Contact Precautions Research Articles

Revisiting the personal protective equipment components of transmission-based precautions for the prevention of COVID-19 and other respiratory virus infections in healthcare.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted some potential limitations of transmission-based precautions. The distinction between transmission through large droplets vs aerosols, which have been fundamental concepts guiding infection control measures, has been questioned, leading to considerable variation in expert recommendations on transmission-based precautions for COVID-19. Furthermore, the application of elements of contact precautions, such as the use of gloves and gowns, is based on low-quality and inconclusive evidence and may have unintended consequences, such as increased incidence of healthcare-associated infections and spread of multidrug-resistant organisms. These observations indicate a need for high-quality studies to address the knowledge gaps and a need to revisit the theoretical background regarding various modes of transmission and the definitions of terms related to transmission. Further, we should examine the implications these definitions have on the following components of transmission-based precautions: (i) respiratory protection, (ii) use of gloves and gowns for the prevention of respiratory virus infections, (iii) aerosol-generating procedures and (iv) universal masking in healthcare settings as a control measure especially during seasonal epidemics. Such a review would ensure that transmission-based precautions are consistent and rationally based on available evidence, which would facilitate decision-making, guidance development and training, as well as their application in practice.

Impact of COVID-19 and lockdown on COPD admissions to Christchurch Hospital, New Zealand 2020-2021: a combined quantitative and qualitative study.

During the year following New Zealand's first COVID-19 lockdown, a 33% reduction in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)-related admissions occurred and persisted beyond this period at Christchurch Hospital. To identify contributing factors which may have resulted in a persistent decrease in COPD hospitalisation rates at Christchurch Hospital following the 2020 COVID-19 lockdown. Using an explanatory sequential mixed-methods research design, we (i) retrospectively analysed hospital admissions and primary healthcare access by people with COPD (n = 1358) in Canterbury before, during and after COVID lockdown (24 March 2019 to 2021) and (ii) undertook individual interviews from a sample of patients (n = 14). Patients who were not re-admitted following the COVID-19 lockdown had fewer general practice encounters, acute primary care access, antibiotic and prednisone prescriptions. Proportionally fewer Māori and more Pacific patients were admitted with COPD following lockdown. Positive contributing factors at a primary care level included improvements in primary care interactions and medication management. At a patient and community level, there were improvements in lifestyle, self-management practices, social support and contact precautions. However, a subgroup of patients described negative effects such as social isolation. A combination of patient, primary care and community-level factors led to an overall persistent decrease in COPD admissions following the COVID-19 lockdown. Future targeted and individualised measures focusing on these modifiable factors may decrease future COPD-related hospital admissions. The study design facilitated further explanation about factors that contributed to the persistent decrease in hospital admissions among people living with COPD and has underscored the importance of social support, patient empowerment and reduction in barriers in accessing care in admission reduction.

Containment of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales colonisations and infections: Results from an integrated infection control intervention in a large hospital trust of northern Italy

We describe the results of an infection control intervention, implemented in 4 tertiary hospitals in Romagna, Italy, aiming at containing the spread of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CRE). The intervention consisted of rectal screening in patients at risk for CRE; pre-emptive contact precaution waiting for screening results; timely notification of CRE identification and concomitant computerized alert; contact precaution for confirmed CRE-positive patients. We performed an interrupted time series analysis to compare the incidence of CRE bacteraemia, of other CRE infections, and CRE-positive rectal swabs in the pre and postintervention period (January 2015-July 2017 and August 2017-June 2020, respectively). 4,332 CRE isolates were collected. Klebsiella pneumoniae was the most represented pathogen (n=3,716, 85%); KPC production was the most common resistance mechanism (n=3,896, 90%). The incidence rate of CRE bacteraemia significantly decreased from 0.554 to 0.447 episodes per 10.000 patient days in the early postintervention period (P=.001). The incidence rate of other CRE infections significantly decreased from 2.09 to 1.49 isolations per 10.000 patient days in the early postintervention period (P=.021). The monthly number of rectal swabs doubled in the postintervention period and there was a significant reduction trend of CRE-positive swabs, sustained over time (P<.001). The infection control intervention was successful in containing the spread of CRE infections and colonisations.

A Review of Monkeypox: Present-day Scenario in India.

