Consequentialist Theories Research Articles

10.1023/A:1005819731964

Retributivism is commonly taken as an alternative to a consequentialist justification of punishment. It has recently been suggested, however, that retributivism can be recast as a consequentialist theory. This suggestion is shown to be untenable. The temptation to advance it is traced to an “intrinsic good” claim prominent in retributive thinking. This claim is examined, and is argued to be of little help in coping with the difficulties besetting the retributive theory, as well as clashing with a “desert” claim equally central to that theory.

10.1023/A:1025988423748

Many recent attempts at justifying the institution of legal punishment have departed from traditional consequentialist accounts, and have taken the form of retributivist theories. Retributivist theories of punishment are “backwards-looking”, in that they attempt to justify punishment on the basis of events that occurred prior to the time of punishment; whereas consequentialist theories of punishment are “forward-looking” in that they try to justify punishment on the basis of events that are expected to occur as a result of the punishment.1 Retributive theories commonly appeal to the negative desert acquired by the offender as a result of his crime as a means of justifying legal punishment. But there are less prominent varieties of retributivism that appeal to such considerations as the rights that the offender has forfeited as a result of his crime, the unfairness of the offender’s crime, or the offender’s violation of the victim’s trust. The theory of justification based on this last sort of consideration – which one might call “trust-based retributivism” – has received little critical attention, and will be the main focus of this paper. The interest in defending the moral permissibility of punishment on the basis of trust violations seems to have stemmed from a series of papers on trust by Annette Baier.2 The earliest attempt to justify punishment on trust-based grounds was made by David

Consequentialism, rights, and the new social welfare theory

Traditional consequentialist social welfare theory [SWT] is intendedly value-free and institutionless. It follows that, while unattenuated exchange and property rights are assigned an implicit, instrumental role in the achievement of first-best Paretian optima, little attention has focused on alternative rights construals, on their associated, correlative duties, and on the implications for SWT. This is true, even among economists who regard “freedom” as morally exigent.This paper argues that the rights which social welfare theorists regard as instrumentally important—and, therefore, legally sanctioned—need not, in consequentialist theory, be respected: The duties which are correlative to social welfare theorists' implicitly sanctioned rights may, in consequentialist terms, be overcome by purely utilitarian considerations. It follows, pari passu, that reliance on a goal-based efficiency standard is irreconcilable with respect for the rights which most economists either take to be intrinsically important or seek to justify. Granting this, normative analysis must take account of the logical and other tensions among consequences, rights, duties, and other dimensions of moral evaluation.

Max Weber on Religion and Political Responsibility

In his two lectures on the vocations, Max Weber developed a ‘deep theory’ of responsibility focusing on: 1) a readiness to evaluate critically and repeatedly the foreseeableconsequencesof one’s actions; 2) a willingness toabandon or change one’s courseif one has reason to believe such action will result in consequences detrimental to other, more valuable ends or obligations; and 3) an ability tojustifyone’s final course of action to others. I criticize, among other things, Weber’s idea that the capacity of religion to inspire political responsibility can be measured in terms of its readiness to endorse the use of physical force. I am also critical of his ethical indeterminism and his belief that life- and value-spheres are impervious to rational mediation. Nevertheless, I conclude that his consequentialist theory of responsibility was a valuable contribution to our understanding of the relationship between values and political power.

