Contrary Interpretation Research Articles

Heart of Darkness as the Coordinal of Western Imperialism

Widely considered as an anti-imperialist work, the novel's contrary interpretation is commonly ascribed to the publication of Chinua Achebe's “Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darkness”. The book, perhaps the finest source of information regarding Leopold's crimes in Congo, may be interpreted in a variety of ways; to be clear, Conrad was writing a case study of Leopold's cruel rule of the Congo, not a critique of Western imperialism in general. The purpose of this research is to interpret Heart of Darkness via a variety of postcolonial lenses and to locate it within the Western debate on colonialism. For it is only via contrapuntal readings of this novella that the true nature of Conrad's discourse on racism and colonialism becomes apparent.

The Sophists and Antilogic

This paper examines the sophistic practice of antilogikê or antilogic, which consists in, as G. B. Kerferd described, “causing the same thing to be seen by the same people now as possessing one predicate and now as possessing the opposite or contradictory predicate.” Although, since Plato, antilogic has been cast in a cloud of suspicion, understood primarily as the dubious practice of making the weaker argument stronger, I explore a contrary interpretation that antilogic was a technique for pursuing the suspension of judgment, or epochê. In this paper, I define the practice of antilogic through the tale of Corax and Tisias and the surviving fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias. In so doing, I hypothesize that antilogic was a method for averting the natural tendency of language to assign stability and durability to being. Through the perpetual displacement of one logos by another, antilogic grants thought access to the ceaseless flux and becoming of nature. As it barred language from assigning stability to being, so too did it provide a “way out” of the inexorable human drive captured in the opening line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “All humans naturally desire to know.”

Alternatives

That white evangelicals form the political foundation of Trumpism is widely taken for granted. A contrary interpretation focuses on Christian nationalism: the view that the United States is, and should remain, a predominantly white Christian nation. Drawing on analysis of religious nationalisms in India and South Africa, this essay suggests how Christian nationalism can be seen as part of a contradictory hegemonic project, intimately linked with US imperialism and racial capitalism. The essay also reflects on the political challenges of the present moment.

Textualism and the Meaning of 'Sex': A Reply to Eskridge, Slocum, and Gries

A recent article by Professors William N. Eskridge, Brian G. Slocum, and Stefan Th. Gries critically examines textualism, both in general and as applied to the Supreme Court's decision in Bostock v. Clayton County. Although I agree with much of what the authors have to say, some of what they argue misses the mark. In this brief Essay, I contend that the authors mostly criticize strawman varieties of textualism, with the result that much of their article is not addressed to textualism properly understood but to clearly inadequate interpretive approaches that no legal interpreters claim as their own. I also show how the authors' reliance on corpus linguistics to support the Bostock majority's interpretation of Title VII misfires and in fact points to a contrary interpretation.

Brief of Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, PDR Network et al. v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.

This amicus brief explains why a federal district court’s interpretation of a statute does not ordinarily “determine the validity” of an agency regulation that embraces a contrary interpretation under the Administrative Orders Review Act of 1950 (the “Hobbs Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 2342. The Hobbs Act splits the jurisdiction of federal courts to address certain legal questions in certain federal cases. It vests “exclusive jurisdiction” in the courts of appeals to perform a set of specified actions, with review obtainable within a 60-day time period and with regard to certain orders and regulations. But the Act leaves district courts to take any other actions — specifically, any actions not specified in the Hobbs Act’s text — in the ordinary course of the district court’s functions. As explained in the brief, by splitting federal court jurisdiction in this manner, the Hobbs Act raises questions of constitutional structure and statutory meaning. First, as to constitutional structure: The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of such a “jurisdiction-splitting” provision in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), where it held that the “exclusive jurisdiction” provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 complied with due process and Article III. Although Yakus is a controversial precedent, the brief argues that the Court can decide this case based on a faithful construction of the Hobbs Act. Second, as to statutory meaning: The precise boundary between matters reviewable only directly and those reviewable in collateral proceedings is specified by the Hobbs Act’s statutory terms. The courts of appeals have “exclusive jurisdiction” to “enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or [ ] determine the validity” of certain specified orders. When a district court merely disagrees with an interpretation expressed in an agency’s regulation, it does not take any of the four actions specified by the Hobbs Act. Congress borrowed the terms used in the Hobbs Act — “enjoin,” “set aside,” “suspend,” and “determine the validity” — from preexisting statutory schemes governing judicial review of agency action. The brief canvasses these preexisting statutory schemes, primarily the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913 and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Based on these precedents, the brief concludes that a court “determines the validity of” a regulation if, and only if, a violation of the regulation is necessarily a part of the elements of the crime or civil cause of action at issue in the case.

