Perceptual Content Research Articles

Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity

According to capacitism, to perceive is to employ personal-level, perceptual capacities. In a series of publications, Schellenberg (2016, 2018, 2019b, 2020) has argued that capacitism offers unified analyses of perceptual particularity, perceptual content, perceptual consciousness, perceptual evidence, and perceptual knowledge. “Capacities first” (2020: 715); appealing accounts of an impressive array of perceptual and epistemological phenomena will follow.We argue that, given the Schellenbergian way of individuating perceptual capacities which underpins the above analyses, perceiving an object does not require employing a perceptual capacity which picks it out. Although each eye, used on its own, can suffice for perceiving objects in one’s environment, binocular vision allows one to see the same object(s) via both eyes, taking advantage of informational disparities registered by each eye. Yet in certain conditions it is possible to simultaneously see one object via the left eye and a distinct object via the right eye (at least when the inputs are sufficiently similar to prevent the onset of binocular rivalry). We argue that capacitism has trouble making sense of this. After surveying responses, we conclude that not all of the above phenomena can be unified under the capacitist framework. We then present a more nuanced, disjunctivist account of how capacities are individuated. While it may be illuminating to think of perceiving as the employment of perceptual capacities, this picture does not best favour a ‘common factor’ theory of perceptual content in the way existing presentations have envisaged.

Taking non‐conceptualism back to Dharmakīrti

AbstractSome recent surveys of the modern philosophical debate over the existence of non‐conceptual perceptual content have concluded that the distinction between conceptual and non‐conceptual representations is largely terminological. To remedy this terminological impasse, Robert Hanna and Monima Chadha claim that non‐conceptualists must defend an essentialist view of non‐conceptual content, according to which perceptual states have representational content whose structure and psychological function are necessarily distinct from that of conceptual states. Hanna and Chadha additionally suggest that non‐conceptualists should go “back to Kant” to find the most defensible version of an essentialist content non‐conceptualism. I propose instead that non‐conceptualists go back even further to the seventh‐century Indian Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, so that they may not only find historical precedent for an essentialist content view, but also some better arguments in its favor. This essay reconstructs Dharmakīrti's essentialist non‐conceptualism about the contents of conscious sensory representations and the refined theory of conceptualization that it presupposes. In particular, I examine his arguments from the proprietary phenomenology of sensory experience, the cognitive encapsulation of sensory processing, as well as the iconic format of sensory representations, and assess the strength of these arguments relative to their modern counterparts.

Backward and forward neck tilt affects perceptual bias when interpreting ambiguous figures

The relationships between posture and perception have already been investigated in several studies. However, it is still unclear how perceptual bias and experiential contexts of human perception affect observers’ perception when posture is changed. In this study, we hypothesized that a change in the perceptual probability caused by perceptual bias also depends on posture. In order to verify this hypothesis, we used the Necker cube with two types of appearance, from above and below, although the input is constant, and investigated the change of the probability of perceptual content. Specifically, we asked observers their perception of the appearance of the Necker cube placed at any of the five angles in the space of virtual reality. There were two patterns of neck movement, vertical and horizontal. During the experiment, pupil diameter, one of the cognitive indices, was also measured. Results showed that during the condition of looking down vertically, the probability of the viewing-from-above perception of the Necker cube was significantly greater than during the condition of looking up. Interestingly, the pupillary results were also consistent with the probability of the perception. These results indicate that perception was modulated by the posture of the neck and suggest that neck posture is incorporated into ecological constraints.

Efficient Prestimulus Network Integration of Fusiform Face Area Biases Face Perception during Binocular Rivalry.

Ongoing fluctuations in neural excitability and connectivity influence whether or not a stimulus is seen. Do they also influence which stimulus is seen? We recorded magnetoencephalography data while 21 human participants viewed face or house stimuli, either one at a time or under bistable conditions induced through binocular rivalry. Multivariate pattern analysis revealed common neural substrates for rivalrous versus nonrivalrous stimuli with an additional delay of ∼36 msec for the bistable stimulus, and poststimulus signals were source-localized to the fusiform face area. Before stimulus onset followed by a face versus house report, fusiform face area showed stronger connectivity to primary visual cortex and to the rest of the cortex in the alpha frequency range (8-13 Hz), but there were no differences in local oscillatory alpha power. The prestimulus connectivity metrics predicted the accuracy of poststimulus decoding and the delay associated with rivalry disambiguation suggesting that perceptual content is shaped by ongoing neural network states.