The victim and the justification of punishment

Introduction The rise of the victims' rights movement is a signal that the justice system has missed something. In 1980 Wilham Clifford, Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology, stated: The victims of crime are, indeed, the forgotten tribe of our criminal justice system. It is quite remarkable that, for so long, the interests of victims (except as witnesses for the prosecution) have been given so little public attention.(1) More recently, though, the justice system has taken steps towards giving the victim a role. Victims may submit impact statements in some cases. Alternative sentences may incorporate restitution. Spurred, apparently, by the success of these practical initiatives, some contemporary philosophers have argued for reforms to the social institution of punishment which take account of victims' concerns.(2) What is striking about their arguments, however, is that they are advanced in the absence of adequate theoretical support. On the theoretical side, attempts to justify the social institution focus either on the wrongdoer or on the community as a whole. None of them deals adequately with the role of the victim. In this paper I argue that a justification for punishment should take account of victims' concerns as well as those of the wrongdoer and community.(3) In other words, the justification should deal with the social institution's plurality of aims. Specifically, I argue that one good reason for taking victims' concerns into account is rooted in the moral sentiments which arise in both the victim and the community in reaction to a crime.(4) In the course of that argument I sketch in broad strokes the type of justification I have in mind. I then illustrate the explanatory value of my approach to punishment by using it to evaluate certain reforms in sentencing advocated by proponents of restorative justice. The Inadequacy of Traditional Theories Let us begin by considering traditional theoretical approaches to justifying punishment with an eye to determining why there is little or no mention of victims' concerns. Retributive theories claim that punishment is justified because, and only because, the wrongdoer deserves it for having done wrong. These theories look back to the wrong action in order to explain why the person who performed it deserves punishment. They focus on the abstract need to balance the scales of justice by giving the wrongdoer what she deserves while, at the same time, respecting her dignity. They do not explain adequately the benefit of punishment for society, and they are silent on the relationship of the victim to the practice of punishment.(5) Consequentialist theories justify punishment on the basis of social benefit. They are classified as forwardlooking because they take the future benefit of society to be a necessary condition for punishment. Criticisms of consequentialist approaches center on worries that social utility will take precedence over wrongdoers' rights or even lead to the punishment of innocents. Another important criticism--one seldom mentioned by philosophers but increasingly discussed in social debate--is that the victim's concerns may be overridden by those of society. Mixed theories, of which H.L.A. Hart's is perhaps the best example, rightly attempt to incorporate a plurality of reasons for punishment.(6) According to Hart, the inadequacies of theories which attempt to justify punishment based on a single principle can be met by one that incorporates partly discrepant principles by separating the distinct questions involved in justifying the social institution. The key to Hart's proposal is the distinction he makes between retribution as a general justifying aim and retribution in distribution. Whereas taking retribution as a justifying aim would conflict with the aim of social benefit, retribution in distribution merely places a restriction on the unqualified pursuit of that aim. …

Consequentialism and Commitment

Abstract: It is sometimes claimed that a consequentialist theory such as utilitarianism has problems accommodating the importance of personal commitments to other people. However, by emphasizing the distinction between criteria of rightness and decision procedures, a consequentialist can allow for non‐consequentialist decision procedures, such as acting directly on the promptings of natural affection. Furthermore, such non‐consequentialist motivational structures can co‐exist happily with a commitment to consequentialism. It is possible to be a self‐reflective consequentialist who has genuine commitments to individuals and to moral principles, without engaging in self‐deception.

Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert

This paper criticizes the ‘justice-adjusted’ consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, is similarly flawed. Feldman's basic ideas could, however, be developed into a more plausible theory. I suggest one possible way of doing this.

Good and Bad Actions

It is usually assumed to be possible, and sometimes even desirable, for consequentialists to make judgments about both the rightness and the goodness of actions. Whether a particular action is right or wrong is one question addressed by a consequentialist theory such as utilitarianism. Whether the action is good or bad, and how good or bad it is, are two others. I will argue in this paper that consequentialism cannot provide a satisfactory account of the goodness of actions, on the most natural approach to the question. I will also argue that, strictly speaking, a consequentialist cannot judge one action to be better or worse than another action performed at a different time or by a different person. Even if such theories are thought to be primarily concerned with rightness, this would be surprising; but in the light of recent work challenging the place of rightness in consequentialism,' it seems particularly disturbing. If actions are neither right (or wrong) nor good (or bad), what moral judgments do apply to them? Doesn't the rejection of both rightness and goodness, as applied to actions, leave consequentialism unacceptably impoverished? On the contrary, I will argue that consequentialism is actually strengthened by the realization that actions can only be judged as better or worse than possible alternatives.

What Do We Learn from the Repugnant Conclusion?

