Conspiracist Beliefs Research Articles

S113. THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SCHIZOTYPAL COMPONENTS AND CONSPIRACIST BELIEFS THROUGH COGNITIVE MEDIATORS

BackgroundBelief in conspiracy theories (i.e., a subset of false narratives in which the ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a malevolent plot by multiple actors working together) is a widespread and stable aspect of contemporary public opinion. Given such findings, researchers have sought to understand the factors that make someone more or less likely to adopt conspiracist beliefs. More specifically, scholars have focused primarily on social and differential aspects, as well as possible psychopathological elements. These endeavours have led to reports of significant associations between schizotypal facets (odd or magical thinking and, to a lesser extent, ideas of references) and the endorsement of conspiracist beliefs. However, one limitation of extant findings is the assumption that the afore-mentioned relationships are ultimately direct; that is, schizotypal facets are directly associated with conspiracist beliefs, rather than influenced by mediating processes. To overcome this limitation, the present study sought to replicate previous findings by confirming the relationships between components of schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs. Second, this study examined the mediating influence of cognitive processes on this relationship.MethodsAn international online sample of 411 women and men completed measures of schizotypal components (i.e., odd beliefs or magical thinking and ideas of reference), conspiracist beliefs, and cognitive processes (i.e., need for cognition, analytic thinking, and cognitive insight).ResultsThrough path analysis, results indicated associations between both schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs in the present sample. Further, there was evidence for the association between analytic thinking and conspiracist beliefs, and between cognitive insight and conspiracist beliefs. Indeed, cognitive insight was found to mediate the association between odd beliefs or magical thinking and ideas of reference with conspiracist beliefs. In addition, analytic thinking provided a mediating link to conspiracy ideation for odd beliefs or magical thinking, this was not found with ideas of reference. Despite an association between odd beliefs or magical thinking and need for cognition, this did not extend to conspiracist beliefs.DiscussionIn summary, the results of this study supported the association between schizotypal components and conspiracist beliefs. However, they also extend previous research by suggesting that cognitive processes mediate this link. That is, although a direct link between these variables may be tenable, it is also important to consider the possible ways in which schizotypy influences cognitive processes, which in turn have an effect on conspiracist beliefs. From a practical point-of-view, this highlights possible intervention routes for reducing conspiracist beliefs, either by targeting schizotypal traits indirectly or cognitive factors directly. While this research addresses schizotypy, patients with psychotic disorders and those with an at-risk mental state have also been shown to have reasoning biases. Therefore, future research, in relation to the clinical spectrum, should consider not only reasoning biases, but an outcome of conspiracy beliefs.

The relationship between schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs via cognitive processes

This study sought to replicate previous work showing relationships between components of schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs, and extend it by examining the mediating role of cognitive processes. An international online sample of 411 women and men (mean age = 35.41 years) completed measures of the schizotypal facets of Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of Reference, conspiracist beliefs, and cognitive processes related to need for cognition, analytic thinking, and cognitive insight. Path analysis confirmed the associations between both schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs in the present sample. Confirmatory evidence was found for the association between analytic thinking and conspiracist beliefs, and results also suggested an association between cognitive insight and conspiracist beliefs. Cognitive insight also mediated the link between Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and Ideas of Reference with conspiracist beliefs. However, analytic thinking provided a mediating link to conspiracy ideation for Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and not Ideas of Reference. Finally, there was an association between Odd Beliefs or Magical Thinking and need for cognition, but this path did not extend to conspiracist beliefs. These results suggest possible mediating roles for analytic thinking and self-certainty between schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs.

To Brexit or not to Brexit: The roles of Islamophobia, conspiracist beliefs, and integrated threat in voting intentions for the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum.

We used an identities approach to examine voting intentions in the June 2016 UK referendum on membership of the European Union (EU). In April 2016, 303 British adults (58.7% women, age M=34.73) indicated their voting intentions for the referendum and completed measures of identification with the national in-group, perceived threat from Muslim immigrants, belief in Islamophobic conspiracy narratives, Islamophobia, general conspiracist beliefs, ambiguity tolerance, and belief in a clash of civilizations. Path and mediation analyses indicated that greater belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories mediated the link between Islamophobia and intention to vote to leave. Islamophobia and Islamophobic conspiracist beliefs also mediated the effects of perceived threat from Muslims on voting intentions. Other variables acted as antecedents of perceived threat or Islamophobic conspiracy narratives. These findings highlight the role that identity-based cognitions may have played in shaping voting intentions for the UK EU referendum.

