Constructive Empiricism Research Articles

Should We Believe in Cells, or Just Remain Agnostic about Them? A Critical Analysis Through Bas van Fraassen’s Lenses.

For constructive empiricism, being observable or unobservable is defining for deciding about the empirical adequacy and epistemic value of theory components. The classification of microscopic images has been particularly debated. van Fraassen initially classified microscope images as unobservable and then as mere images, like rainbows. Afterwards, he claimed it is not irrational to maintain neutrality about their classification and left them in some kind of limbo between being images of something real or being mere images. Here, I provide an argument to classify microscopic images of cells as copy-qualified images. The argument is described in general terms to sustain that any unobservable entity that is derived from observable self-dividing entities and looks similar to the observable entity when detected under the microscope, corresponds to a copy-qualified image of something real. Because of the existence in nature of large observable cells that fulfil these properties, I conclude that microscopic images of cells are images of something real. This determines their empirical adequacy and epistemic value, making them hard-core and stable components of biological theories. The argument described provides a strategy to develop a more grained classification of what is observable and unobservable with the consequent implications for theory development.

Wilfrid Sellars and Constructive Empiricism

Wilfrid Sellars and Constructive Empiricism

Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency

AbstractThis paper connects veritistic teleological epistemology, VTE, with the epistemological dimension of the scientific realism debate. VTE sees our epistemic activities as a tradeoff between believing truths and avoiding error. I argue that van Fraassen’s epistemology is not suited to give a justification for a crucial presupposition of his Bad Lot objection to inference to the best explanation (IBE), the presupposition that believing that p is linked to p being more likely to be true. This makes him vulnerable to a counterargument, tailored after Musgrave’s defense of IBE, which would result in a stalemate between them about presuppositions of rationality. I will, however, show that switching to VTE can justify van Fraassen’s presupposition. This leads to a dismissal of common IBE arguments for realism as presented by Boyd and Musgrave, but I also argue that a more cautious version of realism can be rescued from the Bad Lot objection. Finally, I raise some worries about epistemic risk-attitude consistency for constructive empiricists and develop an alternative anti-realist position.1

Natural Historical Attitude: Objectivity Before Truth Book Review: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Derek Turner believes that a proper interpretation of Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude can help to reveal the nature of the difference between «historical» (geology, archeology, forensics) and «empirical» (physics, chemistry) sciences. From his point of view, the apparent asymmetry between these sciences is a consequence of different understanding of the possibilities to «manipulate» the objects of study and the role played by background theories. In our opinion, Turner’s concept is a good example of how profound and inviting the instrumentalistic concept of science could be. First, it is «reflexive» in the sense that it constrained other instrumentalist theories (B. Fraassen’s constructive empiricism deeply flawed). And secondly, it is «constructive» – the emphasis that «the strength of arguments for or against scientific realism can vary depending on the scientific context» quite unexpectedly leads to the fact that «ideographic / nomothetic division is not very helpful», and to the fact that «epistemic disadvantage, but the same epistemic status». Reflections on the book: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism and Bruno Latour’s Constructivism

André Kukla has argued that both Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and Bruno Latour’s constructivism should be regarded as anti-realist approaches. In order to support his own claim, Kukla brought forward three parallels between them, namely: i) the observable/unobservable distinction in Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism may be found in Bruno Latour’s constructivism, too; ii) the constructivist’s emphasis over the social construction of facts could be (although it was not) acknowledged by van Fraassen; iii) both constructive empiricism and constructivism are approaches about scientific practice. The aims of this paper are, firstly, to introduce and criticize the support gave by Kukla regarding his own conception and, secondly, to argue for that there is, instead, a stronger relationship between constructivism and realism than constructive empiricism and constructivism.

Some reflections on the semantic approach, tarskian truth and structuralism

In the present paper, we return to one of the main theses we already defended concerning the role of the tarskian truth notion within the semantic approach (CARNIER, 2022). As it was argued, this truth notion proves to be insufficient to be applied to scientific theories as they are conceived by this approach, i.e., as extralinguistic entities, because it is a property of sentences and because the tarskian truth of a sentence doesn't necessarily mean the world is as it describes, which results in the fact that other truth conceptions more appropriate need to be articulated within the several members of the semanticist family, in order to characterize the relationship between theory and phenomenon. Our argument in this regard was based in a case study applied to constructive empiricism and quasi-realism, but in this paper we extend our analysis to structuralism, assuming and endorsing the position according to which this proposal may be considered a member of the semantic approach.

