts at evading parliamentary control over executive foreign policy powers to violate, or withdraw from, multilateral agreements. Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, President Trump’s mercantilist power politics, authoritarian state-capitalism (e.g. in China), and European ordo-liberalism reflect systemic divergences that may justify broad interpretations of WTO ‘exceptions’ (e.g. for WTO trade remedies and climate change mitigation). Europe’s multilevel, democratic constitutionalism protecting ‘social market economies’ was comparatively more effective in limiting protectionism and carbon emissions inside Europe’s common market. The EU’s ‘new green deal’ for a carbon-neutral ‘green economy’ was made possible by stronger, social, and democratic support based on ‘constitutional interpretations’ of Europe’s ordo-liberalism assisting adversely affected workers, producers, traders, investors, and other citizens to adjust economic and environmental activities to climate change mitigation. EU leadership for WTO-consistent climate change rules requires ‘greening embedded liberalism’ by interpreting the WTO ‘sustainable development’ objectives in conformity with the 2015 Paris Agreement, the UN ‘sustainable development goals’, and human rights (e.g. as legal basis for climate change litigation in Europe).

Удосконалення механізмів парламентського контролю за діяльністю спецслужб в Україні як складова демократизації та реформування владних інститутів

Метою статті є аналіз правових механізмів парламентського контролю за діяльністю спецслужб в Україні у контексті дискусії щодо доцільності створення спеціального контрольного комітету Верховної Ради України.
 Наукова новизна у контексті дискусії про необхідність створення спеціального парламентського комітету, який і повинен здійснювати контроль за діяльністю спеціальних служб в Україні, полягає в обґрунтуванні невідповідності самого підходу щодо створення окремого парламентського контрольного комітету за діяльністю спецслужб Конституції й законам України.
 Висновки. Чинне законодавство України передбачає механізми контролю держави та суспільства за діяльністю спецслужб і правоохоронних органів спеціального призначення, які реалізовані в повноваженнях Верховної Ради, її Уповноваженого з прав людини й Рахункової палати, а також діяльності судової гілки влади. Водночас в Україні, на відміну від США, Великої Британії чи сусідньої Польщі, Конституція й інші законодавчі акти визначають парламентський контроль у нерозривному зв’язку законодавчої та контрольної функцій Верховної Ради України, а контрольна функція парламентських комітетів не розглядається відокремлено від інших функцій. Такий підхід посилюється правовою позицією Конституційного Суду України, за якою комітети не є самостійними суб’єктами парламентського контролю. Як наслідок, не створено спеціальних парламентських комітетів із функціями контролю за діяльністю спеціальних органів і служб, як і не забезпечується належним чином інформування суспільства з боку Верховної Ради чи Президента про діяльність спецслужб щодо протидії загрозам національної безпеки. Такий підхід скоріше диктується не потребами забезпечення таємності, а усталеною ще з радянських часів практикою та нерозвиненістю інститутів громадського контролю в цілому. Разом із тим посилення громадського контролю за діяльністю спецслужб можливе і в рамках чинного законодавства. Видається за доцільне оприлюднювати щорічний звіт голови СБУ в частині, що не містить таємної інформації, а також законодавчі ініціативи та кроки парламенту, прийняті за результатами такого звіту. Подібне інформування й ознайомлення суспільства з результатами діяльності спеціальних органів і служб не лише сприятиме реалізації на практиці прав і свобод людини та громадянина, а й підвищенню рівня довіри громадян до них та владних інститутів загалом. Водночас створення комітету/комітетів Верховної Ради України з функціями виключно контролю за діяльністю спецслужб і спеціальних органів держави суперечить нормам Конституції України.