Capitol Records v. Vimeo

In Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. Vimeo, L.L.C., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the “safe harbor” provisions of Section 512 of the federal Copyright Act covered state law claims against an online service provider for infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings.1 The evidentiary basis for this conclusion was slender. At the heart of the decision was the court’s surmise that Congress must have intended to cover state law “copyright,” because a contrary interpretation would undermine the policy objectives of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In reaching its decision, the court apparently misread the Copyright Act and misunderstood both the nature of state law protection for pre-1972 sound recordings and the trade-offs that underlay the DMCA. We submit that this holding of Vimeo should not be followed by courts in other circuits, however sympathetic its policy underpinnings may be.2 It is doubtful that Congress considered state law “copyright” claims in passing the DMCA, or that it meant to include them under § 512. As a policy matter, it probably should have done so. But had it done so, Congress almost certainly would have said so explicitly, and would have altered other provisions of the DMCA to achieve a fairer result for owners of rights in pre-1972 sound recordings than the Second Circuit did. Congress could, for example, have protected pre-1972 sound recordings under § 1201 et seq., or otherwise provided those recordings with greater protection under the Copyright Act.3 The court’s focus on only one policy objective of the DMCA led it to interpret the Copyright Act in an implausible manner that benefits online service providers (OSPs), at the expense of owners of pre-1972 sound recordings, and the unique position of those recordings under copyright law. The central issues in this case that concern pre-1972 sound recordings are more appropriately under Congressional purview, as the Second Circuit should have recognized. And indeed, Congress should act to resolve these issues, particularly now, in view of the conflicting treatment of state law claims between Vimeo (concerning the safe harbor in § 512 of the Copyright Act)4 and the Ninth Circuit’s sweeping conclusion in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C.5 that state law intellectual property claims are barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA).6 Accordingly, we recommend legislation to address this issue and to resolve other problems and inconsistencies that have arisen due to the peculiar situation of pre-1972 sound recordings and federal copyright law, as discussed below. In Part I, we discuss the legal status of pre-1972 sound recordings as necessary background to evaluating the Second Circuit’s decision in Vimeo. Part II discusses that decision in greater detail, and Part III explains the flaws in the court’s rationale. In Part IV, we address the Second and Ninth Circuits’ contradictory views concerning the treatment of state law claims against OSPs under § 512 of the Copyright Act and § 230 of the CDA. In Part V, we explain that it is up to Congress to change the role of pre-1972 sound recordings in the federal copyright scheme, and argue that the time is ripe for Congress to exercise that power. We conclude in Part VI.