Decoding distributed oscillatory signals driven by memory and perception in the prefrontal cortex.

Sensory perception and memory recall generate different conscious experiences. Although externally and internally driven neural activities signifying the same perceptual content overlap in the sensory cortex, their distribution in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), an area implicated in both perception and memory, remains elusive. Here, we test whether the local spatial configurations and frequencies of neural oscillations driven by perception and memory recall overlap in the macaque PFC using high-density electrocorticography and multivariate pattern analysis. We find that dynamically changing oscillatory signals distributed across the PFC in the delta-, theta-, alpha-, and beta-band ranges carry significant, but mutually different, information predicting the same feature of memory-recalled internal targets and passively perceived external objects. These findings suggest that the frequency-specific distribution of oscillatory neural signals in the PFC serves cortical signatures responsible for distinguishing between different types of cognition driven by external perception and internal memory.

Capacitism and the transparency of evidence

Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account—“capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of evidential force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that our evidence be less than fully transparent to us.

Perceptual Content and the Unity of Perception

AbstractIn recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely, how to account for the unity among the relevant intellectual acts. Section 4 provides an answer to this problem of unity, while section 5 explicates the relation to Soames and Hanks. In section 6, I extend the model to a theory of the unity of experiential consciousness. Finally, in section 7, I apply the preceding considerations to debates about the nature of perceptual representation. The upshot will be that experiential unity is not simply a phenomenal feature of consciousness, but central to an account of the role perceptual representation plays in perceptual cognition.

Perceptual filling-in dispels the veridicality problem of conscious perception research

Conscious perceptual experiences are expected to correlate with content-specific brain activity. A veridicality problem arises when attempting to disentangle unconscious and conscious brain processes if conscious perceptual contents accurately match the physical nature of the stimulus. We argue that perceptual filling-in, a phenomenon whereby visual information inaccurately spreads across visual space, is a promising approach to circumvent the veridicality problem. Filling-in generates non-veridical although unambiguous percepts dissociated from stimulus input. In particular, the radial uniformity illusion induces a filling-in experience between a central disk and the surrounding periphery. We discuss how this illusion facilitates both the detection of neurophysiological responses and subjective phenomenological monitoring. We report behavioral effects from a large-sample (n = 200) psychophysics study and examine key stimulus parameters that drive the conscious filling-in experience. We propose that these data underpin future hypothesis-driven studies of filling-in to further delineate the neural mechanisms of conscious perception.

On Some Epistemological Advantages of the Notion of “Intervenient Aesthetic Field”

The reality of the aesthetic seems to manifest itself more and more in relational and immersive ways that defy analyses that follow the trail of the modern tradition of philosophy, based on the dual gnoseological relationship between subject and object. Even some areas of the new cognitive sciences seem to converge towards a conception of experience as a complex horizon in which variously related vectors operate. From this point of view, it is worth exploring the notion of “field” as a conceptual tool to describe the aesthetic. In this paper we will consider two possible uses of this notion in reference to the aesthetic: to describe experiential modes (following Arnold Berleant), and to describe social dynamics (following Pierre Bourdieu). Yet, the starting point will be some considerations provided by Peter Abbs. We will thus try to show how the notion of “aesthetic field” can be consonant with scientific settings that advocate models of mind that stress its being extended and situated. A particular test bed will be the psychology of art as a discipline spanning philosophical knowledge and empirical investigation. In this key will also be considered the so-called “experiential revolution” in psychology, which indicates an extra-cognitive horizon variously coinciding with the perspective of an aesthetic research focused on the conception of aisthesis as a system of practices of perception, emotion, and expression. According to this conception, the dynamics within the aesthetic field, such as those related to the nexus between perceptual contents and aesthetic properties, or between emotional content and the practices of sensing could prove to be dynamics of “intervenience,” rather than of supervenience.

Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism

According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between Rich and Sparse theorists is the so-called ‘method of phenomenal contrast’. I explore how this method of phenomenal contrast interacts with the sort of content-externalism made familiar by Putnam. I show that the possibility of Twin Earth style cases places important restrictions on the range of properties that the method of phenomenal contrast could plausibly apply to. Moreover, these restrictions would apply to some paradigmatically low-level properties as well as to some of the frequently advanced high-level properties. I also draw some general lessons about the different ways one might conceive of the relation between phenomenal character and representational content.

Negative affect impedes perceptual filling-in in the uniformity illusion

The notion of cognitive penetrability, i.e., whether perceptual contents can in principle be influenced by non-perceptual factors, has sparked a significant debate over methodological concerns and the correct interpretation of existing findings. In this study, we combined predictive processing models of visual perception and affective states to investigate influences of affective valence on perceptual filling-in in extrafoveal vision. We tested how experimentally induced affect would influence the probability of perceptual filling-in occurring in the uniformity illusion (N = 50). Negative affect led to reduced occurrence rates and increased onset times of visual uniformity. This effect was selectively observed in illusionary trials, requiring perceptual filling-in, and not in control trials, where uniformity was the veridical percept, ruling out biased motor responses or deliberate judgments as confounding variables. This suggests an influential role of affective status on subsequent perceptual processing, specifically on how much weight is ascribed to priors as opposed to sensory evidence.

Tourists’ perceptual presentation of national forest park——A case study of Wujin mountain national forest park

ABSTRACT Tourists’ perceptions are always presented in a certain way, and social media platforms play a role in this regard. Using Rost and Nvivo for frequency extraction and multiple encoding, we analysed social media comments about the Wujin Mountain National Forest Park. The results reveal five types of perceived tendencies: “complaint suggestion”, “emotion express”, “consulting description”, “travel experience description”, and “value judgment”; and three kinds of platform features, one being “consulting–travel experience”, the other two, namely “value judgment–positive value” and “self-expression–complaint”.There are three categories of perceptual content: tourism resources are the most, followed by experience evaluations and traffic information. Presentation in social media is the basic demand of tourists; the National Forest Park perception is still at the entertainment level and the ecology of forests has not been highlighted. Communitas is not only reflected in the activity, but also on media platforms, and ultimately shapes the overall image of the National Forest Park. We hope that this study can provide suggestions for innovative development of the National Forest Park.

Perceptual hashing method for video content authentication with maximized robustness

Perceptual video hashing represents video perceptual content by compact hash. The binary hash is sensitive to content distortion manipulations, but robust to perceptual content preserving operations. Currently, boundary between sensitivity and robustness is often ambiguous and it is decided by an empirically defined threshold. This may result in large false positive rates when received video is to be judged similar or dissimilar in some circumstances, e.g., video content authentication. In this paper, we propose a novel perceptual hashing method for video content authentication based on maximized robustness. The developed idea of maximized robustness means that robustness is maximized on condition that security requirement of hash is first met. We formulate the video hashing as a constrained optimization problem, in which coefficients of features offset and robustness are to be learned. Then we adopt a stochastic optimization method to solve the optimization. Experimental results show that the proposed hashing is quite suitable for video content authentication in terms of security and robustness.

Experiencing Mandates: Towards A Hybrid Account

ABSTRACT In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action-properties are presented—namely, those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment ‘demand’ that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a complex contents view, which builds all of the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content, is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue that EMs involve bodily potentiation, which is best understood in terms of felt action readiness. I then outline a hybrid account, which combines content-based features of EMs with action-readiness.

