Constitutional History Research Articles

Austrian Constitutional History and the Argument about Invalidity of The Constitution of Japan

Austrian Constitutional History and the Argument about Invalidity of The Constitution of Japan

Who Should Be in Charge of Cyberspace? The European Union, Member States and the Constitution of Structural Power

Cyberspace has evolved as a domain of overlapping and essentially contested authorities. This paper seeks to explore the underlying power dynamics between supranational and national actors within the European Union. I argue that, historically, the persistent securitization of cyberspace has constituted structural power positions that privilege member states and grant them the responsibility of formulating policy responses to new challenges. An empirical analysis of more than 500 speech acts collected from public discourse in Germany and the United Kingdom from 1988 to 2017 shows, however, that securitization has not freed governments from normal politics. Calls for exceptional policies have been vague. The conceptual link between securitization and structural power thus allows for a differentiated view as to who should be in charge of cyberspace. These findings contribute to a better understanding of today’s cyberpolitics and the historical constitution of structural power within Europe.

On Using U.S. Diplomatic Records for Research on African Constitutions: A Guide to the Archives

A rich, but unexpected, source for research in African constitutional history is records of the U.S. Department of State at the National Archives. Because the State Department followed African constitutional politics, particularly as African nations moved toward independence in the 1950s and 60s, U.S. diplomatic records document African constitutional developments, and sometimes include local sources, such as competing constitutional proposals. Drawing upon her own research on constitutional politics in Kenya in the early 1960s, the author describes the sort of primary sources that might be found in U.S. diplomatic records. Because these sources are rarely used by legal scholars, this essay provides a practical guide to constitutional history research in U.S. diplomatic records.

The defence of the democratic constitution in extraordinary circumstances: the law of exception in comparative law and in spanish constitutional history

In this paper we examine the appropriateness and significance of the law of exception in the Spanish constitutional order. For this, we have examined the models of Comparative Law that Spain has followed to restore its disturbed constitutional order. Basically, historically, concern arose at the time of North American and French Revolutions of how to incorporate into the Constitution the institutions related to their protection. British singularity was also manifested in the way of understanding and including specific protection for the defence of the Constitution and the law of exception, with institutions such as martial law or habeas corpus. The suspension of habeas corpus as an extraordinary instrument of protection of the state organization was considered in the American Constitution of 1787, and is thought of as a precedent of Article 55.1 of the current Spanish Constitution of 1978. During the period between 1812 and 1869, the law of exception contemplated in Spanish Historical Constitutions covers only the suspension of guarantees. The republican Constitution of 1931 conserved the outline of the Constitution of 1869, with certain relevant alterations. The most significant normative instruments of this legislation were the Law of Defence of the Republic and the Law of Public Order of 1933. After the publication of this last Law, it became the extraordinary norm that has most deeply and habitually been put into practice, since Spain has experienced practically a permanent situation of "constitutional abnormality". This highlights the fact that a Law of Public Order for the defence of the constitutional regime established by the Second Republic could be transferred in many of its precepts, with very similar contents to the Francoist Law of Public Order that was able to remain in force until much later, being finally repealed by the Organic Law of LO 1/1992, of Protection of Citizen Safety.

Plea bargaining in South Africa : an economic perspective

This essay applies a simple economic model of the plea bargaining process to the two-tiered structure of negotiated pleas and sentences in South Africa. Bargaining in South Africa proceeds along one of two tracks. A formal procedure, authorized and regulated by s 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act, gives defendants represented by counsel access to precise information about the terms of the bargain before the plea is made and permits them to withdraw their pleas should the sentencing judge reject the agreement. In contrast, an older, informal procedure, governed by s 112, applies to defendants without counsel and grants them significantly less information and agency in the bargaining process than does the s 105A procedure. The model illuminates the central role of information and uncertainty in the defendant's decision to plead guilty or insist on a full trial, and suggests that if all plea bargains were governed by the formal procedures of s 105A, the system would more effectively represent the interests of both prosecutors and defendants by producing more bargains, and fewer trials, in cases where both sides want to avoid trials and consummate plea bargains. A final section considers the constitutionality of plea bargaining under ss 35 and 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. It reviews the constitutional history of plea bargaining in the United States to emphasise the differing perspectives on the constitutionality of plea bargaining demanded by significant variations in substance and interpretative style in the two constitutions. The essay concludes by briefly suggesting the arguments that might be made against the constitutionality of plea bargaining under s 35 and the corresponding limitations analysis that might be raised to justify the practice should it be found to violate s 35.