An examination of the factorial and convergent validity of four measures of conspiracist ideation, with recommendations for researchers

A number scales have been developed to measure conspiracist ideation, but little attention has been paid to the factorial validity of these scales. We reassessed the psychometric properties of four widely-used scales, namely the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), and the One-Item Conspiracy Measure (OICM). Eight-hundred-and-three U.S. adults completed all measures, along with measures of endorsement of 9/11 and anti-vaccination conspiracy theories. Through both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we found that only the BCTI had acceptable factorial validity. We failed to confirm the factor structures of the CMQ and the GBCS, suggesting these measures had poor factorial validity. Indices of convergent validity were acceptable for the BCTI, but weaker for the other measures. Based on these findings, we provide suggestions for the future refinement in the measurement of conspiracist ideation.

Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Validation of a French and English Single-Item Scale

We designed, in French and in English, a single-item scale to measure people’s general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. The validity and reliability of this scale was assessed in 3 studies (total N = 555). In Study 1 (N = 152), positive correlations between the single-item scale and 3 other conspiracy belief scales on a French student sample suggested good concurrent validity. In Study 2 (N = 292), we replicated these results on a larger and more heterogeneous Internet American sample. Moreover, the scale showed good predictive validity—responses predicted participants’ willingness to receive a bi-monthly newsletter about alleged conspiracy theories. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 111), we observed good test-retest reliability and demonstrated both convergent and discriminant validity of the single-item scale. Overall these results suggest that the single-item conspiracy belief scale has good validity and reliability and may be used to measure conspiracy belief in favor of lengthier existing scales. In addition, the validation of the single-item scale led us to develop and start validating French versions of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale, the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, and a 10-item version (instead of the 15-item original version) of the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory.

Does Self-Love or Self-Hate Predict Conspiracy Beliefs? Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories

Across three studies, we examined the role of self-evaluation in predicting conspiracy beliefs. Previous research linked the endorsement of conspiracy theories to low self-esteem. We propose that conspiracy theories should rather be appealing to individuals with exaggerated feelings of self-love, such as narcissists, due to their paranoid tendencies. In Study 1, general conspiracist beliefs were predicted by high individual narcissism but low self-esteem. Study 2 demonstrated that these effects were differentially mediated by paranoid thoughts, and independent of the effects of collective narcissism. Individual narcissism predicted generalized conspiracist beliefs, regardless of the conspiracy theories implicating in-group or out-group members, while collective narcissism predicted belief in out-group but not in-group conspiracies. Study 3 replicated the effects of individual narcissism and self-esteem on the endorsement of various specific conspiracy theories and demonstrated that the negative effect of self-esteem was largely accounted for by the general negativity toward humans associated with low self-esteem.

Intention seekers: conspiracist ideation and biased attributions of intentionality.

Conspiracist beliefs are widespread and potentially hazardous. A growing body of research suggests that cognitive biases may play a role in endorsement of conspiracy theories. The current research examines the novel hypothesis that individuals who are biased towards inferring intentional explanations for ambiguous actions are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories, which portray events as the exclusive product of intentional agency. Study 1 replicated a previously observed relationship between conspiracist ideation and individual differences in anthropomorphisation. Studies 2 and 3 report a relationship between conspiracism and inferences of intentionality for imagined ambiguous events. Additionally, Study 3 again found conspiracist ideation to be predicted by individual differences in anthropomorphism. Contrary to expectations, however, the relationship was not mediated by the intentionality bias. The findings are discussed in terms of a domain-general intentionality bias making conspiracy theories appear particularly plausible. Alternative explanations are suggested for the association between conspiracism and anthropomorphism.

Relationships between conspiracy mentality, hyperactive agency detection, and schizotypy: Supernatural forces at work?

We examined whether belief in conspiracy theories is predicted by an overactive tendency to perceive agency in the environment, and hypothesized that this association is especially robust among high-schizotypy individuals. Samples of undergraduates (n=209) and conspiracist website visitors (n=37) completed measures of conspiracy mentality, hyperactive agency detection, and schizotypy. Correlation analysis indicated significant positive relationships between all pairs of variables in both groups. Multiple regression analysis showed that schizotypy is incrementally predicted by conspiracy mentality and hyperactive agency detection, with chi-square analysis revealing a significant tendency for high-schizotypal individuals to score higher on both variables. Heightened uncertainty about causally ambiguous subjective experiences likely predisposes schizotypals to greater hyperactive agency detection, thereby increasing the probability of conspiracy thinking. Findings are linked to ideological and theoretical differences between secular and supernatural conspiracist beliefs, which are readily apparent in conspiracist literature and communities, and bring into question the homogeneity of the conspiracy mentality construct.