TWENTY YEARS AND TWENTY DRAWBACKS OF THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION

The subject of the research is the legal norms of the current Constitution of the Russian Federation. The work analyzes the chapters of Constitution, identifies the main shortcomings of the existing norms that do not correspond to modern reality and puts forward proposals for their change.
 The purpose of the study is to confirm or disprove the hypothesis that changes to the Constitution of the Russian Federation are inevitable due to the presence of defects in it that cannot be eliminated in any other way.
 The methodological basis of the research is a set of general scientific methods of knowledge and special scientific techniques and methods developed in law, including: logical method, comparative legal analysis, system method and formal legal analysis.
 The main results and scope of their application. The problems that critically affect the stable development of our society and state and its success were formulated. Among these problems are: the absence in the Constitution of the institute of parliamentary control over the executive authorities; the rise of the institution of the President of the Russian Federation over the three branches of government; the unequal status of constituent entities of the Russian Federation; the absence in the Constitution of the concepts "public property" or "national heritage". A significant part of these problems is related to the text of the current Constitution of the Russian Federation. In this regard, the author notes that the current Constitution of the Russian Federation has many defects. The author points out 20 drawbacks of the current Constitution of Russia which make the authorities imitate the principles of democracy and people's power in the actual political practice and substantiates the conclusion on the necessity of the constitutional reform.
 Conclusions. Revision of the Constitution of the Russian Federation is inevitable, since the Basic Law of the country is not devoid of shortcomings that require correction and legisla-tive changes.

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ЗДІЙСНЕННЯ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКОГО КОНТРОЛЮ ЗА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЮ ДЕРЖПРИКОРДОНСЛУЖБИ УКРАЇНИ

В статті досліджуються питання здійснення демократичного цивільного контролю за діяльністю Державної прикордонної служби України Верховною Радою України та її органами.
 Розглянувши поняття та сутність демократичного цивільного контролю над збройними силами та іншими силовими структурами в будь-якій демократичній країні автор констатує, що це є одним з принципів функціонування держави, а також одним з ключових принципів забезпечення національної безпеки. Виникнення цього інституту в нашій державі стало наслідком розвитку демократії в Україні, а також інтеграції України в міжнародні структури. 
 Цей принцип, по відношенню до Державної прикордонної служби України, закріплено серед основних принципів діяльності зазначеного інституту в Законі України «Про Державну прикордонну службу України», а процедура його реалізації передбачена у Стратегії розвитку Державної прикордонної служби України.
 В системі демократичного цивільного контролю за діяльністю Державної прикордонної служби України важливе місце займає парламентський контроль, який є невід’ємною цінністю демократичної форми організації суспільства, оскільки він являє собою передбачену Конституцією і законами України діяльність Верховної Ради України, утворених нею органів, обраних посадових осіб та народних депутатів України щодо отримання, вивчення, оприлюднення інформації про діяльність, рішення, правові акти інших органів і посадових осіб публічної влади, підприємств, установ та організацій і вжиття на основі цієї інформації передбачених Конституцією і законами України заходів реагування. Він здійснюється завдяки звітам Голови Державної прикордонної служби України про виконання нею своїх завдань; діяльності парламентських комітетів і спеціальних комісій; парламентському контролі Уповноваженого Верховної Ради України з прав людини; контролі народних депутатів України та контрольної діяльності Рахункової палати.
 Робиться висновок, що здійснення дієвого демократичного цивільного контролю за діяльністю Державної прикордонної служби України зі сторони парламенту підвищить рівень довіри як до зазначеної структури так і України в цілому світової спільноти та громадян України.

The problem of the formation of legal regulation of parliamentary control in the Russian Federation

The article considers the problems of legal regulation of parliamentary control and parliamentary investigation in the Russian Federation and ways to improve it. To this end, an analysis of the constitutional practice of parliamentary control in European countries such as Austria, Germany, Spain, Italy, Switzerland was made and attempts were made to implement international experience in Russian practice. The development of the organizational foundations of parliamentary control is proposed on the basis of consolidating the special status of decisions of the subjects of parliamentary control.

Contradicciones y veleidades en el debate parlamentario sobre la Televisión pública en España (1990-2010)

La llegada de la televisión privada a España a partir de 1990 sumió a la televisión pública en una doble crisis: financiera, debido a la pérdida de ingresos por publicidad, y de función, pues no se había planteado qué significaba ser una televisión de servicio público. Este artículo analiza el debate político en la Comisión de Control de RTVE en el Parlamento entre 1990 y 2010, fecha de entrada en vigor de la ley que definió un nuevo modelo de TVE, sin publicidad y con una definición clara de servicio público. La falta de voluntad política por parte de los sucesivos gobiernos para hacer cambios reales y una oposición más interesada en erosionar al gobierno de turno que en dirimir los grandes debates de fondo sobre el modelo televisión pública hicieron que los cambios llegaran forzados por circunstancias exteriores, como la normativa europea o la crisis del mercado publicitario.