Sources, Recognition and the Unity of the Legal System

A critical analysis of Kelsen’s theory leads to a broad concept of custom, which covers diverse types of customary norms, where the always required conviction of legal bindingness depends on different types of factual and normative reasons. In it we should include a strict concept of custom or legal usage, derogating custom, custom of general international law, custom that establishes an unwritten constitution, custom that establishes a new written constitution, judicial custom which creates a rule of precedent and custom newly expressed in the judicial application of customary rules. The basic norm could be formulated as a constitutive norm: ‘If the norms created through the first historical constitution are effective, then the first historical constitution (and all the norms derived from it) are valid.’ It is thus a customary constitutive rule that recognizes the first historical constitution as valid law. Norms which establish sources of law are constitutive rules, they can be customary norms or legislated norms, but if they are legislated, they have their validity recognized by, directly or indirectly, a constitutive customary norm. By using a broad concept of custom as a conventional practice, Hart implies that general recognition of a customary rule, together with the practice that accompanies it, are sufficient conditions of validity. A doctrine of recognition that is arrived at by means of criticism and a rational reconstruction of the doctrines of Kelsen and Hart regains the essential theses of the traditional recognition theory of Bierling and Engisch.

La guerra de la independencia y la Constitución de Cádiz (1812). Peculiaridades e influencias

La promulgación de la Constitución de Cádiz representa un momento crucial en la historia del constitucionalismo, que tuvo sus inicios con las Revoluciones Atlánticas. Este artículo pretende rendir un tributo a la Constitución Española de 1812 —que dio origen al principio de soberanía nacional—, a través del análisis de su importancia para el constitucionalismo universal, especialmente el brasileño y el portugués. Dedica especial atención al contexto histórico que modeló aquél documento y al examen de algunos de los dispositivos que se destacan por su peculiaridad.

European Constitutional Imaginaries: Utopias, Ideologies and the Other

This paper outlines the conceptual background to a broader intellectual project that aims to study ‘European Constitutional Imaginaries’. These are understood as ideas that stand behind various conceptualisations of the EU constitution, produced by EU constitutional lawyers and theorists. The paper first explains the concept and identifies the gap in various approaches to the study of EU constitutionalism that come close to the one proposed here. It briefly discusses works by some constitutional lawyers, legal historians and legal sociologists that engaged with deeper structures of EU constitutional thought. Two particular are then made: the need to pay more attention to political economy behind constitutional theory and to the comparative dimension of how EU constitutional theory has been generated over time. In the concluding part the paper outlines the whole project.

1932-1945년 대한민국 임시의정원의 모습과 그 헌정사적 의의

본래 대한민국 임시정부는 1919년 상해에서 설립되어 활동하였다. 그러나 1932년부터 1940년까지는 상해를 떠나 중국 각지를 전전해야 했다. 이 시기는 국제 정세나 경제적 여건 등 여러 측면에서 임시정부에 어려운 시기였으며, 독립운동 세력이 분열된 가운데 임시정부의 활동이 매우 침체된 시기였다. 임시정부의 의회였던 대한민국 임시의정원도 운영이 쉽지 않았으나 상임위원회를 중심으로 임시정부의 명맥을 이어갈 수 있도록 뒷받침하였다. 상황이 호전되고 1940년 임시정부가 중경에 정착한 뒤, 우선 우파 독립운동 세력이 임시의정원에 참여하고 한국독립당으로 통합되었다. 이어 1942년에는 조선민족혁명당 등 좌파 독립운동 세력이 임시의 정원에 진출하기에 이르렀다. 이로써 임시의정원은 좌와 우를 아우르는 기관으로서의 지위를 갖게 되었다. 임시정부와 임시의정원이 실제로 국민을 얼마나 대표할 수 있었는가라는 사실적 한계는 지속적으로 제기되고 있지만, 좌우 합작운동이 임시의정원에서 상당 부분 결실을 맺었다. 이는 다시 좌우의 토론과 타협에 의한 대한민국 임시정부헌법 개정 과정으로써 다시 한번 그 헌정사적 의의를 드러내었다. 1932년부터 1945년에 이르는 시기 임시정부헌법문서 상으로 드러나는 임시의정원의 역할은 아주 크게 변화한 것은 아니다. 그러나 좌익 세력의 참여로 인해 사상을 달리하는 여러 독립운동 세력을 모으는 구심점으로서의 역할이 강화되었음을 알 수 있다.

