What Do We Learn from the Repugnant Conclusion?

Abstract

In a series of articles on population theory, culminating in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit presented dilemmas for utilitarian and consequentialist moral theories.' Parfit's work has led to renewed interest in the theory of optimal population. More generally, Parfit is searching for a general theory of beneficence-Theory -that also will cover population comparisons. Theory X corresponds to Kenneth Arrow's notion of a social welfare function-both attempt to provide a generic formula or algorithm for ranking social outcomes on the basis of their characteristics. So far, normative population theory remains at an impasse. The proposed population standards imply implausible or counterintuitive moral conclusions at one point or another. Neither average utilitarianism, total utilitarianism, combinations of average and total principles, nor the consideration of nonutility values offers a clear path through the thicket of possible paradoxes. Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion is the most serious obstacle which normative population theories must face. The Repugnant Conclusion (explained in more detail below) postulates a society with a large amount of total utility obtained by having very many persons living at near-zero levels of utility. Most (although not all) consequentialist