Monkeypox is an Orthopoxvirus whose outbreak has been noted in various parts of the world in 2022. A significant outbreak has not yet occurred in India and various other developing countries. With this review, our aim is to create awareness among the health-care personnel including paramedical staff regarding epidemiology and diagnostic and infrastructure challenges. The predominant manifestation of this illness is cutaneous; however, morbidity and mortality can occur due to multiorgan involvement which is often overlooked. We have touched upon the differential diagnosis, treatment, and prevention with immunization. Recommendations have also been made from our side with respect to training of nonmedical workers in case of an outbreak in making provisional diagnosis on field, workup, and monitoring of confirmed cases at residence and in a health-care setting. This could be of great benefit in making early diagnosis, taking contact precautions, appropriate referrals, and judicious use of resources.

Monkeypox Infection, what we need to Know About

Monkeypox virus is an orthopoxvirus which was isolated for the first time in the 1950s from a group of unwell monkeys. It is in the same genus as variola that causes smallpox and vaccinia viruses. Although they are famously suspicious, there’s no clear evidence that monkeys are the primary natural reservoir of the Monkeypox virus. However, humans and monkeys are considered to be incidental hosts. Monkeypox is usually acquired by humans through contact with animal fluid or bites, nevertheless, the human-to-human infection may occur through contact with infectious skin, exposure to large respiratory droplets and/or prolonged face-to-face contact within 6 feet for more than 3 hours without appropriate protections. Interestingly, the most recent outbreak that took place in May 2022 in non-endemic places has been linked to some sexual activities through an unknown mechanism. After the discontinuation of smallpox vaccination in 1979, monkeypox was endemic in Central and West Africa with sporadic cases reported in other non-endemic countries, mostly in returning travellers from endemic areas. In 2003, the United States of America reported an outbreak of monkeypox virus from infected prairie dogs who were in contact with imported animals from Africa. The incubation period of the monkeypox virus is 6 to 13 days with a range of 5 to 21 days. The most common presenting features of monkeypox are rash, fever, lymphadenopathy, chills, and myalgias. It is usually a mild disease that might be associated with nausea and vomiting, and Most of the infected persons recover without intervention. However, more serious cases might require hospitalization and supportive care. Laboratory confirmatory tests are essential to differentiate monkeypox from fever and rash diseases. These include (i) virus isolation in mammalian cell cultures, (ii) direct electron microscopy, (iii) real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and (iv) enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), and (v) immunofluorescent antibody assay. The public health authorities should be notified according to most states’ health regulations. Varicella, smallpox, herpes simplex infection, and other orthopoxvirus infections are the differential diagnosis for Monkeypox. Tecovirimat and brincidofovir are the approved antiviral treatment for smallpox in the United States as their activity against monkeypox are approved in animals and are expected to be effective in human infection. Cidofovir has in vitro effect against monkeypox with a particular effect against lethal monkeypox in animal models. Contact, droplet, and airborne standard precaution measures are essential for any hospitalized patient with a generalized unknown vesicular rash as monkeypox and smallpox are part of the differential diagnosis. Pre- and post-exposure smallpox vaccination prophylaxis are reasonable options for select circumstances with appropriate notifications of public health authorities. In this review, we will discuss briefly the virology, geographic distribution, diagnosis and management of monkeypox infection.

Impact of control measures including decolonization and hand hygiene for orthopaedic surgical site infection caused by MRSA at a Japanese tertiary-care hospital

Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is the most common pathogen in orthopaedic surgical site infections (SSIs). However, few studies have investigated the transmission process of orthopaedic MRSA SSI. To investigate the transmission process of orthopaedic MRSA SSI using epidemiological and molecular analyses and to determine a method to prevent MRSA SSI innosocomial orthopaedic surgery. Active MRSA surveillance, preoperative decolonization and contact precautions for MRSA-positive cases was performed at our institution. Changes in epidemic strains were evaluated and the possibility of transmission from patients in an orthopaedic ward of a Japanese tertiary-care hospital was assessed by genotyping stored MRSA strains. In addition, data on the prevalence of MRSA SSI, MRSA colonization, and use of an alcohol antiseptic agent (mL/patient-days) during 2005-2022 were retrospectively assessed. SCCmec type II strain in the SSI group decreased over time, associated with fewer outbreaks. Even during a period of high infection rates, no cases of transmission-induced SSI from nasal MRSA carriers were identified. The infection rate correlated negatively with the use of an alcohol antiseptic agent (r = -0.82; P < 0.0001). Two cases among five nasal carriers developed MRSA SSI caused by strains different from those related to nasal colonization. The infection control measures for transmission from the hospital reservoirs including strict adherence to hand hygiene and decolonization of carriers is likely to be important for the prevention of orthopaedic MRSA SSI. However, the need for contact precautions for decolonized nasal carriers might be low.

