What balance between Eurojust and Europol from a parliamentary angle?

Abstract

The article addresses the debated issue of the democratic accountability of Europol and Eurojust. After a short introduction on the discussion in the pre-Lisbon phase, it focuses on the current legislative framework. Through a comparative analysis of the relevant provisions of reg (EU) 2016/794 (concerning Europol) and reg (EU) 2018/1727 (on Eurojust), the article highlights an asymmetry in the intensity of the parliamentary oversight on the two Agencies and a much strong interest of Parliaments in the control on Europol. The reasons of this misalignment are identified in the different nature of the two bodies (police vs. judicial) and the reinforced operational dimension of Europol’s activity, which can have a stronger impact on fundamental rights. The second part of the contribution analyses the experience of the recently established Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) on Europol, identifying some limits to the parliamentary control mechanism, linked, on the one hand, to the legislative framework and, on the other hand, to the rules governing the structure and functioning of the JPSG. Finally, the article notes that relaunching the process of revision of the JPSG’s Rule of procedure is needed to improve the effectiveness of the parliamentary oversight on Europol. Moreover, a more functional framework for the interparliamentary control on Europol could provide substantial and procedural inputs to the implementation of the extremely meagre provisions related to Eurojust’s democratic accountability. Ultimately, it could represent a general model in the discussion about the democratic accountability of the proliferating Justice and Home Affairs agencies.