‘Inequality of Goods and Lands’ in Mortgaged Democracies: Paradigms and Effects of Global Comparative Law

The article reappraises the law’s ‘egalitarian commitment’ in an era of global inequality. It upholds that such an egalitarian predicament scarcely squares with the reality. Firstly, international groups aim to control how wealth is distributed in society; secondly, the divide between the Global South and the Global North rises at a steady rate. Thirdly, the rule of law, which should spread good governance and development, conceals a policy of domination. Finally, global financial actors code their own interests through the law by seeking a connection with the public sphere in the field of public finance. The article argues that private interests have infiltrated the public sphere and contributed, globally and domestically, to the rise of ‘mortgaged democracies’. In so doing, it draws examples from English constitutional history and considers how the common-law mentality has facilitated their advent. It then explains how this has triggered a change in how societies perceive the political bond, which is now rooted in several acts of conveyance. Finally, the article provides us with a further paradigm for the organisation of communities. English law has been able to cope to the iniquitous effects of the mortgage by developing the conception of the equity of redemption. The redemption paradigm is probably able to challenge the role of economic interests within societies and therefore radically transform the idea that political obligations might be conveyed upon condition.

Circuitos locales en contextos globales de circulación. Una aproximación a las revistas científicas argentinas

Las revistas científicas se han consolidado como parte neurálgica de los regímenes de evaluación de la ciencia contemporánea. En este contexto, nos interesa aproximarnos a un espacio de circulación nacional concreto para advertir hasta qué punto la tan remanida globalización de la ciencia ha impactado en circuitos locales y regionales. En este artículo nos proponemos indagar la morfología del espacio argentino de revistas científicas, su constitución histórica y actual mapeo espacio-institucional. Para ello analizamos un universo de 1208 revistas científicas indexadas y no indexadas activas al año 2016/2017. Como resultado observamos la coexistencia de diferentes formas simultáneas y diversas de circulación de revistas. Particularmente analizamos dos tipos particulares de circuitos orientados localmente: 1) un circuito con una larga tradición de edición, orientado disciplinarmente por las ciencias exactas y naturales, editados mayoritariamente en papel y sin indexación; 2) y otro, con una tradición de edición desde mediados de 1990, que edita digitalmente y se desarrolla en el seno de grandes universidades nacionales. Proponemos una conceptualización guiada por la noción de capital social para comprender la subsistencia de estos circuitos locales en el marco de las culturas evaluativas nacionales y de la competencia científica internacional.

КОНСТИТУЦІОНАЛІЗМ XIX – ПОЧАТКУ XX СТ. У ВИКЛАДАННІ «ІСТОРІЇ ДЕРЖАВИ І ПРАВА УКРАЇНИ»

History of State and law of Ukraine can be considered as one of the leading academic disciplines to modern lawyers. Its purpose is to familiarize professionals with the historical experience of the development of statehood on the territory of modern Ukraine that directly or indirectly impacts the current status and the quality of the public authority in our country, the relationship between the State and citizens, the situation in Ukraine in the international arena, its image in the world, etc.The role of history of State and law of Ukraine here is mapping the processes of historical evolution of human relationships and the State of modern Ukrainian territory. This includes compliance with State rights, in particular political ones, struggle of people for their rights through both peaceful and violent way (through armed revolt against the authorities) etc. In this connection, we think that the evolution of public authority as a result of the struggle of people for their rights should be displayed in training courses and researches on history of State and law.The purpose of the article: coverage of the history of constitutionalism on the territory of modern Ukraine in XIX – early XX centuries.The task: disclosure of the relationship between the history of State and law and constitutional law of Ukraine through the analysis of the content of the constitutions for the then population of Ukrainian lands in various states.Findings from this research and prospects for further research in this field: 1. Teaching history of constitutionalism in the training course «History of State and law of Ukraine» must conform to the Constitution of Ukraine as the Main Law of the State and the benchmark for social activities. 2. Teaching History of constitutionalism in the training course «History of State and law of Ukraine» gives an opportunity to examine the historical evolution of the idea of limit and self-restriction of State power in favor of its citizens rights. This is not just about the rich historical tradition of constitutionalism on the territory of modern Ukraine, but about the ability of our ancestors to live in conditions of observing the rules of the law and maintenance of order in society and the State in civilized ways.3. The prospects of further scientific researches, to our opinion, are the following: a) research of history of constitutionalism is separate states on the territory of modern Ukraine; b) research of separate problems and periods of history of constitutionalism in Ukraine.

