Abstract
Our earlier paper (Weingast and Moran 1983) put forth the hypothesis that congressional oversight committees play powerful yet subtle roles in regulatory agency policy choice. We attempted to show, theoretically and empirically, that decisions made by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) responded to congressional preferences. In his critique, Muris (this issue) challenges this claim by attempting to check our predictions against new data. This type of endeavor is undoubtedly a necessary component of confirming a theory. We shall show, however, that his data are inappropriate to support his claim. We provide the relevant data and show that the data support our view.
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