Problems of increasing the efficiency of the parliamentary control mechanism in the Republic of Kazakhstan

The article analyzes the problems of organizing parliamentary control in the Republic of Kazakhstan.Based on the analysis of modern research in the Republic of Kazakhstan and foreign countries, relevant issues of the formation and development of this legal institution have been raised. The authors of the article substantiated conceptual provisions. Parliament has a complex multifunctional mechanism for effective control. The analysis is based on two fundamental conceptual principles in the interpretation of parliamentary control. Firstly, parliamentary control as a system of norms aimed at checking and evaluating the activities of executive bodies, with the possible application of sanctions. Secondly, parliamentary control is a set of measures that allows initiating the resignation of the government. The principle of democracy is the initial category of parliamentarism. The central category of parliamentary law theory is the principle of separation of powers. The main functions of the Parliament are updated: legislative, representative, control. The article formulates the main conclusions and presents options for improving the effectiveness of the mechanism of parliamentary control in the Republic of Kazakhstan. One of the main conclusions of the study is the conclusion that a law is needed in the republic that would regulate and intensify the activities of the Parliament in such aspects as appeal to procedural forms of control such as interpellation with its ability to apply political sanctions, a resolution of censure, a parliamentary investigation of official crimes persons entailing their resignation, etc.

Erdogan’s Train to Authoritarianism

Recep Tayyip Erdogan — Turkey’s current president (elected 2014) and former prime minister (2003–2014) — infamously once declared that “democracy is like a train; you get off once you have reached your [real] destination.” In other words, one can use democratic means to achieve authoritarian goals. Analyzing Erdogan’s imaginary train journey, one must conclude that the Turkish leader never had the intention of reaching democracy. Indeed, now that he has achieved his actual authoritarian goal, he has jumped off the train. However, his journey did not always seem to be destined for such a terminus. Indeed, in his first decade in power, Erdogan won three parliamentary elections by ever-larger shares of the popular vote because he had helped to build Turkey into a burgeoning economic powerhouse and a moderate Islamic democracy. In the past decade, however, despite winning Turkey’s first popular election for president in August 2014, presiding over another great parliamentary victory in November 2015, and then winning re-election as president as well as retaining control of parliament in June 2018, Erdogan’s increasing authoritarianism has helped precipitate an accelerating crisis both domestically and externally for Turkey. His actions have also negatively affected the Kurds. Although his partial setback in the local elections held in March and June 2019 did seem to affect his hold on power, his seemingly successful creation of a Turkish safety zone in Northern (Syrian) Kurdistan in October 2019 revived his flailing domestic fortunes.

What balance between Eurojust and Europol from a parliamentary angle?

The article addresses the debated issue of the democratic accountability of Europol and Eurojust. After a short introduction on the discussion in the pre-Lisbon phase, it focuses on the current legislative framework. Through a comparative analysis of the relevant provisions of reg (EU) 2016/794 (concerning Europol) and reg (EU) 2018/1727 (on Eurojust), the article highlights an asymmetry in the intensity of the parliamentary oversight on the two Agencies and a much strong interest of Parliaments in the control on Europol. The reasons of this misalignment are identified in the different nature of the two bodies (police vs. judicial) and the reinforced operational dimension of Europol’s activity, which can have a stronger impact on fundamental rights. The second part of the contribution analyses the experience of the recently established Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) on Europol, identifying some limits to the parliamentary control mechanism, linked, on the one hand, to the legislative framework and, on the other hand, to the rules governing the structure and functioning of the JPSG. Finally, the article notes that relaunching the process of revision of the JPSG’s Rule of procedure is needed to improve the effectiveness of the parliamentary oversight on Europol. Moreover, a more functional framework for the interparliamentary control on Europol could provide substantial and procedural inputs to the implementation of the extremely meagre provisions related to Eurojust’s democratic accountability. Ultimately, it could represent a general model in the discussion about the democratic accountability of the proliferating Justice and Home Affairs agencies.

