Read back from the 1990s, the scenario of a Greater Serbian agenda based in Belgrade and using Yugoslavia as a means to that end continues to tempt Western scholarship. Serbian exceptionalism thereby doomed both Yugoslavias. This special issue of East Central Europe addresses connections between Belgrade, Serbia, and Yugoslavia promoting contradictions that belie this simple scenario. Focusing on the first Yugoslavia, these six articles by younger Belgrade historians critically examine a series of disjunctures between the capital city and the rest of Serbia as well as Yugoslavia that undercut the neglected pre-1914 promise of Belgrade’s Yugoslavism. First came the failure of the city’s political and intellectual elite the First World War was ending to persevere with that promise. Most could not separate themselves from a conservative rather than nationalist reliance on the Serbian-led ministries in Belgrade to deal with the problems of governing a new state that now included many non-Serbs. From Serbian political divisions and a growing parliamentary paralysis to the Belgrade ministries’ failure to support the Serb colonists in Kosovo, problems mounted. They opened the way for King Aleksandar’s dictatorship in 1929, with initial Serbian support. But as the royal regime imposed an integral Yugoslavism on what had been the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and punished disloyalty to the Crown in particular Serbs were punished as well as non-Serbs. Their locally organized associations were also placed under royal authority, whose ministries were however no more successful in uniform administration than their predecessors. At the same time, however, Belgrade’s growing connections to European popular culture skipped over the rest of the country, Serbia included, to establish a distinctive urban identity. After the Second World War, what was now a Western identity would grow and spread from Belgrade after the Tito-Stalin split, despite reservations and resistance from the Communist regime. This cultural connection now promoted the wider Yugoslav integration that was missing in the interwar period. It still failed, as amply demonstrated in Western and Serbian scholarship, to overcome the political contradictions that burdened both Yugoslavias.