О том, как когнитивная семантика Гегеля фундирует «IV правило экспериментальной философии» Ньютона и тем самым подрывает «конструктивный эмпиризм» ван Фраасена

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason developed an insightful, incisive semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference to particulars, which justifies important consequences for epistemology and philosophy of science; it holds altogether independently of transcendental idealism and remains cogent today. Disentangling this cognitive semantics from transcendental idealism is Hegel’s achievement. Here I demonstrate that this cognitive semantics directly and powerfully undergirds Newton’s methodological Rule IV, thus further supporting Newton’s causal realism regarding gravitational force. I first consider Newton’s Rule IV of experimental philosophy and its role in his justification of causal realism regarding gravitational force (§ 2). Then I summarise this cognitive semantics (§ 3) and show how it is embedded within Rule IV and thus strongly supports Newton’s rule (§ 4). This result exposes a crucial, previously unrecognised fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s core argument for his anti-realist “constructive empiricism”, a fallacy central to many common objections to causal realism, especially in the sciences (§ 5). This problem reveals a second inadequacy of constructive empiricism, in short, that it, so to speak, is itself “empirically inadequate”, insofar as it is not at all adequate to Newton’s classical mechanics (§ 6). This inadequacy highlights a chronic empiricist misunderstanding of Newtonian mechanics (§ 7). Furthermore, this cognitive semantics contributes to an improved “semantic interpretation” of scientific theories, in part because it undercuts the mistaken idea that physical laws literally “lie” (§ 8). In these regards, Newton, Kant and Hegel provide crucial insights for contemporary history and philosophy of science (§ 9).

Extended Cognition and Constructive Empiricism

According to constructive empiricists, accepting a scientific theory involves belief only that it is true of the observable world, where observability is defined in terms of what is detectable by the unaided senses. On this view, scientific instruments are machines that generate new observable data, but this data need not be interpreted as providing access to a realm of phenomena beyond what is revealed by the senses. A recent challenge to the constructive empiricist account of instruments appeals to the extended mind thesis, according to which cognitive processes are sometimes constituted not just by brain activity, but can extend into the rest of the body and the surrounding environment. If this is right, scientific instruments may, in the right circumstances, literally become part of our perceptual processes. In this article, I examine this extended perception argument, and I find that it fails for the vast majority of scientific instruments. Even if the extended mind thesis is accepted, the constructive empiricist can draw a line between observables and unobservables that makes very few concessions to the realist.

Neo-Pyrrhonism, Empiricism, and Scientific Activity

Pyrrhonism involves the inability to defend claims about the unobservable world, or, more generally, about what is really going on beyond the phenomena (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 1994). As a result, the Pyrrhonist is not engaged in developing a philosophical doctrine, at least in the sense of defending a view about the underlying features of reality. The issue then arises as to whether the Pyrrhonist also has something positive to say about our knowledge of the world, while still keeping Pyrrhonism. In this paper, I develop a positive neo-Pyrrhonist attitude, indicating that we can use this attitude to make sense of important aspects of science and empirical knowledge. To do that, I explore the connection between this revived form of Pyrrhonism and contemporary versions of empiricism, in particular constructive empiricism (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, 1989, 2002, 2008). Although constructive empiricism is not a form of skepticism, there are important elements in common between constructive empiricism and Pyrrhonism. The resulting form of Pyrrhonism suggests that there is something right about the original stance articulated by Sextus Empiricus, and that suitably formulated it provides an insightful approach to think about empirical knowledge (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2006, for the original inspiration behind neoPyrrhonism).

Agency, Causation, and Empiricism

AbstractPrice claims that the agency theory of causation could be understood as a sophisticated form of either realism or empiricism (but not a simple‐minded form of any of them). In this paper, I argue that the agency theory could find a more congenial ally in constructive empiricism (rather than realism) and show that this new alliance would be profitable to both constructive empiricism and the agency theory of causation.

Can constructive empiricists believe in exoplanets too?

Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between the observer, the image and the detected entity, while in the former it is - at least in principle. In this paper I argue that this is a weak argument to support the belief in the existence of exoplanets that, according to van Fraassen, comes with accepting a theory that posits these entities. If a constructive empiricist asserts the empirical adequacy of such a theory, she might be relying on typical realist arguments, instead - of the very same ilk as the ones used to defend the veridicality of microscopic images. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to explain his view on telescopes.

The Field of Relational Sociology

I offer a qualitative sketch and a brief empirical analysis of relational sociology as a scientific field. The field consists of scholarly communication that adheres to the label “relational sociology”, articulating and elaborating the idea that the social world is structured in relations. Within this general orientation, very different versions of relational sociology exist. These rest on diverging conceptions of the key term “social relations” and on different epistemological approaches (pragmatism, critical realism, constructive empiricism). These patterns are reconstructed by way of correspondence analyses of co-citation patterns of authors in the chapters of The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology. Contemporary self-proclaimed relational sociologists (Crossley, Dépelteau, Donati, Emirbayer) here co-feature with sociological classics rebranded under the label as key references in the field. The major division reflects a separation between authors working on the theoretical reflection of network research, on the one hand, and those focusing on the theoretical formulation of a social world made of relations, on the other hand. This second tendency then bifurcates into pragmatism-inspired authors and critical realists.

How to save van Fraassen’s own antirealism: a modest proposal

Bas van Fraassen’s antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism , notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow for a viable distinction between the observable and the unobservable. The aim of this work, however, is not to propose another characterization of observability that fits constructive empiricism, but to put forward a little amendment to van Fraassen’s own antirealism, to the effect that it can actually be seen as a coherent position, albeit controversial, since its present consistency might be called into question.

Formulational vs. Epistemological Debates Concerning Scientific Realism

ABSTRACTA formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are useful. By contrast, an epistemological debate is a debate over whether we have sufficient evidence for scientific realism and antirealism, defined in a certain manner. I argue that Hilary Putnam's definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are more useful than Bas van Fraassen's definitions of scientific realism and constructive empiricism because Putnam's definitions can generate both formulational and epistemological debates, whereas van Fraassen's can generate only formulational debates.

Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism

Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version

Astroparticle physics, a constructive empiricist account

Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic (2012), Brigitte Falkenburg defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that realist beliefs constitute an indispensable methodological principle of research in this discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image (1980). Problems and results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does, van Fraassen’s goal is not to demonstrate that his stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent or proven false by his opponents (see Kusch 2015, 172). In this paper it will be shown that the constructive empiricist stance constitutes a legitimate alternative to scientific realism even when it gets to astroparticle physics and that it does indeed make sense of this new discipline, pace Falkenburg.

Kusch and van Fraassen on Microscopic Experience

Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not “windows on an invisible world”, but rather “image generators”. Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen’s own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.

ADAPTIVE EMPIRICISM

This paper presents a sketch of a moderately anti-realist position in philosophy of science that is a modification of Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and that I call ‘adaptive empiricism’. This modification is motivated by the intuition that assessing what is or is not observable should be an important element of theory choice for an empiricist. (I use cases of underdetermination as examples.) Thus I argue that Van Fraassen’s distinction between what is observable and what is unobservable should be adapted to changing theoretical and experimental contexts. I close with some ideas as to how to develop this position more fully.

Constructive Methods in Economics

Constructive methods and constructivity have been under extensive discussion in the philosophy of science. In mathematics and experimental sciences, constructive methods have a long tradition. From experimental sciences, constructive methods broadened to empirical sciences, as constructive empiricism demonstrates. For the last few decades, scientists from social sciences have been discussing social constructionism, which is a new direction in this multidimensional tradition of constructive methods. In economics, mathematical methods such as game theory are generally used. The mathematisation of science can be done in the spirit of the pedagogic-scientific mode or technocratic-scientific mode, which both are present in economics. Mathematical and other constructive methods may allow us to find out scientific understanding for particular phenomena. However, there is a real danger that the whole of science becomes technocratic. The question is not about constructions, but the whole aim of science – whether it is pedagogical or not.

The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation

In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen in The scientific image, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own “positive argument” for CE by their own lights.