Transmission of Carbapenem-Resistant Enterobacterales in an Overcrowded Emergency Department: Controlling the Spread to the Hospital.

Overcrowded emergency departments (EDs) may increase the risk of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CRE) transmission. We conducted a quasi-experimental study divided into 2 phases (baseline and intervention) to investigate the impact of an intervention on the acquisition rate and identify risk factors for CRE colonization in an ED of a tertiary academic hospital in Brazil. In both phases, we did universal screening with rapid molecular test (blaKPC, blaNDM, blaOXA48, blaOXA23, and blaIMP) and culture. At baseline, both screening test results were not reported, and patients were put under contact precautions (CP) based on previous colonization or infection by multidrug-resistant organisms. During the intervention, all patients hospitalized in the ED were placed in empiric CP and the result of CRE screening was reported; if negative, patients were released from CP. Patients were rescreened if they stayed >7 days in the ED or were transferred to an intensive care unit. A total of 845 patients were included: 342 in baseline and 503 in intervention. Colonization at admission was 3.4% by culture and molecular test. Acquisition rates during ED stay dropped from 4.6% (11/241) to 1% (5/416) during intervention (P = .06). The aggregated antimicrobial use in the ED decreased from phase 1 to phase 2 (804 defined daily doses [DDD]/1000 patients to 394 DDD/1000 patients, respectively). Length of stay >2 days in the ED was a risk factor for CRE acquisition (adjusted odds ratio, 4.58 [95% confidence interval, 1.44-14.58]; P = .01). Early empiric CP and rapid identification of CRE-colonized patients reduce cross-transmission in ED. Nevertheless, staying >2 days in ED compromised efforts.

Efficacy of a continuously active disinfectant wipe on the environmental bioburden in the intensive care unit: A randomized controlled study.

To evaluate the efficacy of a new continuously active disinfectant (CAD) to decrease bioburden on high-touch environmental surfaces compared to a standard disinfectant in the intensive care unit. A single-blind randomized controlled trial with 1:1 allocation. Medical intensive care unit (MICU) at an urban tertiary-care hospital. Adult patients admitted to the MICU and on contact precautions. A new CAD wipe used for daily cleaning. Samples were collected from 5 high-touch environmental surfaces before cleaning and at 1, 4, and 24 hours after cleaning. The primary outcome was the mean bioburden 24 hours after cleaning. The secondary outcome was the detection of any epidemiologically important pathogen (EIP) 24 hours after cleaning. In total, 843 environmental samples were collected from 43 unique patient rooms. At 24 hours, the mean bioburden recovered from the patient rooms cleaned with the new CAD wipe (intervention) was 52 CFU/mL, and the mean bioburden was 92 CFU/mL in the rooms cleaned the standard disinfectant (control). After log transformation for multivariable analysis, the mean difference in bioburden between the intervention and control arm was -0.59 (95% CI, -1.45 to 0.27). The odds of EIP detection were 14% lower in the rooms cleaned with the CAD wipe (OR, 0.86; 95% CI, 0.31-2.32). The bacterial bioburden and odds of detection of EIPs were not statistically different in rooms cleaned with the CAD compared to the standard disinfectant after 24 hours. Although CAD technology appears promising in vitro, larger studies may be warranted to evaluate efficacy in clinical settings.

Infection control measures againstmultidrug-resistant Gram-negativebacteria in children and neonates.

The increase in infections caused by multidrug-resistant (MDR)Gram-negative bacteriain neonatal and pediatric intensive care units over recent years is alarming. MDR Klebsiella pneumoniae, Pseudomonasaeruginosaand Acinetobacter baumanniihave constituted the main causes of theMDRGram-negative bacteria problem. The implementation of infection control measuressuch as hand hygiene, cohorting of patients, contact precautions, active surveillance and environmental cleaning could diminish their spread. Recently, water safety has been identified as a major component of infection control policies. The aim of the current review is to highlight the effectiveness of these infection control measures in managing outbreaks caused by MDRGram-negative bacteriain neonatal and pediatric intensive care units and highlight future perspectives on the topic.