Libertarian Free Decision: A Thomistic Account

Libertarian Free Decision:A Thomistic Account Steven J. Jensen ACCORDING TO some interpretations, Aquinas is effectively a compatibilist, that is, his account of free will is compatible with a kind of intellectual determinism.1 The intellect considers what actions are to be done and issues a judgment. The will then follows the lead of the intellect. The whole process is deterministic, from beginning to end. Nevertheless, actions are considered free insofar as they do arise from the person's own beliefs and desires. A contrary interpretation sees Aquinas as a libertarian, meaning that, according to him, free actions are not simply those that arise from an individual's own beliefs and desires.2 [End Page 315] This condition is necessary for freedom but not sufficient. An action is free only if it arises from within and if it is not determined by the sum total of causes acting upon the person; rather, a free action is determined by the agent himself. As Aquinas says, "Free decision is the cause of its own movement, because a man by way of free decision moves himself to act."3 For the purposes of argument, this paper will presume that Aquinas was in some manner libertarian with regard to free will. The project is not to show that Aquinas was a libertarian; rather, it is to show how his account can be libertarian. In particular, the paper will develop an idea advanced by Scott MacDonald, namely, that what MacDonald calls "meta-judgments" are central to any Thomistic account of free decision.4 The project will begin with an examination of three features of reason that—according to the express statement of Aquinas—underlie the freedom of the will. First, reason knows in the universal, which is indeterminate with regard to particulars (section I). Second, reason bends back upon its own act, knowing that it knows (section II). Third, reason is able to understand causal relations and the relation between means and ends (section III). [End Page 316] Given these three features, the practical judgment of reason will place the will at an impasse, in which it is unable to move forward. Reason will prove ineffective in freeing the will from this impasse. After describing the impasse (section IV), the paper will show how the will alone can free itself from this impasse, not by way of some new act of will, but by the cessation of an ongoing act (sections V and VI). I. The Indetermination of Reason Aquinas attributes free decision to human beings because reason knows in the universal and is able to make comparisons.5 The form of a natural thing is a form individuated through matter, so that the consequent inclination is determined to one, but the form of the intellect is a universal, under which many things may be included. Since action is in singulars, in which there is nothing that exhausts the potential of the universal, it follows that the inclination of the will relates indeterminately to many things. A builder, for instance, may conceive the form of a house in a universal fashion, under which are included diverse shapes of a house; his will can then be inclined to make a rectangular house or a round house, or some other figure.6 Aquinas has in mind a common feature of our desires, which often have an abstract character. It is not that we desire an abstraction, for we desire what is good, and the good is found in the concrete. Nevertheless, we do desire concrete realities under some abstraction. Christine might begin by desiring [End Page 317] sweets, for instance, without yet having determined what kind of sweet, whether chocolate, caramel, or licorice. Similarly, the builder does not desire an abstract house, which does not exist; he desires a concrete house, but he (initially) desires it abstracted from any particular shape, which will be determined later. Animals lack this indetermination, but they have another indetermination: The active principle in nonhuman animals is midway between the two, for the form apprehended by sense is individual, as is the form of a natural thing; consequently, from this form follows an inclination to one act, as in...

Gran Pajatén y su contexto en el paisaje prehispánico Pataz-Abiseo

For more than one hundred years, archaeologists have attributed impressive monumental settlement complexes in the tropical montane forests of Chachapoyas to late pre-Hispanic population intrusions from neighboring regions, or to colonization by highland states and empires. The longevity and tenacity of these migrationist explanations is remarkable given the virtual obsolescence of verticality and population pressure models still invoked to support them. Archaeological data from Gran Pajaten and other sites in the Rio Abiseo National Park in the southern part of Chachapoyas support a contrary interpretation, attesting to the autochthonous development of autonomous societies. In order to demonstrate the defects of the most widely-accepted migration and colonization hypotheses, we carried out a reconnaissance in the highlands of Pataz District adjacent to the montane cloud forest where Gran Pajaten (2850 m) is located, in order to locate and document archaeological evidence of dense, centralized populations allegedly capable of launching and subsidizing “colonies” of such monumentality and unique character. However, the reconnaissance only registered a predominance of small and dispersed settlements in the highlands, a result that contradicts the expectations of migration models. An additional goal of our reconnaissance was to begin placing sites of the Pataz-Abiseo area within a broader context of local demographic development. The abundance in the highlands of small sites related to transport and communication infrastructure along the road networks supports the argument that a dynamic flow of travelers and intense interregional interaction spurred processes of population nucleation and the construction of permanent settlements within the forest. Contacts maintained with such a diversity of regions would have driven local innovations culminating in unique aesthetic achievements such as Gran Pajaten and other monumental sites in the montane forests of the Rio Abiseo National Park, designated World Cultural Heritage by UNESCO in 1991.

The Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality in the European Parliament: Taking Advantage of Institutional Power Play

The European Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM Committee) is a core actor within the European Union's gender equality policy machinery. Its capacity to act, though, is shaped by the institutional setting within the European Parliament (EP). Using a qualitative approach, this article shows how this particular committee exploits parliamentary rules and routines to maximise its influence. Existing scholarship has suggested that the voluntary nature of its membership implies a weak position within the EP. However, there is evidence to support a contrary interpretation that its voluntary membership assures institutional persistence, thematic inclusion, organisational attention and networked integration.

The pragmatics of morphological negation: pejorative and euphemistic uses of the prefix non- in French

In this paper I examine a particular type of morphological negation in French, namely non- prefixation on nominal bases (e.g. non-violence ‘nonviolence’). Drawing on a wide range of authentic examples from the Trésor de la Langue Française informatisé (TLFi), the French literary database Frantext and the internet, I show that although the basic meaning of non- prefixation is negation, the nouns prefixed by non- (abbreviated as [non-N]N) may carry an additional nuance, which can be pejorative or euphemistic; hence the hypothesis defended in this paper that the prefix non- can also serve pragmatic purposes.
 After having briefly described the morphological and semantic variety of nominal lexemes which can be the input of non- prefixation, I show that [non-N]N can have three different readings, namely what I call the “complementary” interpretation (e.g. les Italiens et les non-Italiens aiment la cuisine italienne ‘Italians and non-Italians like Italian cuisine’), the “ontological” interpretation (e.g. Toute sa vie durant, Gandhi est demeuré convaincu du bien-fondé de la non-violence ‘For all his life, Gandhi was convinced of the legitimacy of nonviolence’), and the “contrary interpretation” (e.g. Les fleurs, je m’en fiche. Serais-je une non-femme? ‘Flowers, I don’t care! Could I be a nonwoman?). In the second section, I describe the pejorative and euphemistic uses of [non-N]N. The pejorative useshave been noticed by several authors (a.o. Gaatone 1971, 1987, Di Sciullo and Tremblay 1993, 1996 for French, Zimmer 1964, Algeo 1971, Bauer 1983, Horn 1989 for English); I show that these uses arise when the [non-N]N have a contrary interpretation and that they are quite frequent. I also emphasize the importance of the discourse context compared to the semantics of the base noun. Then I address the euphemistic uses of [non-N]N, which are linked to the ontological interpretation, and which are more constrained and thus less frequent; I note that these uses function almost as a politeness device. The fourth section provides an attempt to draw a parallel between certain uses of [non-N]N and the polemic and metalinguistic uses of sentential negation, as they have been described by Ducrot (1980, 1984) and Horn (1985, 1989).

The Military Commissions Act's Inconsistency with the Geneva Conventions: An Overview

The Military Commissions Act codifies a wide range of provisions that are inconsistent with binding international humanitarian law standards. In spite of the Act's title, these inconsistencies go well beyond the rules and procedures governing the trail of terrorist suspects before military commissions. In addition to violating fundamental fair trial guarantees defined in international humanitarian law, the Act misapplies the Geneva Conventions by adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach to the characterization of all counter-terrorist operations, provides for an overly broad definition of unlawful combatant status that effectively deprives terror suspects of applicable law of war protections, repudiates longstanding ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ contained in common Article 3 and entrenches a detention regime that does not comport with the terms of the Geneva Conventions. These departures from international humanitarian law are reinforced by provisions of the Act that purport to insulate US government personnel and their agents from contrary interpretation and judicial scrutiny. The Act is thus best described as a series of breaches rather than developments of international humanitarian law, and as such, signals a stark departure from the US's historical commitment to the laws of war.

Nanosphere Embedding into Polymer Surfaces: A Viscoelastic Contact Mechanics Analysis

Teichroeb and Forrest [Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 016104 (2003)] image gold nanosphere embedment into a polystyrene surface and imply the existence of a liquid surface layer. We use a viscoelastic contact mechanics model of their results to give a contrary interpretation. The surface interactions between gold and polystyrene and the indentation depth determine the loads on the nanospheres. Using bulk properties, quantitative agreement between the model and the data is obtained, implying little or no depression in the glass temperature or existence of a liquid layer at the polystyrene surface.

