How to save van Fraassen’s own antirealism: a modest proposal

Alessio Gava

doi:10.51359/2357-9986.2018.241532

Abstract

Bas van Fraassen’s antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism , notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow for a viable distinction between the observable and the unobservable. The aim of this work, however, is not to propose another characterization of observability that fits constructive empiricism, but to put forward a little amendment to van Fraassen’s own antirealism, to the effect that it can actually be seen as a coherent position, albeit controversial, since its present consistency might be called into question.

Highlights

If one asks what the realism vs antirealism debate in the philosophy of science is about, a good answer comes from Anjan Chakravartty: “The essence of the controversy between realists and antirealists concerns the possibility of having knowledge of the unobservable” (CHAKRAVARTTY, 2007, p. xiii)
Still in 1982, Philip Hanson and Edwin Levy, authors of one of the first reviews of The Scientific Image, wondered why there should be a difference between accepting a theory about the moons of Jupiter - that van Fraassen considers observable, but that have never been observed directly - and one about bacteria - which belong to the class of the unobservable, since they can only be detected by means of a microscope
If the truth be told, van Fraassen has never clarified his position on telescopic detections, but it seems quite straightforward that to him microscopes and telescopes are not a par, since in the first case it is not possible to compare the instrumental output with the entity allegedly detected, while in the second it is, at least in principle again, were this not the case, what on earth would ‘a clear case of observation’ mean?

Summary

Introduction

If one asks what the realism vs antirealism debate in the philosophy of science is about, a good answer comes from Anjan Chakravartty: “The essence of the controversy between realists and antirealists concerns the possibility of having knowledge of the unobservable” (CHAKRAVARTTY, 2007, p. xiii).

Results

Conclusion