The true US death toll in Iraq and Afghanistan recently reached the 6,000 threshold. But that is not what the media are reporting and as a result, the public remains generally unaware. At the end of July 2008, mainstream media reported that 4,673 service members have died in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Counting only military fatalities, however, understates the human cost of America's engagements in these regions by nearly a fourth. On the modern, outsourced battlefield, are sustaining injuries and fatalities in increasing numbers. Specifically, the losses chronicled in The Washington Post's ongoing Faces of the Fallen series (1) fail to recognize the little-known fact that, as of 30 June 2008, more than 1,350 civilian contractor personnel had died in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of US military and political operations. Another 29,000 have been injured; more than 8,300 seriously. (2) Yet contractor fatalities (and injuries) remain generally outside the public's consciousness. (3) Given the extent of the military's reliance upon in the combat zones, a combined number of fatalities that exceeds 6,000 is a more accurate tally of the fallen. Apprising the American public of the human cost associated with military operations is critically important. This is especially true as the United States prepares for a post-election transition; transparency will inform discussions regarding the extent to which Americans are willing to outsource in fulfillment of the government's mandate, at home and abroad. Why Count Contractors? The total number of casualties is important, because the public and Congress not only care deeply about these fatalities, they routinely rely on body count as a measure of success or failure. President George W. Bush's 31 July 2008 statement highlighted the perceived importance of fatalities and the potential for obfuscation. The President trumpeted that [v]iolence is down to its lowest level since the spring of 2004, apparently relying solely upon military casualties as the significant measure of the violence. (4) Meanwhile, neither the American public nor Congress fully grasp the extent of the military's reliance upon in the combat zones. In 2006 and 2007 the contractor death rate climbed dramatically in Iraq. At least 301 civilian died in 2006. During 2007, some 353 died in Iraq, compared with 901 US military personnel. In other words, in 2007, accounted for more than one in four deaths associated with ongoing operations. In the second quarter of 2008, at least 61 additional contractor employees died in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Government Accountability Office recently reported that contractor deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of 2008 were a minimum of 455. (5) This result should not be surprising. Today, the heavily outsourced US military cannot effectively function or sustain itself without an enormous contractor presence. Particularly in Iraq, the US government employs--directly and through subcontracts--more than military. Most experts agree that are at least 190,000, and as many as 196,000, contractor personnel in Iraq, compared to fewer than 170,000 military personnel. In Iraq and Afghanistan, provide a variety of support, including food, transportation, postal, sanitation, housing, and morale, welfare, and recreation services. They also gather intelligence, maintain weapons, train troops, and handle interrogations. The Comptroller General observed that there are more private security in Iraq today than the total number of [of any type] (about 9,200) that were deployed to support military operations in the 1991 Gulf War. (6) Military doctrine increasingly reflects the nearly unlimited scope of contractor integration. In describing contractors as a force-multiplier, Army Field Manual 3-100. …