Neo-Pyrrhonism, Empiricism, and Scientific Activity

Otávio Bueno

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.42184

Abstract

Pyrrhonism involves the inability to defend claims about the unobservable world, or, more generally, about what is really going on beyond the phenomena (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 1994). As a result, the Pyrrhonist is not engaged in developing a philosophical doctrine, at least in the sense of defending a view about the underlying features of reality. The issue then arises as to whether the Pyrrhonist also has something positive to say about our knowledge of the world, while still keeping Pyrrhonism. In this paper, I develop a positive neo-Pyrrhonist attitude, indicating that we can use this attitude to make sense of important aspects of science and empirical knowledge. To do that, I explore the connection between this revived form of Pyrrhonism and contemporary versions of empiricism, in particular constructive empiricism (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, 1989, 2002, 2008). Although constructive empiricism is not a form of skepticism, there are important elements in common between constructive empiricism and Pyrrhonism. The resulting form of Pyrrhonism suggests that there is something right about the original stance articulated by Sextus Empiricus, and that suitably formulated it provides an insightful approach to think about empirical knowledge (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2006, for the original inspiration behind neoPyrrhonism).

Highlights

There are significant connections between skepticism and scientific practice
Some aspects of scientific reasoning and practice may not seem to be skeptical3⁄4in fact some may even seem to go against skepticism
I explore the connection between this revived form of Pyrrhonism and contemporary versions of empiricism, in particular constructive empiricism (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980 and 1989; see VAN FRAASSEN, 2002 and 2008)

Summary

Introduction

There are significant connections between skepticism and scientific practice. Some aspects of scientific reasoning and practice may not seem to be skeptical3⁄4in fact some may even seem to go against skepticism. The Pyrrhonist is not in the business of developing a philosophical doctrine, at least in the sense of defending a view about the ultimate features of reality This emerges from the Pyrrhonist’s strategy of investigation. Constructive empiricism is not a form of skepticism, there are important elements in common between constructive empiricism and Pyrrhonism; in particular, the emphasis on the observable aspects of the world, the idea that truth need not be a norm for (scientific) inquiry, and the use of underdetermination arguments to motivate agnosticism about the existence of unobservable entities. I will indicate significant differences between neo-Pyrrhonism and constructive empiricism This revived form of Pyrrhonism indicates that there was something right with the original stance articulated by Sextus Empiricus, and that, suitably formulated, it provides a novel way to examine empirical knowledge. If I intend to refer to some other form of skepticism, I will employ suitable qualifiers, such as ‘Cartesian skepticism’

The neo-pyrrhonian attitude

Neo-pyrrhonism and constructive empiricism

Pyrrhonism and scientific activity

Conclusion