Interpreting Mill's Qualitative Hedonism

Against Schmidt-Petri's claim, I argue that John Stuart Mill is committed to the view that one pleasure is higher in quality than another if and only if at least a majority of those people who are competently acquainted with both always prefer the one no matter how much of the other is offered. I support my reading with solid textual evidence; none such is provided by Schmidt-Petri in support of his contrary interpretation that qualitative superiority exists whenever the experienced prefer less of one pleasure to more of another. The decisive objection to this is its incompatibility with the hedonistic requirement that more pleasure ought to be preferred to less, a a requirement so fundamental that it would be uncharitable to suppose that Mill lost sight of it in his doctrine of higher pleasures.

Arbitration. Fifth Circuit Holds Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claims Arbitrable despite Contrary Agency Interpretation. Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002)

Arbitration. Fifth Circuit Holds Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claims Arbitrable despite Contrary Agency Interpretation. Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002)

Reviewing the History Wars

suppressing any contrary interpretation. He alleges that they were formed in the radicalism of the 1960s and accuses them of a deliberate politicisation of history. This school comprises prominent historians such as Henry Reynolds, Lyndall Ryan and the late Lloyd Robson, archaeologists such as John Mulvaney and Rhys Jones, local historians such as the late Brian Plomley and younger researchers such as Sharon Morgan. The ages of these scholars range over several decades; they vary widely in views and sympathies. The idea that they colluded in a political project is as absurd as his allegation that they victimise dissidents is offensive. He misreads those whom he castigates. Windschuttle repeatedly alleges that Reynolds and Ryan sought to depict the frontier as a place of indiscriminate white killing. Yet Reynolds was principally interested in the Aboriginal response to the newcomer, and consistently argued that it took a variety of forms, from co-operation and partnership to resistance and warfare. Ryan was concerned to relate the story of the dispossession and survival of Tasmanian Aboriginals, and frontier violence was only one part of her story. So far from them creating an 'orthodox school', other historians had long since challenged the emphasis on frontier violence and queried the idea of a frontier with Europeans on one side and Aboriginals on the other. The greater part of Windschuttle's book is given over to a minute examination of the massacres. He scrutinises the historians' treatment of these events, tracks their references back to the archives and compares their versions against the original source. This is by far the most damaging of his criticisms, as he finds some of the sources do not support what the historians reported while others do not even exist. He pays careful attention to chronology and topography, consistency and plausibility - when and where did the incident occur? who was there and can we trust their version of what happened? - to reduce the number of casualties. He imposes stringent standards of evidence - from reputable eyewitnesses and preferably corroborated - to rule out higher numbers. While Windschuttle applies these forensic techniques to prosecute historians, he also acts as the counsel for the defence for the colonial authorities. They were engaged in the peaceful settlement of a new colony, and encountered 'senseless violence' from its primitive inhabitants, yet they endeavoured to preserve the rule

An Ethical Dilemma

The Florida Dental Association’s Code of Ethics, like those of most states, notes that “dentists shall be obliged to report to the appropriate reviewing agencies instances of gross and/or continual faulty treatment or violation of the Florida Dental Practice Act by another dentist. If there is evidence of such treatment the patient should be informed.” 1 Florida Dental Association Code of Ethics Today’s FDA Sourcebook. 1997-98; 9: 192 Google Scholar The same paragraph contains what some commentators have considered to be a contradictory statement: “dentists shall be obliged to refrain from commenting disparagingly without justification about the services of other dentists.” 1 Florida Dental Association Code of Ethics Today’s FDA Sourcebook. 1997-98; 9: 192 Google Scholar The potential contradiction is that making a comment to a patient or agency concerning a colleague’s treatment of a patient may appear to fulfill an obligation to report; the contrary interpretation of such verbiage may, in reality, be a disparaging remark that could subject the reporting dentist to administrative and legal consequences. 2 Weinstein BD Dental Ethics. in: Lea & Febiger, Philadelphia1993: 105 Google Scholar How should dentists balance the ethical responsibilities to the public, the profession, and to colleagues, without improperly violating the code of ethics? Therein lies the dilemma.

