Abstract
Abstract: State Nonconceptualism is the view that perceptual states (not perceptual content) are different in kind from cognitive states (not cognitive content), insofar as a subject could be in perceptual states even if she lacked the concepts necessary to describe those states. Although this position has recently met serious criticism, this piece aims to argue on its behalf. A point I specifically want to highlight is that, thanks to State Nonconceptualism, it is possible to characterize perceptual experiences as nonconceptual or concept-independent without relying on the notion of perceptual content - a feature I term here the content independence of State Nonconceptualism. I think one should welcome this result: for, although a nonconceptualist characterization of perceptual experience is quite plausible, nonrepresentationalist approaches to perception have persuasively challenged the thought that perceptual experiences have representational content. This brief piece is divided into three parts: (i) I introduce two versions of Perceptual Nonconceptualism, namely, Content and State Nonconceptualism; (ii) I go on to stress State Nonconceptualism’s content independence; and (iii), I briefly address three prominent objections against the state nonconceptualist.
Highlights
Perceptual Nonconceptualism is often understood as the claim that perceptual experiences have contents different in kind from those of cognitive states, such as beliefs and judgements: in particular, perceptual content is nonconceptual
We should welcome this result: if Nonconceptualism is conceived as a claim about the conditions under which a subject could instantiate perceptual states–a minimal claim which is in principle wholly non-committal about perceptual content– discussions concerning that position and its main rival, Conceptualism, could be framed independently of the controversial question whether perceptual experiences have representational content
Perceptual Nonconceptualism builds on a fairly straightforward thought: unlike beliefs and judgements, the perceptual experiences that a subject could have at a time do not depend on what conceptual repertoire she has at that time
Summary
Perceptual Nonconceptualism is often understood as the claim that perceptual experiences have contents different in kind from those of cognitive states, such as beliefs and judgements: in particular, perceptual content is nonconceptual. It has recently been argued, that there is an alternative way of understanding the nonconceptualist stance: according to this view,. This proposal, increasingly known as State (as opposed to Content) Nonconceptualism, has been attacked by José Luis Bermúdez and Josefa Toribio, both being more sympathetic towards Content Nonconceptualism (BERMÚDEZ, 2007; TORIBIO, 2008; BERMÚDEZ AND CAHEN, 2015) In this brief piece, I aim to show that the relevant view is not as implausible as those writers depict it.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