In a series of articles on population theory, culminating in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit presented dilemmas for utilitarian and consequentialist moral theories.' Parfit's work has led to renewed interest in the theory of optimal population. More generally, Parfit is searching for a general theory of beneficence-Theory -that also will cover population comparisons. Theory X corresponds to Kenneth Arrow's notion of a social welfare function-both attempt to provide a generic formula or algorithm for ranking social outcomes on the basis of their characteristics. So far, normative population theory remains at an impasse. The proposed population standards imply implausible or counterintuitive moral conclusions at one point or another. Neither average utilitarianism, total utilitarianism, combinations of average and total principles, nor the consideration of nonutility values offers a clear path through the thicket of possible paradoxes. Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion is the most serious obstacle which normative population theories must face. The Repugnant Conclusion (explained in more detail below) postulates a society with a large amount of total utility obtained by having very many persons living at near-zero levels of utility. Most (although not all) consequentialist

Value and Agent-Relative Reasons

In recent years the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons has been taken by many to play a key role in distinguishing deontology from consequentialism. It is central to all universalist consequentialist theories that value is determined impersonally; the real value of any state of affairs does not depend on the point of view of the agent. No reference, therefore, to the agent or to his or her position in the world need enter into a consequentialist understanding of what makes an action right or wrong or morally permissible. Consequentialism thus provides an agent-neutral account of both the right and the good.

Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death.

Presenting a clear and engaging discussion of classic philosophical questions surrounding death, Feldman investigates in a cohesive and comprehensive manner the great metaphysical and moral problems of death. In the first part, Feldman argues that a definition of life is necessary before death can be defined. He maintains that death is a conceptual mystery - it cannot be defined as the cessation of life, or in any other similar way. After an exploration of several of the most plausible accounts of the nature of life and death and a demonstration of their failure, a conceptual scheme involving life, death, existence, personality, and related concepts emerges from Feldman's analysis. In the second part, Feldman turns to ethical and value-theoretical questions about death. Addressing the ancient Epicurean ethical problems about the evil of death, he argues that death can be a great evil for those who die, even if they do not exist after death, because it may deprive them of the goods they would have enjoyed had they continued to live. After formulating principles that purport to evaluate the badness (or goodness) of death, Feldman concludes with a novel consequentialist theory about the morality of killing, applying it to such thorny practical issues as abortion, suicide, and euthanasia. Written to be accessible to the non-specialist, Confrontations wth the Reaper presents a conceptual framework for answering practical as well as philosophical questions on the nature and value of death that have immediate relevance to virtually everyone. 'Lucid, sensible, and insightful throughout.' - Philosophical Review

SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM

AbstractThe article discusses Michael Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism, which is the view that moral agents are not required to maximise the good, but merely to produce a sufficient amount of good. It is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable alternative to Maximising Consequentialism. In particular, it is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism cannot be less demanding in practice than Maximising Consequentialism without also endorsing a wide range of clearly unacceptable actions. It is then argued that Slote's inability to provide adequate reasons for moral satisficing stems from a mistaken analogy between rationality and morals. The sense of ‘good enough’ which is relevant to morality is one which focusses on the effort an agent puts in, rather than on the outcome she produces. However, replacing outcomes with efforts would undermine Slote's Consequentialist project. Finally, it is suggested that similar problems will be faced by others who seek to construct essentially Consequentialist theories which are not unduly demanding.

Rationality, constitutions, and the ethics of rules

It seems clear that individuals stand to mutually benefit, in a wide variety of situations, from structuring their interactions in terms of constitutional practices. But a commitment to treat the rules defining such practices as setting real constraints on choice—a commitment to what could be characterized as an “ethics of rules”—is hard to reconcile with the standard, consequentialist theory of rational choice, which requires, in effect, that individuals regard any rule as providing no more than a “maxim” for choice. Such a theory of rational choice, then, constrains individuals to settle for a second best outcome in which choice is aligned with practice rules by means of strategies of precommitment and threats. The outcome is second best because such methods yield only partial alignment, and involve the expenditure of scarce resources, as well as a sacrifice of flexibility and freedom. To say this, however, is to identify the corresponding theory of rational choice as havingconsequentially unacceptable implications. A modified theory of choice is presented, which is still consequentially oriented, but which assesses consequences in a more holistic manner. It is then argued that this modified theory can provide a rational choice grounding for the needed “ethics of rules.”

