The article evaluates the influence of the constitutional project of the Herrenchiemsee Convention (10–23 August 1948) on the final content of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany adopted on 23 May 1949. Based on retrospective, comparative historical and comparative legal methods of research, as well as analysis of the political alignment of Western Germany during the period of allied occupation (1945–1949), the significance of the Herrenchiemsee project for the discussions of the Parliamentary Council in Bonn (1 September 1948 – 8 May 1949) is determined. Comparison of the materials of the Convention (primary drafts, session reports, final report) with the final version of the Basic Law allows concluding that the Herrenchiemsee project has a fairly high degree of influence on the “Bonn Constitution”. The most debatable issues, which were framed in the draft as various alternatives to constitutional norms, retained their problematic nature in the Parliamentary Council. Despite the official refusal to consider the Herrenchiemsee project as a whole, the delegates of the Parliamentary Council often started from the materials of the Herrenchiemsee Convention or even reproduced (in meaning or verbatim) certain norms and basic principles of the state structure. The reasons for turning to the Herrenchiemsee materials are related to their worthwhile advantages compared to other constitutional projects, namely: (1) they were a positive experience of compromise between representatives of different German states and parties; (2) they were compiled by authoritative experts in the field of constitutional law, governance and finance; 3) they were generally approved by the allied military governments and had the support of the regional elite. For this reason, it was the formulations of the Herrenchiemsee project that often served as the basis for productive inter-factional negotiations in the Parliamentary Council. Significant deviations of the Basic Law from the Herrenchiemsee proposals were most often within the competence of the federal center, as well as within the mechanisms for guaranteeing federalism and democratic order. This was due, on the one hand, to significant disagreements between the factions of the Parliamentary Council themselves and the constant revision of reached compromises. On the other hand, the unconditional acceptance of the Herrenchiemsee project would have meant a confirmation of the high influence of the Minister Presidents the German states and the state bureaucracy, which the party leaders did not want to allow. Therefore, the delegates of the Parliamentary Council either settled on more centralist alternatives to the Herrenchiemsee developments or weakened the mechanisms of political influence of the lands.
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