Active Surveillance and Contact Precautions for Preventing Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Healthcare-Associated Infections During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Statistically significant decreases in methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) occurred in Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals from 2007 to 2019 using a national policy of active surveillance (AS) for facility admissions and contact precautions for MRSA colonized (CPC) or infected (CPI) patients, but the impact of suspending these measures to free up laboratory resources for testing and conserve personal protective equipment for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) on MRSA HAI rates is not known. From July 2020 to June 2022 all 123 acute care VA hospitals nationwide were given the rolling option to suspend (or re-initiate) any combination of AS, CPC, or CPI each month, and MRSA HAIs in intensive care units (ICUs) and non-ICUs were tracked. There were 917 591 admissions, 5 225 174 patient-days, and 568 MRSA HAIs. The MRSA HAI rate/1000 patient-days in ICUs was 0.20 (95% confidence interval [CI], .15-.26) for facilities practicing "AS + CPC + CPI" compared to 0.65 (95% CI, .41-.98; P < .001) for those not practicing any of these strategies, and in non-ICUs was 0.07 (95% CI, .05-.08) and 0.12 (95% CI, .08-.19; P = .01) for the respective policies. Accounting for monthly COVID-19 facility admissions using a negative binomial regression model did not change the relationships between facility policy and MRSA HAI rates. There was no significant difference in monthly facility urinary catheter-associated infection rates, a non-equivalent dependent variable, in the policy categories in either ICUs or non-ICUs. Facility removal of MRSA prevention practices was associated with higher rates of MRSA HAIs in ICUs and non-ICUs.

Severe SARS-CoV-2 and respiratory syncytial virus co-infection in two children.

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) affects mainly older adults. Those with comorbidities are at a higher risk of severe disease and even death. The symptomatic infection rate of children is lower, manifestations are milder, and severe forms are scarce. We present here two children with severe COVID-19 and a respiratory syncytial virus, with the goal of emphasizing the possibility of coinfection with a severe course and a different result. The microbiological diagnosis was made using multiplex PCR. This assay not only provided an early and accurate diagnosis but also aided in the implementation of contact precautions. Further research should be done to determine the influence of coinfection on the clinical course and outcome of pediatric patients.

Risk factors for colonization with multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria and Clostridioides difficile in Long Term Care Facilities (LTCFs) residents: the evidence from 27 facilities in a high endemic setting.

Residency in LTCFs increases the likelihood of colonization with multidrug resistant Gram-negative bacteria (MDR-GNB). We assessed the prevalence and risk factors for enteric colonization by III-generation cephalosporins-resistant and carbapenem-resistant (CR) GNB in a large group of LTCFs in a high endemic setting. We also assessed the prevalence and risk factors for C. difficile colonization. A point prevalence survey with rectal screening (RS) was conducted in 27 LTCFs in north Italy. Epidemiological and clinical variables on the survey day, history of hospitalization and surgery within one year, and antibiotics within three months, were collected. The presence of III-generation cephalosporin resistant and CR GNB was assessed using a selective culture on chromogenic medium and PCR for carbapenemase detection. The presence of C. difficile was assessed using ELISA for GDH and RT-PCR to identify toxigenic strains. Multi-variable analyses were performed using two-level logistic regression models. In the study period 1947 RSs were performed. The prevalence of colonization by at least one GNB resistant to III-generation cephalosporin was 51% (E. coli 65%, K. pneumoniae 14% of isolates). The prevalence of colonization by CR GNB was 6%. 6% of all isolates (1150 strains) resulted in a carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae, and 3% in a carbapenem-resistant E. coli. KPC was the most frequent carbapenemase (73%) identified by PCR, followed by VIM (23%). The prevalence of colonization by C. difficile was 11.7%. The presence of a medical device (OR 2.67) and previous antibiotic use (OR 1.48) were significantly associated with III-generation cephalosporin resistant GNB colonization. The presence of a medical device (OR 2.67) and previous hospitalization (OR 1.80) were significantly associated with CR GNB. The presence of a medical device (OR 2.30) was significantly associated with C. difficile colonization. Main previously used antibiotic classes were fluoroquinolones (32% of previously treated subjects), III-generation cephalosporins (21%), and penicillins (19%). Antimicrobial stewardship in LTCFs is a critical issue, being previous antibiotic treatment a risk factor for colonization by MDR-GNB. The prevalence of colonization by III-generation cephalosporin and CR GNB among LTCF residents also underlines the importance to adhere to hand hygiene indications, infection prevention and control measures, and environmental hygiene protocols, more achievable than rigorous contact precautions in this type of social setting.

