This article critically examines the modalities through which the right to a healthy environment shapes environmental law and the environmental law-making function of the State. I argue that construing the right to a healthy environment through the prism of internormativity, embodiment and emergence can facilitate a conceptual leap that allows the right to be more attentive to people’s lived experiences of environmental injustice and harm. The conceptual leap I advocate for is in response to the fact that a constitutionalized right to a healthy environment potentially reproduces specific normative, ontological and discursive closures that have typically been associated with the prevailing positivistic view of the law. These closures work to disengage the right from the physical and factual dimensions of people’s experience of environmental injustices and harm. The main normative closures manifest as liberal positive law’s exclusion and devaluation of the normative potential of ordinary formal law and of productive forms of knowledge drawn from diverse philosophical-cultural traditions. Institutionalized human rights propagate liberal law’s erasure of embodiment, justifying the attendant piecemeal attention given to the full scope of human suffering. The treatment of constitutional human rights as an ultimate, stable framework for validating and legitimizing ordinary law forecloses the discursive practices that give meaning to human rights law beyond formal law-making processes and institutions. In light of these closures, construing the right through the three-pronged conceptual lens suggested here could, I contend, help focalize actual human experiences of environmental injustices and harm by harnessing the normative potential of formal and informal sources of values and norms, by centralizing embodiment as the actual ontological circumstance of the human beneficiary of the right and by giving voice to discursive strategies that imbue meaning to the right to a healthy environment beyond its formal rendition.