한국 민주공화정의 기원과 대한민국임시정부의 헌정사적 의미

한국 민주공화정의 기원과 대한민국임시정부의 헌정사적 의미

Constituição da Infância na Sociedade Ocidental

A Infância na História veio a constituir-se, como tema e objecto epistémico, desde inícios do período moderno, ainda que a História da Infância, como conhecimento e narrativa, seja mais recente. A constituição histórica da Infância inclui distintos modos de representar e de significar, assinalando tempos de convergência e tempos de divergência ou mesmo contradições e rupturas. Na religião, na civilidade, na arte, na literatura, na pedagogia, a Infância resulta de uma constelação, que congrega dimensões demográficas, económicas, afectivas, socioculturais. A Infância teve infâncias que se traduzem em novos espaços, novas manifestações de afectividade e de relação nos quadros público, privado e doméstico, e a que foram sendo destinados espaços, tempos e meios de ser ensinada e de aprender. A Infância emergiu e foi constituída como campo de ciência e de educação. De motivo e tema, a Infância e particularmente a criança tornaram-se objecto de investigação, cruzando diferentes domínios científicos, designadamente a psicologia, a medicina, a pediatria, a pedagogia e mais recentemente a sociologia e a história. A escola surgiu como lugar e tempo da infância. Desde o século XVIII que a historiografia regista aspectos estruturais de duração longa e conjunturas onde a evolução sofreu acelerações e rupturas. A Infância congrega e representa crianças, consignando homogeneidade e admitindo a diversidade e a especificidade. Assim, a escola surgiu como lugar e tempo da infância, mas não foi cumprida de modo uniforme.Neste artigo procurar-se-á problematizar, documentar e entender a Infância como conceito e como categoria epistémica, com um passado recente, mas nem por isso isento de controvérsia, denso, cumulativo, muito particularmente no Mundo Ocidental. Tomando como principal referência a Europa, dar-se-á particular atenção aos aspectos de natureza conceptual e à sistematização das principais linhas histórico-pedagógicas de constituição da Infância. No fundamental, o método utilizado é o historiográfico, combinando diacronia e sincronia e recorrendo a um exercício hermenêutico dos principais textos e teses sobre o tema. É, no entanto, uma abordagem aberta à interdisciplinaridade que procura abranger a constelação de vectores de natureza substantiva, teórica e metodológica, constitutivos da Infância na Sociedade Ocidental.

La construcción del derecho a la educación en México

El objetivo del texto es exponer la construcción del derecho a la educación en México en el marco de las transiciones del país y la formación del Estado constitucional. Se parte de una comprensión de la cultura y se distinguen cuatro transiciones en el país. Se analiza la historia constitucional y, en ella, los hitos significativos de la legislación secundaria. Se concluye que México se ha formado con fundamento en el proyecto de Estado democrático de derechos y que en las transiciones del país la educación ha sido un elemento clave del proyecto de nación; así mismo, se sostiene que la legislación educativa, al tiempo que muestra variantes en diversos momentos de reestructuración del proyecto nacional, en el presente recoge valores fundamentales de la herencia histórica y ofrece una perspectiva renovada de la tarea del Estado como garante del derecho a la educación.

Foundations of the Uncodified Historical Constitution of Hungary

The article examines the evolution of the Hungarian Public and Constitutional Law from 1301 until the Austro-Hungarian compromise in 1867. The topic is highly relevant, because the year 2017 marked the 330th anniversary of the 1st and 2nd Act of 1687, which state that the Habsburgs are the only and true heirs of the Hungarian throne; it also marked the 150th anniversary of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Furthermore the current Fundamental Law says that “We honour the achievements of our historical constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of the nation”. The main chain of thoughts of the article presents the crown-ideology and the Doctrine of the Holy Crown, the Rákos field resolution of 1505, the Acts 2 and 3 of 1687, the Pragmatic Sanction, Acts 10 and 12 of 1790, the public law aspects of the April Laws of 1848, and the laws on the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. The article presents the fundamental documents of the Hungarian uncodified historical Constitution issued within the given period. Through their formation and historical background we can truly understand the Hungarian customary law and the legal traditions, which are still honoured by our present Fundamental Law.

