Congressional Preferences Research Articles

Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice: Reply to Muris

Our earlier paper (Weingast and Moran 1983) put forth the hypothesis that congressional oversight committees play powerful yet subtle roles in regulatory agency policy choice. We attempted to show, theoretically and empirically, that decisions made by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) responded to congressional preferences. In his critique, Muris (this issue) challenges this claim by attempting to check our predictions against new data. This type of endeavor is undoubtedly a necessary component of confirming a theory. We shall show, however, that his data are inappropriate to support his claim. We provide the relevant data and show that the data support our view.

Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party

Midterm congressional elections have been generally viewed as relatively sterile affairs marked by reduced turnout, party voting, and the play of politically idiosyncratic forces such as friends-and-neighbors voting. The usual reduction in the number of seats controlled by the President's party, according to the “surge and decline” thesis, simply reflects the departure of short-term forces which presumably benefited the president's party two years earlier. In this study an alternative thesis is proposed which considers midterm election outcomes within the context of the current political environment. Evaluations of the President's performance are found to be directly associated with congressional preferences over a series of midterm elections from 1946 through 1966. Moreover, controlling for party identification, persons who disapprove of the President's performance were generally more likely to vote and to cast their ballot against the President's party than were his admirers to support it. This “negative voting” bias helps to explain why the Democratic and Republican parties have performed more poorly in those midterm elections during which they occupy the White House.

Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party

Midterm congressional elections have been generally viewed as relatively sterile affairs marked by reduced turnout, party voting, and the play of politically idiosyncratic forces such as friends-and-neighbors voting. The usual reduction in the number of seats controlled by the President's party, according to the “surge and decline” thesis, simply reflects the departure of short-term forces which presumably benefited the president's party two years earlier. In this study an alternative thesis is proposed which considers midterm election outcomes within the context of the current political environment. Evaluations of the President's performance are found to be directly associated with congressional preferences over a series of midterm elections from 1946 through 1966. Moreover, controlling for party identification, persons who disapprove of the President's performance were generally more likely to vote and to cast their ballot against the President's party than were his admirers to support it. This “negative voting” bias helps to explain why the Democratic and Republican parties have performed more poorly in those midterm elections during which they occupy the White House.

Tariffs and the Distribution of Income: The Importance of Factor Specificity, Substitutability, and Intensity in the Short and Long Run

This paper analyzes the effects of changes in relative commodity prices on the distribution of income among factors of production in the context of two models of a simple, two-good economy. In the first model capital is treated as a specific factor in each industry, with labor mobile between industries. The assumption of specificity determines the direction of factor income changes, with magnitudes depending on substitutability between factors and on intensities of factor use within the two industries. In the second model, capital is viewed as a quasi-fixed factor. For the short run, this model is identical to the model first considered. For the long run, this model is identical to the Stolper-Samuelson model in which the direction and magnitude of factor income changes depend solely on relative factor intensities. The difference between the short-run and long-run determinants of changes in factor incomes gives rise to a conflict between factor owners' short-run and long-run interests.