Healthcare worker perceptions surrounding Staphylococcus aureus transmission and prevention practices in the neonatal intensive care unit.

To understand healthcare worker (HCW) perceptions surrounding Staphylococcus aureus transmission and prevention in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). Qualitative case study with focus groups. A level IV, 150-bed NICU at a Midwestern academic medical center that conducts active surveillance and decolonization of S. aureus-positive patients. NICU HCWs, including bedside nurses, nurse managers, therapy services personnel, pediatric nurse practitioners, clinical fellows, and attending neonatologists. Semistructured focus group interviews, assembled by occupation, were conducted by 2 study team members. Interviews were video recorded and transcribed. Deductive coding and thematic analyses were performed using NVivo software. In total, 38 HCWs participated in 10 focus groups (1-12 participants each), lasting 40-90 minutes. Four main themes emerged: (1) Methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) and methicillin-susceptible S. aureus (MSSA) are inconsistently described as high risk. (2) Infection prevention interventions are burdensome. (3) Multiple sources of transmission are recognized. (4) opportunities exist to advance infection prevention. HCWs perceived MSSA to be less clinically relevant than MRSA. Participants expressed a desire to see published data supporting infection prevention interventions, including contact precautions, environmental cleaning, and patient decolonization. These practices were identified to be considerable burdens. HCWs perceived families to be the main source of S. aureus in the NICU, and they suggested opportunities for families to play a larger role in infection prevention. These data highlight opportunities for HCW and parental education, research, and reevaluating interventions aimed at improving infection prevention efforts to reduce the burden of S. aureus in NICU settings.

Use of contact precautions for multidrug-resistant organisms and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic: An Emerging Infections Network (EIN) survey

Background: The CDC recommends routine use of contact precautions for patients infected or colonized with multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs). There is variability in implementation of and adherence to this recommendation, which we hypothesized may have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Methods: In September 2022, we emailed an 8-question survey to Emerging Infections Network (EIN) physician members with infection prevention and hospital epidemiology responsibilities. The survey asked about the respondent’s primary hospital’s recommendations on transmission-based precautions, adjunctive measures to reduce MDRO transmission, and changes that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. We sent 2 reminder emails over a 1-month period. We used descriptive statistics to summarize the data and to compare results to a similar EIN survey (n = 336) administered in 2014 (Russell D, et al. doi:10.1017/ice.2015.246). Results: Of 708 EIN members, 283 (40%) responded to the survey, and 201 were involved in infection prevention. Most respondents were adult infectious diseases physicians (n = 228, 80%) with at least 15 years of experience (n = 174, 63%). Respondents were well distributed among community, academic, and nonuniversity teaching facilities (Table 1). Most respondents reported that their facility routinely used CP for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA, 66%) and vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE, 69%), compared to 93% and 92% respectively, in the 2014 survey. Nearly all (&gt;90%) reported using contact precautions for Candida auris, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CRE), and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter spp, but there was variability in the use of contact precautions for carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa and extended-spectrum β-lactamase–producing gram-negative organisms. In 2014, 81% reported that their hospital performed active surveillance testing for MRSA, and in 2022 this rate fell to 54% (Table 2). The duration of contact precautions varied by MDRO (Table 3). Compared to 2014, in 2022 facilities were less likely to use contact precautions indefinitely for MRSA (18% vs 6%) and VRE (31% vs 11%). Also, 180 facilities (90%) performed chlorhexidine bathing in at least some inpatients and 106 facilities (53%) used ultraviolet light or hydrogen peroxide vapor disinfection at discharge in some rooms. Furthermore, 89 facilities (44%) reported institutional changes to contact precautions policies after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic that remain in place. Conclusions: Use of contact precautions for patients with MDROs is heterogenous, and policies vary based on the organism. Although most hospitals still routinely use contact precautions for MRSA and VRE, this practice has declined substantially since 2014. Changes in contact-precaution policies may have been influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, and more specifically, contemporary public health guidance is needed to define who requires contact precautions and for what duration.Disclosures: None

Decolonization of hospital patients may aid efforts to reduce transmission of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales

Background: Multimodal approaches are often used to prevent transmission of antimicrobial-resistant pathogens among patients in healthcare settings; understanding the effect of individual interventions is challenging. We designed a model to compare the effectiveness of hand hygiene (HH) with or without decolonization in reducing patient colonization with carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CRE). Methods: We developed an agent-based model to represent transmission of CRE in an acute-care hospital comprising 3 general wards and 2 ICUs, each with 20 single-occupancy rooms, located in a community of 85,000 people. The model accounted for the movement of healthcare personnel (HCP), including their visits to patients. CRE dynamics were modeled using a susceptible–infectious–susceptible framework with transmission occurring via HCP–patient contacts. The mean time to clearance of CRE colonization without intervention was 387 days (Zimmerman et al, 2013). Our baseline included a facility-level HH compliance of 30%, with an assumed efficacy of 50%. Contact precautions were employed for patients with CRE-positive cultures with assumed adherence and efficacy of 80% and 50%, respectively. Intervention scenarios included decolonization of culture-positive CRE patients, with a mean time to decolonization of 3 days. We considered 2 hypothetical intervention scenarios: (A) decolonization of patients with the baseline HH compliance and (B) decolonization with a slightly improved HH compliance of 35%. The hospital-level CRE incidence rate was used to compare the results from these intervention scenarios. Results: CRE incidence rates were lower in intervention scenarios than the baseline scenario (Fig. 1). The baseline mean incidence rate was 29.1 per 10,000 patient days. For decolonization with the baseline HH, the mean incidence rate decreased to 14.5 per 10,000 patient days, which is a 50.2% decrease relative to the baseline incidence (Table 1). The decolonization scenario with a slightly improved HH compliance of 35% produced a relative reduction of 71.9% relative to the baseline incidence. Conclusions: Our analysis shows that decolonization, combined with modest improvement in HH compliance, could lead to large decreases in pathogen transmission. In turn, this model implies that efforts to identify and improve decolonization strategies for better patient safety in health care may be needed and are worth exploring.Disclosures: None

Measuring the efficacy of routine disinfection methods on frequently used physical therapy equipment

Background: Frequently used physical therapy (PT) equipment is notably difficult to disinfect due to equipment material and shape, however, the efficacy of standard disinfection of PT equipment is poorly understood. Methods: We completed a prospective observational microbiological analysis of fomites used in adult or pediatric PT at Duke University Health System, Durham, North Carolina, from September to December 2022. Predetermined study fomites were obtained after being used during a clinical shift and standard disinfection had been completed by clinical service staff. Fomites were split into 2 halves, left and right, for sampling. Samples were taken with premoistened cellulose sponges processed using the stomacher technique and were incubated on appropriate selective and general medias. We defined antimicrobial-resistant, clinically important pathogens (AMR-CIP) as MRSA, VRE, and MDR-gram-negative isolates, and non–AMR-CIP as MSSA, VSE, and gram-negative species. Study fomites were grouped as follows: (1) pediatric pig toy, (2) walking aids (walkers or canes), (3) balls (medicine, dodge, etc), and (4) other (foam roller, sliding board, etc). Results: In total, 47 patients, 61 fomites, and 122 were analyzed. Of the study patients, 24 (51%) were female, 13 (27%) had active infections, and 15 (32%) were on contact precautions. Because fomites were split in half, patients in the left and right study arms were identical. Overall, the median total colony-forming-units (CFU) of study fomites was 1,348 (IQR, 398–2,365): 468 (IQR, 161–1,230) for the left side study arm and 540 (IQR, 102–1,221) for the right study arm (P = .45). At the sample level, 52 (43%), 15 (12%), and 37 (30%) of 122 samples harbored any CIPs, AMR CIPs, or non-AMR CIPs, respectively. At the fomite level, 27 (44%), 5 (8%), 15(25%), and 7 (11%) of 61 fomites harbored any CIPs, only AMR-CIPs, only non-AMR CIPs, or both AMR and non-AMR CIPs, respectively. Generally, therapy balls were the most contaminated study fomites (n = 2,237; IQR, 1,425–2,658), and walking aids were most frequently contaminated with any CIPs (n = 26, 72%), AMR CIPs (n = 8, 22%), and non-AMR CIPs (n = 15, 47%). Discussion: Following routine disinfection, frequently used PT equipment remained heavily contaminated and harbored AMR and non-AMR CIPs, supporting the notion that PT equipment is difficult to disinfect via standard disinfection. Additionally, left-, and right-side fomite divisions had similar pathogens, suggesting that this sampling model of intrapatient comparisons may be helpful for resolving case-mix issues in future studies. Future work should focus on PT-specific enhanced disinfection strategies to improve the disinfection of PT equipment.Financial support: This study was funded by PURioLABS.Disclosures: None