Parliamentary control in the mechanism of ensuring constitutional law and orderin the Republic of Abkhazia

Parliamentary control in the mechanism of ensuring constitutional law and orderin the Republic of Abkhazia

Международный опыт осуществления государственного финансового контроля

Financial control is a major part of the financial management system. Its increasing importance in the contemporary world is reflected in the Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, according to which financial control is an integral component of public finance management. The relevance of the topic is also associated with the strengthening of the role of financial control in developed countries and the search for ways to increase the effectiveness of its implementation. The article aims to identify the main development trends of state financial control in advanced countries and to analyze the standardization process. Despite the fact that the system of state financial control is based on different principles in different countries, depending on the prevailing historical, economic and regulatory traditions of a particular country, further directions for the development of this sphere are determined by general trends toward decentralization of control and the standardization of control activities. In addition, the current level of development of state financial control in the Russian Federation and the possibility of adapting international experience in our country in order to increase the effectiveness of financial control are described. In this article, the analysis of foreign experience has been carried out at three levels: general control over public finance; government and parliamentary control; and internal control and internal audit as special areas of financial control. In regards to standardization, the standards of external state control have been found to be formed and approved by the national control and accounting bodies of the country, taking into account the requirements of INTOSAI standards. At the same time, national standards include legally established features of the state financial control organization in a given country as well as the national practice of conducting state audit. Requirements for the organization and implementation of internal financial control can be set by supreme audit bodies or ministries of finance, whereas requirements to organize and carry out internal financial audit are often provided by law.

Rent, Taxes, and Political Participation: Long-Term Effects of Urban Autonomy in Recent Studies in Development Economics. Article 1

The article addresses a central modernization problem: how to build and maintain effective public administration while being dependent on foreign debt and investment? Based on a review of the recent literature, the article shows that, in the 13th–18th centuries, Western European states facing outside finance shortage tended to look for alternative source of revenue and improve their fiscal systems and bureaucracies. The article also uses the case of Italian urban autonomy to discuss whether public debt, fiscal system and parliamentary control are interdependent

ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЕ РОССИЙСКОГО ПАРЛАМЕНТА И СУДЕБНОЙ ВЛАСТИ

The article discusses the constitutional problems of consolidation, implementation and improvement of the mechanism of interaction between the parliament and higher courts in parliamentary procedures. The research methods are analysis, synthesis, normative (formal-logical), and historical-legal. The key aim of the study is to identify a mechanism for ensuring the control function of the parliament to control the implementation in the Russian Federation of laws adopted by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. The author came to the following conclusions. In recent years, the higher courts of the Russian Federation have been more actively involved in the work on improving legislation in various ways. At the same time, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly on January 15, 2020, President of Russia Vladimir Putin outlined proposals to strengthen the role of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the legislative process. Since 2008, a trend has been outlined in Russia to strengthen the control powers of the parliament. One of the most important control powers of the Russian Federal Assembly, fixed in the Federal Law “On Parliamentary Control”, is, in the author’s opinion, the study of the application of laws (legal monitoring), the development of proposals for their improvement. However, along with the annual reports of the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation at the Federation Council regarding effectiveness of legislation, it is seen necessary to oblige the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to present reports on judicial practice in the State Duma. The Supreme Court, realizing the constitutional function of summarizing the judicial practice of the courts of the Russian Federation and developing a uniform interpretation of the norms of the law, often quite independently eliminates legal gaps, sometimes developing new legal rules, which is not fully consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers in continental law systems. Such new rules are developed within the framework of not only procedural law, but also substantive (civil and criminal) law. In fairness, it is worth noting that this is not a modern trend, it is the Russian practice that has developed over centuries: the Senate of the Russian Empire, being the highest court, developed new legal rules long before the legislator. All this, of course, does not fully correspond to the role of the court in the continental legal system. However, the same Senate of the Russian Empire, in accordance with the decree of Emperor Alexander I, also had the right to inform the emperor of the need to improve legislation. In this regard, taking into account the historical parallel, the author comes to the conclusion that there is an urgent need for Russia to introduce the annual practice of the Supreme Court’s reports to the State Duma as part of the parliamentary legal monitoring of legal gaps and conflicts identified by the Supreme Court when summarizing judicial practice, with its proposals for improving legislation.