Honoring and Promoting Values

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionHonoring and Promoting ValuesDavid McNaughton, and Piers RawlingDavid McNaughton Search for more articles by this author , and Piers Rawling Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 102, Number 4Jul., 1992 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/293451 Views: 36Total views on this site Citations: 29Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1992 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Motsamai Molefe Personhood and Moral Recognition in African Moral Thought, Eastern African Literary and Cultural Studies 8, no.33 (Jul 2021): 176–195.https://doi.org/10.1080/23277408.2021.1930940Nathan Robert Howard Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View, Ethics 132, no.44 (Jun 2022): 787–816.https://doi.org/10.1086/719517Motsamai Molefe African Ethics and Agent-Centred Duties, (Nov 2021): 107–124.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70436-0_8Thaddeus Metz How to Report on War in the Light of an African Ethic, (Nov 2021): 145–162.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70436-0_10Motsamai Molefe Theories of Dignity in African Philosophy, (Jan 2022): 17–46.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93217-6_2Jörg Löschke Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no.44 (Mar 2020): 477–491.https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.3Motsamai Molefe Personhood and a meaningful life in African philosophy, South African Journal of Philosophy 39, no.22 (Jul 2020): 194–207.https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2020.1774980Ján Kalajtzidis Ethics of Social Consequences as a Hybrid Form of Ethical Theory?, Philosophia 47, no.33 (Aug 2018): 705–722.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0013-7Jörg Löschke Responding Appropriately to the Impersonal Good, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22, no.33 (Jul 2019): 701–714.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10020-yMatthew Hammerton Distinguishing Agent-Relativity from Agent-Neutrality, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97, no.22 (May 2018): 239–250.https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1477166Motsamai Molefe An Exposition of Personhood as Moral Theory, (Apr 2019): 37–69.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2_3Motsamai Molefe Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality?, (Apr 2019): 71–92.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2_4Motsamai Molefe Personhood and Options in African Moral Thought, (Apr 2019): 93–116.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2_5Fiona Woollard Double effect, doing and allowing, and the relaxed nonconsequentialist, Philosophical Explorations 20, no.sup2sup2 (Oct 2017): 142–158.https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1356355Motsamai Molefe An African religious ethics and the Euthyphro problem, Acta Academica 49, no.11 (Jan 2017).https://doi.org/10.18820/24150479/aa49i1.2Matthew Hammerton Patient-Relativity in Morality, Ethics 127, no.11 (Sep 2016): 6–26.https://doi.org/10.1086/687330PR Ehrlich Human impact: the ethics of I=PAT, Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 14, no.11 (Oct 2014): 11–18.https://doi.org/10.3354/esep00151 Bibliographie, (Feb 2014): 243–255.https://doi.org/10.3917/puf.bill.2014.01.0243Tom Dougherty Agent-neutral deontology, Philosophical Studies 163, no.22 (Oct 2011): 527–537.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9829-8Sandeep Sreekumar An Analysis of Consequentialism and Deontology in the Normative Ethics of the Bhagavadgītā, Journal of Indian Philosophy 40, no.33 (Mar 2012): 277–315.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-012-9154-3Nicolas Tavaglione, Samia A. Hurst Why Physicians Ought to Lie for Their Patients, The American Journal of Bioethics 12, no.33 (Mar 2012): 4–12.https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2011.652797Timothy Chappell The Polymorphy of Practical Reason, (Jan 2004): 102–126.https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230524149_6Philip Pettit Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability, The Philosophical Quarterly 50, no.199199 (Apr 2000): 175–190.https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00178Jan C. 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The shape of the good: Christian reflections on the foundations of ethics

An introduction to ethical theory from a Christian perspective, The Shape of the Good examines the connection between moral theory, theology, and metaphysics, approaching standard ethical theories from the standpoint of Christian theology. A range of standard theories are discussed in the first four chapters: relativism, subjectivism, the divine command theory, ethical egoism, act and rule utilitarianism, Kant's view, contractarianism, and pluralistic deontological views. Chapters five and six develop a Christian teleological view of ethics and show its implications in a series of contemporary moral issues, such as world hunger, human rights, abortion and criminal punishment. In the final chapters, C.Stephen Layman proposes a specifically Christian consequentialist theory of ethics that should be of interest to professionals and non-specialists alike.