Impact of discontinuation of contact precautions on surveillance- and whole-genome sequencing-defined MRSA infections

Background: Current guidelines recommend contact precautions to prevent transmission of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in acute-care hospitals. Prior literature demonstrates that discontinuation of contact precautions for MRSA has not been associated with an increase in carriage rates including surveillance-defined healthcare-associated infection (HAI) while horizontal infection prevention strategies are implemented. Objective: To analyze the impact of discontinuation of contact precautions on the rate of MRSA infections, including surveillance-defined HAI and transmission events identified through whole-genome sequencing (WGS) surveillance. Methods: In this single tertiary-care center, retrospective, observational, quality improvement analysis, we measured 2 MRSA HAI outcomes before and after discontinuation of contact precautions (ie, gown and gloves no longer required for care of patients with prior or current MRSA infections or colonization, effective December 2, 2020). First, we conducted a time-series analysis using linear regression modelling of NHSN reported MRSA HAI rates (January 2019–November 2022). We also calculated the frequency of WGS-confirmed MRSA transmission events before in the discontinuation of contact precautions (January 2019–August 2019) and after the discontinuation of contact precautions (January 2022–November 2022) periods. Surveillance HAI events were determined using NHSN definitions; MRSA transmission events were defined as an isolate identified ≥3 days after hospitalization or within 30 days of a healthcare exposure, genetically related by ≤15 single-nucleotide polymorphisms compared to ≥1 previously sequenced MRSA isolate. Results: We identified 171 MRSA HAIs in the 23 months before discontinuation of contact precautions, corresponding to 4.24 HAI per 10,000 patient days, and 129 HAIs in the 24 months after discontinuation of contact precautions, corresponding to 3.01 HAI per 10,000 patient days (Fig.). We detected a nonsignificant change in the trend in HAI rate before and after discontinuation of contact precautions (P = .22) as well as a significant immediate decrease in the MRSA HAI rate (P &lt; 0 .001) at the time of discontinuation of contact precautions. In the WGS analysis 8 months before discontinuation of contact precautions, 11 MRSA transmission events were confirmed, comprising 4 clusters (0.75 per 10,000 patient days). In the WGS for the 11-month analysis period after discontinuation of contact precautions, there were 23 confirmed MRSA transmission events comprising 10 clusters (1.22 per 10,000 patient days; incidence rate ratio, 1.61; 95% CI, 0.75–3.66; P = .19). Conclusions: After discontinuation of contact precautions, there was no significant increase in MRSA HAI or transmission events. Further evaluation of the individual WGS transmission clusters will be helpful to determine whether discontinuation of contact precautions led to MRSA transmission in this facility in the period after discontinuation of contact precautions.Disclosure: None

Impact of respiratory syncytial virus in an open bay neonatal intensive care unit

Background: Respiratory syncytial virus, RSV, is a respiratory virus that causes cold-like symptoms in adults. In infants and young children, RSV can cause severe illnesses such as bronchiolitis or pneumonia. We describe a successful response to a laboratory-confirmed RSV outbreak in a 21-bed open-pod neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) at a level 2 trauma hospital. Methods: After 2 of the 3 initial neonates were diagnosed with hospital-onset RSV, an outbreak investigation began on November 16, 2022. Following the results, testing was expanded to all neonates in the NICU. The clinical case was defined as a hospitalized neonate with laboratory confirmation of RSV by RSV antigen screen or polymerase chain reaction (PCR) detection on the Biofire respiratory panel. Outbreak resolution was determined by utilizing a viral test for the remaining positive neonates after the 2-week incubation period from the last identified positive neonate. Results: On day 1 of the investigation, 6 of 18 neonates were identified as positive for RSV. The initial 12 negative neonates received a prophylactic dose of palivizumab. Due to the increase in positive neonates, enhanced infection prevention and control measures were immediately implemented. These measures included the immediate closure of the NICU for new transfers, placing all positive neonates in a single-bay cohort in the NICU, implementing contact and droplet precautions, minimizing shared staff, increasing environmental cleaning, and using dedicated equipment. With awareness of the increased community occurrence of RSV, additional measures were taken to monitor adherence to infection prevention and control measures by staff and visitors entering the NICU, including daily symptom screening. Visitation was restricted to block scheduling to monitor the number of individuals in the NICU. Once we obtained the complete conversion of the initial neonate cohort, the additional focus shifted to maintaining the enhanced precautions until all neonate laboratory tests were negative. The NICU was successfully reopened once the remaining 3 positive neonates received no growth on their viral culture. Conclusions: The quick and effective response from a multidisciplinary team allowed a successful intervention to mitigate the identified outbreak. This investigation highlights the importance of enhanced infection prevention and control practices during increased community spread. Future efforts focus on educating staff and visitors on appropriate measures to decrease transmission risks.Disclosures: None