Hungary’s authoritarian emergency state

The Orban regime in Hungary has exploited the Sars-Cov-2 pandemic to further tighten the hold on power by the authoritarian regime. With an unconstitutional enabling act, it has suspended all parliamentary control and judicial oversight for the duration of the state of emergency. The state of emergency can only be lifted by a majority that is at the beck and call of the regime. However, even if the enabling act is suspended, Hungary will have taken a further step along the path to authoritarianism. The government is exploiting the fight against the pandemic to suppress the opposition. The regional districts in particular, where in the autumn of 2019, mayors from opposition parties were elected for the first time for many years – particularly in Budapest – the regime is curtailing state funding.

Інститут омбудсмена як складник системи захисту прав дітей в україні

The urgency of the topic is due to the fact that children – a special age category, that needs specific protection. Ombudsmen have a special place in the system of protection of children's rights, whose purpose is to assist in the realization of their rights by children, to secure and protect the rights of children. The purpose of the article is to determine the place and role of the Ombudsman Institute in the system of protection of children's rights. It is established that the Commissioner for Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Human Rights, exercising parliamentary control over the observance of constitutional rights and freedoms, can visit places where under the decision of a court or administration are forcibly detained by minors, as well as interrogate them regarding their treatment, the conditions of their detention, and to apply to the court for the protection of the rights and freedoms of persons who, because they are not of legal age, are unable to defend their rights independently. It has been found that scientists have a critical appraisal of the human rights potential of the Presidential Ombudsman, since this official is not endowed with real powers and is not independent in his activities. It is revealed that the Presidential Commissioner for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has the right to visit the institutions of the system of rehabilitation of children with disabilities, educational institutions, health care institutions and other institutions and to take measures to eliminate violations of children's rights in these institutions. The protection of the right to education (the right to quality and accessible education, the right to receive lifelong education, the right to free education) is one of the powers of the educational ombudsman. It is concluded that the current Ombudsmen (Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for Human Rights, Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for the Rights of the Child, Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Educational Ombudsman) within their competence, among other institutions and organizations of the state nature, organize activities aimed at ensuring the conditions necessary and sufficient for the realization of their rights by children, the protection of children's rights.

Reinforcement of the parliamentary control of the intelligence service

Reinforcement of the parliamentary control of the intelligence service

The issue of criminal liability for illegal enrichment

In the article results undertaken a study of issues of the day of the legislative adjusting are offered in Ukraine of questions of criminal responsibility for the illegal enriching.The authors of publication spared the special attention of maintenance of decision of Constitutional Court of Ukraine in business after constitutional presentation 59 deputies of people's of Ukraine in relation to accordance of Constitution of Ukraine (to constitutionality) of the article 3682 (illegal enriching) КК of Ukraine, and also chronologies of events, that took place in Ukraine in connection with criminalization and further decriminalization of the illegal enriching. Thus, they paid attention to that judges of Constitutional Court of Ukraine were not unanimous in a decision-making about confession of the indicated criminal law norm unconstitutional.The publication supports the duly substantiated legal position of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine regarding the unconstitutionality of the provisions of Article 3682 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. At the same time, the authors pointed out that the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine could make a decision that would be unconstitutional only the latest version of this rule of October 16, 2014 No. 1698-VII. Such a decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine would leave in force the wording of Article 3682 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which complies with the constitutional requirements, and would prevent the consequences of undesirable consequences for the Ukrainian society.It is indicated, on some law consequences to that actual decriminalization of the illegal enriching led and can lead in Ukraine. Thus, authors offered own vision of that, how it was possible to avoid the offensive of these consequences. In this context they gave mind on inactivity of subjects of imperious plenary powers (President of Ukraine, deputies of people's of Ukraine, judges of Constitutional Court of Ukraine), that within the limits of the competense did not accept necessary legal measures for the settlement of situation.Reasons and terms, that resulted in the offensive of negative consequences in connection with confession of the article 3682 КК of Ukraine unconstitutional and such that lost an action, are adopted, and also the possible ways of exit are certain from a situation that in this connection was folded. In particular, speech goes about legislative initiatives of the newly elected President of Ukraine in the field of it and it is indicated on the necessity of strengthening of parliamentary control af-ter forming and realization of public anticorruption policy as by a factor that has considerable influence on the state of providing of national safety.Authors recommend Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the end of 2019 to con-duct the parliamentary listening during that to hear the lectures of leaders of anti-corruption organs about the results of their activity in 2018–2019, give the estimation of activity of these state structures and define urgent measures that must use public authorities for the increase of efficiency of realization of anticorruption politics of the state.