Bored to fears: Boredom proneness, paranoia, and conspiracy theories

The present study examines the relationships between paranoia, conspiracist ideation, and boredom proneness. A sample of the general public (N=150) completed the Paranoia scale, the Boredom Proneness scale, and the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. Bivariate correlations revealed significant interrelationships between the three traits. Further analysis revealed that the relationship between boredom proneness and conspiracist ideation was fully mediated by paranoia. That is, proneness to experiencing boredom is associated with stronger endorsement of conspiracy theories only in as much as boredom proneness is associated with increased paranoia.

Conspiracy theory and cognitive style: a worldview.

This paper assessed whether belief in conspiracy theories was associated with a particularly cognitive style (worldview). The sample comprised 223 volunteers recruited via convenience sampling and included undergraduates, postgraduates, university employees, and alumni. Respondents completed measures assessing a range of cognitive-perceptual factors (schizotypy, delusional ideation, and hallucination proneness) and conspiratorial beliefs (general attitudes toward conspiracist thinking and endorsement of individual conspiracies). Positive symptoms of schizotypy, particularly the cognitive-perceptual factor, correlated positively with conspiracist beliefs. The best predictor of belief in conspiracies was delusional ideation. Consistent with the notion of a coherent conspiratorial mindset, scores across conspiracy measures correlated strongly. Whilst findings supported the view that belief in conspiracies, within the sub-clinical population, was associated with a delusional thinking style, cognitive-perceptual factors in combination accounted for only 32% of the variance.

Poster #M85 VERBAL EPISODIC MEMORY IMPAIRMENT ALONG THE COURSE OF SCHIZOPHRENIA AND BIPOLAR DISORDER

The present study examines the relationships between paranoia, conspiracist ideation, and boredom proneness. A sample of the general public (N = 150) completed the Paranoia scale, the Boredom Proneness scale, and the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. Bivariate correlations revealed significant interrelationships between the three traits. Further analysis revealed that the relationship between boredom proneness and conspiracist ideation was fully mediated by paranoia. That is, proneness to experiencing boredom is associated with stronger endorsement of conspiracy theories only in as much as boredom proneness is associated with increased paranoia.

Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale

The psychology of conspiracy theory beliefs is not yet well understood, although research indicates that there are stable individual differences in conspiracist ideation – individuals’ general tendency to engage with conspiracy theories. Researchers have created several short self-report measures of conspiracist ideation. These measures largely consist of items referring to an assortment of prominent conspiracy theories regarding specific real-world events. However, these instruments have not been psychometrically validated, and this assessment approach suffers from practical and theoretical limitations. Therefore, we present the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale: a novel measure of individual differences in generic conspiracist ideation. The scale was developed and validated across four studies. In Study 1, exploratory factor analysis of a novel 75-item measure of non-event-based conspiracist beliefs identified five conspiracist facets. The 15-item GCB scale was developed to sample from each of these themes. Studies 2, 3, and 4 examined the structure and validity of the GCB, demonstrating internal reliability, content, criterion-related, convergent and discriminant validity, and good test-retest reliability. In sum, this research indicates that the GCB is a psychometrically sound and practically useful measure of conspiracist ideation, and the findings add to our theoretical understanding of conspiracist ideation as a monological belief system unpinned by a relatively small number of generic assumptions about the typicality of conspiratorial activity in the world.

Lunar Lies: The Impact of Informational Framing and Individual Differences in Shaping Conspiracist Beliefs About the Moon Landings

SummaryTwo studies examined the role of informational framing and individual differences on acceptance of the moon landings conspiracy theory (CT). In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups in which they were exposed to different forms of information about the moon landings CT. Results showed that information critical of the moon landings CT resulted in attenuated conspiracist beliefs and that information supportive of the CT resulted in stronger conspiracist beliefs. In addition, stronger belief in the moon landings CT was associated with participants' belief in other CTs and openness to experience. In Study 2, participants completed a survey measuring their belief in the moon landings CT and a range of individual difference factors. Results showed that acceptance of the moon landings CT was associated with the adoption of a conspiracist worldview and schizotypal tendencies. Possibilities for conceptualizing the functional roles played by CTs are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Unanswered questions: A preliminary investigation of personality and individual difference predictors of 9/11 conspiracist beliefs

AbstractGiven the widespread appeal of conspiratorial beliefs, it is surprising that very little empirical research has examined the psychological variables associated with such beliefs. In the present study, we examined individual and demographic predictors of beliefs in conspiracy theories concerning the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon among a representative British sample of 254 women and men. Results of structural equation modelling showed that 9/11 conspiracist beliefs were positively associated with belief in other conspiracy theories, exposure to 9/11 conspiracist ideas, political cynicism, defiance of authority and the Big Five personality factor of Agreeableness. In total, a model including demographics, personality and individual difference variables explained over 50% of the variance in 9/11 conspiracist ideas. The implications of these findings for the literature on conspiracy theories are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.