Active surveillance and contact precautions for preventing MRSA healthcare-associated infections during the COVID-19 pandemic

Background: Statistically significant decreases in methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) occurred in Veterans Health Administration (VA) facilities from 2007 to 2019 using active surveillance for facility admissions and contact precautions for patients colonized (CPC) or infected (CPI) with MRSA, but the value of these interventions is controversial. Objective: To determine the impact of active surveillance, CPC, and CPI on prevention MRSA HAIs, we conducted a prospective cohort study between July 2020 and June 2022 in all 123 acute-care VA medical facilities. In April 2020, all facilities were given the option to suspend any combination of active surveillance, CPC, or CPI to free up laboratory resources for COVID-19 testing and conserve personal protective equipment. We measured MRSA HAIs (cases per 1,000 patient days) in intensive care units (ICUs) and non-ICUs by the infection control policy. Results: During the analysis period, there were 917,591 admissions, 5,225,174 patient days, and 568 MRSA HAIs. Only 20% of facilities continued all 3 MRSA infection control measures in July 2020, but this rate increased to 57% by June 2022. The MRSA HAI rate for all infection sites in non-ICUs was 0.07 (95% CI, 0.05–0.08) for facilities practicing active surveillance plus CPC plus CPI compared to 0.12 (95% CI, 0.08–0.19; P = .01) for those not practicing any of these strategies, and in ICUs the MRSA HAI rates were 0.20 (95% CI, 0.15–0.26) and 0.65 (95% CI, 0.41–0.98; P &lt; .001) for the respective policies. Similar differences were seen when the analyses were restricted to MRSA bloodstream HAIs. Accounting for monthly COVID-19 admissions to facilities over the analysis period using a negative binomial regression model did not change the relationships between facility policy and MRSA HAI rates in the ICUs or non-ICUs. There was no statistically significant difference in monthly facility urinary catheter-associated infection rates, a nonequivalent dependent variable, in the categories during the analysis period in either ICUs or non-ICUs. Conclusions: In Veterans Affairs medical centers, there were fewer MRSA HAIs when facilities practiced active surveillance and contact precautions for colonized or infected patients during the COVID-19 pandemic. The effect was greater in ICUs than non-ICUs.Disclosures: None

Oral and fecal polio vaccine excretion following bOPV vaccination among Israeli infants

IntroductionInactivated polio virus (IPV) vaccinations are a mainstay of immunization schedules in developed countries, while oral polio vaccine (OPV) is administered in developing countries and is the main vaccine in outbreaks. Due to circulating wild poliovirus (WPV1) detection in Israel (2013), oral bivalent polio vaccination (bOPV) was administered to IPV primed children and incorporated into the vaccination regimen. ObjectivesWe aimed to determine the extent and timeframe of fecal and salivary polio vaccine virus (Sabin strains) shedding following bOPV vaccination among IPV primed children. MethodsFecal samples were collected from a convenience sample of infants and toddlers attending 11 Israeli daycare centers. Salivary samples were collected from infants and toddlers following bOPV vaccination. Results398 fecal samples were collected from 251 children (ages: 6–32 months), 168 received bOPV vaccination 4–55 days prior to sample collection. Fecal excretion continued among 80 %, 50 %, and 20 %, 2, 3, and 7 weeks following vaccination. There were no significant differences in the rate and duration of positive samples among children immunized with 3 or 4 IPV doses. Boys were 2.3-fold more likely to excrete the virus (p = 0.006). Salivary shedding of Sabin strains occurred in 1/47 (2 %) and 1/49 (2 %) samples 4, and 6 days following vaccination respectively. ConclusionsFecal detection of Sabin strains among IPV-primed children continues for 7 weeks; additional doses of IPV do not augment intestinal immunity; limited salivary shedding occurs for up to a week. This data can enhance understanding of intestinal immunity achieved by different vaccination schedules and guide recommendations for contact precautions of children following bOPV vaccination.