The purpose of the publication is to investigate the problem of the evolution of the state industrial policy in the field of petrochemical development in the second half of the 1960s on the basis of declassified archival documents. It is proved that the country's leadership had all the data indicating both the significant role of petrochemistry in the economy of developed countries, the active growth of production volumes, and the significant lag of the Soviet Union in a number of areas. The data provided by Soviet diplomats and experts in this field accelerated the consideration of these issues in the Central Committee of the CPSU. The conclusion is formulated that measures were taken to overcome the backlog, but they proved insufficient and did not bring the expected results. Among the blocking factors are: the predominance of the interests of individual departments; planning miscalculations; lack of financing; low prices for oil and petroleum products, constraining the development and implementation of energy-saving technologies, economical power plants; wasteful consumption of raw materials, products of its processing; forcing the export of raw materials, including to the COMECON countries. It was often political motives that prevailed in this case, but not economic expediency.