Expertise and becoming conscious of something

Becoming conscious refers to how new mental content emerges in the mind. To understand this phenomenon, we studied how people experience graffiti by thinking aloud. In protocols, we found three types of becoming conscious: experiencing emotional and perceptual content directly linked to a perceivable object, non-perceivable or apperceived information content, and transformation and restructuring processes. On the grounds of the content-based study of protocols, we suggest that people can become conscious of either direct perception, apperception, or restructuring thinking. Research of the mind, which is grounded in analysis and explained by properties of mental content, can be called content-based thinking or content-based psychology.

Capturing the objects of vision with neural networks.

Human visual perception carves a scene at its physical joints, decomposing the world into objects, which are selectively attended, tracked and predicted as we engage our surroundings. Object representations emancipate perception from the sensory input, enabling us to keep in mind that which is out of sight and to use perceptual content as a basis for action and symbolic cognition. Human behavioural studies have documented how object representations emerge through grouping, amodal completion, proto-objects and object files. By contrast, deep neural network models of visual object recognition remain largely tethered to sensory input, despite achieving human-level performance at labelling objects. Here, we review related work in both fields and examine how these fields can help each other. The cognitive literature provides a starting point for the development of new experimental tasks that reveal mechanisms of human object perception and serve as benchmarks driving the development of deep neural network models that will put the object into object recognition.

Multimodal

Multimodal

Nonconceptualism and content independence

Abstract: State Nonconceptualism is the view that perceptual states (not perceptual content) are different in kind from cognitive states (not cognitive content), insofar as a subject could be in perceptual states even if she lacked the concepts necessary to describe those states. Although this position has recently met serious criticism, this piece aims to argue on its behalf. A point I specifically want to highlight is that, thanks to State Nonconceptualism, it is possible to characterize perceptual experiences as nonconceptual or concept-independent without relying on the notion of perceptual content - a feature I term here the content independence of State Nonconceptualism. I think one should welcome this result: for, although a nonconceptualist characterization of perceptual experience is quite plausible, nonrepresentationalist approaches to perception have persuasively challenged the thought that perceptual experiences have representational content. This brief piece is divided into three parts: (i) I introduce two versions of Perceptual Nonconceptualism, namely, Content and State Nonconceptualism; (ii) I go on to stress State Nonconceptualism’s content independence; and (iii), I briefly address three prominent objections against the state nonconceptualist.

Seeing the forest for the trees: Scene perception and the admissible contents of perceptual Experience

Debates surrounding the high-level contents of perceptual experience focus on whether weperceive the high-level properties of visual objects, such as the property of being a pine tree. Thispaper considers instead whether we perceive the high-level properties of visual scenes, such asthe property of being a forest. Liberals about the contents of perceptual experience have offered avariety of phenomenal contrast cases designed to reveal how the high-level properties of objectsfigure in our visual experience. I offer a series of equivalent phenomenal contrast cases intendedto show how the high-level properties of visual scenes also figure in visual experience. Thisfirst-person evidence of high-level scene perception is combined with third-person evidence fromthe extensive empirical literature on scene categorisation. Critics of liberalism have attempted todeflate existing phenomenal contrast cases by explaining the contrasts in terms of non-perceptualcontents or in terms of attentional changes. I show that neither response is applicable to mycontrast cases and conclude that we do indeed perceptually experience the high-level propertiesof visual scenes.

Untying the knot: imagination, perception and their neural substrates

How tight is the conceptual connection between imagination and perception? A number of philosophers, from the early moderns to present-day predictive processing theorists, tie the knot as tightly as they can, claiming that states of the imagination, i.e. mental imagery, are a proper subset of perceptual experience. This paper labels such a view ‘perceptualism’ about the imagination and supplies new arguments against it. The arguments are based on high-level perceptual content and, distinctly, cognitive penetration. The paper also defuses a recent, influential argument for perceptualism based on the ‘discovery’ that visual perception and mental imagery share a significant neural substrate: circuitry in V1, the brain’s primary visual cortex. Current neuropsychology is shown to be equivocal at best on this matter. While experiments conducted on healthy, neurotypical subjects indicate substantial neural overlap, there is extensive clinical evidence of dissociations between imagery and perception in the brain, most notably in the case of aphantasia.