Review of hydrodynamic separator-regulator efficiencies for practical application

Different approaches to assess hydrodynamic separator performance are presented. These approaches are applied to the same data, evaluated at both steady state and at unsteady state conditions. It is shown that the overflow and baseflow concentration of particles at steady state conditions is increasing with increasing hydraulic load under constant inflow concentration. The different qualitative approaches allow a very contrary interpretation. Their value increases, decreases or has a maximum over the varied flow conditions. Furthermore it is shown that none of the presented approaches can accurately describe hydrodynamic separator performance at unsteady state conditions. Finally a set of two approaches is presented which is able to describe the quantitative and qualitative performance of a hydrodynamic separator and also takes unsteady state conditions into account.

Review of hydrodynamic separator-regulator efficiencies for practical application

Different approaches to assess hydrodynamic separator performance are presented. These approaches are applied to the same data, evaluated at both steady state and at unsteady state conditions. It is shown that the overflow and baseflow concentration of particles at steady state conditions is increasing with increasing hydraulic load under constant inflow concentration. The different qualitative approaches allow a very contrary interpretation. Their value increases, decreases or has a maximum over the varied flow conditions. Furthermore it is shown that none of the presented approaches can accurately describe hydrodynamic separator performance at unsteady state conditions. Finally a set of two approaches is presented which is able to describe the quantitative and qualitative performance of a hydrodynamic separator and also takes unsteady state conditions into account.

Weber and Foucault: Social Theory for the Study of Organizations

Weber, credited with having founded organization theory, did so inadvertently, as the study of the ideal type of bureaucracy. A contrary interpretation suggests organization analysis would be a branch of cultural studies with the analysis of values at its core. The contemporary theorist who has come nearest to carrying out a Weberian project with respect to the analysis of organizations, without acknowledging that this was so, was Foucault. Foucault's imputed foundations for the analysis of organizations bring into effect two liberations from the Weberian legacy. The first liberation is from analysis of organizations principally as structure, the predominant interpretation of Weber in the literature. The second liberation is not to lapse into the obverse of the structuralist view, a perspective that seeks to interpret individuals through the practice of verstehende. Structural analysis has no truck with individuals and their subjectivity, unless these become privileged by being embedded in strategically powerful representations in the organization. By contrast, analyses that function principally at the level of interpreting the putative motives, intentions and other attributes of subjectivity that, supposedly, are recoverable from an interpretative understanding of the individuals that compose organizations, rarely grasps the means and forms whereby some subjective representations become strategically sovereign. While the former offers an overstructuralized account of organizations, the latter offers-one that is understructuralized. In the former, individuals are regarded as bearers of a structural rationality worked out by impersonal forces of size or efficiency, while in the latter individuals are conceived of as subjectivities abstracted from structure. More appropriately, analysis should focus on how it is possible that certain structures of subjectivity and modes of what passes for rationality get constituted. At the core of this analysis are a post-Foucauldian, post- interpretative and post-structuralist account of power. Central to this are the analytically paradoxical interconnections of values, power, rules and discretion. Certain forms of organization structure seek to fix these in specific fields of force through contractualizing and otherwise freezing specific relations of meaning. Structure, in this sense, does not concern the scalar and other properties of bureaucracy that Weber identified so much as the forms of organization design that creative and dominant imagination envisages and concretizes.

Representing Africa: Colonial Anthropology Revisited

There are suggestions in the recent literature that since professional anthropology grew enormously during the colonial period, anthropologists of the time implicitly advanced the interests of colonial production and hegemony. A careful examination of relevant sources results in a contrary interpretation. In the course of demonstrating the mythical existence of “colonial anthropology,” this paper also raises questions about the present anthropological engagement with “development” wherein anthropologists are explicitly advancing the aims and interests of capitalistic transformation.