Virtue Ethics and Maori Ethics

There has been considerable recent interest among moral philosophers in the significance of the virtues for ethics and in the possibility of establishing virtue ethics as a normative theory distinct from deontological and consequentialist theories.' The main thesis of this essay is that traditional New Zealand Maori ethics is a virtue ethics. Our argument for this thesis is composed of three distinct, though frequently intertwined, strands. Descriptively we argue that a virtue ethics model is a fruitful one for understanding the nature of Maori ethics. Comparatively we argue that Maori ethics displays important similarities (and dissimilarities) when compared with other examples of virtue ethics, such as the Aristotelian tradition. Metaethically we argue that qua instance of a virtue ethic, Maori ethics implies certain conceptions of the self as moral agent, of the nature and forms of moral education, and of the appropriate patterns of sociopolitical organization.

Parfit's Moral Arithmetic and the Obligation to Obey the Law

Though consequentialist theories of political obligation have been widely criticized in recent years, a series of arguments presented by Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, are now believed to have given this position new life.

Is Hume A Moral Skeptic?

The question of whether Hume is a moral skeptic is difficult to answer, since there seems to be no generally accepted account of exactly what is.' Often the notion of skepticism is little more than an abusive label, and at other times it is taken to mean only that one denies knowledge of some fact which most people accept. To say that Hume is a moral skeptic in either of these senses would, of course, be uninteresting because similar charges could be brought against almost any moral theory. The question is whether he is a moral skeptic in a more interesting sense, and what this sense might be. This is the question I want to address here. I will approach this issue by seeing how Hume's moral theory compares to a contemporary standard of moral skepticism. Using J. L. Mackie's analysis of moral skepticism as a point of reference, I will argue that, as a normative theory, Hume's account of morality is not at all skeptical since he is offering a relatively optimistic consequentialist theory of right and wrong action. As a metaethical theory, however, I will argue that Hume is a weak metaethical skeptic insofar as he denies that morality is independent of the existence and character of human beings. He should not be considered a thorough or strong metaethical skeptic, though, since he advances a moral theory which is firmly grounded in human instinct.

When votes are words not deeds: Some evidence from the Nuclear Freeze Referendum

According to our empirical results, voting patterns in the NFR were consistent with the central thesis of an expressive model, that moral expression dominates consequentialist behavior when choice is costless. While consequentialist theory would predict that owners of capital would favor nuclear weapons, capital owners could afford to vote contrary to their interests, and in line with common morality, because the costs of moral expression in the NFR were so low. Just as the capital ownership variables do not work in the direction predicted by our consequentialist model, neither does income. Does this mean that wealthy voters cast votes diametrically opposed to their self-interest? Not at all. The expressive model contends that when voting is costless, people do not have interests, but, rather, moral judgments which now cost very little to express. Indeed, when votes involve words, not even individuals' interests in government expenditure can be detected.

Schefflerian ethics and corporate social responsibility

This paper examines some of the essential features of Samuel Scheffler's hybrid theory of ethics. Scheffler posits and defends a moral theory which is intended to be neither act-consequentialist nor fully agent-centered. Instead, it provides an agent-centered analysis of moral thinking: one that, unlike consequentialist theories, respects the personal integrity of the moral agent. In this paper I shall do the following: (1) Sketch some of the general points of Scheffler's proposal; (2) Apply Scheffler's ethical theory to the matter of corporate social responsibility; and (3) Raise some objections to this Schefflerian corporate social responsibility theory, along with some modifications of this hybrid theory of corporate social responsibility which are intended to evade such criticisms.