Five Generations of Russian Constitutions: Russia as Part of the Western Legal Heritage

The paper is devoted to the study of the relationship between the Russian constitutional history and Western legal traditions. The author argues the position according to which the constitutionalism has been a part of Russian legal history for centuries. On one view of Russian legal history, a written constitution remained an aspiration of the Russian people that was only partly realized in 1906. Marxist legal thought contemplated, or predicted, the “withering away of law” after a proletarian Revolution; adopting a constitution seemed counter-intuitive to this projected vector of history. This paper explores in general outline the five generations of the constitutions of Russia (1918, 1925, 1937, 1978, and 1993) and the maturing of a constitutional tradition in Russia which has led from a blueprint for communism to fully-fledged constitutional rule-of-law social State in which the constitution acts as a restraint upon the exercise of State power and performs the role that a constitution routinely performs as part of the western legal heritage. The author concludes the 1993 Russian Constitution is, for the first time, a living document that could be considered as a reaction against the Russian past, the embodiment of Russian experience, and the repository of Russian values and desires for its future.

The Janus-Faced Second Amendment: Looking Backward to the Renaissance, Forward to the Enlightenment

The Second Amendment has two clauses, the first stating the importance of a “well-regulated militia,” and the second guaranteeing the “right of the people to keep and bear arms.” The interplay between these was prominent in the seminal case of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and will return later this year in New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. New York, No. 18-280 (cert. granted, Jan. 22, 2019). The Heller dissent saw the militia clause as explaining the purpose of, and thus imposing a limitation on, the right to arms clause. That is, the right to arms exists only insofar as necessary to service in a well-regulated militia (a term it nowhere defined). The Heller majority saw the militia clause as a preface, explaining why the right to arms merited express constitutionalization. This article proposes third approach, which is better founded in the historical record. The militia clause and the right to arms clause are completely separate concepts. They have different origins, one looking back to the Renaissance, the other forward to the Enlightenment. In 1787-91 they largely had different constituencies: some Americans were concerned that the new Congress would neglect the militia, others that it might disarm the people. For most of this period, drafters of State declarations of rights, or of proposals for a Federal bill of rights, chose either to praise the militia as an institution, or to guarantee an individual right to arms, but never both. The exception came in the Virginia ratifying convention of 1788, the eleventh hour of constitutional history, when the convention realized they could do both in one amendment, and joined a militia clause to the right to arms clause. The practical significance of this is that the militia clause cannot be read to limit the right to arms clause. They were separate ideas from the start and at the end. Moreover, the historical record indicates that the right to arms clause was seen as, by far, the more important of the two. This article also explores the question of whether the modern National Guard is the well-regulated militia of the Constitution, and concludes that is not. The test of World War II led to a variety of statutory changes, culminating in 1933, that converted the Guard into a reserve Federal force. The Framers envisioned the militia as a State force that would serve as a counterpoise to the plenary Congressional power to raise armies; thus States were expressly guaranteed the right to select militia leaders and the train the force, and Congress was made unable to send it overseas. But Congressional action 1903-1933 used the Army clause to reorganize the Guard so that its officers were Federally approved, its training federalized, and it could be deployed overseas. It remains a reserve military force, but no counterpoise to Congressional exercise of the Army Clause.

Sri Lanka’s Quest for a Reformed Constitution: Lessons from a Lost Opportunity

Abstract The history of Sri Lanka is highly instructive of the dynamics of constitutional evolution in a post-colonial, multi-ethnic, and economically challenged Asian nation. Sri Lanka is one of the few ex-colonies where constitutional change has happened without military involvement. Citizens have changed their government 10 times by generally fair and free elections. In the first three decades after independence, the country’s judiciary enjoyed an enviable reputation for independence, integrity, and competence. The public service, though poorly rewarded and resourced, maintained a praiseworthy standard of administrative impartiality and competence. Sri Lanka had, and still has, one of the highest rates of literacy in the developing world and scores creditably on human development indicators. Despite these impressive achievements, the country has a chequered record of constitutional government since independence. It has been ruled for long periods under emergency rule, and the nation’s two republican constitutions have a poor record of maintaining constitutional democracy and basic rights and freedoms. The nation’s most recent efforts at constitutional reform, despite some notable successes, have stalled as a consequence of hyper-partisanship and opportunistic political strategizing. This article examines the post-independence constitutional history of the nation, prognosticates its prospects of constitutional revival, and draws important lessons from the failure of the current constitutional project.

¿Existió un tribunal constitucional en México?

Este artículo explica si existió o no un Tribunal Constitucional en México a partir de los órganos y las funciones de control de la constitucionalidad que tuvieron vigencia en el país; la investigación abarca a las seis Constituciones históricas, incluyendo a la original de 1917 y sus principales reformas constitucionales de 1988, 1995 y 2011.